he world has changed dramatically in the last few years. The Berlin Wall has come down, Germany has been reunited, and the Soviet Union has disintegrated. These events ended the Cold War and the atmosphere of continuing crisis that had shaped relations between East and West since the end of World War II. The world that emerged, however, has not been as peaceful as most Canadians had hoped. By the early 1990s, for example, war broke out in the Persian Gulf and in the remains of Yugoslavia. More than 2,000 Canadian soldiers took part in the 1991 Gulf War and at the end of 1994, 2,700 Canadian soldiers continued to serve as United Nations peacekeepers - a familiar, respected, but increasingly dangerous task.

While today's world situation may not threaten Canadians directly, as it did during the Cold War, neither is it more peaceful or stable. Meanwhile, the harsh economic reality of a $750 billion national debt means that Canada will cut its defence expenditures. Despite these reductions, Canada's armed forces must still strive to meet the widespread military commitments that history and geography have bestowed upon them. They continue to "stand on guard" for their country and its allies in North America and Europe. Under the banner of the United Nations, they also fulfil their peacekeeping duties in troubled regions around the world.

Reductions in military personnel and equipment will make it difficult to meet all these commitments. But the gap between political commitment and actual military capability is not unique to the post-Cold War era. It is deeply embedded in our military history, and is part of Canada's continuing defence dilemma.

anada was born of a sense of threat. By 1865, the United States had become a major military power, having survived a bloody civil war which left it with one of the strongest armies of the time. Wary British colonials in Canada feared this superior military force and sought a greater sense of security through Confederation in 1867.

But the fledgling Canadian nation made no serious attempt to arm itself against a possible American invasion. Canada maintained only a small, ill-equipped and ill-trained militia that did not become a professional fighting force until the eve of World War I.

There were, however, sound reasons for this: with a small population and a vast territory (9.2 million km sq.), Canada could never hope to defend itself against the United States with whom it shared a long and indefensible border. Rather than try to create a huge military force, Canada chose to rely on law and diplomacy to settle disputes with its neighbour to the south. Canada's leaders also reasoned that - given Canada's geography - only great powers could threaten this country, and only great powers could defend it. Canada, on this logic, could best defend itself through alliances with powerful protectors whose own military interests included the defence of Canada.

he first of these defenders was, of course, Great Britain. British garrisons in Canada were permanently withdrawn by 1905. However, until the late 1930s, Britain remained the world's dominant naval power, and was committed to protecting our extensive shores (total coastline, including islands, 244,000 km). As British power declined, however, the role of Canada's guardian was assumed by its former rival and now good neighbour, the United States.

Just prior to World War II, the United States extended to Canada the protection of its 19th-century Monroe Doctrine. This claimed the Western Hemisphere as America's backyard. During an address at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario in 1938, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged that "the United States would not stand idly by" if Canada were ever threatened by a hostile power. Since then, the defence of the United States has meant the defending of the North American continent. When America became an atomic superpower in the postwar era, it extended its nuclear shield to its northern neighbour. Canada's security is in the national interest of the United States and this has earned us a guarantee of automatic protection, a commitment that stands as the basis of Canadian defence policy today.

he military historian Charles Stacey once described Canada as an "unmilitary community." By this he meant that Canada has never wanted a powerful military establishment. Canadians have preferred, instead, to spend their money both on consumer goods and public services. Our lack of interest in things military stems partly from our ties to the friendly and protective great powers of Great Britain and the United States. But, it is also deeply rooted in Canada's history and culture. During both world wars, opposition to conscription, particularly in Quebec, nearly tore the country apart. Canada survived these threats to its unity, but the fact of deep divisions over the country's military role could not be ignored.

On the other hand, if war has sometimes divided us, it has also strengthened our sense of nationhood and brought us together in the face of a common threat. Fear of the giant that emerged from the American Civil War was at least partially responsible for Confederation. The two world wars also contributed greatly to Canadian national identity. Although conscription was introduced toward the end of World War II after much bitter debate, all Canadian forces sent overseas in both wars were volunteers whose patriotism inspired others. The sacrifices of Canada's soldiers played a major role in Canada's evolution into a sovereign nation.

f the 500,000 troops Canada contributed to the allied war effort during World War I, 60,000 never came back. In 1919, the League of Nations was organized and Canada became a founding member. World War I had ironically been called "the war to end all wars," and the League was established to guard the peace. Its goal was to maintain international security by imposing collective economic or military sanctions against countries that threatened the peace. But Canada quickly asserted its independence at the League by declining to participate in collective security measures. This contributed to the isolationism, even more evident in the United States at that time, that finally rendered the League ineffective.

In 1931, Canada achieved sovereign nation status through the Statute of Westminster. As a member of the new British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada now had full power to make its own foreign and defence policies. Great Britain could no longer declare war on Canada's behalf. But, when World War II broke out in 1939, Canada again contributed generously to the allied effort. The loss of 45,000 soldiers further strengthened the country's resolve to defend world peace. In 1945, the United Nations was formed as the central forum for dealing with issues of world peace. As a recognized middle power, Canada used its voice in world councils to promote collective security. An early and strong advocate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Canada firmly supported the United Nations involvement in the Korean War in 1950.

But Canadian leaders chose not to maintain a large military force during peacetime as a means of deterring war. After both world wars, Canada demobilized its troops as rapidly as any of the victorious powers. While it supported NATO in the late 1940s as a bulwark against Soviet military expansion into Western Europe, it did not plan to send troops to Europe in aid of the alliance. When the call came from the United Nations requesting troops be sent to Korea, the Canadian military cupboard was almost bare. Once again, Canada found itself rapidly mobilizing: its defence budget leaped to an all-time high of 7.8% of the gross domestic product; 154 Canadian naval vessels including nine destroyers put to sea, and 27,000 Canadian soldiers (the fourth largest United Nations contingent) saw action in Korea, with 424 casualties.

NATO, however, profited most from Canada's dramatic remilitarization in 1950. Canada deployed 10,000 troops and 12 air squadrons to Europe, and earmarked its naval forces in the Atlantic chiefly for the alliance. But the situation in Europe has changed, and the 1994 White Paper on Defence announced the recall of these troops. Canada will instead maintain its military forces at home in the event of a new security threat.

The wars in which Canada's soldiers fought during this century were not great tests of Canadian patriotism because the Canadian homeland was never clearly at risk. For Canada, these were wars of principle: Canadians believed they were defending democracy during the two world wars and supporting the notion of collective security in the Korean War and more recently in the Gulf War. But, these were also wars of commitment. In the 20th century, Canada went to war partly because of commitments to its great power benefactors. For Canada, the world wars were Britain's wars; the Korean War and the Gulf War were America's wars.

commitment to war has been the ultimate price that Canada has paid for its protection by great powers. But, even in peacetime, Canada supported the vital security interests of its powerful allies and has continued to do its share for the common defence. This sense of commitment was captured well by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in his response to President Roosevelt's 1938 pledge to protect Canada. Said King, "we too have obligations as a good and friendly neighbour...."

In 1938, King and Roosevelt committed their countries to defend one another, and in 1940 the Ogdenburg Agreement created a Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). These events set the stage for closer military cooperation between Canada and the United States not only during, but after World War II.

The onset of the Cold War and ominous advances in military technology strengthened Canadian-American military collaboration. The Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons and long-range bomber aircraft that could reach North America. This led to the establishment of a joint command for the air defence of North America under the 1958 North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD). NORAD now became Canada's post-1945 military obligation and represented the North American counterpart to NATO. While the Soviet bomber threat receded long ago, NORAD remains a major element of Canadian defence policy.

At times, Canada's obligations under NATO and NORAD have fuelled intense domestic debates. Among the principal issues at stake has been Canada's non-nuclear defence policy. Many Canadians abhor nuclear weapons, even though they have relied upon the American nuclear deterrent for their security. Therefore, at the outset of the nuclear era, Canada announced that, while it had the technical capabilities, it would not become a nuclear power. By the late 1950s, however, in light of the Soviet Union's growing military strength, Canada's armed forces were expected to assume nuclear roles under NATO and NORAD. Indecision over this issue contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker in 1963. While the victorious Liberals under Lester Pearson honoured Canada's nuclear commitments, it would remain a subject of political controversy.

As Prime Minister in 1968, Pierre Elliot Trudeau renounced Canada's nuclear roles. That decision led to the most thorough review ever of Canada's defence policy. This review concluded that Canada's troop and equipment commitments to NATO should be significantly reduced. To the dismay of its NATO allies, in 1971 Canada halved its 10,000 strong troop presence in Europe. The review also concluded that Canada's NORAD forces should be more concerned with challenges to Canadian sovereignty in its air and coastal spaces than with Soviet bombers, a now much diminished threat to North American military security.

But the retreat from alliance was short-lived. In 1975, Canada renewed its commitment to NATO with the purchase from West Germany of 128 Leopard I main battle tanks designed for use in Central Europe. In 1983, Canada strengthened its North American defence by signing the Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP). To the dismay of some Canadians, CANUSTEP permitted the testing by the United States of nuclear-capable cruise missiles in Canadian air space.

Such decisions are often more useful for Canada as instruments of diplomacy than as measures of military strength. They have symbolized Canada's continued commitment to its alliances even when a common enemy has not been clearly present. Canada's allies value this commitment and see it as a willingness on our part to share the burden of global military responsibilities. Moreover, Canada's military allies are amongst its closest trading partners; in return for the economic advantages this brings, they expect Canada to do its share for the common defence. The close relationship between Canada's trade and defence policies was recognized in the 1994 Defence White Paper. For example, a growing Canadian interest in the security of Asia and Latin America is anticipated, as these are regions where Canada is trying to build stronger trade links. But maintaining a military force also has benefits and consequences for the economy here at home.

Keeping a defence force, with all the personnel, equipment, and military bases which that entails, is a costly operation, but there are benefits as well. By purchasing services and equipment and maintaining bases over the years, the federal government has helped offset regional economic disparities, particularly within the high unemployment regions of Quebec and Atlantic Canada. Expensive defence equipment programs have been frequently undertaken to provide opportunities for Canada's economy. During the Cold War years of the early 1980s, a number of labour- and capital-intensive high technology defence projects were initiated and are still continuing, despite recent defence budget cutbacks. A prime example is the $404 million contract for a fleet of 12 patrol frigates awarded in 1983 to a New Brunswick shipbuilding firm. The first vessel was delivered in 1991, the year the Soviet Union disintegrated; the last vessel is to be delivered in 1996.

This relationship which developed between defence and the economy during the Cold War has become an important one. However, the approximately 7% of the February 1994 budget earmarked for defence was down from 8% in 1991; equipment acquisitions will be cut by $15 billion over the next 15 years; and, there is a plan to further reduce Canadian defence personnel by 25% between 1994 and 1999. By contrast, 35% of the budget is designated for health and social services. Public disappointment at the recent closing of military bases reflects a fear of the social and economic consequences which defence cutbacks represent. Yet Canadians are also aware that in hard times public funds spent on defence are resources lost to health, welfare, and higher education.

 

eacekeeping traditionally involved the positioning of impartial forces between combatants. The best known, and perhaps most successful, of Canada's peacekeeping missions was the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East. UNEF was a Canadian idea, commanded initially by a Canadian soldier. Many in Canada saw it as an excellent example of how a middle power could offer impartial diplomacy as well as equipment and personnel to help defuse international conflicts. Peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours held for a decade between 1956-1967, and Canada's foreign minister, Lester Pearson, won the Nobel Peace Prize for proposing UNEF to the United Nations.

But UNEF left the Middle East in 1967, and war broke out once again between Arabs and Israelis. Pearson had feared this, because no peacekeeping measures had been provided for in his resolution. Peacekeeping is no longer the mere intervention of impartial forces to keep the peace, a military role that has suited an unmilitary people like Canadians. A chief dilemma of many such operations today is the marked absence in troubled regions of any peace to keep. Future missions may therefore require a post-conflict peace building role, which will call for troops that have a mandate to fight. Because of the recent hostage situations in Somalia and the Balkans, Canada and other peacekeepers will be more selective in accepting such missions. Clearer policies are now being developed regarding division of responsibility, command structures and clear rules of engagement. This will allow both commanders and their troops to better understand their duties.

Despite this challenge, the 1994 Defence White Paper has increased by 3000 the number of Canadian soldiers that can be called upon to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. This shows a continued Canadian commitment to what has become a logistically demanding, expensive, and dangerous military role.

he history of Canada's defence policy is one of commitments far beyond the protection of the Canadian homeland. Our military tradition has been to support great power patrons; to defend the principle of democracy; to cultivate military alliances; to protect trading partners; and, increasingly, to participate in United Nations peacekeeping and collective security operations. It has often been important to impress Canada's friends as well as its foes.

The end of the Cold War and a shifted balance of power has given Canada and its allies a greater sense of security. But, at the same time, there have been increasing incidents of localized conflicts within and between smaller, less powerful countries which have caused tremendous upheaval, repression, and human suffering. These events raise a whole new set of questions about the responsibilities of governments and security alliances and how they should develop and deploy their military forces. Will new military strategies and practices be required to accomplish peacekeeping goals without unnecessarily endangering troops? Although these recent conflicts do not directly threaten our security, does Canada have a moral responsibility to help settle them?

The most recent White Paper on Defence reflects the belief that to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force is in the national interest. Despite a 14.2% budget cut between now and 1997, the Department of National Defence will still have the largest operating budget of any government department.

The White Paper also recognizes the challenges confronting our armed forces. The spread of advanced weapon technologies and the availability of weapons of mass destruction to so-called "rogue regimes" is a particular concern. Our international duties have included ensuring safe environments for the protection of refugees, delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil order has collapsed.

Internally, we must monitor and control activities within Canadian territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction. Special military equipment and trained personnel are called upon to assist other government departments in national search and rescue operations, fisheries protection, drug interdiction and environmental protection, and in situations involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Military resources have, for example, been used effectively in the recurring off-shore fisheries disputes of recent years.

The far-flung and diverse military commitments which Canada has made, partly for economic and diplomatic reasons and partly because of deeply held principles, have outpaced its military capabilities. To what extent will such commitments tax the nation's economic resources? To what extent will they strengthen and enhance our nation as a whole? Finding the answers to these questions will be essential to meeting the challenge of effectively defending Canada.