January 2017
Changed address to Dominican Dr.
Simplified the acknowledgements
Inserted corrections in footnotes toward the end
Added as a Postscript (slightly reworked) “Seven Words” (April 2011)
1 March 2017
Corrected a few things in the Postscript
29 January 2018
extended annotation on my p. 422: Faulkner/Lawrence on temporality
6 February 2018
extended annotation on p. 387 to include *Collected Works*, Vol 82
7 February
extended annotation on Sartre and body with *Collected Works*, Vol 82
10 December 2018
Corrected several typos in the Postscript and relocated note pp. 83-84

Martin Heidegger

*Being and Time*

An Annotated Translation

Cyril Welch
This translation was prepared in the expectation that Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927) would enter into the (United States) public domain on January 1, 2003. However, on October 27, 1998, the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act was signed into law. Despite the valiant efforts of the Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in a decision handed down on January 15, 2003. The result is that works such as Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Walt Disney's Mickey Mouse will not enter the public domain for another twenty years. Thus the publication of this translation in the U.S. must wait until January 1, 2023 (four years later in Canada, where “life of the author plus fifty years” prevails).

The delay has allowed me to notice and to correct a small number of typographical errors (insignificant for the understanding of the text but aesthetically displeasing), to rectify some infelicities of expression, to uniformize some of the terminology, and to insert additional annotations in my master copy.

Of the copies prematurely printed and bound, I submit a few to the critical review of students and scholars — on two conditions: that they make use of their copies for private study only, and that they communicate to me their suggestions for improving the text and the translation for the subsequent publications in 2023 and 2027.

Cyril Welch
10 Dominican Drive
Sackville, N.B.
Canada E4L 2Z1

Acknowledgements

I hereby extend a special thanks to Rainer A. Bast for the help he generously offered me in my efforts to interpret various passages in Heidegger's work. In addition, his *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'* (co-authored with Heinrich P. Delfosse, 1979) proved to be an invaluable aid in my efforts to interpret thoughts recurring in the work.

Liliane Welch performed a service most writers only dream of: she scoured the entire manuscript on the lookout for inelegancies and downright errors. As a result, the translation reads much more accurately and coherently than it otherwise would have.

In addition, an anonymous reader of a university press also read the entire manuscript and submitted twelve pages of discerning commentary and criticism.

Finally, several students of mine at Mount Allison University test-read the translation, supplying helpful suggestions for improving its readability, as well as detecting typographical and other errors.
Translator’s Preface

The chief challenge has been to provide a reading that remains close by the spirit of Heidegger’s work — and that proceeds as smoothly as possible, given the bumpy road. The chief temptation, avoided every time, has been to insert the original German in order to explain the interconnections of the original text, or the inadequacies of the English version.

Accuracy too, of course. But accuracy in regard to what? The letter or the spirit? In the case of great works, the only literal accuracy is that provided by the original text. All else is interpretation, and, if the translator shrinks from interpreting, the result will be . . . an interpretation, namely of how to transpose one set of letters into another.

Any translation of a norm-resetting work requires interpretation in a special sense, the one we easily recognize in the work of conductors and musicians: they must get the score to work.

Interpretation lurks everywhere in a translation: in the punctuation, in the choice or omission of articles, in the pursuit or not of metaphors, in the layout of the pages.

And in the location of the notes: since I interpret the whole of Being and Time as instituting a dialogue with the entire tradition of philosophy, I place the references to this tradition right where they address the reader — at the foot of the page.

And in the location of the notes: since I interpret the whole of Being and Time as instituting a dialogue with the entire tradition of philosophy, I place the references to this tradition right where they address the reader — at the foot of the page.

Also, since more than seventy-five years have passed since the original publication of the book, not only are many of the unspoken references fading from memory, but many new voices from later works now have a say as well in the reading of the text. These I have only begun to suggest in the multitudinous annotations.

Many of these voices Heidegger himself has indicated in his own marginalia. These often consist of keywords only, recalling later texts. These I have annotated with a view to what they would suggest to a reader of the originals.
There is some confusion about the original text of *Being and Time*. To the seventh edition (1953), Heidegger added a note that begins:


Volume VIII also contained an entire treatise by another author. It is primarily as the “special edition” that *Being and Time* is available to us, in its many reprintings. (Still, several footnotes in the text refer to works as appearing “in this Yearbook,” i.e. in previous volumes of the series.) Then in 1977 the work appeared as Volume 2 in the on-going publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* (which I refer to as his Collected Works). This edition includes Heidegger’s marginalia.

In all, there are three sorts of footnotes in the present translation:

- Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, . . . ) for Heidegger’s own.
- Lower-case letters (a, b, c, . . . ) for Heidegger’s marginalia.
- Characters (*, †, ‡, . . . ) for my annotations.

Throughout, square brackets, […] , also contain my annotations. And the page numbers I cite (both in the annotations and in the margins of the translation) are those of the original “special” edition.

Cyril Welch
November 2003
Introduction
Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being

Chapter One
Necessity, Structure, and Primacy of the Question of Being

§1. The necessity of an explicit repetition of the question of being
This question has today fallen into oblivion, even though our age considers itself progressive in that it once again affirms “metaphysics.” But then it also considers itself exempt from the exertions required to kindle anew γιγαντομάχια. Yet the question here touched upon is not just one among others. It kept the inquiries of Plato and Aristotle in an aura of suspense, only to subside from then on into silence as a thematic question of actual investigation. What those two achieved held up, throughout manifold displacements and “retouchings,” on into Hegel’s Logic. And what at one time was wrested from the phenomena with the utmost effort of thought, although fragmentary and roughly incipient, has long since become trivialized.

Not only that. On the basis of the Greek approaches to the interpretation of being, there has evolved a dogma that not only declares...
superfluous the question about the meaning of being but also sanctions the neglect of the question. It is said that “being” is the most universal and the most empty concept. As such, it resists every attempt to define it. Moreover, this most universal and therefore indefinable concept needs no definition. Everyone uses it constantly, and also understands what is thereby meant. Thus that which, as concealed, drove ancient philosophizing into restlessness, and kept it so, has become perfectly obvious, clear as day, such that anyone who even continues to pose the question is charged with committing a methodological error.

At the beginning of this investigation it is not possible to discuss thoroughly the prejudices ever again planting and cultivating the confidence that there is no need for the question about being. These prejudices have their root in ancient ontology itself. This ontology can in turn only be interpreted adequately with the guidance of the question of being—the very question that we must first clarify and answer: and here we must look to the soil from which the fundamental concepts grew, and ask about the appropriateness with which the categories were certified, and about their completeness. We therefore intend to discuss these prejudices only to the extent that the necessity of a repetition of the question about the meaning of being becomes clear. There are three such prejudices:

1. “Being” is the “most universal” concept: τὸ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλα πάντων.1 Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit. “An understanding of being is in each instance already included in everything one apprehends about a being.”2 Yet the “universality” of “being” is not that of a genus. It does not encompass the highest region of things that are, as these things get articulated conceptually in the manner of genus and species: οἶκτε τὸ ἐν γένεις.1 The “universality” of being “surpasses” every genus-based universality. In the language of medieval ontology, “being” is a “transcendens.” Aristotle already understood the unity of this transcendent “universality,” a unity for the multiplicity of the highest generic concepts pertaining to things, as unity by analogy. With this discovery, Aristotle placed the problem of being on a fundamentally new basis—for all his dependence on Plato’s ontological way of positioning the question. To be sure, he too did not cast light on the obscurity of these categorical inter-connections. Medieval ontology discussed this question in many ways, mainly in the Scholastic manner of Thomas and Scotus, without coming to any fundamental clarity. And when, finally, Hegel defines “being” as the “undetermined immediate,” and makes this definition the foundation of all further categorial explications in his Logic, he remains within the perspective of ancient ontology, except that he dismisses the problem of the unity of being for the multiplicity of the “categories” pertaining to things. So, considering all this, when one says that “being” is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that this concept is the clearest, and in need of no further discussion. The concept of “being” is much rather the most obscure.

2. The concept “being” is indefinable. This follows from its being the highest universality.2 And rightly so—if definito fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam [if definition is made by proximate genus and specific difference]. As a matter of fact, “being” cannot be

---

1 Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 998 b 22. [“... neither is what-is a genus”: a horse trainer does not get closer to his horse (its being fast, lame, or small) by discovering that it is an animal.]
On ne peut entreprendre de définir l’être sans tomber dans cette absurdité: car on ne peut définir un mot sans commencer par celui-ci, c’est, soit qu’on l’exprime ou qu’on le sous-entende. Donc, pour définir l’être, il faudrait dire c’est, et ainsi employer le mot défini dans sa définition.

[“One cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity: for one cannot define a word without beginning with this, it is, whether expressly or implicitly. Thus, to define being it would be necessary to say it is, and thereby to use the defined word in its definition.”]
conceptualized as a being; enti non additur aliqua natura: “being” cannot become determinate by our attributing something to it. Being cannot be derived definitionally from higher concepts, and cannot be presented by lower concepts. But does it then follow that “being” can offer no further problem? Hardly. It can only be inferred that “being” is not anything like a being. Thus the way one determines beings (justified within certain limits) — the “definition” of traditional logic, itself grounded in ancient ontology — is not applicable. The indefinability of being does not dispense with the question of its meaning; rather, it makes it all the more urgent.

3. “Being” is the one self-evident concept. In every cognizing, every stating, every relating to beings, in every relation to oneself, “being” is used, and the expression is immediately intelligible. Everyone understands such utterances as “The sky is blue” and “I am happy.” Yet this average intelligibility only demonstrates its unintelligibility. It makes manifest that in every comportment, every being toward beings as beings, there lies an enigma. That each of us already lives in an understanding of being, while the meaning of being also remains shrouded in darkness, proves the foundational necessity of repeating the question about the meaning of being.

Recourse to self-evidence is a dubious procedure in the realm of basic philosophical concepts, all the more so in regard to the concept “being”—assuming that precisely what appears “self-evident” (what Kant calls “the covert judgements of common reason”) is to become and remain our explicit theme of analysis (“the business of philosophers”).

The consideration of these prejudices has also made it clear that not only is the answer to the question about being lacking, but even the question itself is obscure and without direction. Thus to repeat the question of being means first of all to work out adequately the way to position the question.

§2. The Formal Structure of the Question

The question about the meaning of being must be positioned. If it is a—or even the—fundamental question, such questioning stands in need of a transparency suitable to it. Thus we must briefly discuss what in general belongs to any question, in order then to make the question of being discernible as a pre-eminent one.

Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its initial direction from what is sought. Questioning is a knowledgeable searching of beings, a sifting through their that and their how. Knowledgeable searching can become “investigation,” i.e. a determining of what the question aims at, a determining that lays it bare for [theoretical] inspection. As a questioning about..., questioning has something pressing about which it asks. Every questioning about... is a questioning in the nearness of... Besides what presses in any questioning, questioning also engages something to be examined. In an investigative, i.e. specifically theoretical question, what presses in must be determined and conceptualized. Thus within the pressing there lies, as what is uppermost intended and toward which the questioning aims, something to be ascertained. Questioning itself, as a comportment of a being, of the questioner, has its own character of being. A given question might unfold as a “just asking” or as an explicit interrogative stance. Special about this latter stance is that questioning here becomes transparent to itself, in all three named constitutive elements.

The question about the meaning of being must be positioned. Thus we are confronted with the necessity of discussing the question of being in regard to the structural moments just cited.

As a seeking, questioning needs precedental guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of being must therefore already be available in

*a* no! rather [what can be inferred is this]: with the help of such conceptuality we cannot decide about being.

* “The business of philosophers is not to give rules, it is rather to analyze the covert judgements of common reason” (Akademie edition of Kant’s collected works, Vol. 14, p. 180); cited again on p. 23. — Heidegger almost always takes “self-evident” in the sense of “taken for granted as obvious,” whereas the evidence at issue in phenomenological discourse must be earned.
Introduction: The Question of Being

8

Plato’s Sophist, 242C. [Cf. his Republic, 396C to 398B, on telling tales.]

This much was intimated: we always already move within an understanding of being. Out of this understanding there grows the explicit question about the meaning of being, and the drive toward conceptualizing it. We don’t know what [the word] “being” means. But already when we ask what “being” is we move within an understanding of the “is” — even without being able to fix conceptually what the “is” signifies. We don’t even know the horizon within which we might get hold of and fix its meaning. This average and vague understanding of being is a factum.

This understanding of being may ever so much waver and fade and border on mere verbal familiarity. Yet this very indeterminateness of the understanding of being, in each instance already available, is itself a positive phenomenon that stands in need of clarification. However, an investigation of the meaning of being cannot hope to provide this clarification at the outset. The interpretation of this average understanding obtains its necessary guidance only with the developed concept of being. From the clarity of the concept, and an appropriate manner of explicitly understanding it, we shall be able to discern what the obscure, or the not-yet-elucidated understanding of being means, and what sorts of obfuscation or hindrance of an explicit elucidation of the meaning of being are possible and necessary.

More: the average and vague understanding of being can be permeated by traditional theories and opinions about being, and in such a way that these theories, as the sources of prevailing understanding, remain hidden. — What is sought in the question of being is not something entirely unfamiliar, but it is something at first totally incomprehensible.

What presses us into elaborating the question is being — that which determines things to be as they are; that from which things, however they are discussed, are in each instance already understood. The being of beings “is” not itself a being. The first philosophical step in the understanding of being consists in not “telling a tale” — μὴ διηγεῖσθαι — i.e. in not determining the provenance of things as the things they are by recurring to something else that is, as though being had the character of some determinate being. As what presses in on us, being thereby requires its own manner of display, one essentially different from

§2. The Formal Structure of the Question

9

that of discovering beings. Accordingly, what we aim to ascertain, the meaning of being, will require its own conceptuality, one that again stands in contrast to those concepts in which beings attain their significant determinateness.

Inasmuch as being constitutes what presses (being means the being of something that is), it turns out that what the question of being asks us to examine is something that is. This it is that gets tested, so to speak — tested in regard to its being. If, however, it is to yield the characteristics of its being without falsification, it must in turn have become accessible in advance as the being it is in itself. In regard to what it examines, the question of being must achieve, secure at the outset, a proper manner of access to something that is. But we say of many things that they are, and we do so in many different ways. Everything we talk about “is,” everything we believe in, everything to which we relate in whatever way; what and how we ourselves are — this too “is.” Being lies in each that and in each how, in reality, on-hand-ness, inventory, prevalence, being-there, and in each “there is.” From which thing that is should we read off the meaning of being, which should we take as the point of departure for the disclosure of being? Is the point of departure incidental, or does some one being have primacy in our elaboration of the question of being? Which one is this exemplary being, and in what sense does it have primacy?

If the question about being is to be explicitly posed, and brought to full transparency of itself, then the elaboration of this question requires (according to what we have just elucidated) an explication of [1] the manner in which we view being, [2] the understanding and conceptual comprehension of its meaning, [3] the preparation for the possibility of properly choosing an exemplary being, [4] the elaboration of an intrinsic manner of accessing this being. Viewing, understanding and conceptualizing, choice and access — these are constitutive comportments of questioning, and thus are themselves modes of being of a determinate

1 Plato’s Sophist, 242C. [Cf. his Republic, 396C to 398B, on telling tales.]

2 Two quite different questions are here strung together; misleading, above all in relation to the role of being-there [as remarked in the previous note].

3 Misleading. Being-there is exemplary [only] because in its nature as being-there (upholding the truth of being) it is a co-player playing up to and along with being as such — bringing being into the play of resonance.
being, namely of that being that we ourselves, each of us engaged in the questioning, are. Accordingly, to elaborate the question of being means this: to make this one being—the one who questions—transparent in its being. The very asking of this question is itself, as one being’s mode of being, essentially determined from what is pressing within this one being—from being. This one being, one that each of us is and that has, among other things, the essential possibility of questioning, we formulate terminologically as being-there. The very positioning of the question about the meaning of being, posing it explicitly and transparently, requires a precedental and appropriate explication of one being (being-there) regarding its being.

But is not such an undertaking obviously circular? To have to determine beforehand one being in its being, and then on the basis of this determination to want to pose the question about being: What else is this but to run in a circle? Do we not here already “presuppose” for the elaboration of the question something that only the answer to the question can provide? Such formal objections as this one—arguing about the “circularity” of a “proof,” invariably easy to do in areas where we are searching out principles—are always sterile when we are considering concrete paths of investigation. They contribute nothing to understanding the matter at hand, and inhibit advancement into the field of investigation.

Factualiy, however, there is no circularity at all in the manner in which we are positioning the question. A being can get determined in its being apart from any need for an explicit concept of the meaning of being to be already available. If that were not the case, there could not ever have been any ontological cognition, the factical stock of which we can hardly deny. Indeed, “being” gets “presupposed” in all previous ontology, but not as an available concept—not as that which defines what is sought. The “presupposition” of being has the character of a precedental vista opening onto being, and in such a way that from this vista beings that are already available in their being get provisionally articulated. This guiding vista onto being emerges from the average manner in which being is intelligible, an intelligibility within which we always already move and which belongs in the end to the essential constitution of being-there. Such “presupposing” has nothing to do with positing a principle from which one deductively derives a series of propositions. In posing the question about the meaning of being there can never be a “circularity in the proof” because in answering the question it is not a matter of deriving anything from a ground, but rather of laying bare the ground, showing it.

In the question about the meaning of being, there is no “circularity in the proof,” but there is indeed a remarkable “back and forth relation” between what presses for the question (being) and the questioning itself—as a mode in which this one being [i.e., being-there] is. The way what is pressing engages our questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being. But that only says: a being bearing the character of being-there has a relation—perhaps even a distinctive one—to this question of being. Have we not thereby proved a determinate being to have a primacy [for the question] of being, and displayed the exemplary being that can serve as what we examine in the question of being? Our discussions hitherto have neither proved the primacy of being-there, nor decided upon its possible, let alone necessary, service as the being to be primarily examined. Yet something like a primacy of being-there has suggested itself.

§3. The ontological primacy of the question of being

The characterization of the question of being, under the guidance of the formal structure of the question as such, has clarified the question as a special one, special in that its elaboration, not to speak of its solution, requires a series of fundamental reflections. However, what is distinctive

---

a Being-there: being held out into the nothingness of being, held up as relation. [Heidegger here qualifies in advance this present concern to examine “ourselves”: what is distinctive about ourselves is precisely our relation to the being of things other than ourselves. The image of “being held out into nothingness” is elaborated in his lecture “What is Metaphysics?” (1929). That the self of human being is a relation, and finds its support in this relation, Heidegger states below (p. 12); it is a thought developed explicitly by Kierkegaard in his Sickness unto Death.]
b But the meaning of being does not get read off this one being. [Heidegger here contradicts his remark on the top of p. 7.]
about the question of being will fully come to light only when the question gets sufficiently delimited in regard to its function, its intention, and its motive.

Hitherto the necessity of a repetition of the question has been motivated partly by its venerable provenance, but above all by the lack of a determinate answer, even by the want of an adequate manner of positioning the question at all. One can therefore wonder what purpose the question might serve. Does it remain, or is it in fact, only the business of a free-floating speculation about the most universal generalities — or is it the question that at once aims at the most basic principles and at what is most concrete?

Being is in each instance the being of some being. In reference to its various domains, the totality of beings can become a field in which we can lay bare and delimit determinate areas of inquiry. These areas — e.g. history, nature, space, life, being-there, language, and the like — can in turn become thematized as objects of scientific investigations. Scientific research brings these areas into relief roughly and naïvely, providing their initial demarcation. The elaboration of a given area in its basic structures is, in a way, already accomplished by the pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the domain of being in which the given area of inquiry confines itself. The resulting “basic concepts” initially serve as guidelines for the first concrete disclosure of the area. Even if the thrust of research continues to lie in such positivity, its real progress comes about not so much in collecting results and storing them in “handbooks” as in the questioning of the basic constitution of the area itself — a questioning to which one is generally driven retroactively by the increasing knowledge of the matters at issue in the area.

The real “evolution” of the sciences takes place in the more or less radical revision of the basic concepts, a revision transparent to itself. The level to which a science is developed gets determined by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises in the sciences the relation of positive investigative questioning to the matters being examined becomes shaky.* Everywhere today in the various disciplines there are drives to shift research onto new foundations.

**Mathematics**, the science apparently the most strict and the most secure in its structure, has been experiencing a “foundational crisis.” The battle between formalism and intuitionism centers on obtaining and securing the primary mode of access to what can serve as the object of this science. In **physics**, relativity theory grew out of the drive to expose nature’s own coherence as this coherence subsists “in itself.” As a theory of the conditions of access to nature herself, physics is seeking to preserve, by determining all relativities, the immutability of the laws of motion; it is thus confronted by the question of the structure of its pre-given area of inquiry, i.e. by the problem of matter. In **biology** the drive has awakened to get behind the determinations that both mechanism and vitalism have given to organism and to life, and to determine anew the way living beings as such are. In the **historiographical humanities** the thirst has grown for historical actuality itself, by way of tradition and its portrayal: the history of literature tends to become the history of problems. **Theology** is searching for a more original interpretation of man’s being toward God, an interpretation prefigured by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within that faith. It is slowly beginning to understand again Luther’s insight that its [present] doctrinal system rests on a “foundation” that does not grow from a questioning wherein faith is primary, a “foundation” whose conceptuality is not only insufficient for the range of problems proper to theology, but even covers over this range and distorts it.

Basic concepts are determinations in which the area of inquiry underlying all the thematic objects of a science acquires a precedential intelligibility guiding every positive investigation. These concepts are thus identified and “justified” only in a correspondingly precedential research into the area of inquiry itself. However, inasmuch as each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, this precedential research excavating the basic concepts entails nothing less than interpretation of these beings in reference to the basic constitution of their being. Such research must precede the positive sciences; and it can do so. The labors of Plato and Aristotle prove the point. This manner of

---

* About these terms “positive” and “positivity”: whatever we can record (whether data or patterns) counts as “positive,” and the achievement of the manner of doing this is called a “positivity.” In contrast, thoughts about the relation between the efforts to record and the matters addressed: these thoughts have traditionally been called “philosophical.” Positivism (whether in law or in science) is the belief that positivities suffice by themselves, and that philosophy can only help clarify them in their self-sufficiency. Cf. the end of §10, p. 50.
laying the foundations of the sciences differs in principle from the kind of “logic” that limps along behind, investigating some current condition of a science for its “method.” It is a productive logic — productive in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into a determinate area of being, discloses this area in its essential constitution for the first time, and makes available to the positive sciences the structures thereby acquired, these structures then supplying the transparent directives of questioning. Thus what is philosophically primary is not, for example, a theory of concept-formation in historiography; neither is it the theory of historiographical cognition nor the theory of history as the object of historiography; it is rather the interpretation of what is authentically historical with a view to its historicity. Then, too, the positive outcome of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* consists in its approach to working out what belongs to any nature whatsoever, and not in a “theory” of cognition. His transcendental logic is an *a priori*, a material [not just formal] logic of the area of being we call nature.

Yet such questioning — ontology, taken in the broadest sense, without leaning on ontological movements or drives — itself still stands in need of guidance. To be sure, in comparison with the ontological questioning of the positive sciences, ontological questioning is more primordial. But by itself it remains naïve and opaque if its investigations into the being of beings leave the meaning of being undiscovered. And precisely the ontological task of a genealogy that does not construe deductively the various possible manners of being — this task requires an initial agreement about “what we then really have in mind with this word ‘being’.”

Thus the question of being aims at an *a priori* condition of possibility — not just of the sciences, which investigate beings as determined to be such-and-such and which thereby already in each instance move within an understanding of being, but rather [also] of those ontologies that precede and found the ontic sciences. *All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit the categorial system at its disposal, remains fundamentally blind, and distorts its innermost intent, if it has not sufficiently clarified at the outset the meaning of being and understood this clarification as its fundamental task.*

Correctly understood, ontological research itself bestows upon the question of being its ontological priority over the mere resumption of a venerable tradition and the promotion of an hitherto opaque problem. But this primacy in regard to the material sciences is not the only one.

### §4. The Ontical Primacy of the Question

Science in general can be defined as the whole of interconnected and justified propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it get at the meaning of science. As human comportments, sciences are in the manner of this one being, human being. This being we have terminologically formulated as *being-there*. Scientific research is not the sole and not the most intimate way this being is. Moreover, being-there itself differs distinctively from other beings. It is our provisional task to make this distinctive difference visible. Here the discussion must anticipate subsequent analyses that only later really show the matter.

Being-there is not simply one being that occurs among others. Rather, it is ontically distinguished inasmuch as, in its being, its being is at issue for it. But then, to this essential constitution of being-there belongs, in its very being, a relation to being. And this again means: in its being, being-there understands itself in some manner and with some explicitness. It is proper to this one being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being. *Understanding of being is itself a determination of the being of being-there.* What distinguishes being-there ontically is that it is ontologically.

To be ontological does not yet mean to study ontology. Thus if we reserve the term “ontology” for the explicit theoretical questioning about the meaning of beings, then what is intended by calling being-there “ontological” should be designated as “pre-ontological.” But this signifies nothing so simple as being in an ontic manner, but rather being within some understanding of being.

---

*a* But here being not only as the being of human being (ex-sistence). This becomes clear from what follows. Being-in-world includes in itself a bearing of ex-sistence upon being as a whole: understanding of being. [Heidegger repeatedly recognizes that his formulations at this point might mislead readers, and emphasizes here (as in the note on p. 8 regarding being-there as relation) that the concern of being-there for its own being spills over into the concern for the being of whatever arises within the “horizon” of being-there.]
The being to which being-there can, and always somehow does relate itself, in various ways, we call ex-sistence.* And because the determination of the nature of this being cannot be accomplished by proffering a “what” specifying its factual content — its nature lying much rather in the task of each to be its own being — the term “being-there” has been chosen to designate this being, this term expressing its being purely.

Being-there understands itself always in reference to its ex-sistence, to a possibility of its own: the possibility of being itself or not being itself. Being-there has either itself chosen these possibilities, or it has stumbled into them, or it has long grown up within them. Only each instance of being-there decides ex-sistence, either in the manner of seizing or in the manner of neglecting. Only through ex-sisting can the question of ex-sistence be settled. We call this latter self-understanding existentiell understanding. The question of ex-sistence is an ontic “concern” of being-there. There is here no need for the theoretical transparency of the ontological structure of ex-sistence. The question about this latter aims for a dissection of what constitutes ex-sistence. The interconnectedness of these structures we call existentiality. The analysis of existentiality has the character, not of an existentiell, but rather of an existential understanding. The task of an existential analysis of being-there is, so far as its possibility and necessity go, prefigured in the ontic constitution of being-there.

Now, inasmuch as ex-sistence defines being-there, the ontological analysis of this being will in any case always stand in need of a

---

a That very [Heidegger adds a restrictive emphasis: not being as such.]
b as its own [Heidegger again emphasizes the restriction.]
* I shall hyphenate this word, in keeping with Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” (1946-1947: available in Pathmarks), where the hyphenation brings out the root of the word: ex-stasis, standing out. “The standing in the clearing of being I call the ex-sistence of human being.” Later, Heidegger will talk about the “three ecstacies of temporality,” i.e. the threefold way we are drawn out of ourselves (into the clearing).

12 Thus [there is here] no philosophy of existence [Heidegger wishes to distinguish his own work from that of Karl Jaspers (who, along with Jean-Paul Sartre, analyzes the existentiell understandings open to us); still, later Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges Jaspers’ contribution on the question of “boundary situations.”]

---

§4. The Ontical Primacy of the Question

precedental glimpse of existentiality. This existentiality we understand as an essential constitution of the one being that ex-sists. Already in the idea of such a constitution lies the idea of being. And thus the possibility of undertaking an analysis of being-there depends upon the precedential elaboration of the question about the meaning of being as such.

Scientific disciplines are ways in which being-there is, and therewith ways of relating to beings that it itself need not be. However, one thing belongs essentially to being-there: being in a world. Thus the understanding of being belonging to being-there bears equi-primordially on the understanding of something like “world” and on the understanding of the being of those beings becoming accessible within that world. Those ontologies that take as their theme beings not taking the measure of their nature from being-there are on this account grounded in and motivated by the ontic structure of being-there itself, a structure that includes the determinateness of a pre-ontological understanding of being.

It follows that fundamental ontology, out of which all other ontologies spring, must be sought in the existential analysis of being-there.

So, then, being-there has a multiple primacy over all other beings. The first primacy is an ontical one: this one being is determined in its being by ex-sistence. The second primacy is an ontological one: being-there is, given its determinateness to ex-sist, in itself “ontological.” But then this also belongs to being-there equiprimordially — as a constituent of the understanding of ex-sistence: an understanding of the being of all beings not taking their measure from being-there.* Thus being-there has a third primacy as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies. So being-there has proved to be what, prior to all other beings, deserves to be examined first of all.

* Throughout Being and Time Heidegger refers to “beings not taking their measure from being-there.” Since the analyses themselves concentrate precisely on what does take its measure from being-there, the reference is elusive. There are at least three exemplifications: (1) the things that modern science investigates (Galileo’s concern about the material of the moon, the present-day concern about the elements and energies at the origin of our solar system); (2) the things at issue in ancient ontology (the horseness of horses, the divinity of nature); and (3) things as Heidegger understands them to emerge through, but not as measured by, being-there (contemplated in his later works: see my annotation on p. 333).
Still, the existential analysis itself is and remains existentially, i.e. ontically rooted. Only when philosophically investigative questioning is itself understood existentially as a possible way for a given ex-sisting being-there to be — only then does the possibility arise of a disclosure of the existentiality of ex-sistence, and thereby of a firm hold on any sufficiently grounded ontological problematic. This consideration also makes clear the ontic primacy of the question of being.

The ontic-ontological primacy of being-there was already seen early on, without being-there itself getting formulated in its intrinsic ontological structure, or even becoming a problem aiming at such a structure. Aristotle says: η ψυχη τα οντα πως εστιν, “the soul (of man) is in some way the beings [known]”; the “soul,” which constitutes the being of human being, uncovers, in the manners of its own being, i.e. in αισθησις and νοησις, everything that is — in regard to its that-ness and its how-ness, but also always in regard to its being. Itself deriving from the ontological thesis of Parmenides, this statement Thomas Aquinas resumed in a discussion characteristic of his own work. In the course of undertaking to derive the “transcendents,” i.e. those characteristics of being that lie out beyond everything that can possibly be determined as confined to any one being (determined by way of the thing’s material and generic content), out beyond every modus specialis entis — characters that bear upon every “thing” whatsoever — he aspires to show how the verum also counts as one of these transcendents. He proceeds by appealing to the one being that, in accordance with its own manner of being, has the aptitude to “come together with” anything that in any way is. This pre-eminent being, this ens, quod natum est convenire cum omni ente, is the soul (anima). Although ontologically unclarified, the primacy of being-there that emerges in these passages obviously has nothing in common with the rapid subjection of the totality of beings.

The proof that the question of being is ontically and ontologically pre-eminent is grounded in the provisional indication of the ontic-ontological primacy of being-there. But the analysis of the structure of the question of being as a question (§2) came up against a pre-eminent function of this one being within the positioning of the question itself.

Here, being-there revealed itself as the one being that must be elaborated in an ontologically sufficient manner if the question is to become transparent. But now it has become clear that the ontological analysis of being-there precisely constitutes fundamental ontology — that, in this vein, being-there serves as the being that we must examine in its fundament and in advance, with an eye to its being.

If the interpretation of the meaning of being becomes the task, being-there is not only the primary being to be examined, it is even more the one being that in each case already relates itself to what is pressing in the question. Hence the question of being is nothing other than the radicalization of a drive belonging essentially to the being of being-there itself — the radicalization of the pre-ontological understanding of being.*

Chapter Two
The Double Task in the Elaboration of the Question of Being
The Method of the Investigation and its Outline

§5. The ontological analysis of being-there as the exposure of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of being in general

When characterizing the tasks lying within the “positioning” of the question of being we showed not only that we need to establish the one being that is to serve as the focus of our examination, but also that it is necessary explicitly to appropriate and secure a proper access to this being. Which being assumes the preferred role within the question of being, this we have discussed. But how might this being, being-there, become accessible — and, during our interpretation and understanding, how can we “take aim” at it?

* Several times already Heidegger has talked of “drive,” and throughout the text he will continue to do so, without ever talking about it. The term is best understood in its verbal form: being-there drives at various things and in various ways, but all the while it also drives at its own fulfillment (cf. Plato’s account of ἔρως in his Symposium and Phaedrus as complementing those passages from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas on the soul being the “convening” of things). Abstractly, we might say: being-there is “tendentious,” i.e. in-sistent as well as ex-sistent. Later, Heidegger will use the noun to express a feature of any literary work: it drives at something, and our task is to become attuned to what it is driving at.
The ontic-ontological primacy we have displayed for being-there might wrongly lead one to believe that this one being would also have to be what is primarily given for ontic-ontological consideration—in the sense that not only its being would be “immediately” graspable but also the manner in which it is in this “immediate” pre-givenness. To be sure, being-there is ontically not only nearby or even the nearest thing: we are this being, each of us. Nevertheless, or precisely thereby, this being is ontologically the farthest away. To be sure, it belongs to its ownmost being to have an understanding of its being and to comport itself in each instance within a certain interpretedness of its being. But this does not at all mean that such pre-ontological interpretation of [its own] being can be adopted as an adequate guide, as though this understanding of its being would have to spring from a thematically ontological reflection on one’s ownmost essential constitution. Much to the contrary, and in accordance with a manner of being belonging to it, being-there has the drive to understand its own being in reference to those beings to which it essentially relates itself, constantly and most closely—in reference to its “world.” In being-there itself, and therewith in its own understanding of being, there lies what we will show to be an ontological reflection cast back from the understanding of world onto the interpretation of being-there.

The ontic-ontological primacy of being-there is therefore the reason why the essential constitution specifically belonging to being-there—this constitution understood as its “categorial” structure—remains hidden from it. To itself, being-there is ontically “nearest,” ontologically farthest, and yet pre-ontologically not at all foreign.

With these considerations we have only shown, in a provisional manner, that the interpretation of this one being is confronted with peculiar difficulties rooted both in the way our thematized object itself is and in the way our own thematizing comportment is—and not rooted in some shortcoming of our cognitive powers, or in an apparently remediable deficiency in our conceptual apparatus.

Now, because not only an understanding of being belongs to being-there, but also because this understanding develops or degenerates in keeping with the variable ways being-there is, it has a wealth of fixed interpretations available to it. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, “politics,” poetry, biography, historiography: all these have carefully studied the bearings, faculties, powers, possibilities, and destinies of being-there, and done this in differing ways and to varying extents. However, the question remains whether these interpretations have been as existentially primordial in their development as they have been existentially primordial in themselves. These two do not necessarily proceed together, although they do not exclude one another. Existentiell interpretation can lead to existential analysis, provided we grasp philosophical cognition in its possibility and necessity. Only once we have sufficiently elaborated the basic structures of being-there in an explicit orientation toward the problem of being itself will all those earlier attainments in the interpretation of being-there receive their existential justification.

So the first concern in the question of being must remain an analysis of being-there. But then the problem of attaining and securing a guiding manner of access to being-there becomes really crucial. Negatively formulated: we cannot afford to let just any arbitrary idea of being and actuality, no matter how “self-evident,” be applied to this one being by way of dogmatic constructions, nor to let any “categories” prefigured in such an idea be impressed upon being-there without ontological consideration. Very much to the contrary, our manner of access and interpretation must be chosen in such a way that this one being can show itself from itself and as itself. And the manner should show this being as it initially and mostly is—in its average everydayness. Not arbitrary and incidental, but essential structures of this everydayness should be brought out into the open, structures persevering throughout each and every manner of factual being-there, and its different manners of being, as determinate of its being. In the purview of the basic constitution of the everydayness of being-there, the being of this one being will come into relief in a preparatory way.

Thus construed, the analysis of being-there remains wholly oriented toward the one guiding task of elaborating the question of being. Its limits get thereby determined. The analysis cannot hope to provide a complete ontology of being-there, something that must be built out if anything like a “philosophical anthropology” is ever to rest upon a philosophically adequate foundation. With a view to a possible anthropology, or to its ontological fundament, the following interpretation offers only a few, although hardly inessential “pieces.” The analysis of

---

Footnote:

a i.e., here, in reference to what is on hand [not in reference to what is at hand, as Heidegger will eventually draw this distinction].
being-there is, however, not only incomplete, it is at first also provisional. It initially only brings the being of this one being into relief, without interpreting its meaning. It intends rather to prepare for exposing the horizon for the most primordial interpretation of being. Once this horizon is attained, the preparatory analysis of being-there requires repetition on a higher, an authentic ontological basis.

The meaning of the being of the one being we call being-there proves to be temporality. The proof of this must sustain itself in the repeated interpretation of the (earlier only provisionally displayed) structures of being-there as modes of temporality. But this interpretation of being-there as temporality does not already provide the answer to the guiding question, the question intent upon the meaning of being in general. Yet the ground has been prepared for the attainment of this answer.

This much has been partly shown: a pre-ontological being belongs to being-there in its ontic constitution. Being-there is in such a manner that, inasmuch as it is, it understands something like being. Holding fast to this connection, we intend to show that time is what serves being-there in its inexplicit understanding and interpretation of anything like being. Time we must bring to light and intrinsically conceptualize as the horizon of every understanding of being and of each interpretation of being. In order to become clear about this, we stand in need of a primordial explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, an explication deriving from temporality as the being of being-there—of the being that understands being. In the entire scope of this task there lies also the requirement that we distinguish this concept of time from the ordinary understanding of it, an understanding that has become explicit in one interpretation of time reflecting the traditional concept that has persisted since Aristotle down to Bergson and beyond. Then, too, we must make it clear that and how this concept of time, and the ordinary understanding of time, spring from temporality at all. We thereby restore to the ordinary concept of time its own rightful place—in contrast to Bergson’s thesis that time construed in the ordinary manner is space.

§5. The Ontological Analysis of Being-there

separates off things that are “temporally” (natural processes and historical events) from things that are “atemporally” (spatial and numerical relations). It is customary to distinguish the “timeless” meaning of propositions from the “temporal” course of propositional assertions. Then too, one discovers a “gap” between “temporal” beings and “super-temporal” eternal beings, and one tries to bridge the two. In each of these cases, “temporal” means as much as being “within time,” a determination that is of course still rather obscure. But the factum remains: time, in the sense of “being in time,” serves as a criterion for separating regions of being. How time comes to have this pre-eminent function, and even with what right precisely something like time serves as such a criterion, and more importantly whether in this naïvely ontological application of time its genuinely possible ontological relevance is expressed—none of this has hitherto been questioned or investigated. “Time,” especially within the horizon of the ordinary understanding of it, has just taken on this “self-evident” function—“on its own,” as it were—and has ever since been stuck in it.

In contrast, the task is to show, on the basis of the elaborated question about the meaning of being, that and how the central problematic of every ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time—this phenomenon as rightly viewed and explicated.

If being is to be conceived on the basis of time, and if the various modes and derivatives of being (within their modifications and derivations) are in fact to become intelligible in reference to time, then being itself—and not only beings as “within time”—gets made visible in its “temporal” character. But then “temporal” can no longer mean merely “being in time.” Even things “non-temporal” or “super-temporal” are, in regard to their being, “temporal.” And this again not only by way of privation when compared to something “temporal,” i.e. “within time,” but in a positive sense—one that remains to be clarified, of course. Because the expression “temporal” has been expatiated in its meaning by reference to pre-philosophical and philosophical usage, and because in the following investigations the expression will lay claim to yet another meaning, we call the primordial determinateness of the meaning of being, as well as its various characters and modes based on time, its time-bound determinateness. The fundamental ontological task of interpreting being as such includes, then, the elaboration of the time-boundness of being.
first concrete answer to the question about the meaning of being.*

Because being in each instance only becomes comprehensible in regard to time, the answer to the question of being cannot lie in an isolated and self-enclosed proposition. The answer is not grasped in the recitation of what it asserts in propositional form, especially when it is transmitted as a free-floating result, so that we merely take note of a “standpoint” which perhaps deviates from the way things have previously been treated. Whether the answer is “new” has no bearing and remains an external consideration. What is positive about the answer must lie in its being old enough that, from it, we can learn to conceive the possibilities the “Ancients” set up for us. By its very meaning, the answer provides a directive for concrete ontological research to begin questioning investigatively within the exposed horizon — and this is all the answer provides.

If in this way the answer to the question of being becomes the guiding directive for research, it follows that it is only adequately given when it leads to insight into the specific manner of previous ontology — the destinies of its questioning, discovering, and failing — as something necessary to being-there itself.

§6. The task of destructuring the history of ontology

All research — and not least research moving within the sphere of the central question of being — is an ontic possibility of being-there. The being of being-there finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the condition of the possibility of historicity as a temporal manner in which being-there itself is, quite apart from whether and how it is something “in time.” What we [will] determine as historicity precedes what is called history (world-historical happening). Historicity means the essential constitution of the “happening” of being-there as such; only on the ground of this happening can there be anything like [disciplines of] “world-history,” and can [these] historically belong to world-history. In its factual being, each instance of being-there is how and “what” it has already been. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. And it is this way not only in that its past drags along “behind,” as it were, and that it possesses past things as still on-hand properties occasionally affecting it. Being-there “is” its past in the manner of its own being — and, crudely stated, its being “happens” in each instance out of its future. In various ways of being, and in accordance with corresponding understandings of being, being-there has grown up within and into a received interpretation of being-there. It initially understands itself from this received interpretation — and, within a certain range, it constantly does so. This understanding discloses the possibilities of its being, and regulates them. Its own past — and this always means the past of its “generation” — does not follow behind it; rather, in each instance its past already moves ahead of it.

This elemental historicity of being-there can remain concealed from it. But it can also, in a certain way, be uncovered and undergo a cultivation of its own. Being-there can uncover, preserve, and explicitly track down tradition. The discovery of tradition, and the disclosure of what and how it “transmits,” can be undertaken as a task in its own right. In this way, being-there moves into the mode of being proper to historiographical questioning and researching. However, as a manner in which being-there poses questions, historiography — better, engagement in the telling of history — is only possible because being-there is in the ground of its being determined by historicity. If and as long as historicity remains concealed from being-there, the possibility of historiographical questioning and discovering of history is withheld from it. The absence of historicity is no evidence against the historicity of being-there; rather, as a deficient mode of the constitution of its being, such absence is evidence for it. An epoch can only be unhistoriographical because it is “historical.”

On the other hand, once being-there has comprehended the possibility lurking within it, not only of making its ex-sistence transparent to itself but also of tracking down the meaning of existentiality, and that means tracking down the meaning of being in a provisional way, and once our eyes have been opened to the essential historicity of being-there, then this one insight is inevitable: questioning about being, the questioning we indicated in its ontic-ontological necessity, is itself characterized by historicity. The elaboration of the question of being must therefore detect, in the innermost sense of its own questioning,
as itself historical, the directive to track down its own history, i.e. to become historiographical — and this in order to enact, while in full possession of its ownmost possibilities of inquiry, a positive appropriation of the past. The question about the meaning of being is of itself brought to understand itself as historiographical — in accordance with the manner in which this question gets enacted, i.e. as a precedential explication of being-there in its temporality and historicity.

Yet the preparatory interpretation of the fundamental structures of being-there with regard to its initial and average manner of being — wherein it is initially historical as well — will make it manifest that being-there not only has the inclination to collapse into the world in which it finds itself, and to interpret itself in the reflection of this world; in unison with all this, being-there also gets caught in its tradition, more or less explicitly comprehending it. Tradition then divests being-there of its own leadership, its questioning and its choosing. This holds not least for that understanding and its possible formation which is rooted in the innermost being of being-there — ontological understanding.

The tradition thereby gaining dominance makes what it “transmits” so little accessible that, instead, it initially and mostly covers it up. It entrusts to self-evidence what has been transmitted, it dislocates the access to the primordial “wellsprings” from which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. Tradition even makes us forget such provenance altogether. Indeed, it even undoes our capacity to understand the necessity of returning to such wellsprings. Tradition uproots the historicity of being-there to such an extent that all being-there can do is take an interest in the phantasmas for possible types, movements, and standpoint of philosophizing, and in the remotest and strangest cultures — and with this interest it seeks to veil its own groundlessness. As a result, for all the historiographical interest and zeal for a philologically “objective” interpretation, being-there no longer understands the most elemental conditions that alone make possible a positive return to the past, i.e. a productive appropriation of it.

At the outset (§1) it was shown that the question about the meaning of being was not only unresolved, not only inadequately positioned, but has also, for all the interest in “metaphysics,” fallen into oblivion. Greek ontology and its history, which throughout its many filiations and contortions still determines the conceptuality of philosophy, is proof that being-there understands both itself and being in general in terms of the “world,” and that the ontology that has emerged in this way is trapped in its own tradition — letting this tradition sink to self-evidence and mere material to be reworked (as in Hegel). Thus uprooted, Greek ontology becomes, in the Middle Ages, a fixed body of doctrine. Its systematics is anything but a joining together of inherited pieces into a single construction. Within the limits of its domastic adoption of the fundamental conceptions of being, this systematics contains much unpretentious work that does make advances. In its Scholastic mould, Greek ontology makes the essential transition, by way of Suarez’s disputationes metaphysicae, into the “metaphysics” and transcendental philosophy of the modern period, and still determines the fundamentals and the goals of Hegel’s Logic. Insofar as, in the course of this history, certain pre-eminent domains of being loom into view and continue to guide the problematic (the ego cogito of Descartes, subject, I, reason, spirit, person), these domains remain unexamined in regard to being, and in regard to their own being — in keeping with the thorough neglect of the question of being. Instead, the body of categories embedded within traditional ontology gets transferred to this one being [ego cogito, subject, ...], with corresponding formalizations and merely negative restrictions — or else dialectic is called upon to help in the effort to provide an ontological interpretation of the substantiality of the subject.

If the question of being is to attain to a transparency of its own history, there is a need to loosen up our hardened tradition, to dissolve the cover-ups that our tradition has fructified.* This task we understand as the destructuring of the inherited body of ancient ontology, one returning us to the primordial experiences in which the first, and from then on the guiding determinations of being were obtained. Such destructuring proceeds under the guidance of the question of being.

As an investigation displaying their “birth certificate,” this proof of the provenance of the basic concepts of ontology has nothing to do with the pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. Just as little does destructuring have the negative meaning of shaking off the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it intends to stake out this tradition in its positive possibilities — and this always means to stake out the limits factically given in the positioning of the question and the encircling of the possible field of investigation. This destructuring does not relate itself negatively to the past; its critique bears on the “current day,” on

---

* On the crucial metaphor of “fructifying,” see my annotation on p. 328.
the currently dominant manner of treating the history of ontology, whether inclined toward the history of opinions, ideas, or problems. Destructuring does not aim to bury the past in nothingness; it has a positive intention, and its negative function remains tacit and indirect.

Within the scope of this treatise, which aims at a fundamental elaboration of the question of being, we can carry out the destructuring of the history of ontology (which belongs essentially to the positioning of the question, and is only possible within this positioning) only in regard to the fundamentally decisive stations of this history.

In accordance with the positive drive of destructuring, the question we need first ask is whether and to what extent, in the course of the history of ontology, the interpretation of being has at all been thematically connected with the phenomenon of time, and then whether the necessary problematic of time-boundedness was or could be elaborated in its fundaments. The first and the only one who traversed a stretch of the path toward investigating the dimension of time-boundedness—or allowed himself to be driven there by the compelling force of the phenomena themselves—is Kant. Only once we achieve a focus on the problematic of time-boundedness can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. Along the way we will also be able to show why this area had to remain closed to Kant in its authentic dimensions and central ontological function. Kant himself was aware that he was venturing into an obscure area:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of activity we will likely never extract from nature and lay open to our gaze.

That from which Kant here shrinks, so to speak, must be brought to light in a thematic and fundamental way—if the expression “being” is ever to have a certifiable meaning. In the end, those phenomena that the following analysis will unfurl under the title “time-boundedness” are the most covert judgements of “common reason,” the analysis of which Kant defines as the “business of philosophers.”

While pursuing the task of destructuring under the guidance of the problematic of time-boundedness, the following treatise attempts to interpret Kant’s chapter on the schematism, and from there the Kantian doctrine of time. It will also show why Kant could not succeed in gaining insight into the problematic of time-boundedness. Two things prevented this insight: for one, the total neglect of the question of being and, in connection with this neglect, the lack of a thematic ontology of being-there—in Kantian language, the lack of a provisional ontological analytic of the subject’s subjectivity. Instead, for all his essential improvements, Kant dogmatically adopted Descartes’ position. As a result, his analysis of time still takes its orientation from the traditional and ordinary understanding of time, despite his reinsertion of this phenomenon into the [human] subject; and this is ultimately what prevents Kant from elaborating the phenomenon of a “transcendental role for time” in its own structure and function. As a consequence of this double after-effect of the tradition, the decisive connection between time and the “I think” remains entirely shrouded in obscurity; it does not even become a problem.

By taking over Descartes’ ontological position, Kant neglects something essential: an ontology of being-there. This neglect is a decisive one, given Descartes’ ownmost drive. With the cogito sum [I think therefore I am], Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure foundation for philosophy. However, what he leaves undetermined in this “radical” beginning is the being of the res cogitans, the way this [thinking thing] is, more exactly the meaning of the sum, the way it [the “am”] is. The elaboration of the tacit ontological foundations of the cogito sum occupies the second station on the path of the destructural return to the history of ontology. The interpretation not only presents evidence that Descartes had to neglect the question of the meaning altogether, but also shows why he came to the opinion that the absolute “certainty” of the cogito exempted him from the question of the meaning of this one being, how it is.

However, with Descartes it is not just a matter of this one neglect, and thus of a thorough ontological indeterminateness of the res cogitans sive mens sive animus [. . . whether mind or soul]. Descartes effects the fundamental reflections of his Meditations by transferring medieval ontology onto this one being he takes to be the fundamentum inconcussum [unshakable foundation]. He ontologically defines the res cogitans as ens, and for medieval ontology the meaning of ens, the way something is, is geared to an understanding of ens as ens creatum.
The common Greek word for “the present” is parousia, while ousia has the ordinary meaning of “estate.” In the first Book of Plato’s Republic the latter word can be translated as “wealth,” whereas later in that work, and in his Sophist, it seems to take on the meaning of “essence.” In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, “substance” seems appropriate and, in his Politics, “property.” Both thinkers assume that what makes things intelligible is what gives them presence — starting with the thought that each item on an estate “makes sense” only against the background presence of the whole estate. Heidegger himself raises the question of how, where and when an “estate” can become our own — or, rather, come into its own as we learn to “take” it as our own.

25 That Descartes is “dependent” on medieval Scholasticism, and that he uses its terminology — this anyone sees who is familiar with the Middle Ages. But with this “discovery” nothing is gained philosophically so long as it remains obscure to what profound extent medieval ontology influences the way posteriority determines (or does not determine) the res cogitans ontologically. The extent of this influence cannot be estimated until the meaning and limits of ancient ontology have been shown by an orientation toward the question of being. In other words, destructuring finds itself faced with the task of interpreting the soil of ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of time-boundedness. It then becomes manifest that the ancient interpretation of the being of beings is oriented toward the “world,” or toward “nature” in the broadest sense, and that it in fact takes its understanding of being from “time.” An external testimony of this — but of course it is only external — is the determination of the meaning of being as παρουσία, or οὐσία — which means, ontologically-temporally, “presentness.”* Each being is comprehended in its being as “presentness,” i.e. it is understood with an eye to a determinate mode of time, the “present.”

The problematic of Greek ontology must, like any other ontology, take its guideline from being-there itself. Being-there, i.e. the being of human being, is, both in the ordinary and in the philosophical “definition,” delimited as ζωον λόγον ἔχον, the living being whose being is essentially determined by its ability to talk. It is λέγειν (cf. §7 b) that supplies the guideline for attaining to the essential structures of that one being encountered in the addressing and discussing of beings arising for encounter. That is why the ancient ontology taking shape in Plato becomes “dialectic.” Once we progress in the elaboration of the guideline itself, i.e. of an “hermeneutics” of λόγος, there emerges the possibility of a more radical version of the problem of being. Then “dialectic,” which has been a veritable philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. The reason Aristotle “no longer had any understanding” of dialectic was that he placed it, raised it, onto a more radical plane. Then λέγειν itself, or νοεῖν (the direct [intellectual] perception of something on hand in its pure on-hand-ness, what Parmenides already took as the guiding thread of his interpretation of being) has the temporal structure of a pure “finding present” of something. Beings — those that show themselves in and for this “finding present,” and that are then understood as what really is — are accordingly interpreted with an eye to the present. That is, they are conceptualized as presentness (οὐσία).

Yet this Greek interpretation of being unfolds without any explicit awareness of the guideline serving it, without knowledge or understanding of the fundamental ontological function of time, without inspection of the ground of the possibility of this function. On the contrary: time itself is taken as one being among others, and the attempt is made to comprehend it, in its essential structure, from within the horizon of an understanding of being that is tacitly and naïvely oriented toward time itself.

Within the framework of the following fundamental elaboration of the question of being, we cannot offer a thorough interpretation of the time-bound foundations of ancient ontology — especially not of its intellectually highest and purest level in Aristotle. Instead, the elaboration offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on time,¹ which can be taken as the discrimin [decisive point] revealing the basis and limits of the ancient science of being.

Aristotle’s treatise on time is the first thorough interpretation of this phenomenon that has come down to us. It set the essential course for all subsequent construal of time — including that of Bergson. Also, from the analysis of Aristotle’s concept of time it will become retrospectively clear...

---

1 Physics, Δ 10-14, 217 b 29 through 224 a 17.
that the Kantian construal of time still moves within the structures unfurled by Aristotle; this means that, for all the differences in its new manner of questioning, Kant’s ontological orientation remains, in its fundament, that of the Greeks.

Only once we have completed the destructuring of our ontological tradition does the question of being attain its veritable concretion. In doing so we obtain solid evidence that we cannot avoid the question about the meaning of being, and in this way we demonstrate the meaning of talking about the “repetition” of this question.*

In this field, where “the matter itself is profoundly veiled,” every investigation should refrain from overestimating its results. For this kind of questioning constantly forces itself to face the possibility of the disclosure of a still more primordial, still more universal horizon from which one might draw the answer to the question: What does “being” mean? We can only debate such possibilities seriously, and with positive outcome, when once again the question of being is awakened and a field has been opened where thoughts can compete in a verifiable manner.

§7. The Phenomenological Method of Investigation

With the provisional characterization of the thematic object of our investigation (the being of beings, or just the meaning of being), its method also seems already to be prefigured. The task of ontology is to bring the being of beings into relief and to explicate being itself. And the method of ontology remains highly questionable so long as we wish merely to consult historically transmitted ontologies or similar efforts. Since in our investigation the term “ontology” is used in a formally broad sense, the approach of clarifying its method by tracing its history is automatically precluded.

In using the term “ontology” we do not refer to some one deter-

minate philosophical discipline standing in relation to others. It should not at all be our task to satisfy the demands of any pre-given discipline. On the contrary: a discipline inevitably takes shape from the in-built necessities of determinate questions, and from a style of handling them that “the matters themselves” demand.

With the guiding question of the meaning of being, the investigation stands within the fundamental question of philosophy itself. The style of handling this question is the phenomenological one. This treatise does not thereby subscribe to any “standpoint,” nor to any “movement”—because, so long as it understands itself, phenomenology neither is nor can become any such thing. The expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize what the objects of philosophical research are, what it bears on, but rather its how. The more genuinely a concept of method unfolds itself, and the more comprehensively it determines the fundamental flow of a discipline, the more primordially it is rooted in the struggle with the matters themselves and the more it distances itself from what we call technical manipulation, the likes of which are also legion in theoretical disciplines.

The term “phenomenology” expresses a maxim, one that can be formulated: “To the things themselves!”—as opposed to all free-floating constructions and incidental discoveries, as opposed to taking over concepts only apparently demonstrated, and as opposed to those pseudo-questions that often spread through whole generations as “problems.” But, one might object, this maxim is abundantly self-evident, and, moreover, is an expression of the principle of all scientific knowledge. It is not clear why this self-evident commonplace should be explicitly inserted into the name designating an investigation. Indeed, at stake here is a “self-evidence,” one we want to bring in closer to ourselves, insofar as it helps to illuminate the procedure of this treatise. We shall explicate only the initial concept of phenomenology.

The expression has two components: phenomenon and logos. Both go back to Greek terms: φαινόμενον and λόγος. Viewed from the outside, the word phenomenology is formed like those of theology, biology, and sociology, names we translate as science of God, of life, and of community. Accordingly, phenomenology would be the science of phenomena. The initial concept of phenomenology we shall unfurl by characterizing the meaning of each component, “phenomenon” and “logos” and by getting a focus on the meaning of the compounded name.

---

* In his 1955 lecture “The Question of Being” Heidegger comments:

The “destructuring” discussed in Being and Time has only one intent: by dismantling current and empty conceptions, to win back the primordial experience of being lurking in metaphysics.

Headings such as “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” will always have a double meaning: the inherited conception and the lurking possibility.

1 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, A88, B121. [N. K. Smith translates very loosely: “the inevitable difficulty of the undertaking.”]
The history of the word itself, which seems to have originated in the Wolffian school, is here without any significance.

§7. The Phenomenological Method

A. The concept of phenomenon

The Greek expression φαινομενον, from which the term “phenomenon” derives, stems from the verb φαινεσθαι, meaning “to show itself.” Thus φαινομενον means: what it is that shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest. As for φαινεσθαι itself, it is a middle voice form of φαινον, to bring to the light of day, to place into the light; and φαινον has the root φα-, as in φως, light, i.e. that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. To be born in mind as the meaning of the expression “phenomenon” is this: what shows itself in itself, what is manifest. The φαινομενα, the “phenomena,” then comprise the totality of what lies in the light of day, or can be brought to light — what the Greeks sometimes identified with τα δινα (beings). Yet beings can show themselves in various ways, depending on our manner of access to them. There is even the possibility that beings show themselves as something they are not. In this kind of self-showing a being “looks like…” Such self-showing we call seeming. And so in Greek the expression φαινομενον, phenomenon, also has the meaning: what looks like, what seems to be, “seeming”; φαινομενον δεικνυθαι means a good that looks like, but is not “in reality” what it gives itself out to be. For any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon everything depends on seeing how what is named in these two meanings of φαινομενον (“phenomenon” as what shows itself and “phenomenon” as seeming) coalesces in its structure. Only inasmuch as something strives to show itself, i.e. to be a phenomenon, can it show itself as something that it is not — can it “only look like…” Already in the one meaning of φαινομενον (“seeming”) there lies the primordial meaning (phenomenon: the manifest) as founding the other. We assign the term “phenomenon” to the positive and primordial meaning of φαινομενον, and distinguish this from seeming as its privative modification. What both terms express has from the start nothing whatsoever to do with what is called “appearance,” let alone “mere appearance.”

As in the talk of “appearances of illness”: what is meant are occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing, as the self-showing, “indicate” something that does not show itself. The emergence of such occurrences, their self-showing, coincides with on-hand disturbances that do not show themselves. Accordingly, appearance as appearance “of something” means precisely not “showing itself” but rather the reporting, by way of something that does show itself, of something that does not show itself. Appearing is a not showing itself. This “not” we should under no circumstances confound with the primitive one figuring in the structure of seeming. What does not show itself — as in the manner of something appearing — can also never seem. All indications, depictions, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though these do differ among themselves.

Although “appearing” is not, and is never, a self-showing in the way a phenomenon is, appearing is still possible only on the basis of a self-showing of something. But this self-showing enabling appearance is not itself the appearing. The appearing is a self-reporting by way of something that shows itself. If it is now said that with the word “appearance” we are referring to something within which something appears without itself being an appearance, such talk fails to encompass — but rather presupposes — the concept of phenomenon. This presupposition remains concealed because in such talk of “appearance” the expression “to appear” takes on two meanings: that wherein something “appears” means that wherein something reports itself, i.e. does not show itself; and in the phrase “without being itself ‘appearance,’” appearance means the showing of itself. Yet this self-showing belongs essentially to that “wherein” in which something reports itself. On this account, phenomena are never appearances, but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena. If one defines “phenomenon” with the help of the concept of “appearance” (a concept which is, moreover, still unclear), then everything is turned upside down — and a “critique” of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking.

The expression “appearance” can itself mean two things: for one, appearing in the sense of reporting itself as not showing itself, and then also the reporting itself, a self-showing indicating that there is something not showing itself. And of course one can use “appearance” as a name for phenomenon in the genuine sense, the self-showing. If one designates these three different conditions as “appearance,” confusion is inevitable.

Yet “appearance” can assume still another meaning, and this only increases the confusion. Taking the reporting that, in its self-showing, indicates something non-manifest — taking this sense of appearance as

---

34 The history of the word itself, which seems to have originated in the Wolffian school, is here without any significance.

35 Introduction: The Question of Being

36 §7. The Phenomenological Method

29 A. The concept of phenomenon

29 In this case [as in the appearances of an illness: symptoms, signs]
what it is about the non-manifest itself that comes to the fore—as what radiates from the non-manifest, and in such a way that the non-manifest gets thought as what is by its own nature never manifest: then “appearance” means as much as producing, or even what is produced (this latter, though, not constituting the authentic being of what does the producing: appearance in the sense of “mere appearance”). What reports itself (as itself produced) does show itself, and in such a way that, as the radiation of what it reports, it constantly veils what it reports. But this not-showing, this veiling, is not yet seeming. Kant employs the term appearance in this connection. In his use, appearances are the “objects of empirical intuition”—what shows itself in such intuition. This self-showing (phenomenon, in the genuine primordial sense) is also “appearance” as the radiation reporting something that conceals itself in the appearance.

Inasmuch as there is a phenomenon even when something “appears” in the sense of reporting itself by way of a self-showing, and inasmuch as this phenomenon can then transform itself privatively into seeming, appearance can become mere seeming—illusion. Under certain lighting conditions someone can look as if he were flushed: the self-showing redness of his cheeks can then be taken as reporting the presence of a fever, which in turn indicates a disturbance in the organism.

Phenomenon—the showing of itself as itself—signifies a distinctive manner in which something gets encountered. In contrast, appearance means an indicational relation within a being such that what does the indicating (the reporting) can only perform its function when it shows itself, and does this showing as itself: is “phenomenal.” In different ways, both appearance and illusion are founded in phenomenon. The confusing multiplicity of “phenomena”—carrying the names “phenomenon,” “seeming,” “appearance,” and “mere appearance”—can only be disentangled if right from the start we understand the concept of phenomenon, namely as what shows itself by itself.

If in this understanding of the concept of phenomenon it remains undetermined which being it is we are addressing as a phenomenon, and if it remains undecided whether what is showing itself in any given instance is a being or rather a characteristic of the being of this being, then one has simply obtained the formal concept of phenomenon. If, however, what is showing itself we understand those beings accessible in empirical intuition (as in Kant), the formal concept of phenomenon takes on a legitimate application. This usage satisfies the ordinary concept of phenomenon. This ordinary concept, however, is not the phenomenological concept. Within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can illustrate what we shall conceptualize phenomenologically with the term “phenomenon” by saying this (disregarding other differences): what shows itself in appearances (in each case preceding and accompanying the phenomenon in the ordinary sense, yet still unthematic) can be brought thematically into self-showing, and this showing of itself as itself (in Kant, the “forms of intuition”) are the phenomena of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way—they must be able to become phenomenon—if, when he says that space is the a priori “wherein” of an order, Kant is laying claim to a transcendental statement grounded in the matter itself.

Now, if the phenomenological concept of phenomenon is at all to be understood (apart from how we might determine more exactly what it is that shows itself), one unavoidable precondition is insight into the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon, and into how it may be legitimately employed in one of its ordinary meanings. —Before getting a focus on the concept of phenomenology we must delimit the meaning of λόγος, so that it becomes clear in what sense phenomenology can ever be a “science of” phenomena.

B. The concept of logos

In Plato and Aristotle the concept of λόγος has many meanings, and in such a way that these meanings strain in divergent directions without positive guidance from any basic meaning. In fact this only seems to be the case; it’s an illusion that perseveres only so long as our interpretation of their works is unable to comprehend appropriately the basic meaning in its primary content. When we say that the basic meaning of λόγος is talk, this literal translation is fully valid only when we determine what talk itself means. Later developments in the meaning of λόγος, and above all the multiple and capricious interpretations of subsequent philosophy, constantly conceal the authentic meaning of talk, a meaning which is often plain enough. Increasingly, λόγος gets “translated,” i.e. always interpreted, as reason, judgement, concept, definition, ground, proportion. How might “talk” have this ability to modify itself, so that λόγος means all these things, and this within scholarly usage? Even if λόγος is understood in the sense of assertion, and assertion as
“judgement,” this apparently correct translation can still miss the fundamental meaning, especially if judgement is understood in the manner of some contemporary “theory of judgement”; λόγος does not mean judgement, in any case does not primarily mean this, if judgement is understood as “connecting” [a predicate with a subject] or as “taking a stand” (acknowledging or rejecting).

Much rather, λόγος as talk means δηλοῦν, making manifest what, in the talk, “the talk is all about.” Aristotle explicated this function of talk more precisely as ἀποφαίνεσθαι. A λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what the talk is about — and this for the one who is talking (the medium), or for those who are talking with one another. Talk “lets something be seen” from, ἀπὸ...: from whatever the talk is about. In genuine talk (ἀποφαίνεσθαι), what is said will be drawn from what is talked about, so that any talked communication will, in what it says, make manifest, and therefore accessible to others, what it talks about. Such is the structure of λόγος as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, “apophantical talk.” Not every kind of “talking” suits this mode of making manifest, the mode of letting something be seen by pointing it up. For example, requesting (ἐπιχείρησις) makes something manifest, but in a different way.

In concrete performance, talking (letting something be seen) takes the form of speaking, a voiced sounding-out in words. Then λόγος is φωνή, more exactly φωνὴ μετὰ φαντασίας — a voiced sounding-out where in each case something is sighted.

And only because the function of λόγος (as ἀποφαίνεσθαι) lies in letting something be seen (in pointing it up), can it take the structural form of σύνθεσις, “synthesis.” Here, synthesis does not mean the associating or conjoining of representations, the tinkering with psychical occurrences, whereupon there arises the “problem” of how these associations, as inside, can agree with the physical conditions outside. Rather, the συν, the “with,” has a purely apophantical meaning, and says: letting something be seen as something — seen in its togetherness with something else.

And then too, because λόγος is a letting be seen, it can therefore be true or false. Here everything depends on freeing oneself from any concept of truth construed as an “agreement” of some sort. In no way is this idea of agreement (or correspondence) the primary concept of ἀλήθεια, “truth.” The “being true” of a λόγος means, as ἀλήθευεν: in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, while talking apophantically, to bring out of its concealment what the talk is coming from, to let it be seen as unconcealed (ἀλήθεις) — to uncover.* In the same manner “being false,” ἀλήθευεν, means as much as deceiving, this construed as covering up: to place something in front of something (by way of letting the one be seen) and thereby to pass it off as something it is not.

Because “truth” has this sense, and because λόγος is a determinate mode of letting be seen, we cannot rightly acclaim λόγος as the primary “location” of truth. When, as so often happens these days, truth gets determined as what “really” pertains to judgement, and Aristotle is invoked to support this thesis, not only is this invocation unjustified: more importantly, the Greek concept of truth is misunderstood. In the Greek sense, what counts as “true,” more primordially than does the λόγος we have discussed, is ἀφθασία: the straightforward sensible perception of something. Insofar as an instance of ἀφθασία is directed to what is proper to it (its ιδία), namely to the being that in each case becomes intrinsically accessible by and for such perception (e.g. sight directed toward colors), perception is always true. Thus: seeing always uncovers colors, hearing always uncovers sounds. Still, in the most pure and most primordial sense of truth, it is pure ἀποφαίνεσθαι — the perception straightforwardly detecting the simplest determinations of how a being itself is — that is “true,” i.e., that only uncovers, so that it can never cover up anything. This ἀποφαίνεσθαι can never cover up, never be false, it can at most remain an imperception, ἄνοφαίνεσθαι, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access.

What no longer takes active shape as a pure letting-see, but rather recurs, in its pointing up, to something else, and in this way lets something be seen as something: this, with its structure of synthesis, takes on the possibility of covering things up. The “truth” belonging to a judgement is only the counter-movement to such cover-up — i.e., a

---

1 Cf. On Interpretation, Chapters 1 — 6; also, Metaphysics, Book Seven, Chapter 4, and Nicomachean Ethics, Book Seven. [Heidegger’s commentary follows these texts very closely.]
multiply founded phenomenon of truth. Realism and idealism alike
thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth, from which
alone the possibility of anything like a “doctrine of ideas” can be
understood as philosophical cognition.

And because the function of λόγος lies in its letting something be
seen straightforwardly — in letting things be perceived, apprehended — it
can mean reason in the sense of intellectual apprehension. And then
again, because λόγος gets used not only in the meaning of λέγειν
(“saying”) but also in the meaning of λέγομενον (“what is said,” what is
pointed out as such), and because this in turn is nothing other than the
διοκετέμενον (what in each instance lies always on hand as the basis
for each incipient addressing and discussing), λόγος qua λέγομενον means
reason in the sense of ground, ratio. And, finally, because λόγος qua
λέγομενον can also mean what is addressed as something which has
become visible in its bearing on something else, in its “relatedness,”
λόγος takes on the meaning of relationship or proportion.

May this interpretation of “apophantic talk” suffice for the
clarification of the primary function of λόγος.

C. The concept of phenomenology

If we think through concretely what has been exhibited in the
interpretation of “phenomenon” and “logos,” we will be struck by how
what is intended by each of these terms bears intimately on what is
intended by the other. The expression “phenomenology” we may
formulate in Greek: λεγειν τα ϕαινομενα, “saying the phenomena”; but
λεγειν means αποφαινεσθαι. Phenomenology then means:
απο-ϕαινεσθαι τα ϕαινομενα: to let be seen, from itself, what shows itself,
and in the way it shows itself from itself. Here is the formal meaning
of the research that calls itself phenomenology. But this expresses
nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To the things
themselves!”

Accordingly, the term “phenomenology” differs in its meaning from
such designations as “theology” and the like. These name the objects
of their respective sciences, each in regard to its content. “Phenomenology
names neither the object of its research, nor does the term characterize
the content of the research. The word tells us only about how things are to
be pointed up, how we are to treat whatever might be considered
in this science. Science “of” phenomena means: getting hold of its
objects in such a way that everything that gets discussed must be
considered as it is directly shown and directly identified. The expression
“descriptive phenomenology” (which is basically tautological) has the
very same meaning. Here, description does not mean the kind of
procedure one finds, say, in botanical morphology. Once again, the term
introduces a prohibition: Keep away from every act of determining that
does not draw something identifiable into view! The way this description
works, the specific meaning of its λόγος, can only be stipulated in
reference to, and out of, the “whatness” of what is to be “described,” i.e.
brought into scientific determinateness while retaining the manner in
which it is encountered as phenomenon. Formally speaking, the meaning
of the formal and ordinary concept of phenomenon justifies us in calling
“phenomenology” any manner of pointing up beings as they show
themselves by themselves.*

What then must we take account of so that the formal concept
of phenomenon will be deформalized into the phenomenological one? And
how does this one get distinguished from the ordinary one? What is it
that phenomenology might “let us see”? What is it that should be called
“phenomenology” in a distinguished sense? What is it that, by its very
nature, serves as the theme to be pointed up explicitly? [The answer:]
Manifestly, a theme that initially and mostly does not show itself, one
that, in contrast to what does initially and mostly show itself, remains
concealed while also being something that essentially belongs to what
initially and mostly does show itself, and in such a way that it constitutes
the latter’s meaning and ground.†

* In short: this science “of” is really science “from.” In his later works,
Heidegger more and more recurs to a thought implied in this account
of phenomenology: fully thoughtful discourse incarnates primarily, if not
exclusively, a response to what addresses us (“we only discern what concerns
us”: Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 100). He then recognizes that it is
misleading to call such thinking “scientific,” since even the broadest meaning
of “science” implies the priority of a pre-established framework — a promotion
of it rather than of the encounter with phenomena addressing us.

† Truth of being. [In his later works, Heidegger repeatedly argues that
traditional philosophy focuses on the truth of beings, i.e. on how we know
phenomena. He then distinguishes this concern for truth from his own concern
for the truth of being, i.e. for the ways that the being of beings concerns us,
takes us into its draw precisely in its withdrawal — this draw then “con-
Now, what in a special sense remains concealed—or falls back again under cover, or only shows itself “distortedly”—is not this or that being; rather, as the foregoing considerations have shown, it is the being of these beings. This can be covered up to such an extent that it is forgotten, that the question about it and about its meaning does not get raised. What phenomenology thematically “takes in hand” as its object is then this: what demands to become phenomenon—in a distinguished sense, where the demand issues from the matter itself.

Phenomenology is a manner of access to, and the revelatory manner of determining, whatever is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is only possible as phenomenology. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, of what shows itself, bears on the being of beings, its meaning, its modifications and derivations. And the self-showing is not just any self-showing, nor anything like appearing. Least of all can the being of beings ever be something “behind” which something else lurks, “something not appearing.”

“Behind” the phenomena of interest in phenomenology lurks, by their very nature, nothing at all. Still, what is to become phenomenon can be concealed. And precisely because phenomena are initially and mostly not given is there a need for phenomenology. The counter-concept to “phenomenon” is covered-up-ness.

There are various ways in which phenomena are covered up. For one, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it is still entirely undiscovered: there is neither information nor misinformation about it. Then, too, a phenomenon can be buried: here, the phenomenon was at some earlier time uncovered, but has since gone undercover. This latter can happen totally, but as a rule what has earlier been uncovered does remain visible, only now as seeming—illusion. However, where there is seeming there is “being.” This kind of covering up, i.e. “disguising,” is the most frequent and the most dangerous, since here the possibilities of deception and misguidance are especially persistent. Within a “system,” the structures of being and their corresponding concepts can perhaps assert themselves rightly; they are after all available, just veiled in their rootedness. Constructively bolstered within a system, they take on the status of what needs no further justification; they are “clear” and therefore serviceable as the departure-point for progressive deductions.*

The cover-up, whether construed as concealment or burial or distortion, again has two possible versions. There are incidental cover-ups and there are necessary cover-ups—ones having their basis in the condition of the thing discovered. Every phenomenological concept or proposition drawn from its source can degenerate when communicated in an assertion: it gets circulated in a vacuous intelligibility, loses its rootedness, and becomes a free-floating thesis. Right within the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lies the possibility that what primordially offers a “good grip” becomes stiff and slippery. And the difficulty of this research consists precisely in keeping it critically disposed toward itself in a positive way.

Our first and abiding task is to wrest from the objects of phenomenology the manner in which being, and in which the structures of being, can protrude in the mode of phenomenon.† Thus the departure-point of the analysis, as well as the access-point to the phenomenon and the passage through the prevailing cover-ups, must secure its own method. In the idea of an “originary” and “intuitive” hold on and explication of phenomena there lies an opposition to the naïveté of incidental, “immediate,” and unreflective “beholding.”

Having delimited the concept of phenomenology in rough fashion, we can now achieve a focus on the meaning of the terms “phenomenal” and “phenomenological.” We call “phenomenal” what is given in the manner of a phenomenon and can be explicated as such; we can therefore talk about phenomenal structures. We call “phenomenological” everything belonging to this manner of identification and explication, and therefore serviceable as the departure-point for progressive deductions.†

* Here and throughout, Heidegger invites us to dwell at the point of “conversion” from thinking “downwards” to thinking “upwards” — as first formulated by Plato in his Republic, 510B-518D.

† In his later works, Heidegger reconsiders the appropriateness of “wresting.” Cf. the end of his essay on Aristotle’s concept of nature (available in Pathmarks) where, in reference to Heraclitus’ “nature loves to hide,” he remarks that what is called for is not that we overcome the hiding, rip something from it, but rather that we leave nature her hiding, in all its purity, as what belongs to her—a much more difficult task, as many myths suggest. On p. 222, Heidegger does associate the violence of “overcoming” and “ripping” more with discovery than with disclosure (a distinction only later worked out).
everything constituting the conceptuality required in this research.

Because phenomenon understood phenomenologically is always just what constitutes being, and being is in each instance the being of some being, what we first of all need, in our intention to expose being, is that this one being become available. Moreover, this one being must show itself within the manner of access that intrinsically belongs to it. And so the ordinary concept of phenomenon does become phenomenologically relevant. The first task of “phenomenologically” securing the exemplary being [= being-there] as the departure-point for an authentic analysis is always already pre-figured in the goal of the analysis itself.*

Considered in reference to its content, phenomenology is the science of the being of beings — ontology. During the elucidation of the tasks of ontology the necessity of a fundamental ontology emerged, one having as its ontologically and ontically distinguished theme one being, being-there — and in such a way that this ontology is brought before the cardinal problem, the question about the meaning of being in general. In the course of the investigation itself this much will emerge: the method of phenomenological description proceeds as interpretation. The λόγος of the phenomenology of being-there takes the shape of ἐρμηνεύειν: in and through the act of interpreting, the authentic meaning of being, and the basic structures of its own being, are divulged to the understanding of being that already belongs to being-there. Pheno-

omenology of being-there is hermeneutics — in the original meaning of the word, according to which it designates the work of interpretation. But inasmuch as the uncovering of the meaning of being, and of the basic structures of being-there in general, establishes the horizon for all further ontological investigation of beings not taking their measure from being-there, this hermeneutics becomes “hermeneutics” in a second sense: the elaboration of the conditions of the possibility of any ontological investigation. And, finally, inasmuch as being-there has ontological primacy over every other being — since it is in its possibility of existence — hermeneutics, as interpretation of being-there, receives a specific, a third meaning (philosophically understood, the primary one): the analysis of the existentiality of ex-sistence. In this hermeneutics — inasmuch as it elaborates ontologically the historicity of being-there as the ontic condition of the possibility of historiography — lie the roots of what can be called “hermeneutics” only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those disciplines in the humanities that proceed historiographically.

Being, understood as the basic theme of philosophy, is no genus of beings, and yet it pertains to each and every being. Its “universality” is to be sought higher. Being and the structure of being lie beyond each and every being, beyond each and every possible determination we make about beings. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. The transcendence of the being of being-there is a distinguished one, inasmuch as it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of being as transcendens is transcendental cognition. Phenomenological truth (disclosure of being) is veritas transcendentalis.

Ontology and phenomenology are not two differing disciplines among others belonging to philosophy. The two terms characterize philosophy itself, the one its object and the other the way it proceeds. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutics of being-there; as analysis of ex-sistence, hermeneutics ties the knot of the guiding thread of all philosophical

* Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of “analysis”: (1) the descriptive taking-apart (e.g., of Aristotle’s concept of time) and (2) the projective account of the way things are “projectively” (viz. of being-there). This distinction is implicit in Being and Time, but stated explicitly in Collected Works, Vol. 67, p. 132.

a Being — not genus, not being for beings universally; the “in general” = καθολου = in the whole of: being of beings; meaning of the difference. [Heidegger here calls attention to something bothersome about the phrase “in general” occurring throughout the work: it tends to suggest the traditional concern to formulate generalizations about how things are, “universals” as against “particulairs”; instead, Heidegger invites us to think about wholeness, as the Greek adverb suggests, and to question the difference between being and beings.]

b “ex-sistence” understood in the manner of fundamental ontology, i.e. as bearing down on the truth of being, and only in this manner!

§7. The Phenomenological Method
questioning at the point where such questioning springs up and to which it pulls back.*

The following investigations only became possible owing to the groundwork laid by Edmund Husserl, with whose Logical Investigations phenomenology achieved its breakthrough. The elucidation of the concept of it shows that what is essential about phenomenology does not lie in its actualizing a “movement.” Possibility stands higher than actuality. Phenomenology becomes intelligible only when we apprehend it as possibility.†

About the cumbersomeness, the “inelegance” of expression during the following analysis, this much may be said: it is one thing to tell stories about how beings are, another to lay hold of beings in their being. For this second task, not only are the words mostly lacking, but even more the “grammar.” If an allusion to earlier and (in their level of achievement) incomparable analyses of being be permitted, compare the ontological parts of Plato’s Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics with one of Thucydides’ stories: then one can see just how stunning the formulations were that the Greeks had to undergo from their philosophers. And where our powers are essentially less, and where in addition the domain of being to be disclosed is much more difficult than the one presented to the Greeks, the awkwardness of concept-formation and severity of expression will increase.

§8. Outline of the treatise

The question about the meaning of being is the most universal and the most empty; yet within this question there also lies the possibility of its ownmost acute individualization as it bears down on each instance of being-there. To attain to the basic concept of “being” and to prefigure the ontological conceptuality required by it as well as the necessary variations of this conceptuality, we need a concrete guideline. The “specialness” of the investigation—i.e., the penetration to the concept by way of a special interpretation of one determinate being, being-there, whereupon we should attain the horizon of understanding and of possible interpretation of being—does not conflict with the universality of the concept of being. This one being is in itself “historical,” so that the most proper ontological illumination of this one being necessarily becomes an “historiographical” interpretation.

The elaboration of the question of being branches into two tasks, corresponding to which the treatise falls into two parts:

First Part: The interpretation of being-there in view of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question about being.

Second Part: The basics of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology, following the guidelines of the problematic of time-boundedness.

Part One consists of three Divisions:
1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there.
2. Being-there and temporality.
3. Time and being. b

* In his “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger writes:
I say in Being and Time (p. 38) that all questioning of philosophy “pulls back into existence.” But existence is here not the actuality of the ego cogito. It is also not just the actuality of subjects coming to themselves by working for and with one another. Fundamentally distinct from all existentia and existence, “ex-sistence” is the ex-static dwelling in the nearness of being.

† If the following investigation moves a few steps forward in the disclosure of “things themselves,” the author must above all thank Edmund Husserl, who brought the author, during his studies at Freiburg, into an intimacy with the various areas of phenomenological research — by providing his own penetrating personal guidance, and by generously sharing his unpublished investigations. [Heidegger was Husserl’s assistant, not his student.]
Part Two likewise takes a three-fold form:

1. Kant’s doctrine of the schematism and of time as the initial stage of the problematic of time-boundedness.
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes’ *cogito sum* and the resumption of medieval ontology in the problematic of the *res cogitans*.
3. Aristotle’s treatise on time as the *discrimum* [decisive point] of the phenomenal basis of ancient ontology, and of its limits.*

---

* Only the first two Divisions of Part One exist. To the 1953 edition of *Being and Time* Heidegger added a note regarding the plan of the treatise:

> The designation “First Half” appended to previous editions has been dropped. After a quarter century the second half [Division Three of Part One, plus the whole of Part Two] could not be affixed without the first being reworked. This path remains still today a necessary one, if the question about being is to move our being-there.

> For an elucidation of this question, the reader may refer to my *Introduction to Metaphysics*. It presents the text of lectures held in the summer semester of 1935.

Actually, much of Heidegger’s very late work can be read as a “replacement” of Division Three of Part One, or at least as intimating the reversal of thinking devoted to “beings not taking their measure from being-there.” Then, too, Heidegger has since analyzed to some extent each of the three “stations” he planned to destructure in Part Two: most obviously the first “station” in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929).

---

Part One

The Interpretation of Being-there
in Reference to Temporality*

and

the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question about Being*b

---

*a* Only this much in this published portion.

*b* On this portion, see the Marburg lectures of the summer semester 1927 (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [Indiana U. Press, 1982]).
Division One
Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Being-there

Chapter One
The Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Being-there

§9. The theme of the analysis of being-there

§10. Contrasting the analysis of being-there with anthropology, psychology, and biology

§11. Existential analysis and the interpretation of primitive being-there. The difficulties in securing a “natural concept of world”

In the question about the meaning of being, first to be examined is that one being we construe as being-there. In keeping with its own uniqueness, the preparatory existential analysis of being-there stands in need of an exposition prefiguring it, and of a demarcation distinguishing it from apparently similar investigations (Chapter One). Recalling the point of departure we have settled on for the investigation, we must then lay bare a fundamental structure of being-there: being-in-world (Chapter Two). This “a priori,” revealed in the interpretation of being-there, is not just a set of determinations cobbled together, it is rather a structure that is primordially and constantly whole. However, the interpretation does provide various perspectives on the factors constituting the structure. We must bring these factors into phenomenal relief while keeping in view the wholeness of this structure that in each case already prevails. Thus, the object of our analysis comprises: the world in its worldliness (Chapter Three), being-in-world as being with others and being oneself (Chapter Four), and being-in as such (Chapter Five). On the basis of the analysis of this fundamental structure a provisional indication of the being of being-there becomes possible: its existential meaning is care (Chapter Six).

§9. The theme of the analysis of being-there

The being setting the task of our analysis is in each case we ourselves. The being of this one being is in each case mine. By its very being, this

\[50\]

\[51\]

\[50\]

\[51\]
one being relates itself to its being. As the one being having this being [of self-relation], it is entrusted to its own being. What is in each case at issue for this one being is: being. From this characterization of being-there two things follow:

1. The “essence” of this one being lies in its yet-to-be. The whatness (essentia) of this being must be conceived in terms of its being (existentia) — assuming that we can here speak about whatness at all. Then, too, the ontological task is precisely to show that, when we choose to designate the being of this one being as ex-sistence, the term does not have, nor ever can have, the ontological meaning of existentia as our tradition understands it; ontologically, existentia more or less means being on hand, a manner of being essentially inappropriate to anything characterizable as being-there. We can avoid confusion by always using the interpretative expression on-hand-ness for [what is traditionally intended by] the term existentia, and reserve [the term] ex-sistence solely for determining the way being-there is.

The “essence” of being-there lies in its ex-sistence. The characteristics to be elicited from this being are therefore not on-hand “attributes” of some on-hand being that “looks like” such-and-such; rather each characteristic is a possible way for it to be, and only that. Every being-such-and-such of this one being is primarily [its] being. For this reason the term with which we designate this one being, “being-there,” does not express its “what” in the manner that “table,” “house,” “tree” do, but rather [its] being.

2. The being that is at stake for this one being in its being is in each case mine. Thus being-there is never to be understood ontologically as an instance or example of a genus of beings considered as things on hand. For such beings, their being is “indifferent”; more accurately, they “are” in a way that, for them, their being can be neither indifferent nor non-indifferent. When addressing being-there, we must, given its

---

§9. The Theme of the Analysis of Being-there

And then, too, being-there is mine to be — in each case, one way or another. Somehow it has in any case already been decided in which way being-there is mine. This one being, for whom in its very being its being is at issue, relates itself to its being as to its ownmost possibility. Being-there is in each instance its possibility; it does not “have” it in a proprietary way, as something on hand. And because being-there is in each instance essentially its possibility, it can choose itself, gain itself in its own being; then again it can lose itself, or else never — and only “apparently” — gain itself. It is able to have lost itself, it is able not yet to have gained itself, only because, by its very nature, it is a possible being, one that is possibly authentic, i.e. one that is as coming into its own. These two modes of being — authenticity and inauthenticity (and these expressions are taken terminologically in the strict sense of the word*) — are grounded in being-there itself: as determined in each instance to be mine. Yet the inauthenticity of being-there does not signify anything like being “less” or having a “lower” degree of being. On the contrary, inauthenticity can characterize being-there in its fullest concretion, as when busy, excited, interested, or having a great time.

The two characteristics of being-there just sketched out — first the primacy of “existentia” over essentia, and then its being in each case mine — already indicate that an analysis of this one being finds itself placed before a peculiar phenomenal domain. This one being does not have, nor can it ever have, the manner of being had by something on hand within the world. Therefore we cannot make it available to ourselves thematically the way we can when finding things on hand. The proper availability of being-there is so little a matter of course that the determination of this availability constitutes an essential part of the ontological analysis directed toward it. The possibility of making the

---

a But this is historical being-in-world [otherwise the formulation “self relating to itself” would simply resume Kierkegaard’s concern with individuality; cf. the latter’s Sickness unto Death].

b What being [is at issue]? To be the there, and herein to “pass the test” of being.

c That it “has” to be; foreordination!

d the being “of” the there — the “of”: genitivus objectivus [i.e., the being of being-there comes from its there].

* The word here is the auto (“own self”) of the Greek αυτόνικης, one who does things alone, by oneself. Being-there is always at the “place where three roads meet”: it has arrived on one, and has two possibilities — soon described as taking or not taking itself (starting with the first road) as its own. Division One brings the first road into relief; Division Two brings the “stresses and strains” of the other two into relief.
being of this one being at all intelligible stands or falls with the securing of its proper availability. However provisional the analysis may be, it always already requires the assurance of a proper starting point.

In each case, being-there takes on determinateness, as a being, from a possibility that it itself is, and somehow understands itself in its being: this is the formal meaning of how being-there is constituted as existence. Herein then lies the directive for ontologically interpreting this one being: to unravel the problematic of its being from the existentiality of its ex-sistence. However, this cannot mean constructing being-there from a concrete possible idea of ex-sistence. Precisely at the outset of the analysis we must avoid interpreting being-there within the difference of a determinate mode of ex-sisting; we must rather uncover it in its indifference — as it initially and mostly is. This indifference characteristic of the everydayness of being-there is not nothing; it is rather a positive phenomenal character of this one being. From this way of being, and back into it, every instance of ex-sisting is the way it is. We call this everyday indifference of being-there its averageness.

And because, now, average everydayness constitutes the ontic way this one being initially is, it has always been and will ever again be passed over in the explication of being-there. What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically farthest, unrecognized, and constantly overlooked in its ontological significance. When Augustine asks: *quid autem propinquius meipso mihi, “What is closer to me than myself,”* and must answer: *ego certe laboro hic et laboro in meipso: factus sum mihi terra difficilatais et sudoris nimii,* “Assuredly I labor here and labor in myself: I have become to myself a land of trouble and inordinate sweat”  

— this holds not only for the ontic and pre-ontological opacity of being-there, it holds to a much greater degree for the ontological task of not only not missing this one being in its phenomenally nearest manner of being, but making it accessible in its positive characteristics.

The average everydayness of being-there should not be taken as a mere “aspect.” In it, too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, there lies a priori the structure of existentiality. In it, too, and in a determinate way, the being of being-there is at issue for it — to this its being it relates itself in the mode of average everydayness, if only in the mode of flight from and oblivion of it.

However, the explication of being-there in its average everydayness does not provide structures that are average in the sense of some floating indeterminacy. Something that ontically is in the manner of averageness can very well be understood ontologically as having pregnant structures that are structurally indistinguishable from ontological determinations even of an authentic being of being-there.

All explications arising from the analysis of being-there are obtained by looking to its structure of ex-sistence. Because they derive from existentiality, we call the characteristic ways in which being-there is: existentials. These are to be sharply distinguished from determinations of the ways those beings are that do not take their measure from being-there; these we call: categories. We hereby take the expression “category” and hold it fast in its primary ontological significance. Ancient ontology takes as the exemplary basis of its interpretation of being the beings encountered within the world. These beings become accessible by way of νοειν or λόγος: herein beings arise for encounter. The being of these beings must become intelligible in a distinguished λέγειν (letting be seen), and in such a way that their being becomes intelligible beforehand as what [really] is — and as what in each single being already is. The addressing of being, an address that in each instance is already proceeding in any discussion (λόγος) of things, is: κατηγορέω. Such “categorizing” means first of all: to lodge a complaint in public, to accuse someone of something in the presence of others. In its ontological employment, the term means: to accuse, as it were, some thing of something, to accuse it of being what it already is, i.e. to allow it to be seen by everyone in its being. What is sighted and see-able in such seeing are the κατηγορήματα. Such “categories” encompass the a priori determinations of things addressed and discussed variously in λόγος. Existentials and categories are the two basic possibilities for characterizing the being of beings. The being corresponding to each requires a distinctive manner of primary examination: a being is either a who (ex-sistence) or a what (on-handness, in the broadest sense). Only once we have clarified the horizon of the question of being will we be able to consider the connection between these two modes for characterizing the beings of beings.*

---

*better: [the problematic] of its understanding of being.

1 *Confessions*, Book Ten, Chapter 16.

* In this account of the traditional employment of the word “category,” Heidegger assimilates “beings not taking their measure from being-there” to
Already in the Introduction it was suggested that in the existential analysis of being-there a co-task becomes imperative, the urgency of which is hardly less than that of the question of being itself: the exposition of that one a priori which must be visible if the question “what man is” can be discussed philosophically. The existential analysis of being-there is prior to every psychology, anthropology, and especially biology. The contrast with these possible investigations of being-there can lend the theme of our analysis a still sharper delimitation. Also, its necessity can thereby become even more pressingly evident.

§10. Contrasts: Anthropology, Psychology, Biology

After the theme of an investigation has been positively prefigured, it is always relevant to characterize what the investigation precludes—even granting that discussions about what is not supposed to happen can easily become fruitless. What we now need to show is that previous questions and investigations focussing on being-there, however rich in material results, have missed the real, the philosophical problem—that, accordingly, so long as they continue missing it, they may lay no claim whatsoever to be able to accomplish what they basically intend. The contrasts of our existential analysis with anthropology, psychology and biology confine themselves to the fundamentally ontological question. From the standpoint of the “theory of science” these contrasts are necessarily inadequate, for the simple reason that the scientific structure of these disciplines—not the “scientific competence” of those laboring to advance them—is nowadays thoroughly questionable and in need of new impulses that can only spring from the ontological problematic itself.

Historiographically, the intention of existential analysis can be clarified in this way: Descartes, to whom one attributes the discovery of the cogito sum as the point of departure of modern philosophical questioning, investigates the cogitare of the ego—within certain limits. But he leaves the sum [the “ami”] entirely undiscussed, even though it is just as primordially at issue as the cogito. Our own analysis poses the ontological question about the being of the sum. Only once this being has been determined will the manner in which the cogitationes unfolds make sense.

Still, such historiographical exemplification of the intention of our analysis is also misleading. One of the very first tasks of our analysis will be to show that the effort to begin with an immediately given I, or subject, entirely misses the way being-there phenomenally takes shape. Every idea of “subject”—unless purified by a precedental ontological determination of its basis—still introduces ontologically a subjectum (τὸ πρωτότοκον), no matter how energetic one is when ontically resisting the “substantial soul” or the “reification of consciousness.” Thingliness itself we need to identify in its ontological provenance in order to be able to ask what we might understand as positive in the unhingly being of the subject, of soul, of consciousness, of spirit, of person. All these terms name “exploitable” phenomenal domains, yet their employment is accompanied by a remarkable refusal to acknowledge the need for asking about the being of the beings so designated. It is therefore not out of any desire to introduce idiosyncratic terminology that we avoid these names, as well as those of “life” and “man,” to designate the one being that we ourselves are.

On the other hand, in the (rightly understood) drive of every scientifically serious “philosophy of life”—this word is about as informative as “botany of plants”—there implicitly lies a drive to understand the being of being-there. What is conspicuous (and herein lies its principle defect) is that “life” itself, as a manner in which beings are, is not taken to be a problem.

What gives Wilhelm Dilthey’s investigations their aura of suspense is their constant question about “life.” He strives to understand the “experiences” of “life,” their structural and developmental interconnection, by recurring to the wholeness of life itself. What is philosophically relevant in his “humanistic psychology” is not to be found in the fact that it is no longer oriented toward psychic elements and atoms, no longer tries to piece together the life of the soul but aims for “the whole of life” and its “configurations”—but rather in the fact that,

---

46 “beings on hand”; on p. 333 he expressly distinguishes them. See my notes on pp. 13, 37, and especially 333.

47 They have not focussed on being-there at all. [Heidegger increasingly insists that the achievement at issue is precisely this focus.]
Edmund Husserl’s investigations into “personality” have not yet been published. His fundamental orientation in this problematic is already evident in his treatise *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (Logos I, 1910), p. 319. The investigation is considerably extended in the second part of his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (in Husserliana IV). The first part of this work (published in this *Yearbook*, Vol. I, 1913) presents the problematic of “pure consciousness” as the basis for investigating the constitution of every possible reality. The ... world (the personalistic posture as against the naturalistic one). Husserl begins his presentation with the words:

>To be sure, Dilthey . . . saw the problems at which we must aim, and the directions in which our labors must move, but he still did not penetrate to the decisive formulations of these problems, nor to methodologically assured solutions.

After his first elaborations, Husserl pursued the problems more penetratingly and, in his Freiburg lectures, communicated essential portions of his work.\(^1\) But, as regards what is here [in *Being and Time*] wanted and attained, different in goal and in result. [In his later works, Heidegger increasingly distances himself from Husserl’s approach, which he judges to belong to the history of western subjectivity.]

\(^{1}\) Cf. this *Yearbook*, Vols. I, Part 2 (1913) and II (1916), especially pp. 242 ff. [translated 1973 as *Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Value*: cf. Heidegger’s footnote on p. 320].

---

The person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object. Here Scheler emphasizes the same thing that Husserl\(^2\) intimates when requiring for the unity of the person a constitution essentially different from that of things in nature. What Scheler says of the person he also says of acts: “An act is never also an object; for it belongs to the nature of the way acts are that they are experienced only in their performance, and that they are only given [afterwards] in reflection.”\(^3\) Acts are something non-psychical. It belongs to the nature of the person that it only exists in the performance of intentional acts; by its nature it is therefore no object. Every psychical objectification, and therefore every effort to comprehend acts as something psychical, amounts to itself and aspires to determine it by contrasting the specific being of [personal] acts with everything “psychical.” According to Scheler, person can never be thought as a thing or a substance; person “is rather the immediately co-experienced unity of experiences — not a thing merely thought, a thing behind and outside what is immediately experienced.”\(^1\)

Person is no thingly substantial being. Moreover, the being of the person cannot dissolve into being a subject of rational acts governed by some set of laws.

---

\(^{1}\) Edmund Husserl’s investigations into “personality” have not yet been published. His fundamental orientation in this problematic is already evident in his treatise *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* (Logos I, 1910), p. 319. The investigation is considerably extended in the second part of his *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (in Husserliana IV). The first part of this work (published in this *Yearbook*, Vol. I, 1913) presents the problematic of “pure consciousness” as the basis for investigating the constitution of every possible reality. The second part provides the analyses of these constitutions, falling into three sections: 1. The constitution of material nature. 2. The constitution of animal nature. 3. The constitution of the spiritual world (the personalistic posture as against the naturalistic one). Husserl begins his presentation with the words:

>To be sure, Dilthey . . . saw the problems at which we must aim, and the directions in which our labors must move, but he still did not penetrate to the decisive formulations of these problems, nor to methodologically assured solutions.

After his first elaborations, Husserl pursued the problems more penetratingly and, in his Freiburg lectures, communicated essential portions of his work.\(^4\)

\(^{4}\) But, as regards what is here [in *Being and Time*] wanted and attained, different in goal and in result. [In his later works, Heidegger increasingly distances himself from Husserl’s approach, which he judges to belong to the history of western subjectivity.]

\(^{2}\) Cf. *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* [as cited in Heidegger’s footnote on Husserl, p. 47].

I. Chapter One: The Task of Analysis

depersonalization. Yet the person is given as the performer of intentional acts bound together by the unity of a meaning. The being of the psyche therefore has nothing to do with the being of the person. Acts are performed, the person is the performer of acts. — But what is the ontological meaning of “performing,” how might we determine ontologically, and in a positive way, the manner in which the person is? And the critical question cannot stop here. The question aims for the being of the whole human being, the being we are accustomed to construe as a unity of body, soul, and spirit. Then again, body, soul and spirit may well name phenomenal domains thematically separable for the purposes of specific investigations; within limits, their ontological indeterminacy may not be very important. Yet, in the question about the being of human being, the being at issue cannot be just added up from the ways body, soul and spirit are — not least because these ways remain to be determined. And even for such an attempt an idea of the being of the whole would have to be presupposed. What blocks or misguides the fundamental question about the being of there is the prevailing orientation toward the anthropology of Antiquity and of Christianity, whose inadequate ontological foundations both personalism and philosophy of life also ignore. This traditional anthropology includes:

1. The definition of man: ζωον λογον εχον, interpreted as: animal rationale, rational living being. But the being of the ζωον gets understood in the manner of being-on-hand and just occurring. The λογος is a higher endowment, one whose manner of being remains just as obscure as that of the being pieced together in this definition.

2. The other guideline for determining the being and essence of human being is the theological one: και ειπεν ο θεος ποιησω µεν ανθρωπον κατ εικονα η µετεραν καθ οµιολωσιν, faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostrum et similitudinem. From this account, and also the resumption of the ancient definition, Christian-theological anthropology obtains an interpretation of that one being we call man. But just as the being of God is interpreted ontologically by means of ancient ontology, so too the being of the ens finitum — even more so. In the course of the modern period, the Christian definition [of man as creature] became de-theologized. But the idea of “transcendence” — the idea that human being is something that moves out beyond itself — has its roots in Christian dogmatics, about which one would never want to say that it ever turned the being of man into a problem. This idea of transcendence, according to which man is more than a rational being, has worked itself out in various transformations. The following passages may serve to illustrate the origination of this idea:

From Calvin [1509-1564], Institutio I, 15, §8. [“Man’s first condition was excellent because of these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, judgement, non modo ad terraeae vitaeae gubernationem suppeterent, sed quibus transcenderet usque ad Deum et aeternam felicitatem."

Also also der mensch… sin ufsehen hat uf Gott und sin wort, zeigt er klarlich an, daß er nach seiner natur etwas Gott näher anerborn, etwas mee nachschlägt, etwas zu zugs zu jm hat, das alles on zwyfel allein darus flüßt, daß er nach der bildnuß Gottes geschaffen ist.

These two sources of traditional anthropology — the Greek definition and the theological guideline — show that, for all the effort to determine the nature of that one being called “man,” the question about the being of this being falls into oblivion; it is rather taken to be “self-evident,” i.e. human being is taken to have the being of something on hand, one kind among other created things. In modern anthropology these two guidelines intertwine when it takes its methodological point of departure from the res cogitans, from consciousness, or from the interconnectedness of experiences. Inasmuch, however, as these cogitationes remain ontologically indeterminate, or are again implicitly taken to be “self-evident,” something “given” whose “being” is not at all questionable, the problematic proposed by anthropology remains indeterminate in its decisive ontological foundations.

The same is no less true of “psychology,” whose anthropological inclinations are today unmistakable. Nor can one compensate for the

1 Calvin [1509-1564], Institutio I, 15, §8. [“Man’s first condition was excellent because of these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, judgement should suffice not only for the government of this earthly life, but that by them he might transcend even unto God and to eternal felicity.” — Heidegger’s emphasis.]

2 Zwingli [1484-1531], Von der klarheit und gewüsse des worts Gottes (in Deutsche Schriften, I, 58). [“Also [that] man worries so much about God and his Word clearly shows that he is by nature born somewhat closer to God, is somehow more similar to God, has something of a draw to Him — all of which no doubt flows from his being created in the image of God.” — Heidegger’s emphases.]
missing ontological foundation by installing these two disciplines within a universal biology.* In the order of possible ways of comprehending and interpreting things, biology, as the “science of life,” is grounded in the ontology of being-there, even if not exclusively. Life is a mode of being in its own right, but it is essentially accessible only within being-there. Any ontology of life unfolds by way of a privative interpretation: it determines what must be the case in order that something like just-being-alive can make sense. To live is neither to be purely on hand, nor is it the same as being-there. And again, being-there is never to be ontologically determined in a way allowing us to approach it as life (something ontologically indeterminate) and then as something else as well.

The argument that anthropology, psychology, and biology all lack a univocal and ontologically grounded answer to the question of the being of that one being we ourselves are — the manner in which this one being is — does not pass judgement on the positive work achieved in these disciplines. On the other hand, however, we must ever again remind ourselves that we can never disclose the needed ontological foundations belatedly, by hypothesizing them from the empirical results of such work — remind ourselves that these foundations are always already “there” [i.e., presupposed] even when empirical results are just being collected. That positive research does not see these foundations, and considers them self-evident, is no proof that they do not undergird such research, that they are not problematic in a more radical way than any thesis of positive science can ever be.¹

* Precisely what biologists, sociologists, and psychologists have aspired to do during the last decades of the 20th century!

¹ Yet disclosure of what is a priori is not “a priori” construction. From Husserl we have once again learned not only to understand the meaning of all genuine philosophical “experience” but also to handle the tools necessary for working with it. The method of every scientific philosophy that understands itself is committed to the “a priori.” Because this commitment has nothing to do with construction, research into the a priori requires a proper preparation of the phenomenal basis. The first horizon that we must prepare for the analysis of being-there lurks in its average everydayness. While Heidegger insists that phenomenological thinking must accept the task of interpretation — and thus, as in his later works, of retelling the story — he distinguishes such “projection” from the “construction” that has become increasingly thematic (throughout the 20th century) in reflections on scientific method: the realization that rigorous investigation constructs the framework within which “reality” then gets determined. In Heidegger’s sense of the word, interpretation (like that of an orchestra conductor) serves to let something show itself. — Cf. his Collected Works, Vol. 67, p. 132:

But “hermeneutics” intends not at all to describe what’s on hand, but to project. The defect of Being and Time is not that the stance of description is not fulfilled but rather that, on the contrary, the projection and its character of decision is not unfolded decisively enough; instead, [its] “phenomenology” engenders the illusion of intending to describe (“analyze”); but [such] “analysis” is not “analysis” in the sense of projection.
presupposes, as a guideline, an adequate analysis of being-there. And because the positive sciences neither can nor should wait for the ontological labors of philosophy, the progression of their researches will not take place as “progress,” but rather as a repetition of what they have ontically discovered — and as an ontologically more transparent purification of it.\(^1\)

As easy as the formal contrast of the ontological problematic with ontical research may be, the enactment of an existential analysis of being-there, and above all its point of departure, remains burdened with difficulties. Within this task lies one desideratum that has long made philosophy uneasy,\(^2\) the fulfillment of which has time and again stumped it: the elaboration of the idea of a “natural concept of world.” The wealth of information available today, regarding the most variously layered and most distant cultures and forms of being-there, seems favorable to a fruitful resumption of this task. But that is only an illusion. At bottom, this plethora of information seduces us into a miscomprehension of the real problem. Syncretistic comparison and classification does not of itself lead us into genuine cognition of the essence of anything. That we can subject a multiplicity to a tabulation does not guarantee that we really understand what has thereby been ordered. A genuine principle of order has its own integrity, one that cannot be found in the ordering itself but is rather presupposed by it. Thus, for the ordering of world-pictures, we stand in need of an explicit idea of just what world is. And if “world” is itself a constituent of being-there, any conceptual elaboration of the phenomenon of world requires an insight into the basic structures of being-there.

The positive characterizations, as well as the negative considerations of this Chapter have intended to set on the right path an understanding of what the following interpretation is driving at, and of what its questions are. As for furthering the positive disciplines already existing, ontology can make only indirect contributions. It has an independent goal all its own, assuming that, beyond the acquisition of information about beings, the question about being is what spurs all scientific work on.\(^*\)

---

\(^1\) Ernst Cassirer has recently made mythical being-there the theme of a philosophical interpretation (cf. \textit{The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms} (1925), Part Two: “Mythical Thinking”). His investigation provides ethnological research with more comprehensive guidelines. — From the standpoint of the philosophical problematic, the question remains open whether the foundations of Cassirer’s interpretation are sufficiently transparent, and especially whether [as Cassirer supposes] the architectonic of Kant’s \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} and its systematic content can at all provide the possible outline for such a task, or whether we don’t stand in need of a new and more primordial point of departure. As shown in his remark on pp. 16-17, where he refers to the phenomenological horizon disclosed by Husserl, Cassirer himself sees the possibility of such a task. In a conversation that the author conducted with Cassirer on the occasion of a lecture (“Tasks and Directions of Phenomenological Research”) held at the regional meetings of the Kant Society in Hamburg in December of 1923, it became evident that we agreed on the need for an existential analysis of the sort sketched out in the lecture. [On p. 163, Heidegger expresses reservations about trying to understand language as “symbolic form.”]

\(^2\) Not at all! For the concept of world has not at all been understood. [Heidegger insists that no previous intellectual work has even tried to bring into relief what he calls “world”—not even Husserl, who does talk about the “natural,” i.e. pre-philosophical understanding of it.]

\(^*\) Already in his 1929 inaugural lecture “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger argues that what “spurs all scientific work on” is the absence of being: nothingness. In Division Two of \textit{Being and Time} he intimates something of the same thought: the question about being only unfolds genuinely when being-there itself becomes urgent.
§12. Prefiguration of being-in-world based on an orientation toward being-in as such

§13. Exemplification of being-in by way of a founded mode: knowing the world

Chapter Two
Being in World
as the Fundamental Constitution of Being-there

§12. Prefiguration of being-in-world based on an orientation toward being-in as such

In the preparatory discussions (§9) we already brought into relief some characteristics of being that intend to offer a steady light for subsequent investigation, but ones that themselves will also receive their structural concretion in the course of the investigation. Being-there is a being that relates itself understandingly to its own being. We hereby indicate the formal concept of ex-sistence: Being-there ex-sists. Then, too, being-there is a being that in each instance I myself am. To ex-sistent being-there belongs this instantial mineness as a condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. In each instance, being-there ex-sists in one of these modes — or in a modal indifference in regard to them.

Yet these two determinations of the being of being-there must now be seen and understood as grounded a priori in its essential constitution — which we call being-in-world. The interpretation of this constitution locates the proper starting-point of our analysis of being-there.

Already in the way it is coined, the composite expression “being-in-world” suggests that it stands for a unified phenomenon. We must learn to see as a whole this primary givenness. Still, while we cannot dissolve it into elements that we can then piece back together, this constitution does have a manifold of structural constituents. The suggested phenomenal givenness contained in the expression does in fact permit a threefold panorama. Pursuing this panorama, all the while holding fast to the whole phenomenon, we may discern:

1. The “in-world”; in approaching this factor we discover the task

* "Indifference" in the sense of “undifferentiated”: much of Heidegger’s analysis pertains to being-there regardless of its mode.
of examining the structure of “world” and determining the idea of worldliness as such (cf. Chapter Three of this Division).

2. The one being that in each case is in the manner of being-in-world. Here what we search for is what we interrogate when asking “Who?” Identifying* this phenomenologically, we should be able to determine who is in the mode of average everydayness of being-there (cf. Chapter Four of this Division).

3. The being-in as such; the ontological constitution of in-ness itself must be brought out (cf. Chapter Five of this Division).

Highlighting any one of these factors entails highlighting the others as well—i.e., seeing in each instance the whole phenomenon. Being-in-world is indeed an a priori necessary constitution of being-there, but it is far from being sufficient to determine its being fully. Before analyzing thematically each of the three phenomena mentioned, it will help to orient ourselves by characterizing the third constitutional factor.

What does being-in mean? This expression we initially extend to read: being-in—“world” and find ourselves inclined to understand this being-in as “being-inside . . .” — by which term we name the way one thing is when it is within another, as water is “in” a glass, clothing is “in” the closet. With this “in” we mean the way two things extended “in” space relate to one another, are in their relation to their location in this space. Water and glass, clothing and closet, are “in” space in the same way. This relation can be expanded: e.g., this bench is in the classroom, this classroom is in the university, this university is in the city, and so on—all the way to: this bench is in “cosmic space.” All beings whose being “in” one another can be determined in this way have the same manner of being: being-on-hand as things arising “within” the world. This on-handness “in” something on hand, and the co-on-handness along with something having the same manner of being, namely a determinate relation of location: these ontological characteristics—ones belonging to beings not taking their measure from being-there—we call categorial.

In contrast, being-in designates an essential constitution of being-there: it is an existential. It here makes no sense, then, to think of the on-handness of a corporeal thing (the human body) “in” something on hand. Being-in does not designate a spatial “inside one another” any

* Later editions read not “identifying” (in the sense of “spotting and confirming”), but rather “showing” (in the sense of “demonstrating”).
seeing of a primordial structure of being-there (the phenomenal content of which must guide the articulation of our concepts of being), and because the structure of its being cannot in principle be comprehended by the ontological categories we have inherited, we must become more intimate also with this “being near.” We once again choose to proceed by way of a contrast with an ontologically much different, i.e. a categorical relation, one that we linguistically express with the same means. We must explicitly bring out such easily blurred distinctions of the fundamental and ontological kind—even at the risk of discussing things that are “self-evident.” The present condition of ontological analysis shows, however, that we are far from having a “firm grip” on these “self-evidences,” that even more rarely have we interpreted them in their ontological meaning, and that still less do we possess the appropriate structural concepts in secure form.

As an existential, “being-near” the world never means anything like the being-close-on-hand of things that just pop up. There is no “being-next-to-one-another” of one being (called “being-there”) with another being (called “world”). We do indeed customarily express the closeness of two on-hand things in such ways as these: the table stands “near” the door, the chair is “touching” the wall. Yet, strictly speaking, we can never talk about a “touching”—not because in the end we could always, upon close inspection, detect a gap between the chair and the wall, but rather because in principle the chair can never touch the wall even if there were no gap at all. Such touching would presuppose that the wall could arise “for,” be encountered “by,” the chair. A being can only touch other beings on hand within the world if at its very origin it is in the manner of being-in—if, along with its own being-there something like world is discovered to it, out of which things can reveal themselves as touching and in this way become accessible in their on-hand being. Two beings, each on hand in the world and, moreover, in themselves worldless, can never be in “touch” with one another: neither one can “be near” the other. The qualification “in themselves worldless” must not be dropped, since a being which is not worldless, e.g. being-there itself, is also on hand “in” the world or, more precisely: can, with some justification and within certain limits, be construed as merely on hand. Such construal requires that we completely look away from, or simply do not see, the existential constitution of being-in. But with this possible construal of “being-there” as something on hand, and only on hand, we should not associate any manner of “on-handness” belonging to being-there itself. Not in looking away from the structures specific to being-there, but only within a previous understanding of them, does its on-handness become accessible. Being-there understands its ownmost being as indeed a certain “factual being on hand.” And yet the “factuality” of the fact of one’s own being-there is ontologically much different from the factual occurrence of a species of rock. The factuality of the factum that in each case being-there is: this we call its facticity. Only in the light already shed on the basic constitution of being-there can we grasp as a problem the complicated structure of this determination of its being. The concept of facticity includes the being-in-world of an “inner-worldly” being—in such a way that this one being can understand itself as bound up, in its “lot,” with the being of those beings it encounters within its own world.  

For now, it is only necessary to see the distinction between being-in as an existential and the “inside-ness” of on-hand things as a category. This contrast with being-in does not at all deny every kind of “spatiality” for being-there. On the contrary: being-there has its own “being-in-space”—one that, however, is only possible on the basis of its being-in-world. For this reason being-in cannot be clarified ontologically by such ontic characterizations as: the being-in of being in a world is a spiritual property, and the “spatiality” of human being is an attribute of its corporeality, a condition always “founded” on its being a body. Such a characterization leaves us with a being-together-on-hand of two things bearing the attribute “together”—a spirit-thing and a body-thing—and the being of this composite being remains as obscure as ever. Only the understanding of being-in-world as an essential structure of being-there makes possible any insight into the existential spatiality of being-there. Such insight will keep us from overlooking this structure, and also from presumptively dismissing it—such dismissal being not ontologically but rather metaphysically motivated in the naïve belief that human being is

1 Cf. §29 [on being-there as attunement with what is already there].

* Not until p. 384 (§74) does Heidegger resume reflection on “shared lot”: the “doneness” of being-there, already shared with others (part of the destiny of the individual). Cf. Plato’s Republic, 412: the best rulers understand themselves as bound up with a shared lot—taking care (κηδος) of the city, they necessarily love it, and such love (φιλια) requires that they identify their own well being with its well being.
first of all a spiritual thing, one that belatedly gets inserted “into” a space. With its facticity, the being-in-world essential to being-there has in each instance already dispersed or even disintegrated itself in determinate manners of being-in. The multiplicity of such manners of being-in we can exemplify in the following list: having to do with something, producing something, ordering of and tending to something, making use of something, giving up something and losing it, undertaking a project, seeing something through, gathering information, examining, contemplating, discussing, determining. All these manners of being-in include a way of being, one that shall have to characterize more fully: taking care. Even deficient modes like omitting, neglecting, renouncing, and resting are manners of taking care—as are all modes in which the possibilities of taking care are kept to a “bare minimum.” The term “taking care” we initially take in its colloquial meaning: carrying something to completion, finishing it up, “straightening it out.” The expression can also mean “procurring something.” Then too we typically speak of “caring” in the sense of “worrying”: being concerned that an enterprise will fail, i.e., fearing that it will. Along side these colloquial and ontic meanings, the present investigation understands the expression “taking care” as an ontological term (an existential): as designating the being of a possible being-in-world. The term is not chosen because being-there is supposed to be first of all and to a large extent economical and “practical,” but rather because the being of being-there itself will eventually be made visible as care. This expression too is to be construed as an ontological concept of structure (cf. Chapter Six of this Division). The term has nothing to do with “tribulation,” “melancholy,” or “being burdened with cares”; these are ontically found in every being-there, and are ontically possible, just as are “carefree-ness” and “jubilation,” only because being-there is understood ontologically as care. Because being-in-world belongs essentially to being-there, its being toward the world is essentially that of taking care.

From what has been said, being-in is not a “property” that being-there sometimes has and sometimes does not have, with or without which it could just as well be. It just isn’t so that man “is” — and then has, in addition, a relation to “world” as something he on occasion takes on himself. Being-there is never “first of all” free of being-in, and at times in the mood to take up “relations” with the world. Such taking up of

relations with the world is only possible because being-there is the way it is as being-in-world. This essential part of its constitution does not first arise from there being something else on hand besides this being we characterize as being-there, something that then meets up with it. An other being can only “meet up with” being-there insomuch at it has the capacity to show itself from itself within a world.

All the talk we hear nowadays about “man having an environment” says nothing of ontological purport so long as the “having” remains indeterminate. The possibility of any such “having” is founded in the existential constitution of being-in. As essentially being in this manner of being-in, being-there can explicitly discover beings encountered environmentally—know about them, avail itself of them, have the “world.” The ontically trivial talk about “having an environment” is ontologically a problem. To solve it, nothing less is required than first to determine the being of being-there in an ontologically adequate way. If in biology—especially since K. E. von Baer [1792-1876]—use is made of this essential constitution, one must not conclude that its philosophical use implies “biologism.” For, as a positive science, even biology can never find this structure, never determine it—it must presuppose it and make constant use of it. However, only if it is conceptualized beforehand as a structure of being-there can the structure of the environment—of the circum-world—be explicated philosophically as an a priori essential to the object studied by biology. Only once oriented toward the ontological structure thus conceptualized can one define a priori, by way of privation, the essential constitution of “life.” Ontically as well as ontologically, being-in-world, as taking care, has the primacy. In the analysis of being-there this structure obtains its foundational interpretation.

But have we not so far been moving exclusively within negative assertions when determining this constitution of being [the structure of being-in]? We have been hearing only what this supposedly so fundamental being-in is not. That is indeed so. But the prevalence of negative characterization is no coincidence. It rather declares the peculiarity of the phenomenon, and is therefore positive in a genuine

---

a Is there here any justification at all for talking about “world”? Surroundings only [are what biology talks about]? To the “giving” [implied in the biological determination of an environment] there corresponds a “having” [on the part of the organism]. Being-there never “has” world [it is rather as in it].
I. Chapter Two: Being in World

sense, one appropriate to the phenomenon itself. The phenomenological identification of being-in-world has this character of rejection—the elimination of distortions and obfuscations—because this phenomenon [being-in-world] is always already “seen,” somehow or other, in each being-there.* And this is so because this phenomenon is basic to the constitution of the way being-there is—since it is in each case already disclosed, along with the being of being-there, for the latter’s understanding of being. Yet always already the phenomenon is also mostly just as thoroughly misinterpreted, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate way.** But this “seen somehow or other, yet mostly misinterpreted” has no other ground than the very constitution of being-there, according to which it ontologically understands itself—and that also includes its being-in-world—initially from those beings, and from the being of those beings, that it itself is not: from the beings it encounters “within” its world. b

In and for being-there itself, this constitution of its being is always somehow familiar. If now one wishes to cognize it, the cognition that defines such a task takes itself—the effort to know the world—as the exemplary relation: the relation of the “soul” to the

* Essential to Heidegger’s account is the recurrent phrase “always already”: what is at issue, including the being of being-there, is already disclosed, along with the being of being-there, for the latter’s understanding of being. Yet always already the phenomenon is also mostly just as thoroughly misinterpreted, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate way. But this “seen somehow or other, yet mostly misinterpreted” has no other ground than the very constitution of being-there, according to which it ontologically understands itself—and that also includes its being-in-world—initially from those beings, and from the being of those beings, that it itself is not: from the beings it encounters “within” its world.

** A retro-interpretation. [Note the recurrent theme: “being-there has the drive to understand its own being in reference to those beings to which it essentially relates itself, constantly and most closely” (p. 15; reiterated on p. 21).]

§12. Prefiguration of Being in World: Being-in

world.* Thus it is that cognition of the world (νοεῖν), or addressing and discussing “world” (λόγος), serves as the supposedly primary mode of being-in-world, yet without this latter being at all conceptualized. However, because here the structure of being remains ontologically inaccessible while still being ontically experienced as the “relation” between one thing (world) and another (soul), and because being is initially understood from the foothold provided by beings arising within the world, the attempt is made to conceptualize the relation between those two things on their basis, and as their being is construed—i.e. as being on hand. Although it is pre-phenomenologically experienced and familiar, being-in-world becomes invisible in the process of this ontologically inappropriate interpretation. Henceforth one knows the constitution of being-there in the mould of this inappropriate interpretation—and takes it to be self-evident. In this way it becomes the “obvious” point of departure for the problems of epistemology, or the “metaphysics of knowledge.” For what is more self-evident than this: a “subject” relates to an “object,” and vice versa? This “subject-object relation” must be presupposed. Yet this is a disastrous presupposition (although unquestionable in its facticity, and for that very reason disastrous) so long as its ontological necessity, and above all its ontological meaning, are left in the dark.

Because knowing the world is mostly and exclusively taken as illustrating the phenomenon of being-in (and not only for epistemology, since practical comportment is understood as “non-” or “a-theoretical” comportment), and because this primacy of knowing misleads our understanding of its ownmost manner of being, we need to bring out being-in-world even more sharply with a view to knowing the world, and make such knowing visible as itself an existential “modality” of being-in.

* There is an echo of Hegel here: “What is familiarly known is not properly known—for the very reason that it is familiar” (Phenomenology of Mind, Preface; p. 92 of Baillie translation). In keeping with modern philosophy generally, Hegel then takes precisely the effort to “properly know” things as the point de repère for contemplating human involvements. In a manner reminiscent of Nietzsche, Heidegger offers a genealogy of this interest in knowing things—rooting it, however, not in natural drives, or the will to power, but in a privation of the “natural” way of being with things.
§13. The exemplification of being-in by way of a founded mode: knowing the world

If being-in-world is a basic constitution of being-there, one in which it moves not only generally but pre-eminently in the mode of everydayness, it must always already be ontically experienced. It would be incomprehensible if it were totally veiled, especially since being-there has available to it an understanding of its being, however indeterminately this understanding may operate. But as soon as the “phenomenon of knowing the world” itself was grasped it got caught up in an “external,” a formal interpretation. A sign of this is the approach to knowledge, still prevalent today, assuming it to be a “relation between subject and object”—which contains about as much “veracity” as it does vacuity. But subject and object do not cover the same territory as being-there and world.\(^a\)

Even if we were to undertake to determine ontologically the being-in primarily as a cognizant being-in-world, our first task would be to characterize phenomenally this cognition as both a being in and a being toward the world. Reflecting now on this relation of being, we find right off one being, called nature, that is known. Yet knowing is not itself found in this one being. If such knowing at all “is,” it belongs solely to the being that knows. Yet neither in this being, the human thing, is cognition on hand. In any case, it is not externally ascertainable the way bodily properties are. Since, then, cognition does belong to this being, and yet not as an external quality, it must be “within.” And the more univocally one maintains that cognition is first of all and really “inside”—and has nothing in common with the way physical or psychical things have their being—the more one believes one is proceeding without any presuppositions when considering the question of the nature of cognition and of the illumination of the relation between subject and object. For only then can a problem emerge, namely the question: How does this cognizing subject get out of its inner “sphere” and into one that is “other and external”? How can cognition ever have an object at all, and how must this object be thought so that, in the end, the subject can know it without needing to venture a leap into another sphere? However, on this approach, which has many variations, there is a complete failure to raise the question about the being of this cognizing subject—even though the way this subject is lurks constantly, always already, within the theme whenever one deliberates about its cognition. To be sure, on each occasion we are assured that the “within” and the “inner sphere” of the subject is certainly not to be conceived as a sort of “box” or “cabinet.” But silence reigns over the question what the “within” of this immanence positively means, and how the way this “insideness” of cognition is gets grounded in the way the subject is. However one may choose to interpret this inner sphere, the moment one even poses the question how cognition gets “outside” it and achieves a “transcendence,” it becomes clear that one is finding cognition to be problematic—without having ever clarified how and what this cognition is that presents such enigmas.

On this approach, one is blind to what is already tacitly involved when thematizing the phenomenon of cognition, even in the most provisional manner: cognition is a mode in which being-there has its being as being-in-world, and it has its ontic foundation in the constitution of this being. To this claim regarding phenomenal givenness—that cognition is a way being-in-world takes shape—one might object: “But on this interpretation of cognition the problem of knowledge is simply destroyed. After all, what sort of questions might we still ask once we presuppose that cognition is already near its world—the very world it is supposed to reach only in the transcending of the [human] subject?” In this question the constructionist “standpoint” (not phenomenally legitimized*) again comes to the fore; apart from this, though, what court of appeal decides whether and in what sense there is a problem of knowledge at all—other than the phenomenon of cognition itself and the manner in which the knower has its being?

If we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal condition of cognition, we must hold to this: cognition is itself already functionally grounded in an already-being-near-the-world, and the being of being-there is essentially constituted as this being-near. This already-being-near is not first of all simply a matter of fixedly gawking at something purely on hand. In taking care of things, being-in-world is taken over by the world requiring such care. In order that cognition be possible as contemplative determination of things on hand, there must occur, precedentially, an undoing of this taking-care-having-to-do with the world. In abstaining from all producing, manipulating and the like, taking-care puts itself into the only remaining mode of being-in: into just-tarrying near . . . .

\(^a\) Of course not! So little that it is already fatal even to juxtapose them for repudiation.

\(^*\) Heidegger's contrast: “‘To the things themselves!’—as opposed to all free-floating constructions….” (p. 28).
I. Chapter Two: Being in World

Looking-on does not come about simply by looking-away from things — looking-on has its own origin, and has looking-away as a necessary consequence; contemplating things in the mode of aloof observation has its own origination. Looking to ειδος requires something else. [A much needed correction: the mention of ειδος as a back-translation of “the way things purely look” would otherwise suggest that Heidegger is accounting for the Platonic-Aristotelian discourse on “form” as a basis of this manner of being toward the world — one that only permits inner-worldly beings to be encountered in the way they purely look (in their ειδος) — and as a mode of this manner of being, an explicit looking-on at such things becomes possible.] This looking-on is in each case a determinate way of directing oneself to ... a taking-aim at something on hand. Right from the start it draws upon the things it encounters to form its own “point of view.” Such looking-on enters of itself into the mode of autonomous self-detaining near inner-worldly beings. In such “detainment” — abstention from every kind of manipulation and utilization — the perception of things on hand is consummated. The manner in which this perception consummates itself is: the addressing and the discussing of something as something. On the basis of this interpreting (taken in the broadest sense), perceiving turns into determining. What gets perceived and determined can be expressed in propositions, be retained and preserved as something said. This retention of perception in an assertion about ... is itself a manner of being-in-world and may not rightly be interpreted as a “process” in which a subject acquires representations of something, these then being stored up “inside” as acquisitions — whereupon the question might on occasion arise how they “agree” with reality.

In directing itself toward something and getting hold of it, being-there does not first move out of its inner sphere, one initially encapsulating it; rather, in keeping with its primary manner of being, it is always already “outside,” near something arising for encounter within some world already uncovered. And detaining oneself near the being to be known, determining it, does not consist in leaving an inner sphere; rather, even in this “being outside” near the object, being-there is (in the correctly understood sense) “inside,” i.e. it itself (as being-in-world) does the cognizing. And then, too, perceiving what is cognized does not consist in returning from an aggressive journey outside, with acquired booty, a returning back into the “cabinet” of consciousness; rather, even in perceiving, preserving, and retaining, a cognizant being-there remains, as being-there, outside. When “merely” knowing about some way that beings are interconnected in their being, when “just” representing it to myself, when “simply thinking” about it, I am no less near beings outside in the world than when I take hold of them in an originary way. Even forgetting something, when it seems that every essential relation to what was previously known is extinguished, must be conceptualized as a modification of primordial being-in, and so too must all deception and every error.

We have now revealed the foundational complex of those modes of being-in-world that are constitutive for knowing the world. And this much thereby becomes clear: in cognizing, being-there achieves a new stance toward the world that is, in each case, already uncovered in being-there — a stance of its own being. This new possibility of being can take on autonomous form, become a task in itself, and take over the leading role for being-in-world. Still, it is not the case either that cognition first institutes a “commercium” of the subject with a world or that this “interaction” springs from the way the world affects a [human] subject. Cognition is a mode of being-there founded in being-in-world. Thus, as basic to the constitution of being-there, being-in-world requires a precedental interpretation.*

§13. Exemplification: Knowing the World

always already “outside,” near something arising for encounter within some world already uncovered. And detaining oneself near the being to be known, determining it, does not consist in leaving an inner sphere; rather, even in this “being outside” near the object, being-there is (in the correctly understood sense) “inside,” i.e. it itself (as being-in-world) does the cognizing. And then, too, perceiving what is cognized does not consist in returning from an aggressive journey outside, with acquired booty, a returning back into the “cabinet” of consciousness; rather, even in perceiving, preserving, and retaining, a cognizant being-there remains, as being-there, outside. When “merely” knowing about some way that beings are interconnected in their being, when “just” representing it to myself, when “simply thinking” about it, I am no less near beings outside in the world than when I take hold of them in an originary way. Even forgetting something, when it seems that every essential relation to what was previously known is extinguished, must be conceptualized as a modification of primordial being-in, and so too must all deception and every error.

We have now revealed the foundational complex of those modes of being-in-world that are constitutive for knowing the world. And this much thereby becomes clear: in cognizing, being-there achieves a new stance toward the world that is, in each case, already uncovered in being-there — a stance of its own being. This new possibility of being can take on autonomous form, become a task in itself, and take over the leading role for being-in-world. Still, it is not the case either that cognition first institutes a “commercium” of the subject with a world or that this “interaction” springs from the way the world affects a [human] subject. Cognition is a mode of being-there founded in being-in-world. Thus, as basic to the constitution of being-there, being-in-world requires a precedental interpretation.*

— Recalling the special meaning of the neologism “precedental” (first introduced on p. 5, and first explained in the marginalium on p. 85). A “precedential interpretation” is Heidegger’s formulation for an interpretation highlighting what is, by its very nature, prior to ...; it does not mean merely “before going on to other matters.” Cf. also my annotation on p. 58: the frequent use of “already.”

* In §33 (on assertion) Heidegger provides a thorough genealogy of the “perceiving” and “determining” that logicians tend to hypothesize as basic.
Chapter Three

The Worldliness of World

§14. The idea of the worldliness of the world in general
We first need to make being-in-world visible in regard to the one structural factor “world.” The accomplishment of this task seems to be easy, and so trivial that one might still believe it to be dispensable. What can it mean to describe “the world” as a phenomenon? Letting be seen what shows itself in the way of “beings” within the world? For this, the first step is an enumeration of such things as are “in” the world: houses, trees, people, mountains, stars. We can depict the way these things “look” and narrate what happens with and around them. However, all this is obviously a pre-phenomenological “affair,” one that, phenomenologically, is of no relevance whatsoever. Such description remains glued to beings. It is ontical. What we are seeking, however, is being. Formally, we defined “phenomenon” (in the phenomenological sense) as what shows itself as being and as the structure of being.

Accordingly, [it seems that] to describe “world” phenomenologically means to point up the being of beings on hand within the world, and to record this being in concepts and categories. Beings within the world are things — ones in nature and ones “having value.” The thingliness of these things then becomes the problem; and inasmuch as the thingliness of things “having value” builds upon the thingliness of things in nature, the being of natural things, nature as such, becomes the primary theme. The all-founding character of natural things, of substances — what lets them be — is their substantiality. What constitutes the ontological meaning of substantiality? Here [it seems] we have paved a clear road of interrogation for our investigation.

But are we thereby asking about the “world” in an ontological way? The problematic just designated is doubtlessly ontological. Yet even when this ontology succeeds in explicating most purely the being of nature, and this in conformity with the basic assertions about this one being provided by the mathematical science of nature, it never comes upon the phenomenon of “world.” Nature is itself a being that arises
within the world and becomes discoverable in various ways and at various levels.

Should we then stick to that one being near which being-there initially and mostly resides — to things “having value”? Do these things not “really” reveal the world in which we live? Perhaps they do indeed more penetratingly reveal something like “world.” Yet these things, too, are beings “within” the world.

Neither the ontical depiction of inner-worldly beings, nor the ontological interpretation of the being of these beings, comes upon the phenomenon of “world” — so long as such depiction and such interpretation remain purely as they are. In both manners of accessing “objective being” one already “presupposes,” in differing ways, “world.”

Can it be that, in the end, “world” is not something to which we can address ourselves as a determination of the beings we have cited [things of nature, things of value] — even though we have indeed called them inner-worldly? Or is “world” even a characteristic of the way being-there is? And does not each being-there have “at first” its own world? Does “world” not then become something “subjective”? And how might there then still be a “common” world “in” which we also are? And, when we pose this question about “world,” which world do we mean? Neither the one nor the other, but rather the worldliness of world. And in what ways do we come across this phenomenon?

“Worldliness” is an ontological concept, and it means the structure of one constitutive factor of being-in-world. This latter we know to be an existential determination of being-there. Accordingly, worldliness is itself an existential. Asking ontologically about the “world,” we in no way abandon our thematic field, the analysis of being-there. “World” is, ontologically, no determination of those beings that are essentially not being-there; it is rather a characteristic of being-there itself. This does not preclude the possibility that the path of investigation into the phenomenon of “world” might have to traverse inner-worldly beings and their being. The task of providing a phenomenological “description” of world is so far from clear that even an adequate determination of it as a task requires essential ontological clarifications.

From all these considerations, and from its frequent employment, it is apparent that the word “world” has multiple meanings. Disentangling this multiplicity may serve to indicate the phenomena in their differing meanings and in their interconnection.

§14. The Idea of the Worldliness of World

1. World is employed as an ontic concept, and then means the totality of those beings that can be on hand within the world.

2. World serves as an ontological term, and means the being of those beings falling under 1. Moreover, “world” can become the name of a region embracing a multiplicity of beings; e.g., in the talk of the “world” of the mathematician, world means the region of possible objects of mathematical study.

3. World can again be understood in an ontic sense, this time however not as a being that being-there essentially is not, and that can be encountered within the world, but rather as that “wherein” a factual being-there “lives” as the being-there it is. World here has a pre-ontological, an existentiell meaning. Once again there are various possibilities here: world can mean the “public” world of the we, or one’s “own,” one’s most intimate (domestic) environment, one’s circum-world.

4. World designates, finally, the ontological-existential concept of worldliness. Worldliness itself is modifiable into the structural whole, varying from case to case, of particular “worlds,” while nevertheless containing in itself the a priori of worldliness in general.

Terminologically, we reserve the expression world for the meaning defined under 3. Whenever the expression is used in the first of these four senses this meaning will be indicated by quotation marks.

The derivative form “worldly” then means, terminologically, a manner in which being-there has its being, and never the manner in which any being on hand “in” the world has its being. These beings we call belonging-to-the-world, or inner-worldly.

A look at previous ontology is revealing: passing over how being-there is constituted as being-in-world goes together with leaping over the phenomenon of world. Instead, one tries to interpret world from the being of beings — of those beings that are on hand in the world but initially not at all discovered: from nature. Understood ontologically-categorically, nature is a limiting case of the being of possible inner-worldly beings. Only in a determinate mode of its being-in-world can

---

a it is precisely being-there that is owned by world. [In thrall to it, rather than “in” it the way things arising for encounter are.]

b “nature” here in the Kantian sense, as it is construed in modern physics. [Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Ethics do account (obliquely) for our “worldly” being-there; cf. the comments on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, p. 138.]
being-there discover things as nature. Such cognition has the character of a determinate de-worlding of the world. As the overall categorial concept of the essential structures of determinate beings arising for encounter within the world, “nature” can never render worldliness intelligible. And even the phenomenon of “nature” as understood in the Romantic concept of nature becomes ontologically comprehensible only from the concept of world, i.e. from the analysis of being-there.

As regards the problem of an ontological analysis of the worldliness of the world, traditional ontology — if it sees the problem at all — stumbles around in a blind alley. On the other hand, an interpretation of the worldliness of being-there, and of the possibilities and manners of its taking worldly form, must show why being-there leaps over the phenomenon of worldliness when it takes on the form of knowing the world ontically and ontologically. However, the very fact that it does leap over it suggests the need for special precautions in order to obtain the right point of departure for gaining access to the phenomenon of worldliness, and thereby to prevent the leaping.

The methodological directive for this has already been given. Being-in-world, and so also world, are to become the theme of analysis by our placing them in the horizon of average everydayness as the initial manner in which being-there has its being. Everyday being-in-world is what we must pursue, and, within the phenomenal evidence provided by this, something like world should come into view.

The initial world of everyday being-there is the world around it: its circum-world. From this existential character of average being-in-world, our investigation steers a course toward the idea of worldliness in general. The worldliness of the circum-world (circum-worldliness) we search out by passing through an ontological interpretation of those inner-worldly beings that first of all arise for encounter. The expression “circum-world” contains in the “circum-” a suggestion of spatiality. The “all around nearby” constitutive of the circum-world does not, however, have a primarily “spatial” meaning. Rather, the characteristic space that indisputably belongs to the circum-world must be clarified from the structure of worldliness. From this, then, the spatiality mentioned in §12 becomes phenomenally visible. Yet ontology has tried, precisely by starting with spatiality, to interpret the being of the “world” as res extensa. The most extreme drive toward such an ontology of the “world” becomes evident in Descartes — a drive taking for its orientation an opposition to the res cogitans, itself neither ontically nor ontologically congruent with being-there. By way of a contrast with this ontological drive the analysis of worldliness here undertaken can be clarified. The analysis will move through three stages: A. Analysis of circum-worldliness and worldliness in general. B. Illustrative contrast of the analysis of worldliness with Descartes’ ontology of the “world.” C. The circum-ness of the circum-world and the “spatiality” of being-there.

### A. The analysis of circum-worldliness and worldliness in general

#### §15. The being of beings arising in the circum-world

We can display the being of those beings first of all encountered by taking as our guideline the everyday being-in-world that we also call our dealings in and our dealings with inner-worldly beings. Such dealings have already gotten dispersed in a multiplicity of ways of taking-care. Still, as already shown [on p. 61], the initial manner of dealing with things is not one of cognition that purely perceives, but rather one of taking-care that manipulates and uses and has its own kind of “cognition.” Our phenomenological question pertains first of all to the being of beings arising for encounter in such taking-care. To assure the seeing here required, a remark on method is needed.

While in the disclosure and explication of being it is beings that are pre- and co-thematic, our real theme is being itself. In the domain of our present analysis, what we approach as pre-thematic is what shows itself in taking care of things within a circum-world. Such pre-thematic beings are not the object of a theoretical cognition of the “world,” they are what gets used, produced, and the like. As arising for encounter in this way,
these beings enter pre-thematically into the vista of a “cognition” that, as phenomenological, opens out primarily onto their being — and that, on the basis of this thematizing of being, co-thematizes the various beings in question. Accordingly, phenomenological interpretation is not cognition of prevalent qualities of beings, it is rather a determination of the structure of their being. Such interpretation, as the investigation of being, becomes an autonomous and explicit completion of the understanding of being that already belongs in each instance to being-there, and that is “alive” in every dealing with beings. Phenomenologically pre-thematic beings — here, things that are used, things available in production — become accessible as we place ourselves into this taking-care. Strictly speaking, such talk about “placing ourselves” is misleading; for we need not first place ourselves into this manner of dealing with things. Everyday being-there is in this way; e.g., when opening the door, I make use of the handle. Rather, the achievement of phenomenological access to beings encountered in this way consists in suppressing the ever-present interpretational drives ever-crowding in on us, ones entirely covering up not only such “taking-care” but also beings themselves — how they arise for encounter within our taking care of them. These insidious mistakes become clear when we now inquire: What sorts of beings should we take as our pre-theme and focus upon as our pre-phenomenal footing?

One would like to answer: things. But with this self-evident answer we have perhaps already missed the pre-phenomenal footing we are seeking. For in thus addressing what-is as “thing” (res) we tacitly assume a prejudicial ontological characteristic. Analysis starting from such beings, and then asking about being, meets up with thingliness and reality. Proceeding in this manner, ontological explication detects such characteristics of being as substantiality, materiality, extendedness, contingency. . . . But even pre-ontologically those beings arising for encounter in taking-care are initially concealed in such [modes of] being. Even though ontically one means something else, ontologically one goes wrong when naming things as the beings “initially given.” What one really means remains indeterminate. Or one tries to characterize these “things” as “value-loaded.” But what does value mean, ontologically? And how are we to construe this “loading” and loadedness categorially? Apart from the obscurity of this structure of value-loaded-ness, does it touch upon the phenomenal way beings arise in our dealings as we take care of them — upon the way they here are?

The Greeks had an appropriate term for “things”: πράγματα, i.e. what one has to do with in one’s heedful dealings (πράξεις). But, ontologically, they left in the dark precisely the specifically “pragmatic” character of πράγματα and “first of all” determined these as “mere things.”a We ourselves will call beings arising for encounter in our taking care of them: instruments. In our dealings, we find writing instruments, sewing instruments, working instruments [tools], transportation instruments [vehicles], measuring instruments. Our task is now to bring out the manner in which instruments have their being. We do so by following the guideline of what we earlier delimited as allowing an instrument to be an instrument — its instrumentality.

Strictly speaking, there “is” never an instrument. To the being of an instrument belongs, in each case, always an instrumental whole within which any one instrument can be the one it is. An instrument is essentially “something in order to . . . .” The various manners of “in order to” — such as serviceability, helpfulness, usability, handiness — constitute an instrumental wholeness. In the structure of “in order to” lies a reference of one thing to another. Only in the course of the following analyses can the phenomenon intimated by this term be made visible in its ontological genesis. For now it is only a matter of getting phenomenally into view a manifold of references. In its instrumentality, an instrument always is what it is from the way it belongs together with other instruments: pen, ink, paper, pad, table, lamp, furniture, window, doors, room. These “things” never show themselves right away by themselves so that, as a group of real things, they then fill up a room. What first of all arises for encounter, although not as something thematically comprehended, is the room, and this in turn not as something “between four walls” in a geometrical sense — rather, as instrumental for dwelling. Within such a “dwelling instrument” the “furnishings” show

a Why did the Greeks do this? [Aristotle accounts for “things” with] εἴδεσ and μορφῇ and ώλη! so from τεχνη, therefore an “artistic” [i.e., craft-bound] interpretation! if μορφῇ is not [taken as the equivalent of] εἴδεσ, or Ἑδέα! [Heidegger here notes that Plato and Aristotle did not simply leave the “pragmatic” character of things in the dark; they rather embedded their considerations of “form, shape, and matter” in their account of artisanal engagement with things. For an essay devoted entirely to the question of our most intimate, as well as our history-laden understanding of “things,” see his 1950 lecture “The Thing,” available in Poetry, Language, Thought (1971).]
themselves, and within these each “individual” instrument. Prior to any one instrument, there is in each case already an instrumental whole that has been uncovered.

In each case cut to the measure of the instruments, our dealings (e.g., hammering with a hammer) — in which alone the instruments can intrinsically show themselves in their being — do not thematically comprehend these beings as things presenting themselves, nor does the employment of them know anything about the instrumental structure as such. Hammering does not have any additional knowledge about the instrumental character of the hammer; rather, it has taken this instrument as its own, and in a way that could hardly be more appropriate. In such dealings where we make use of things, taking-care submits itself to the in-order-to that constitutes the instrument used; the less we gape at the hammer-thing and the more aggressively we use it, the more primordial our relation to it and the more unreservedly it arises for encounter as the very thing it is: an instrument. Hammering itself uncovers the specific “handiness” of the hammer. The manner in which an instrument has its being, in which it itself reveals itself from itself, we call at-hand-ness. Only because instruments have this “being-in-themselves,” and do not simply present themselves, are they handy in the broadest sense — and available to us. The keenest just-looking-on at how things look, at their various qualities, is incapable of discovering anything at-hand. Viewing things only “theoretically” dispenses with all understanding of at-hand-ness. Dealings in which we use and manipulate things are not, however, blind; they have their own manner of seeing, one that guides our manipulating of things and bestows upon it its specific bonding with them. Dealings with instruments submit themselves to the manifold of references built into the “in-order-to.” This sort of self-adaptation has the vision we call circumspection.

* Both here and in subsequent works Heidegger will dwell on this determination of the being of what we first of all encounter within a circum-world; cf. his What is Called Thinking (lectures from 1951-52), the first “Summary and Transition,” especially pp. 14-17. The immediate contrary of at-hand-ness is on-hand-ness: the character of things that are not integrated into use yet still “appear” (the idea was introduced on pp. 61-2, and will receive closer attention in the sequel). The metaphor of the hand also permits us to think the being of beings as what “touches” us, whereas the traditional metaphor of the eyes leads us to think of being as what we can “see” (cf. below, pp. 400-401: Count Yorck’s repudiation of “purely ocular determinations”).

“Practical” comportment is not “a-theoretical” in the sense implying lack of vision; its contrast with theoretical comportment does not lie in the one being observant and the other being active, action then applying theoretical cognition in order not to stay blind; rather, observation is just as primordially a taking-care as action has its own vision. Theoretical comportment is a non-circumspect just-looking-on. Its being non-circumspect does not mean that looking-on has no rules: it constructs a canon for itself in the form of method.

Something at hand is not at all theoretically comprehended, nor is it first of all circumspectly thematic in our dealings. Remarkable about what is initially at hand is that it withdraws, as it were, in its at-hand-ness — precisely in order to be fully at hand. Neither do our everyday dealings dwell upon the tools themselves; rather, it is the work, whatever is to be produced, that primarily engages attention, and is therefore at hand. The work carries the referential wholeness within which each instrument arises for encounter.

The work to be produced — as the toward which of the hammer, the plane, the needle — has in turn the manner of being of an instrument. The shoe to be produced is for wearing (footgear), the manufactured clock for telling time. Essentially usable, the work that we chiefly encounter in our heedful dealings — the one at which we are working — allows us in each case to co-encounter already the toward-which having a usability of its own. The work placed on order is only on the basis of its use and of the referential context of beings uncovered in this use.

The work to be produced is, however, not only useful for...; producing itself is in each instance a using of something for something. Within a work there already lies a reference to “materials.” The work is dependent upon leather, thread, nails and the like. Then, too, leather is produced from hides. These come from animals raised by others. Animals also arise within the world without being raised, and even in the raising these beings somehow produce themselves. Thus within a circum-world there are also beings becoming accessible that, in themselves without need of being produced, are always already at hand. In themselves, hammer, wrench, nail refer to — they consist of — steel, iron, ore, stone, wood. In an instrument that is being used, “nature” is co-uncovered by the use itself — the “nature” coming to light in natural products.

Yet nature here should not be understood as what is merely on hand
— nor as forces of nature. A forest is timberland, a mountain is rockquarry, a river is hydropower, wind is wind “in the sails.” In such ways, uncovered “nature” arises for encounter along with a circum-world. We can then look away from this manner in which it has its being as at hand, uncover and determine it simply in its pure on-hand-ness. But nature as what “weaves and cleaves,” as what overwhelms us, as the landscape enchanting us, remains hidden from such uncovering of nature. The plants of the botanist are not the flowers at the edge of the field, the geographically established “source” of a river is not the “spring in the dale.”

A produced work not only refers to the toward-what of its usability and the where-from of its subsistence; in the work there also lies, in keeping with the simple conditions of working with things, a reference to those who bear and use it. The work is cut to their measure, they too “are” there during the emergence of the work. Even when goods are produced by the dozen this constitutive reference is by no means lacking; it is only indeterminate, pointing toward the random, the average. So, along with the work there arise for encounter not only beings that are at hand, but also beings that are in the manner of human being*—those for whom, in their taking-care, the work produced becomes at hand. And here the world also arises for encounter, the world wherein the bearers and the users live—the world that is also ours. Any one work we are taking care of is at hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop, but also in the public world. With the public world the environing nature is uncovered and available to everyone. In paths, streets, bridges, and buildings, nature is uncovered in determinate aspects by the way we are taking care of things. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather, a public lighting installation takes account of darkness, i.e. the specific alternation of the presence and absence of daylight, the “position of the sun.” In clocks, account is taken of some definite constellation in the cosmos. When we look at a clock we make tacit use of the “position of the sun” according to which the measurement of time gets officially regulated in an astronomical manner. In the use of a clock (an instrument immediately and inconspicuously at hand) the environing nature is also at hand. Our heedful absorption in our immediate work-world functions in the mode of uncovering; and it belongs to the essence of this discovery-function that in this functioning, according to the manner of the absorption (i.e., to its constitutive references), the inner-worldly beings brought along in the work remain uncoverable, becoming explicit in varying degrees and pressing in on circumspection to varying extents.

The manner in which all these beings have their being is: at-hand-ness. This character of beings should not, however, be understood merely as a way we take things,* as though we talked these “aspects” into the “beings” initially arising for encounter— as though in this manner some world-stuff, initially on hand by itself, became “subjectively colored.” This direction of interpretation overlooks the fact that, for it to work, beings would have to be uncovered and understood in advance as purely on hand, and would have to have primacy and control in all subsequent dealings with the “world,” the very dealings that first uncover and appropriate these beings. But this already runs counter to the ontological meaning of cognition, which we have displayed as a founded mode of being-in-world. Cognition presses beyond what, when we are taking care of things, is at hand, and does this to lay it bare as just on hand. At-hand-ness is the ontological-categorial determination of beings as they are “in themselves.” But, one wants to say, beings can “be” at hand only because they are first on hand. Does it then follow—upon admitting this thesis—that at-hand-ness is ontologically founded upon on-hand-ness?

But even supposing that at-hand-ness can, in the course of our subsequent ontological interpretation, prove to be the manner in which inner-worldly beings are initially discovered to have their being—even supposing that the primordiality of at-hand-ness can prove itself in contradiction to pure on-hand-ness—have all the previous explications contributed in the least to understanding the phenomenon of world ontologically? Throughout the interpretation of these inner-worldly beings we have always already been “presupposing” world. Is there at

---

* For the edition of his Collected Works Heidegger changed the text from “beings that are in the manner of being-there” to “beings that are in the manner of human being.” Cf. Heidegger’s marginia on pp. 57 and 87: readers—and Heidegger himself—must take care to appreciate the sameness and difference in the expressions “being-there” and “human being.”

a But it is only the way they arise for encounter. [Heidegger here reserves judgement: at-hand-ness is not merely the way we take things, but it is still only the way they arise for encounter and not yet the way things take us to themselves. Cf. p. 333: the analysis awaits consideration of the way things neither at hand nor on hand can “subsist” (as in art works)—a major theme of his later essays and lectures.]
all a path leading from the being of these beings to displaying the phenomenon of world?\footnote{The author would like to note that, starting with the winter semester 1919-20, he repeatedly lectured on the analysis of the circums-world, and more generally on the “hermeneutics of facticity” regarding being-there. [H.-G. Gadamer once remarked that, when it first appeared in 1927, Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time} only had a readership because so many of his students had been attending his lectures regularly; he suspected that the same held true of Wittgenstein’s works.]}  

§16. How the worldly character of the circum-world announces itself in inner-worldly beings  

World is not itself an inner-worldly being. And yet it determines these beings to such an extent that they can only arise for encounter and show themselves uncovered inasmuch as world “offers itself.” But how does world “offer itself”? If being-there is ontically constituted by being-in-world and if, in its being, there just as essentially belongs an understanding of how it has its own being — however indeterminate this understanding may be — does it not have an understanding of world, a pre-ontological understanding that dispenses, and can very well dispense, with explicit ontological insights? Does not something like world show itself for being-in-world as it is taking care of the beings therein arising for encounter, i.e. these in their inner-worldliness? Does this phenomenon of world not come into view pre-phenomenologically, does it not always already do so — without requiring any thematically ontological interpretation? Does being-there have in its own being, and in the reach of its heedful absorption with instruments at hand, a possibility within which the worldliness of the inner-worldly beings it takes care of is somehow illuminated for being-there itself and with those beings?  

If such possibilities belonging to the being of being-there can indeed show themselves, a path opens up on which we can pursue the phenomenon of this illumination and try, as it were, to “confront” it — and to examine it for what comes to light of itself within its structures.  

To the everydayness of being-in-world there do belong modes of taking-care that allow cared-for beings to arise for encounter in such a way that the worldly character of what is inner-worldly comes to the fore: \footnote{In our taking-care, we meet up with what is closest at hand as unusable, as not adapted to its intended use. A tool turns out to be damaged, the material inappropriate. \textit{Something instrumental} is indeed here at hand. What uncovers the unusability is not, however, our looking at and formulating of properties, but rather our circumspection in the course of dealing with and making use of the instrument. In such uncovering of unusability the instrument sticks out. Such \textit{sticking out} offers us the at-hand instrument in a certain non-at-hand-ness. Now, this implies that what is here unusable simply lies there: it shows itself as an instrument-thing that looks like such-and-such and, as looking this way, has also and all along been on hand in its at-hand-ness. Pure on-hand-ness announces itself in the instrument — only, however, again to withdraw into the at-hand-ness of something taken care of, i.e. the at-hand-ness of what one now finds needing restoration.* This on-hand-ness of something unusable does not yet entirely dispense with every at-hand-ness; understood as unusable, the on-hand instrument is not yet a thing that simply pops up somewhere. The damaging of an instrument is not yet a mere alteration of something, a change of properties in something on hand, a change simply popping up.}  

[1] In our taking-care, we meet up with what is closest at hand as unusable, as not adapted to its intended use. A tool turns out to be damaged, the material inappropriate. \textit{Something instrumental} is indeed here at hand. What uncovers the unusability is not, however, our looking at and formulating of properties, but rather our circumspection in the course of dealing with and making use of the instrument. In such uncovering of unusability the instrument sticks out. Such \textit{sticking out} offers us the at-hand instrument in a certain non-at-hand-ness. Now, this implies that what is here unusable simply lies there: it shows itself as an instrument-thing that looks like such-and-such and, as looking this way, has also and all along been on hand in its at-hand-ness. Pure on-hand-ness announces itself in the instrument — only, however, again to withdraw into the at-hand-ness of something taken care of, i.e. the at-hand-ness of what one now finds needing restoration.* This on-hand-ness of something unusable does not yet entirely dispense with every at-hand-ness; understood as unusable, the on-hand instrument is not yet a thing that simply pops up somewhere. The damaging of an instrument is not yet a mere alteration of something, a change of properties in something on hand, a change simply popping up.  

[2] Our heedful dealings not only come up against unusable things \textit{among} those that in any case are already at hand; it also finds such things to be lacking — not only not “manageable” but not “within reach” at all. As a finding of one thing to be not at hand, the missing of it again uncovers the things that \textit{are} at hand as a certain kind of being-only-on-hand. When we take note that something is not at hand, whatever \textit{is} at hand moves into the mode of \textit{obtrusiveness}. The more urgently the need for what is lacking and the more fully it arises for encounter in its non-at-hand-ness, the more obtrusive does what remains at hand become — so
much so that now it seems to lose its character of at-hand-ness. It too unveils itself as now only on hand, something that cannot be budged without the missing element. As a deficient mode of taking-care, our helplessness uncovers the things at hand in their merely being on hand.

[3] In our dealings with the world we take care of, things not-at-hand can arise for encounter not only in the sense of being unusable or simply missing, but as something that is precisely not lacking and not unusable, but rather “gets in the way” of our taking-care. Whatever taking-care cannot get around while having “no time” for it: this is something not-at-hand in the sense of not belonging there, not being settled. This sort of thing not at hand disrupts—and makes visible the recalcitrance of what we first of all and all along have to take care of. With this recalcitrance the on-hand-ness of what is at hand declares itself in yet another manner—as the being of what still lies ahead and calls for treatment.

The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and recalcitrance serve to bring forward the character of on-hand-ness that things at hand can have. In these modes, however, things at hand are still not simply observed, gawked at, as on hand; the on-hand-ness here announcing itself is still tied to the at-hand-ness of instruments. These do not disguise themselves as mere things. They become “stuff” that one would like to get rid of; nevertheless, in our drive to get rid of this “stuff,” what is at hand shows itself as still at hand—within its steadfast on-hand-ness.

But what do these intimations of modified encounters with things at hand (modified so that their on-hand-ness unveils itself) have to do with clarifying the phenomenon of world? Even with the analysis of this modification we still abide by the being of inner-worldly things: we have not yet come any closer to the phenomenon of world. — While we have not gotten hold of it, we have made it possible to bring this phenomenon into view.

In becoming conspicuous, obtrusive, or recalcitrant, what is at hand somehow forfeits its at-hand-ness. Yet this at-hand-ness is itself understood (although not thematically) in our dealings with what is at hand. It does not simply disappear; rather, in the conspicuousness of something become unusable, it does effectively take its leave. Its at-hand-ness shows itself all over again, and precisely in this second showing the worldly character of things at hand shows itself too.

The structure of the being of what is at hand as an instrument is determined by references. What is specially and self-evidently “in itself” about the “things” closest to us: this arises for encounter within our taking care of them—a taking-care in which we use them and thereby do not explicitly observe them, and which can come up against them as unusable. An instrument being unusable implies: the constitutive reference of the in-order-to is disrupted in relation to some toward-which. The references themselves are not observed, they are just “there” in our submission to them. It is in a disruption of reference, in their unusability for . . ., that the reference becomes explicit: to be sure, even now not yet as an ontological structure, but rather ontically for the circumspection that runs up against the damagedness of the tool. In this circumspect awakening of reference to its particular toward-which, this latter itself comes into view, and with it the work-context, the whole “workshop”—and this precisely as that wherein taking-care always already resides. The instrumental context lights up—not as something never before seen, but rather as a whole already constantly sighted in advance within circumspection. And it’s with this whole that world announces itself.

It’s the same when something at hand goes missing, something whose everyday proximity has been so much taken for granted that we don’t even take notice of it anymore: there is then a break in the referential interconnections that circumspection uncovers. Circumspection loses its foothold and only now sees what the missing item is for and what it functions with. Once again, the circum-world announces itself. What lights up as the circum-world is not itself one at-hand item among others, and certainly not any on-hand item supplying the foundation for the at-hand instrument. It is in the “there” prior to all detection and observation. It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, since this always goes after determinable beings. Yet it is in each instance already disclosed for circumspection. — Henceforth we employ “disclosing” and “disclosedness” terminologically: they signify, respectively, “opening up” and “having been opened up.” Accordingly, “to disclose” never means anything like “arriving at something indirectly, by way of an inference.”

That the world does not “consist” of at-hand things shows itself in this way, among others: a de-worlding of what is at hand goes along with the lighting-up of the world that occurs in those three modes of taking-care we have been interpreting—so that, in each case, what comes forward is their being-only-on-hand. For any at-hand instrument in everyday taking-care to arise for encounter as it “is in itself” the
references, and the referential wholenesses within which circumspection gets absorbed, must remain unthematic for circumspection — and even more so for any non-circumspect and “thematic” apprehending of it. That the world does not announce itself is the condition of the possibility of at-hand things not stepping out of their inconspicuousness. And herein the phenomenal structure of the “in-itself-ness” of these beings constitutes itself.*

Although privative in formulation, the expressions in-conspicuousness, un-obtrusiveness, and non-recalcitrance signify a positive phenomenal characteristic of the being of what is initially at hand. The negation [in each of the three] signifies the characteristic at-hand things have of keeping to themselves: this keeping-to-itself is what we have in view when speaking of in-itself-ness — something we characteristically ascribe “first of all” to on-hand things, however, i.e. to things we can thematically detect. Orienting ourselves primarily and exclusively toward on-hand things, we can never ontologically clarify the “in-itself.” Still, an interpretation must be proffered if the talk about “in-itself” is to have major ontological significance. This in-itself of being is emphatically invoked, mostly in an ontic manner and with phenomenal justification. But this ontic invocation does not already fulfill the claim to any ontological assertion presumably accompanying such invocation. Our analysis so far has already made it clear that the in-itself-ness of inner-worldly beings can be ontologically discerned only on the basis of the phenomenon of world.

Now, if world can in some way light up, it must assuredly be disclosed. Along with the accessibility of inner-worldly at-hand beings for circumspect taking-care, world is in each instance already pre-

* Heidegger’s talk of “in-itself-ness” recalls both the Platonic-Aristotelian and the Kantian-Hegelian traditions. Plato introduced the thought that, while “outsiders” may enjoy or suffer horses, cities, and songs, those who are competent get at these things as they “are” (rather: drive to be) “in themselves.” Kant then introduced the thought that we intellectuals fool ourselves if we think we can ever know “nature” as it is “in itself”: rather, knowledge of nature, like ordinary experience, articulates things as they are happening (appearing)—while necessarily “assuming” that appearances issue from “things themselves.” In both traditions, “in-itself-ness” is the hallmark of what lays claim to us in our competence. Heidegger’s account of at-handness offers an alternative interpretation of “in-itself-ness,” one based on the way things arising for encounter are “inner-worldly.”

disclosed. Accordingly, world is something “wherein” being-there has in each instance already been, something it will have to come back to on every occasion it in any way explicitly gets into something.

On our interpretation so far, being-in-world means: unthematic and circumspect absorption in the references constituting the at-hand-ness of an instrumental whole. In each instance, taking-care is as it is on the basis of its trusting familiarity with world. Within this familiarity being-there can lose itself in the inner-worldly things arising for encounter, and it can be taken over by them.* What is it with which being-there is familiar? Why can the worldly character of inner-worldly things light up? How, more exactly, are we to understand the referential whole within which circumspection “moves”—the breakdowns of which force to the fore the on-hand-ness of beings?

For answering these questions, all of which aim for an elaboration of the phenomenon and the problem of worldliness, we require a more concrete analysis of the structures into whose elements the questions bore.

* The “agency” at issue in “being taken over” by things contrasts with the agency assumed in our taking them: the latter metaphor lies buried in such innocuous words as “receiving,” “perceiving,” and “conceiving,” as well as in the logical talk of “making claims about” things and the constructivist talk of “construing” things. (The term “being taken over” was introduced on p. 61, and includes the stronger sense of being “taken in,” i.e. fooled by things, as well as the weaker sense of just being “taken,” i.e. stunned by them.) Traditional thinkers from Plato through Nietzsche have generally argued that our own taking is grounded in some sort of being taken (addressed or drawn: as in love, or ἐρως). Heidegger reopens this question from the bottom up, so to speak.
we push in understanding the being of inner-worldly beings, the more broad and the more sure the phenomenal basis becomes for laying bare the phenomenon of world.

Once again we start with the being of what is at hand, this time with the intention of grasping more precisely the phenomenon of reference itself. For this purpose we apply ourselves to an ontological analysis of instruments in which we easily find “references” of various sorts. Such “instruments” are signs. This word covers many things: not only are there various kinds of signs, but also being a sign for... can itself be formulated as a universal kind of relation — so that the sign-structure itself provides an ontological guideline for “characterizing” everything whatsoever that is.

Signs are, first of all, instruments whose specific instrumentality consists in showing. Such signs include: trail markings, boundary stones, marine storm warnings, signals, flags, mourning bands, and the like. Showing can be defined as a “kind” of referring. Taken in an extremely formal fashion, referring is relating. Still, relation does not serve as the genus for “kinds” of references somehow differentiable into sign, symbol, expression, significance. Relation is a formal determination, one we can read directly off every sort of interconnection among things, whatever and however these things happen to be.1

Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every “indicator” [sign showing] is a reference, but not every referring is a showing. It follows that every “indicator” is a relation, but not every relating is a showing. Here then the formal-ontological character of relation comes to light. For an investigation into reference, sign or even significance nothing is achieved by characterizing these as relations.2 In


2 [These insights into the ranking of reference and relation are] fundamental for any certification of the possibility of the claims made by mathematical logic. [Much of Heidegger’s very earlier work focused on the developments of logic from medieval times to the beginnings of “logic.”] Already in the 19th century, mathematicians noted that Aristotelian logic could not formalize relations, the core of modern physics: A strikes B with force C; x precedes y and y precedes z, so x precedes z. Extravagant claims were then made about the power of the new mathematical logic to analyze and to formulate “how things really are,” i.e. how they relate to one another. Cf. my annotation on p. 88.

§17. Reference and Signs

Nowadays, blinkers (I remember still seeing arrows on cars in the 1940s).
this latter does not itself make something into a sign. The instrument we call a “hammer” is also constituted by a serviceability, but that does not make the hammer into a sign. The “reference” involved in a showing is the ontic concretion of the toward-which of a serviceability; it determines the instrument as for this toward-which. In contrast, the reference involved in a “serviceability for . . .” is an ontological-categorial determinateness of the instrument as instrument. That the toward-which of the serviceability receives its concretion in a showing, is incidental to the instrument’s constitution as such. * — In a rough way, this example of a sign already makes visible the difference between its reference as a serviceability and its reference as a showing. So little do these two coincide that, when they do form a unity, they first make possible the concretion of a determinate kind of instrument. Now, as certain as it is that showing (as the constitution of an instrument) is fundamentally distinct from reference, so too is it indisputable that a sign has a special, even a pre-eminent relation to the manner in which any given circum-worldly at-hand instrumental whole has its being — as well as to the manner in which the worldly character of this whole has its being. In heedful dealings, instruments indicating something have a special employment. Ontologically, however, it does not suffice simply to ascertain this factum. The basis and the meaning of this specialty must be illuminated.

What does it mean that a sign shows something? We can only answer this question if we determine the way one appropriately deals with indicational instruments. It is within such dealings that the at-hand-ness of these instruments also becomes intrinsically comprehensible. And what is the appropriate way of having to do with signs? Orienting ourselves with regard to our example (blinkers), we must answer: the corresponding comportment (our being) toward the encountered sign is “getting out of the way” or “coming to a halt” in the face of the approaching vehicle having its blinker on. As deciding upon a direction, getting out of the way belongs essentially to the being-in-world of being-

* When in operation, the blinker shows (indicates), especially to others, that the vehicle is about to turn: there is here an ontic concretion of the reference. In contrast, the ontological reference of the blinker lies in the service it can render: we identify the blinker as blinker, we understand its serviceability, even when it is not operating at all. The serviceability (world) of an instrument is prior to its concretion.
and from a circumspect foresight needing the at-hand possibility that its particular circum-world be allowed at any time to announce itself for circumspection, and this by way of something at hand. But, now, to the very being of anything inner-worldly close at hand there belongs the character (already described) of keeping to itself, not protruding. For this reason, then, circumspect dealings in our circum-world need an at-hand instrument that, in its instrumental character, takes over the “job” of making conspicuous at-hand beings. Thus the establishment of such instruments (signs) must be geared to their conspicuousness. But even as thus conspicuous they cannot be arbitrarily selected from what is on hand; rather, they get “aptly arranged” with a view to easy accessibility, and in a determinate way.

When deciding upon a sign we need not necessarily proceed by fabricating an instrument that is not yet at hand at all. Signs also emerge in taking as a sign something already at hand. In this mode, deciding upon a sign reveals a still more primordial meaning. The showing [inherent in a sign] procures not only the circumspectly oriented availability of an at-hand instrumental whole and of the circum-world at large; deciding upon a sign can even uncover something right off. What is taken as a sign becomes accessible by way of its at-hand-ness. For example, if in farming the south wind is “accepted” as a sign of rain, this “acceptance” (or the “value attached” to this being) is not something just tossed on top of a being already on hand in itself — onto the flow of air and a determinate geographical direction. The south wind is never first of all on hand as something that just comes about (as which it may indeed be accessible for meteorologists), something occasionally taking on the function of warning-sign. Rather, the circumspection inherent in farming is precisely what first uncovers the south wind in its being — here, by taking account of what goes into the farming of land.

But, one will object, what is taken as a sign must surely be in itself accessible beforehand, and be comprehended before we decide upon the sign. To be sure: it must already be available in some manner. The question still remains how the being [e.g., the south wind] is uncovered in that precedental encounter — whether as a thing purely coming about, or much rather as something one just did not understand, something at hand that hitherto one just “couldn’t do anything with,” something that therefore still remained veiled for circumspection. Here again, one cannot properly interpret the circumspectly still undiscovered characteristics of an at-hand instrument as sheer thingliness, something given in advance and then grasped as just on hand.

The being-at-hand of signs in everyday dealings, as well as the conspicuousness (devised for various purposes and in various ways) belonging to signs, not only document the inconspicuousness essential to anything that is at hand and close by; the sign itself derives its conspicuousness from the inconspicuousness of the at-hand instrumental whole that, within everydayness, one “simply takes for granted.” For instance, the familiar “knot in the handkerchief” as a reminder-sign: what it intends to show is something needing to be taken care of in some everyday circumspection. This one sign can show many things, and in very different ways. The broader what might show itself in such a sign is, the narrower its intelligibility and utility. Not only that, as a sign, the knot is only at hand for the one who “devised” on it: it can become inaccessible to the “deviser” himself, so that there is need of a second sign for the first one to be of any circumspect use. When this happens, the knot, useless as a sign, does not lose its character of being a sign, it rather acquires the disconcerting obtrusiveness of a close-by at-hand being.

One might be tempted to illustrate the primary role of signs in everyday taking-care, how this role figures even in the intelligibility of world, by citing the abundant use of “signs” — such as fetish and magic — in primitive being-there. The decisions underlying the use of such signs certainly do not proceed with any theoretical intention or by way of any theoretical speculation: here, the use of signs remains entirely within an “immediate” being-in-world. Yet upon closer inspection it becomes clear that the interpretation of fetish and magic that takes as its guideline the idea of signs does not at all suffice for construing the manner of “being-at-hand” belonging to beings arising for encounter in the primitive world. In regard to the phenomenon of signs we can proffer the following interpretation: for primitive human beings a sign and what it shows are congruent. A sign can itself take the place of what it shows — not only in the sense of replacing it, but rather in such a way that the sign always is what it shows. This remarkable congruence (of sign and what it shows) does not, however, consist in the sign-thing having undergone some sort of “objectivization” — getting experienced as a pure thing and getting shifted into the same region in which on-hand beings have their being, including what is shown by the sign-thing. The
Heidegger calls “ontology of thingliness” the traditional western ontology asking how on-hand things (things from which we have extracted ourselves) are constituted; on p. 68 he employs “reality” as a synonym. In this paragraph on the “primitive world” Heidegger once again insists that the passage back from the ontology of on-hand-ness to an ontology of at-hand-ness completes only half the journey. The other half was planned for Division Three.

§18. Being-bound-up-with and Signification

Beings at hand arise for encounter as inner-worldly. Accordingly, the being of these beings, at-hand-ness, stands in some sort of relation to world and worldliness. World is in every being always already “there.” World is already, precedentally, uncovered along with everything arising for encounter, even though this uncovering is not thematic. World can then light up in various manners of circum-worldly dealings. World it is, out of which at-hand beings are at hand. How can world allow beings at hand to arise for encounter? Our analysis hitherto has shown this much: beings arising as inner-worldly are released in their being for heedful circumspection, for reckoning with things. What does this precedental release mean, and how is it to be understood as an ontologically distinctive feature of world? What problems does the question about the worldliness of world pose for us?

We have shown the instrumental constitution of beings at hand to be that of reference. How can world release beings of this sort in their being? Why is it that these beings first of all arise for encounter? As determine modes of reference we named serviceability-toward, impairment, useability, and the like. In any given instance, the toward-which of serviceability and the for-what of useability delineate the possible concretion of reference. Yet the “showing” occurring in a sign, the “hammering” occurring with a hammer, are not properties of any being. They are not properties at all, if we mean by this term the

83 within the circumspectly heeded circum-world. For this reason, reference itself—if it is to be ontologically the foundation of signs—cannot itself be conceptualized as a sign. Reference is not the ontic determinateness of something at hand, since it after all constitutes at-hand-ness itself. In what sense is reference the ontological “presupposition” of beings at hand, and to what extent is it, as the ontological foundation of signs, also a constituent of worldliness in general?

* Heidegger calls “ontology of thingliness” the traditional western ontology asking how on-hand things (things from which we have extracted ourselves) are constituted; on p. 68 he employs “reality” as a synonym. In this paragraph on the “primitive world” Heidegger once again insists that the passage back from the ontology of on-hand-ness to an ontology of at-hand-ness completes only half the journey. The other half was planned for Division Three.

§17. Being-bound-up and signification; the worldliness of the world

* cleared [Heidegger introduces this metaphor on p. 133: Being-there “is lit up [illuminated, even enlightened]; this means it is in itself cleared as being-in-world—not cleared by anything else but rather cleared in such a way that it is itself the clearing.” This “clearing” (as in the woods) he later interprets as the clearing of (both by and for) being, the authenticity of disclosure and thus the ground of any discovering and discoveredness (p. 220): cf. his “Letter on Humanism,” now available in Pathmarks.]
ontological structure of a possible determinateness of things. * Something at hand is indeed suitable for one thing and unsuitable for another, and its “properties” are, as it were, tied into such suitability and unsuitability as possible ways it has its being in its at-hand-ness (as on-hand-ness, too, is tied into them). Yet, as part of the instrument’s constitution, serviceability (reference) is still not a suitability belonging to any one being; it is rather the ontological condition of the possibility of the ability of such a being to be determined in its suitability. But what then does reference mean? The being of beings at hand has the structure of reference: this means that these beings have in themselves the characteristic of referredness. Any one being is uncovered insomuch as it is, as the being it is, referred to something else. There is something going on with it and near it. The character by which something at hand has its being is being-bound-up. Being bound up with something consists in this: letting something go on with it and near it. The bearing of the “with... near...” is what the term “reference” intends to bring out.

Being-bound-up is the being of inner-worldly beings; within it, beings are in each instance already initially released. This—that it has this bound-up-ness—is the ontological determination of the being of such beings, not an ontic determination about them. That near which it is bound up is the toward-which of its serviceability and the for-which of its useability. There can also be a bound-up-ness regarding the toward-which of serviceability; e.g., what’s going on with the hammer is a hammering (the hammer being called a hammer for that reason), what’s going on with hammering is a fastening, what’s going on with fastening is a protection from bad weather; and protection “is” for the sake of sheltering being-there, i.e. for the sake of a possibility of its being. Exactly which binding pertains to something at hand: this is prefigured in each instance by the wholeness of the bound-up-ness. This wholeness, e.g. one constituting whatever arises in a workshop as at hand (its at-hand-ness), is “earlier” than any one individual instrument—in the same way as the wholeness of a farm is “earlier,” with all its equipment, buildings and fields. Yet the wholeness of being-bound-up itself ultimately comes back to a toward-which no longer having a bound-up-ness, one that is not itself a being having its being the way things at hand do within a world; rather, it comes back to a being whose being is determined as being-in-world, one to whose essential constitution worldliness belongs. This primary toward-which is not a for-something-else, not a what-for of some binding. The primary toward-which is a for-the-sake-of-which. And this “sake” always concerns the being of being-there—for which, in its very being, its being is at issue. For the moment we shall not pursue this inter-connectedness any further, one leading from the structure of being-bound-up to the being of being-there, i.e. to the authentic and single for-the-sake-of-which. Before doing this, we must clarify the “getting bound up” to such an extent that we can bring the phenomenon of worldliness into the focus necessary for detecting the problems regarding it.

Ontically, letting-be-bound-up means this: within the course of some factual taking-care, letting something at hand be such-and-such—as it is and so that it is such. We construe this ontic meaning of “letting be” in a fundamentally ontological manner. We thereby interpret the meaning of the precedental release of inner-worldly things as they are first of all at hand. To let something “be” precedentially does not mean to bring it into its being from scratch, to produce it; rather, it means to uncover something that already “is,” to uncover it in its at-hand-ness, and in this way to let the being be encountered in its being. b This “a priori” being-bound-up is the condition of the possibility for at-hand beings to arise for encounter so that being-there, in ontic dealings with beings arising in this way, can let them be bound up in the ontic sense. In contrast, understood ontologically, letting-be-bound-up concerns the release of every at-hand-being, whether (taken ontically) it thereby has its immediate use or whether (as is mostly and initially the case) it is a being

---

* Heidegger shares with Wittgenstein a sustained effort to overcome the western metaphysical assumption that we “get at” things by discovering their “properties.” Being-bound-up-with (first introduced, in passing, on p. 80) intends to name the way things get moving, bear on one another, and involve us—prior to any discovering and registering of properties on our part.

a Letting-be. Cf. “On the Essence of Truth,” where letting-be holds basically, and very extensively, for every being! [i.e., not just for instruments, but also for “beings not taking their measure from being-there” (e.g., art works). The contrary of “letting” is “forcing”; traditionally, “letting” is interpreted privatively as “habit” (e.g., typing on the typewriter)—later as a “conditioned response” (in preparation for determining things in their on-hand-ness).]

b And so letting it prevail in its truth. [As in the previous marginalium, Heidegger anticipates the thinking planned for Division Three: letting, not determining, signals our relation to the truth.]
that falls short of such use, that is taken care of—that, as uncovered, we do not let “be” just as it is, but rather work over, make better, smash to pieces.

This in-each-case-already-having-let-be, which releases beings in the mode of being-bound-up, is [grammatically] an a priori perfect characterizing the way being-there has its being. Ontologically understood, letting-be-bound-up is a precedental release of beings for their inner-circum-worldly at-hand-ness. The with-what of the binding is released from the near-what of letting-be-bound-up. This with-what arises for taking-care—arises as what is at hand. Insofar as a being shows itself at all to our taking-care, i.e. insofar as a being is uncovered in its being, it is already something circum-worldly at hand, and precisely not “first of all” some sort of “world-stuff” merely on hand.

Being-bound-up, as the being of at-hand beings, is itself in each instance only uncovered on the basis of a pre-uncovering of the wholeness of the binding. In an uncovered bound-up-ness, i.e. in an at-hand being arising for encounter, there accordingly lurks as pre-uncovered what we called the worldly character of at-hand beings. This pre-uncovered wholeness contains itself in an ontological bearing on world. The letting-be-bound that releases beings upon the wholeness of being-bound-up must have already somehow disclosed this wholeness itself. And this wholeness—upon which circum-worldly at-hand beings are released, and in such a way that these first become accessible as inner-worldly beings—cannot itself be conceptualized as a being having its being as something uncovered. It is essentially not discoverable, if from now on we reserve discoveredness as a term for a possible way those beings have

---

**§18. Being-bound-up-with and Signification**

What does it mean to say: that upon which inner-worldly beings are initially released must be precedentially disclosed? To the being of being-there belongs an intelligibility of being. Intelligibility has its being in an understanding. If the way being-there has its being is essentially that of being-in-world, then understanding of being-in-world belongs to its essential constitution. The precedential disclosing of that from which the release of inner-worldly encountered things ensues is nothing else than the understanding of world—world to which being-there, as a being, always relates itself already.

The precedential letting-be-bound near . . . with . . . is grounded in an understanding of the letting-be-bound-up—an understanding of the near-what and of the with-what provided by a bound-up-ness. This—as well as the where-to toward which the bound-up-ness aims, and the for-the-sake-of which to which every aim ultimately returns—must be precedentially disclosed in some intelligibility. And within what, exactly, does being-there, as being-in-world, understand itself pre-ontologically? In the understanding embedded in the whole context of interrelations we have named, being-there refers itself to an in-order-to—and it does this on the basis of an ability-to-be, for the sake of which it itself is (this ability grasped explicitly or implicitly, authentically or inauthentically). This in-order-to prefigures a for-what, and this as a possible near-what of a letting-be-bound which in turn (according to its structure) allows being-there to proceed with something. Being-there already and always refers itself in each instance from a for-the-sake-of which toward the where-with of a being-bound, i.e. it is (inasmuch as it is) in each instance always already letting beings arise for encounter as at hand. Wherein being-there understands itself precedentially: this is the upon-which of precedential letting-be-encountered of beings. The wherein of self-referring understanding as the upon-which of the letting-be-encountered of beings in the manner being-bound-up has its being: this is the phenomenon of world.

---

* The phrasing defining the phenomenon of world deserves careful consideration: the “where-in” is the context of our dealings (structured by taking-care, circumspection, in-order-to, . . . ); the “upon-which” is the same, but recognized as that into which and on the basis of which things arise for encounter. The
Wherein being-there in each instance already understands itself in this manner: with this it is familiar at the start. This familiarity with world does not necessarily require a theoretical transparency of the various interrelations constituting the world as world. On the other hand, though, the possibility of an explicit ontological-existential interpretation of these interrelations: this is grounded in such familiarity with the world constituting being-there — a familiarity that in turn constitutes the understanding of being belonging to being-there. This possibility can be explicitly apprehended once being-there sets itself the task of a primordial interpretation of its being, along with the possibilities of its being, or even of the meaning of being in general.

Yet with our analyses hitherto we have only just laid bare the horizon within which we may search for anything like world and worldliness. Further consideration requires that we first of all make clearer what it is that deserves to be construed ontologically as the context in which being-there refers itself.

Understanding (which we will analyze more thoroughly in §31) holds the indicated interrelations in a precedental disclosure. In such familiar and trusting holding-itself-in-the-disclosedness, understanding holds before itself those interrelations as that wherein its referring takes place. Understanding lets itself be referred in and by these interrelations. The relational character of these interrelations of reference we construe as signifying. In its trusting familiarity with these interrelations, being-there “signifies,” points toward, itself: it provides itself primordially with an understanding of its being and its ability-to-be, all in regard to its being-in-world. The for-the-sake-of-which signifies (points toward) an in-order-to, this signifies a toward-what, this a near-what of letting-be-bound, this a with-what of the bound-up-ness. These interrelations are interlocked among themselves as a primordial wholeness; they are what they are as the signifying within which being-there provides itself precedently with its understanding of being-in-world. The relational whole of this signifying we call signification. This constitutes the structure of world — the structure in which being-there\(^a\) as such in any instance is. In its trusting familiarity with signification, being-there is the ontic condition of the possibility of the un-coverability of beings arising for encounter — these having their being in the manner of bound-up-ness (at-hand-ness), and in this way being able to declare themselves in their in-itself-ness. In each instance, this is what being-there as such is: with its being, there is essentially already a context of at-hand beings uncovered. Insofar as it is, being-there has in each instance already submitted itself\(^b\) to a “world” arising for encounter — and to its being belongs essentially this submissiveness.

Yet signification itself, with which being-there is in each instance already familiar, contains in itself the ontological condition of the possibility that being-there, inasmuch as it already understands and now interprets, can disclose anything like “significances” — “meanings” that, in turn, found the possible being of words and of language.\(^c\)

As an existential constitution of being-there (of its being-in-world), disclosed signification is the ontic condition of the possibility of a wholeness of being-bound-up getting discovered.

But, if we determine in this way the being of at-hand beings (being-bound-up), and even determine worldliness itself in this way, does not the “substantial being” of inner-worldly beings then become volatilized into a relational system? And, since relations are always “things thought,” does not the being of inner-worldly beings then dissolve into “pure thinking”?\(^d\)

Within the present field of investigation one must carefully distinguish the differences, repeatedly marked out, in the structures and dimensions of the ontological problematic:

\(^a\) The being-there in which human being has its being. [Heidegger again emphasizes the interplay of “being-there” and “human being”: “man” is an historically founded “invention,” as Michel Foucault will later say (at the end of Les mots et les choses, 1966). Cf. The notes on pp. 57 and 71.]

\(^b\) But not as an I-based act on the part of a subject; rather: being-there [is drawn into this submission,] and [by] being [itself].

\(^c\) Not true; language is not built up [upon meanings]; rather, it is the primordial prevailing of truth as the there. [Heidegger increasingly insists that the “there” of being-there is fraught with urgency, and that language is to be understood as arising from and drawing us into this urgency.]
1. The being of those inner-worldly beings initially arising for encounter (at-hand-ness);
2. The being of those beings that become available and determinable in a self-sufficient mode of discovery, one passing through what initially arises for encounter (on-hand-ness).
3. The being of the ontic condition of the possibility of inner-worldly beings getting uncovered at all (the worldliness of world).

The third is an existential determination of being-in-world, i.e. of being-there. The other two concepts of being are categories bearing on beings having a being other than that of being-there. The referential context that, as signification, constitutes worldliness, can indeed be taken formally as a relational system. But one must then bear in mind that such formalization levels out the phenomena to the point where the actual phenomenal content gets lost, especially when it comes to such “simple” interrelations as are contained in signification. According to their phenomenal content, these “relations” and “relata” (the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of-which, and with-what of a being-bound-up) resist every mathematical functionalizing; neither are they thought up, just posited in a “thinking”: they are rather interrelations within which heedful circumspection as such already resides in any given instance. As a constituent of worldliness, this “relational system” does not at all volatilize the being of inner-worldly beings; rather on the basis of the worldliness of the world these beings first become discoverable in their “substantial” “in-itself-ness.” And only when inner-worldly beings can arise for encounter does it become possible, within the field of these beings, to forge an access to them as simply on hand. These latter, on the basis of their now being only on hand, can then be mathematically determined, with an eye to their “properties,” in “function-concepts.” Concepts of this sort are ontologically only possible at all as they bear on beings whose being has the character of pure substantiality. Function-concepts are always possible only as formalized concepts of substance.

---

In order to allow the specifically ontological problematic of worldliness to come into still sharper relief, let us, prior to pursuing the analysis itself, clarify our own interpretation of worldliness by recalling an extreme counter-example.

B. The difference between our analysis of worldliness and Descartes’ interpretation of the world

Only step-by-step can our investigation secure the concept of worldliness and the structures this phenomenon embraces. Because the interpretation of world most commonly starts with some inner-worldly being, whereupon the phenomenon of world no longer comes into view at all, we shall attempt to clarify this starting-point ontologically by recalling what is perhaps its most extreme realization. We will not only offer a brief portrayal of the basic features of Descartes’ ontology of “world,” but also inquire into its presuppositions and attempt to characterize these in light of the insights we have so far achieved. The discussion of these matters should enable us to understand just how the interpretations of world coming after Descartes—and also those coming before—rest upon ontological “foundations” that have remained thoroughly unconsidered.

Descartes detects the basic ontological determination of the world in extensio. Since extension co-constitutes spatiality—is even identical with it, according to Descartes—and since spatiality remains in some sense constitutive for the world, the discussion of the Cartesian ontology of “world” also offers a negative foothold for the positive explication of the spatiality of the circum-world and of being-there itself. Our treatment of Descartes’ ontology is threefold: 1. The determination of “world” as res extensa (§19). 2. The foundations of this ontological determination (§20). 3. The hermeneutic discussion of the Cartesian ontology of “world” (§21).

The considerations that follow receive their detailed justification only by formalizing of functions, mathematical logicians have in fact aspired to replace the metaphysical concern for causality; y is a function of x (instances in the set y are “caused” by instances in the set x) “means” there is a “function” (set) f such that: \(<x,y> \in f \& \exists z(<x,z> \in f)\). Such formalization does indeed presuppose an access to beings as instances of kinds (elements of sets), and Heidegger detects in this presupposition not the overcoming, but rather the (suppressed) culmination of our metaphysical tradition. — In his Decline of the West (1918-22), Oswald Spengler detects the primacy of function-thinking in modern mathematics, physics, music and psychology (Untergang des Westens [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998], pp. 20, 101 ff., 115, 118, 388 ff., 504, 535).
way of the phenomenological destructuring of the cogito sum (cf. Part Two, Division Two)."* 

§19. The determination of “world” as res extensa

Descartes distinguishes the ego cogito, as the res cogitans, from the res corporea.† Thereafter, this distinction determines ontologically the one between “nature and spirit.” This contrast may get formulated in ever so many differing ways regarding its content, yet the unclarity of its ontological foundations, and of the two contrasting poles themselves, has its closest roots in the distinction as Descartes drew it. Within what understanding of being has this distinction determined the being of these two beings? The term for the being of anything that is in itself is substantia. The expression means sometimes the being of a being counting as a substance, substantiality, and sometimes such a being itself, a substance. This double meaning of substantia, a doubleness already contained in the ancient concept of οὗσια,² is not accidental.

The ontological determination of a res corporea requires an explication of substance, i.e. of the substantiality of this being considered as a substance. What constitutes the actual being-in-itself of a res corporea? How is a substance, i.e. its substantiality, at all conceivable as such? Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantiae cognoscitur; sed una tamen est cuiusque substantiae praecipua proprietas, quae ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliae omnes referuntur.¹

Substances become accessible in their “attributes,” and each has its distinguished property, from which the essence of the substantiality of a given substance can be read off. Which, now, is this property regarding a res corporea? Nempe extensio in longum, latum, et profundum, substantia corporea naturam constituit.¹ It is then extension — length, breadth, and depth — that constitutes the actual being of the corporeal substance we call “world.” But what makes extensio so distinctive? Nam omne aliud quod corporei tribuit potest, extensionem prae supponit.² For the beings under discussion, extension is the one constitution of their being that, above all other determinations of their being, must already “be” if these other determinations are to “be” what they are. Extension is what must be primarily “ascribed” to any bodily thing. Accordingly, the proof for the extension of the “world,” and for its substantiality characterized by extension, proceeds by showing how all other determinations of this substance (most prominently: divisio, figura, and motus) can be conceptualized as modi of extensio—and that, conversely, extensio sine figura vel motu [extension without a definite shape or motion] remains intelligible.

Thus a bodily thing can, while retaining its total extension, change the distribution of it throughout its various dimensions and still present itself in these multiple shapes as one and the same thing. Atque unum et idem corpus, retinendo suam eandem quantitatem, pluribus diversis modis potest extendi: nunc scilicet magis secundum longitudinem, minusque secundum latitudinem vel profunditatem, ac paulo post e contra magis secundum latitudinem, et minus secundum longitudinem.³

Shape is a modus of extensio, just as movement is; for motus only gets apprehended si de nullo nisi locali cogitemus ac de vi a qua

---

* Promised but never published. Heidegger already previewed his critique of Descartes on pp. 24-25.
† “as res cogitans” added in the edition of his Collected Works, perhaps to retain the parallel: “thinking thing” vs. “corporeal thing.”
² Indeed, even and precisely the [Platonic-Aristotelian] ὁν: τὸ ὁν means: 1. what makes something to be (being-ness) and 2. something that is (a being). [Aristotle defines “primary philosophy” as the contemplation of “beings as beings” — expressed in the singular as “(each) being (τὸ ὁν) just inasmuch as it is” (as distinct from “accidental” ways it can be, including the ways we may simply make use of it). He then gives the name οὗσια to the focal point that every question what a being is must come down to (even when the non-philosophical answer takes the form of an “accident”). These two terms (τὸ ὁν and η οὗσια) incessantly dissolve into one another.] 
³ Principles of Philosophy, 1, §53 (Œuvres, ed. Adam Tannery, Vol. VIII, p. 25). [“And from any one attribute we can know a substance; yet there is always one principle property of a substance which constitutes its nature and its essence, and to which all the others come back.”]
¹ Ibid. [“This extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance.” Heidegger emphasizes extensio.]
² Ibid. [“For everything else that can be attributed to a corporeal thing presupposes extension.”]
³ Ibid., §64, p. 31. [“One and the same body can, while retaining the same quantity as before, be extended in many different ways: at one moment it may be greater in length and less in breadth or depth, while later it may, in contrast, be greater in breadth and less in length.”]
If movement is a determinable property of a res corporea, it must, in order to be apprehended in its being, be conceptualized on the basis of the being of this being itself, on the basis of extensio, and that means: as pure change of place, locomotion. Anything like “force” contributes nothing to the determination of the being of this being. Determinations like duritas (hardness), pondus (heaviness), and color (coloredness) can be removed from matter and the latter still remains what it is. Such determinations do not constitute the actual being of matter; and, inasmuch as they are, they turn out to be modes of extensio. In regard to “hardness” Descartes endeavors to show in detail how this is so: Nam, quantum ad duritiem, nihil alius de illa sensus nobis indicat, quam partes durorum corporum resistere motui manuum nostrarum, cum in illas incurrunt. Si enim, quotiescunque manus nostrae versus aliquam partem moventur, corpora omnia que sic recederent eadem celeritate qua illae accedunt, nullum unquam duritiem sentiremus. Nec ullo modo potest intelligi, corpora quae sic recederent, idcirco naturam corporis esse amissura; nec proinde ipsa in duritie consistit.\(^1\) Hardness gets experienced in touching. What does the sense of touch “tell” us about hardness? The parts of a hard thing “resist” the movement of our hands, as when we wish to move a thing. If hard bodies, i.e. ones not giving way, were to change their place with the same speed with which our approaching hand changes its place, there would never be any contact, hardness would not be experienced and therefore would not be. Yet there is no way we could thereby conclude that the bodies receding with such speed should lose something of their bodily being. If bodies retain their bodily being even with the change in their speed that makes “hardness” impossible, then hardness does not belong to the being of these beings either. Eademque ratione ostendi potest, et pondus, et colorum, et alias omnes eiusmodi qualitates, quae in materia corporea sentiuntur, ex ea tolli posse, ipsa integra remanente: unde sequitur, a nulla ex illis eius (sc. extensionis) naturam dependere.\(^1\) Accordingly, what constitutes the being of any res corporea is extensio: that which is omnimodo divisibile, figurabile et mobile (that which can change in every way of divisibility, formability, and movement), that which remains (remanet) throughout all these changes (capax mutationum). That about a bodily thing that constantly remains: this is what it really is — so that we can characterize the substantiality of this substance by it [i.e., by discovering what constantly remains].

§20. The foundations of the ontological determination of “world”

The idea of being to which the ontological characterization of res extensa returns is that of substantiality. Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possimus, quam rem quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indiget ad existendum: by substance we can understand nothing other than a being that is in such a way that, in order to be, it stands in need of no other being.\(^2\) The being of a “substance” is characterized by its standing-in-no-need. What in its being stands absolutely in no need of any other being: this satisfies the idea of substance in the fullest sense — this being is the ens perfectissimum, the most perfect being. Substantia quae null plane re indiget, unica tantum potest intelligi, nempe Deus.\(^3\) “God” is here, where it is understood as ens perfectissimum, a purely ontological term. At the same time, what the concept of God “self-evidently” includes makes it possible for us to interpret ontologically what constitutes substantiality: standing-in-no-need. Alias vero omnes (res), non nisi ope concursus Dei existere percipimus.\(^4\) Every being that is not God stands in need of being produced (in the broadest sense), and of being sustained. The production of on-hand beings — or, in the one case, the lack of any need to be produced — constitutes the horizon within which “being” is
understood. Every being that is not God is an *ens creatum*. Between these two beings there reigns an “infinite” difference in their being, and yet we still address both created beings and their creator as *beings*. Accordingly, we employ “being” so broadly that its meaning embraces an “infinite” difference. In this way we can, with some justification, also call created beings substances. Relative to God, these beings do stand in need of being produced and sustained; but, within the region of created beings, of “world” construed as *ens creatum*, there are some (e.g., human beings) that, for their creaturely production and sustenance, are relatively “needless of any other being.” There are two sorts of these substances: the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*.

On this account, the being of the one substance whose pre-eminent *proprietas* is *extensio* becomes ontologically determinable in principle once the meaning of being that is “common” to all three substances, the one infinite and the other two finite, has been clarified. But *nomen substantiae non convenit Deo et illis univoce*, ut dici solet in Scholis, hoc est . . . quae Deo et creaturis sit communis. Here, Descartes touches upon a problem that very much occupied medieval ontology — the question in what way the meaning of being signifies each being addressed. In the assertions “God is” and “the world is” we assert being. Yet the word “is” cannot mean these two beings in the same way (*συνωνυμως*, univoce); after all, an infinite difference separates these two beings; and if the signifying embedded in the “is” were univocal, created things would be thought of as uncreated or uncreated things would be reduced to created things. Yet “being” does not serve as a mere homonym; rather, in both cases “being” does get understood. Scholasticism construed the positive meaning of the signifying of “being” as “analogous” signifying, in contrast to univocal or merely homonymous signifying. Taking their clue from Aristotle, in whom (as in the beginning of Greek ontology in general) the problem is prefigured, the Scholastics defined various kinds of analogy — so that even the “schools” were distinguished according to how they construed the way being gets signified. With regard to the ontological development of the problem,

---

1. Ibid., §51, p. 24. [“The name ‘substance’ does not apply to God and to these univocally, as they say in the schools, i.e. [no meaning of this name can be distinctly understood] that would be common to both God and to creature.” — Heidegger deletes the phrase in braces, quoting it further on.]
2. [I.e., the word “is” cannot here apply] in a continuous meaning.

---

Descartes not only entirely evades the ontological question about substantiality, he explicitly insists that substance as such, i.e. its substantiality, is preponderantly inaccessible in and by itself. *Verutamtern non potest substantia primum animadverteri ex hoc solo, quod sit existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit.* Being itself does not “affect” us, therefore it can never be perceived. “Being is not a real predicate,” as Kant states the point, merely reiterating what Descartes claimed. Thus

---

2. Descartes’ *Principles of Philosophy*, I, §51, p. 24. [“No meaning of this name (sc. ‘substance’) can be distinctly understood that would be common to both God and creature.”]
3. *Ibid.*, §52, p. 25. [“But substance cannot first be got at merely by the fact that it exists, since this all by itself does not affect us.” Note that Descartes accepts unquestioningly the categorial distinction between activity (“getting at” something) and passivity (being affected by it).]
4. *Ibid.*, §52, p. 25. [“But substance cannot first be got at merely by the fact that it exists, since this all by itself does not affect us.” Note that Descartes accepts unquestioningly the categorial distinction between activity (“getting at” something) and passivity (being affected by it).]
5. [real] meaning “belonging to the thing itself,” to its “what,” this alone being able to concern us in one way or another. [Besides calling attention to what “real” here means, Heidegger adds the pre-epistemological thought that only what “belongs to the things encountered” can be of genuine concern to us.]
I. Chapter Three: The Worldliness of World

one abandons in principle the possibility of a pure problematic of being and searches out an alternative—a path on which one then acquires the described determinations of substance. Because “being” is indeed not accessible as a being, it gets expressed by the ascertainable determinations (attributes) of given beings. Yet not just by any such; rather, by those satisfying most purely the meaning of being and of substantiality that has been implicitly presupposed. What must be primarily “ascribed” to a substantia finita, as res corporea, is extensio. Quin et facilius intelligimus substantiam extensam, vel substantiam cogitantem, quam substantiam solam, omisso eo quod cogitet vel sit extensa.¹ For substantiality is ratione tantum, [so much an entity of reason that it is] not separable realiter² and findable as are determinable substances.

In this way the foundations for determining “world” as res extensa have become clear: the idea of substantiality, an idea not only not clarified but held to be unclarifiable, and one presented indirectly by way of the most preferential substantial property of any given substance. There also lurks in this determination of substance by way of ascertainable determinations the reason for the double meaning of the term. What is intended is substantiality, and this is understood on the basis of an ascertained quality of substance. Because something ontic undergirds the ontological, the expression substantia serves now in an ontical, now in an ontological, but mostly in a floating ontic-ontological meaning. Behind this slight difference of meaning there lies hidden the failure to come to terms with the fundamental problem of being.

¹ Ibid., §63, p. 31. [“And indeed, it is easier to understand either an extended substance or a thinking substance than substance all by itself, apart from whether it be thinking or extended.”]
² as regards its “what,” its content. [Cf. Heidegger’s previous marginalium on “real”: he recalls the traditional meanings of the words.]

§21. Hermeneutical discussion of the Cartesian ontology of “world”

The critical question now arises: Does the Cartesian ontology of “world” search for the phenomenon of world at all, and, if not, does it at least determine one inner-worldly being to the extent that its worldly character could be made visible? Both questions are to be answered in the negative. The one being that Descartes attempts to apprehend ontologically at its basis as extensio is rather one that becomes discoverable only by way of beings first of all at hand in an inner-worldly manner. But if this is correct, and even if the ontological characterization of this particular inner-worldly being (nature)—as well as the idea of substantiality understood as the meaning of existit and ad existendum implied in its definition—leave us in the dark, there is the possibility that an ontology based on the radical separation of God, I, and “world” might still pose and advance the ontological problem of world. But if there is not even this possibility we must then come up with an explicit proof not only that Descartes gives a wrong ontological determination of world but also that his interpretation and its foundations have led us to leap over the phenomenon of world—as well as over the being of those beings initially at hand in an inner-worldly manner.

In our exposition of the problem of worldliness (§14) we indicated the importance of obtaining an appropriate access to this phenomenon.

Division Three. They are now available in his Collected Works, Vol. 24 (Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 1982):

The difference between being and beings is pre-ontological, i.e., it is latent in the ex-sistence of being-there, without any explicit concept of being. As such, it can be developed into an expressly understood difference. To the ex-sistence of being-there belongs, on the basis of temporality, an immediate unity of our understanding of being and our comportment toward beings. (Collected Works, p. 454)

In a marginalium on p. 208 Heidegger again remarks on the ontological difference. Jacques Derrida subsequently expanded upon this notion of “difference” (or constricted it) with a neologism: différance.]
When now discussing the Cartesian approach we must then ask: On what manner of being—there does this approach settle as the appropriate manner of access to those beings, the being of which Descartes equates with the being of “world” as extensio? The one and only access to such beings is cognizing, intellectio, and this construed as the cognition of mathematical physics. Mathematical cognition is here regarded as the one manner of apprehending beings that can in every instance be certain of a sure grip on the being of the beings apprehended by it. Whatever is in a manner of being satisfying the being that is accessible to mathematical cognition: this is in the fullest sense. These beings are those that always are what they are; thus that constitutes the full being of beings experienced in the world about which it can be shown that they have the character of what constantly remains — as remanens capax mutationum. What enduringly remains: this fully is. This is what mathematics cognizes. Whatever about beings is made accessible by mathematics is what constitutes their being. In this way “world” has its being imposed, as it were — from a determinate idea of being, one lying buried within the concept of substantiality, and also from an idea of cognition that cognizes beings in this manner. Descartes does not allow the manner in which inner-worldly beings have their being to offer itself from these beings themselves; rather, on the basis of an idea of being (where being = on-hand-ness)—an idea whose origin is not disclosed and whose justification is not identified—he dictates to the world its “real” being, as it were. Therefore it is not primarily his dependence on a science he happens especially to value, namely mathematics, that determines his ontology of world, it is rather his basically ontological orientation toward being as constant on-hand-ness, the apprehension of which mathematical cognition satisfies exceptionally well. In this way Descartes accomplishes, explicitly and philosophically, the switch to modern mathematical physics and its transcendental foundations — a switch based on traditional ontology itself.

\[\text{§21. The Cartesian Ontology of “World”}\]

Descartes does not need to pose the problem of the appropriate access to inner-worldly beings. Under the unbroken dominance of traditional ontology, the decision was already made in advance how properly to apprehend what fully is. Apprehension occurs in \(\text{\nu\epsilon\iota\sigma\varsigma\varphi\iota\nu\eta\nu} \), in “intuition” taken most broadly, of which \(\delta\iota\omega\nu\text{\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\omicron\nu}\), “thinking,” is a founded and developed form. And from this basic ontological orientation Descartes introduces his “critique” of the other possible manner of accessing beings by way of intuitive perception, namely sensatio (α\(\sigma\tau\omicron\theta\eta\omicron\iota\omicron\sigma\iota\)) in contrast to intellectio.

Descartes knows very well that beings do not initially show themselves in their full being. What is “initially” given is this one determinately colored, tasting, hard, cold, resonating thing called wax. But this thing, anything at all that the senses offer, remains ontologically inconsequential. Satis erit, si advertamus sensuum perceptiones non referri, nisi ad istam corporis humani cum mente coniunctionem, et nobis quidem ordinare exhibere, quid ad illam externa corpora prodesse possint aut nocere. The senses do not at all let us cognize beings in their being; rather, they simply report how “external” inner-worldly things are useful or harmful to human beings burdened with a body. Nos non docent, qualia (corpora) in seipsis existant; from the senses we receive no information at all about beings in their being. Quod agentes, perciemus naturam materiae, sive corporis in universum spectati, non consistere in eo quod sit res dura vel ponderosa vel colorata vel alto aliquo modo sensus afficiens: sed tantum in eo quod sit res extensa in longum, latum, et profundum.

How incapable Descartes was of allowing what shows itself in sensation to display itself in its own manner of being, let alone of determining it, becomes clear from a critical analysis of the interpretation he engenders of the experience of hardness and resistance (cf. §19).

\[\text{\footnote{\text{\textit{Ibid.}}, II, §3, p. 41. ["It will suffice to note that the perceptions of the senses do not refer to anything but the conjunction of the human body with the mind, showing us indeed how external bodies can help or harm it."]}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{\text{\textit{Ibid.}}, II, §3, p. 41-2. ["They do not teach us what (bodies) exist in themselves."]}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{\text{\textit{Ibid.}}, §4, p. 42. ["Considering this, we will perceive that the nature of matter, or of body regarded universally, does not in itself consist in being a thing hard or heavy or colored or in some other ways affecting the senses: rather, in itself it consists in being a thing extended in length, width, and depth."]}}\]
Hardness is construed as resistance. Yet resistance does not get understood (any more than hardness does) in a phenomenal sense—as something experienced in itself and determinable in such experience. For Descartes, resistance means only this: not giving way, i.e. not undergoing any change of place. The resisting belonging to a thing then means: to remain in a determined place relative to another thing that does change its place—or else to change its own place at such speed that the other thing can “catch up” with it. On this interpretation of the experience of hardness, the manner in which sensuous perception actually happens is extinguished, and so also the possibility of apprehending, according to the way they have their own being, the beings arising for encounter in such perception. Descartes translates the manner a perception of something actually happens into the only manner he knows: perception of something becomes a determinate on-hand-next-to-one-another-ness of two on-hand res extensae; even the relation they have to one another in their motion is [understood] in the mode of extensio—the extension that characterizes primarily the on-hand-ness of a bodily thing. True enough, any possible “fulfillment” of comportment in which we touch things does require a special “nearness” of what is touchable. But that hardly means that, ontologically construed, touching, and then also the hardness that becomes evident in the touching, consist in the differing speeds of two bodily things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless there are beings having their being in the manner being-there does—or at least in the manner a living being does.*

Thus, for Descartes the discussion of possible accesses to inner-worldly beings falls under the dominance of an idea of being that is read off a determinate [i.e., narrowed down] region of those beings. The idea of being as constant on-hand-ness does not just inspire an extreme determination of inner-worldly beings, and then too the identification of these with world in general. It also obstructs the effort to bring comportments of being-there into view in ontologically appropriate ways. And the path is thereby completely blocked for going on to see even the founded character of all sensory and intellect-based perception, and to understand these as [only] one possibility of being-in-world. But Descartes construes the being of “being-there,” to whose

basic constitution being-in-world belongs, in the same way as he does the being of res extensa—as substance [as res cogitans].

But, with these critical considerations, have we not foisted off a task on Descartes, one lying entirely outside his horizon, and then “proven” that he could not handle it? Besides, how could Descartes identify a determinate inner-worldly being, along with its being, with world, if he had no knowledge at all of the phenomenon of world and thereby none at all of anything like inner-worldliness?

In a field of controversy over principles we should not just stay with doxographically construed theses; rather, we must take as our orientation the built-in drive of the problematic itself, even if this orientation does not go beyond an ordinary construal. That Descartes, with his res cogitans and res extensa, not only wanted to pose the problem of “I and world” but also laid claim to a radical solution to the problem: this becomes clear from his Meditations (cf. especially the first and the sixth). The foregoing considerations have intended to show: [1] that, since Descartes takes his basic orientation from the tradition, offering no positive critique of it, it was impossible for him to open up a primordial ontological problematic of being-there, and [2] that this orientation had to distort his view of the phenomenon of world, forcing the ontology of “world” into an ontology of a determinate inner-worldly being.

One might now object: Even if in fact the problem of world, and also the being of circum-worldly beings initially arising for encounter, both remain concealed in Descartes’ account, he nonetheless laid the foundations for characterizing ontologically those inner-worldly beings that, in their being, found all other beings—i.e., material nature. Upon this characterization, i.e. upon this fundamental stratum, the other strata of inner-worldly reality are built up. The extended thing as such serves at the start to ground those determinations that do show themselves as qualities but are at bottom” quantitative modifications of extensio itself. Upon these qualities (themselves reducible) are then grounded such

* A phenomenological analysis of the “sense of touch” might begin with an account of the “hardness” of a handshake, of the ground on which we play basketball, of the heads of different hammers (rubber, plastic, iron).

[Here is a] critique of Husserl’s build-up of “ontologies,” as in general the whole critique of Descartes has the intention of including. Indeed, Descartes has been serving as a synecdoche for the whole modern effort to “build up” a view of our condition (whether “epistemic” or “practical”) starting with supposedly basic elements (John Locke is another obvious example, and then too the academic “psychology” based thereon). For all his appreciation of his mentor, Heidegger locates Husserl in this tradition.]
specific qualities as beautiful, fitting, useful and their opposites; these qualities must be construed (in a primary orientation toward thingliness) as non-quantifiable value-predicates by which what is initially only a material thing gets stamped as a good. With such strata-building one then does indeed arrive at those beings that we have characterized ontologically as at-hand instruments. And so the Cartesian analysis of “world” does [seem to] make it possible to build up securely the structure of beings initially at hand; it only needs to be supplemented with an account, easy enough to provide, of how a thing of nature becomes a full thing of use.

But, apart from the specific problem of world, can the being of what initially arises for encounter in an inner-worldly manner be reached along this path? Starting out with material thingliness, are we not also tacitly starting out with a version of being — constant thingly-on-hand-ness — that, when we subsequently endow beings with value-predicates, so little leads to an ontological account [of how a thing of nature becomes a thing of use] that these value-characteristics themselves remain merely ontical determinations of beings having their being as things? The addition of value-predicates cannot cast any new light on the being of goods, rather, it merely presupposes once again that these goods have their being in the manner of on-hand-ness. Values are on-hand determinations of a thing. In the end, values have their ontological origin solely in a precedental approach taking thing-reality as the fundamental stratum. Yet pre-phenomenological experience already shows something about these beings taken as thingly that is not fully intelligible in terms of thingliness, and for this reason thingly being stands in need of a supplementation. What then does the being of values mean ontologically — or the “prevalence” of values, as Lotze* says, construing this as a mode of “affirmation”? What does this “sticking” of values onto things signify ontologically? As long as these determinations remain obscure, the reconstruction of things of use out of things of nature is an ontologically questionable enterprise — quite apart from its thorough-going distortion of the problematic. And does such reconstruction of the thing initially “skinned” of its use not always already stand in need of a precedental positive view of the phenomenon whose wholeness is supposed to be restored in the reconstruction? For if the ownmost essential constitution of this phenomenon is not explicated beforehand, does not the reconstruction build without a building plan? Inasmuch as this reconstruction and “supplementation” of the traditional ontology of “world” arrives finally at the same beings from which our own foregoing analysis of instrumental at-hand-ness and wholeness of being-bound-up started, it engenders the illusion that it had in fact clarified the being of these beings, or at least set it up as a problem. Just as Descartes did not, with extensio as proprietas, hit upon the being of substance, so neither can taking refuge in properties “of value” bring being as at-hand-ness at all into view — let alone permit it to become, ontologically, a problem.

Descartes intensified the constriction of the question of world to the question about the thingliness of nature — this thingliness understood as that of inner-worldly beings as they are first of all accessible. He re-enforced the opinion that the supposedly most rigorous ontic cognizing of beings could also provide a possible access to the primary being of the beings discovered in such cognition. But what we should also note is that even any “suppletations” of the ontology of the thing proceed in principle on the same dogmatic ontological basis as Descartes does.

We have already intimated (§14) that leaping over world, and over the beings that initially arise for encounter, is not capricious, is not an oversight that could simply be rectified — that it is rather grounded in an essential manner in which being-there has its being. When our analysis of being-there has made transparent its most important structures (those pertinent to the framework of our problematic), when we have assigned to the concept of being in general the horizon of its possible intelligibility—a — so that at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness finally become ontologically and primordially intelligible —: only then can the foregoing critique of the Cartesian ontology of world, basically still today the predominant one, be seen as philosophically justified.

To this end we must show (cf. Part One, Third Division*):

* Rudolf Hermann Lotze, 1817-1881, German philosopher (physiologist, logician, metaphysician) for whom values are the basis of metaphysics.

1. Why was the phenomenon of world leapt over right from the beginning of the ontological tradition (explicit in Parmenides) that has been decisive for us? From what stems the constant recurrence of this leaping-over?

2. Why is it that inner-worldly beings have inserted themselves as the ontological theme, in place of the phenomenon leapt over?

3. Why do these beings get located first of all in “nature”?

4. Why have thinkers, experiencing the need to supplement the traditional Cartesian ontology of world, taken recourse to the phenomenon of value?

Only in the answers to these questions will we reach a positive understanding of the problematic of world, will we point up the origin of our failure to recognize it, will we demonstrate the reasons justifying the rejection of the traditional ontology of world.

The observations regarding Descartes have intended to facilitate the insight that neither the seemingly self-evident procedure of starting with the things of the world, nor the orientation toward the supposedly most rigorous knowledge of beings, guarantees the achievement of a foothold allowing us to meet up phenomenally with the closest ontological constitutions of world, of being-there, and of inner-worldly beings.

When we now recall that spatiality obviously co-constitutes inner-worldly beings, it does eventually become possible to “save” the Cartesian analysis of “world” after all. With his radical exposition of \textit{extensio} as the \textit{praesuppositum} of every determination of \textit{res corpora}, Descartes prepared the way for an understanding of an \textit{a priori} [structure], the content of which Kant then established more penetratingly. Within certain limits, the analysis of \textit{extensio} remains independent of the neglect to provide an explicit interpretation of the being of extended beings. Starting with \textit{extensio} as the basic determination of “world” does have its phenomenal justification—even though recourse to it permits us to grasp ontologically neither the spatiality of world, nor the spatiality initially recovered as belonging to beings arising for encounter in a circum-world, nor even the spatiality of being-there itself.

\textit{C. The circum-ness of the circum-world and the spatiality of being-there}

In connection with our first sketch of being-in (cf. §12), we had to mark being-there off from a manner of being-in-space that we call “inside-one-another” [cf. p. 56]. This term means: one being, itself extended, is encircled by the extended boundaries of another extended being. Both the being inside and the being encircling it are on hand in space. However, our rejection of the pertinence of such inside-one-another to being-there did not intend to exclude in principle every spatiality from being pertinent to being-there; it only intended to keep the way open for seeing the spatiality that does constitute being-there. It is this spatiality that we must now exhibit. However, since inner-worldly beings are also in space, their spatiality will stand in an ontological interconnection with world.\(^a\) For this reason we must determine in what sense space is a constituent of world—world in its turn having been characterized as a structural factor of being-in-world. It must especially be shown how the circum-ness of the circum-world, i.e. the specific spatiality of beings arising for encounter in a circum-world, is grounded by the worldliness of world and not the other way around (the world being something on hand in space). The investigation of the spatiality of being-there and of spatial determinateness of world starts from an analysis of inner-worldly beings at hand in space. The consideration will pass through three stages: 1. the spatiality of inner-worldly beings at hand (§22), 2. the spatiality of being-in-world (§23), and 3. the spatiality of being-there, and space (§24).

\section*{§22. The spatiality of inner-worldly beings at hand}

If, in a sense yet to be determined, space constitutes world, it should come as no surprise if, as we were characterizing the being of inner-worldly beings before, we already had to have these beings in view as inner-spatial. Hitherto we have not apprehended phenomenally and explicitly this spatiality of at-hand beings, nor have we pointed up the way it ties in with the essential structure of these beings. This is now our task.

To what extent have we already come up against the spatiality of at-hand beings when we were earlier characterizing them? We talked about

\(^a\) Thus world is also spatial. [Although \textit{Being and Time} heads for a renewed appreciation of temporality, throughout the work there are also intimations of a renewed understanding of spatiality—to account for a possible ontological and existential status for the phenomenon of autochthony highlighted by 19th-century German and Swiss romantics in an ontic and existentiell manner—and evident in the disclosure at work in art works. Cf. my annotation on p. 112.]
the closest at-hand beings. This means not only those beings that we first, before others, encounter, but also those that are “nearby.” Beings at hand in everyday dealings have the character of nearness. Carefully considered, this nearness of an instrument is already intimated in the term expressing its being: at-hand-ness. Beings that are “handy” have in each case a different nearness, one not discernible by measuring out distances. Their nearness gets measured in the handling and using of them, where they are reckoned with” circumspectly. The circumspection embedded within taking care of them not only discerns in this way what is near, it also discerns them in regard to the direction in which instruments are accessible at any one time. The directed nearness of an instrument implies that the instrument is not simply on hand somewhere, having a position in space; rather, as an instrument, it is essentially fitted for or fitted into something, set up or set to rights. Each instrument has its place — or, alternatively, it is “lying around,” something basically different from just popping up at an arbitrary point in space. In each instance, the place is determined as a place of this instrument for..., and this determination derives from a whole of directionally interwoven places, this whole being that of the instrumental context of things at hand in a circum-world. Neither any one place nor the manifold of places can rightly be interpreted in reference to where things are as they are considered to be on hand in any which way. Any one place is a determinate “over there” or “right here” as these determine where the instrument belongs. Each belonging-there corresponds to the instrumental character of something at hand, i.e. to its belonging to an instrumental whole, a belonging itself shaped by some sort of binding.* Moreover, at the basis of the belonging-there-ness embedded in an instrumental whole, and determining things as placeable, there lies, as the condition of its possibility, an essential where-to: it is in the pursuit of this where-to that the placial wholeness serves the interconnection of instruments. This where-to, already held in view circumspectly during the dealings in which we take care of things: this we call the whereabouts of encounters.

Being “in the whereabouts of . . .” entails not only “in the direction of . . .” but also in the orbit of something lying in that direction. As constituted by direction and remoteness (nearness is but a mode of remoteness), each place is already oriented by and within a whereabouts. Something like a whereabouts must be uncovered beforehand for places to intertwine and be detected within a circumspectly available instrumental wholeness. Characterized by a whereabouts, this orientation of the placial manifold of at-hand beings constitutes the circum-ness (the all-around-us) of the inner-worldly beings we encounter closest to us. What is initially given is never a three-dimensional manifold of possible positions that then gets stuffed with on-hand things. In the spatiality proper to at-hand beings, such dimensionality of space is still veiled. What’s “above” is what’s “on the ceiling,” what’s “below” is what’s “on the floor,” what’s “behind” is what’s “at the door”; all whereabouts are discovered and circumspectly interpreted in the course of everyday dealings, they are not ascertained and registered in observational acts of measuring things out in space.

A whereabouts is not first built up from things on hand together; rather, it is already at hand in each of the places. Within the circumspection belonging to our dealings, the places themselves get interwoven into the beings at hand, or they get detected. It is for this reason that what is constantly at hand, that which circumspect being-in-world first of all takes into account, has a prominent place: the where of its at-hand-ness is charged to our account as we are taking care of things, and geared to the other beings at hand. For example, the sun, whose light and warmth we use everyday, has its prominent places according to the varying employments of what it offers: daybreak, midday, nightfall, midnight. The places of this one being at hand, ever changing yet remaining uniformly constant, become accentuated “indicators” of the whereabouts lurking in these places [e.g., bedroom, canteen, library, barroom]. These heavenly whereabouts, which need not yet have any geographical meaning, provide the precedent where-to governing the particular shaping of any given whereabouts capable of having places. A house has its sunny side and its shady side — to which the “placement” of rooms is oriented, within which again the “furnishings” are arranged, each item according to its instrumental character. For instance, churches and cemeteries are laid out according to the rising and setting of the sun — the whereabouts of life and death, from which being-there itself is determined in regard to its ownmost possibilities of being in the world.

---

* Aristotle assumes that “belonging” (ὑπάρχειν) typifies the “relation” between subject (ὑποκειµένον) and its “attributes.” Heidegger is arguing that such belonging is derivative: that, most primordially, at-hand beings (instruments) belong to world (here, to their respective places in a circum-world).
The taking-care essential to being-there (whose being is, by its own being, an issue for it) uncovers precedentially those where-aboutss within which it in each instance has its decisive binding. The precedential uncovering of these where-aboutss is co-determined by the wholeness of some bound-up-ness, a wholeness through which beings at hand, as those arising for encounter, are released.

In an even more primordial sense, the precedential at-hand-ness of any one where-aboutss, as the being of beings at hand, has the character of inconspicuous familiarity. The where-aboutss itself only becomes visible in the manner of sticking out during a circumspect uncovering of at-hand beings, and this in the deficient modes of taking-care [conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and recalcitrance: pp. 73-74]. It is often when something is not met up with at its place that the where-aboutss of the place becomes explicitly accessible as such, and for the very first time. The space that is uncovered as the spatiality of the instrumental whole within circumspect being-in-world belongs in each case to the beings themselves as their own place. Bare space is still veiled. Space is split up into places.\(^a\) Still, this spatiality has its own unity owing to the world-based wholeness of being-bound-up that embeds beings spatially at hand. The “circum-world” does not arrange itself in a space given in advance; rather, the specific worldlyness of a circum-world articulates, in its significating, the binding-like context of some wholeness of places interweaving themselves in circumspection. Each world uncovers the spatiality of the space belonging to it. That at-hand beings are allowed to arise for encounter in their circum-worldly space: this remains ontically possible only because being-there itself is “spatial” in regard to its being-in-world.

\(^a\) No, [space is] precisely a peculiar and unsplit unity of places!

§23. The spatiality of being-in-world

If we ascribe spatiality to being-there, this “being in space” must obviously be conceptualized on the basis of the manner in which this being has its being. Any spatiality of being-there (which by its nature is not on hand) can mean neither anything like an occurrence at a point in “cosmic space” nor a being-at-hand at a place — these are manners in which inner-worldly beings arising for encounter have their being. In contrast, being-there is “in” a world in the sense of dealing with inner-worldly beings arising for encounter — taking care of them in familiar and trusted ways. Accordingly, if spatiality pertains to being-there in some fashion, this is only possible on the basis of such being-in. And the spatiality of this being-in shows the characters of de-stantiality and directionality.

As a manner in which being-there has its being in regard to its being-in-world, de-stantiality we do not understand as anything like remoteness or even distance. We employ the expression in an active and transitive sense. De-stantiality is an essential constitution of being-there, in regard to which the de-stancing of something, getting it out of the way, is only a determinate factual mode. De-stancing means this: making farness,\(^a\) i.e. remoteness, disappear — bringing it near. Being-there is its de-stancing; as the being that it is, being-there lets each being arise into nearness\(^b\) for encounter. De-stantiality [first] uncovers remoteness. Along with distance, remoteness is a categorial determination of beings not taking their measure from being-there. De-stantiality, in contrast, we must come to understand as an existential. Only inasmuch as beings in their remoteness are at all uncovered for being-there do “distances” pertaining to inner-worldly beings themselves, one being at a measurable distance from another, become accessible. Two points are just as little de-stanced from one another as two things, since neither set can, in their own manner of being, de-stance: points and things simply have a distance from one another, a distance detected and measurable within the de-stancing\(^c\) essential to being-there.

Initially and mostly, de-stancing is circumspect bringing-near, bringing-into-nearness — as when we procure things, prepare things, arrange things so that they are handy. But also certain ways of the purely

\(^a\) Where does this farness come from, that it gets de-stanced? [The Second Division answers: the nothingness of world (cf. pp. 276 and 343).]

\(^b\) [Into] nearness and presence — the magnitude of the distance is not essential.

\(^c\) “De-stancing” [is] more precise than “bringing near.” [“Bringing something near” also covers the simpler meaning of “approaching” it.]
cognitive discovering of beings has this character of bringing-near. *An essential drive toward nearness lies in being-there.* And all ways of increasing speed (that we are more or less forced into these days) press for overcoming remoteness. With the “radio,” for example, being-there has accomplished a de-stancing of the “world” leading toward an expansion and destruction* of the everyday circum-world — and this in a manner that is not yet foreseeable in its meaning for being-there.

De-stancing does not necessarily imply an explicit assessment of how far away an at-hand being lies in relation to being-there. Above all, just how far away something is never gets construed as a measured distance. Should such nearness be assessed, it happens relative to de-stancings within which everyday being-there upholds itself. Considered as calculations, such assessments may be imprecise and variable, yet in everydayness they have their own, thoroughly intelligible determinateness. We say: “it’s just a walk from here, it’s a stone’s-throw away, it’s as far as it takes to smoke a pipeful. These measures express not only that there is no desire to “measure” anything, but also that the nearness getting assessed belongs to some being to which one is going in the mode of taking-care and circumspection. But even when we resort to firm measurements, saying e.g. “it takes half an hour to get to that house,” we must take this measure as estimated: “half an hour” is not 30 minutes, but rather a duration having no “length” at all, if this is construed as a quantitative stretch. Such duration is in each instance interpreted with an eye to customary and everyday concern to “make provisions.” And even where there are available “officially” calculated measures of how far away things are, these are initially assessed in circumspection. Because what is de-stanced in such assessments is at hand, it retains its specifically inner-worldly character. It is then inevitable that the paths we traverse to reach what is afar will vary from day to day.* Indeed, what is at hand in a circum-world is not on hand for an eternal observer relieved of being-there, it rather arises for encounter by protruding into the circumspectly heedful everydayness of being-there. As being-there proceeds on its way, it does not measure off a stretch of space as an on-hand bodily thing, it does not “eat up the miles”; the bringing-near, the de-stancing, is in each instance a being toward what has come near, what has been de-stanced — a being consisting of taking-care. A route that is “objectively” longer can be shorter than an “objectively” much shorter one, one that might be “harder going” and that “looms before us” as interminably long. And only in such “looming before us” is the world *fully at hand.* The objective distances among on-hand things do not coincide with the nearness and nearness of inner-worldly beings at hand. Such distances might be known exactly, yet such knowing remains blind — it does not have the function of bringing a circum-world near, of circumspectly uncovering it. Such knowing gets [rightly] employed only in and for a taking-care being-toward a world that “matters” [to us] — and this being-toward is not one of measuring stretches.

Orienting oneself precedentally toward “nature” and toward “objectively” measured distances of things, one is inclined to pass off the foregoing interpretation of de-stancing and assessment as “subjective.” However, the “subjectivity” here is one that uncovers the “reality” of the world at its perhaps most real, and one that has nothing to do with “subjective” caprice, or with subjectivistic “construals” of a being that “in itself” is something else. *The circumspect de-stancing embedded within the everydayness of being-there uncovers the “in-itself-ness” of the “true world”— of those beings near which being-there, as ex-sitting, in each case already is.†

Orienting ourselves primarily, not to say exclusively toward nearnesses as measured distances, we cover up the primordial spatiality of being-in. What we take to be “nearest” is not at all what “from us” has the shortest

---

*a* To what extent, and why? Being qua constant presence has primacy, finding present. [Heidegger anticipates later analyses: “constant presence has primacy” in our intellectual traditions as well as in being-there itself; this primacy starts with the “finding-present” introduced on p. 326, qualified as “inauthentic” on pp. 328 & 338, and understood on p. 359 as the foundation of the “making-present” essential to intellectual work.]

*b* The phrase “and destruction” was added in the Collected Works edition. In his 1961 “Address at Messkirch,” Heidegger includes television among the “indicators” of a pending “destruction of the circum-world”—destruction of our ability to be at home, as he says (Collected Works, Vol. 16, p. 575).

† Heidegger here resumes Nietzsche’s challenge posed in The Twilight of the Idols, “How the ‘True World’ finally became a Fable.” Yet, while Nietzsche criticizes the traditional concern for a “true world” revealed to “the wise, the pious, the virtuous,” Heidegger offers an alternative.
distance. What is nearest lies in what is de-stanced within an average range of our reach, grasp, and view. Because being-there is, in the manner of de-stancing, essentially spatial, its dealings always keep within a "circum-world" in each instance de-stanced from it, giving it a certain leeway; thus it is that we initially see and hear out beyond what is "nearest" in the way of measured distances. Seeing and hearing are far-ranging senses not because of their extensive power; rather, they are so because, as de-stancing, being-there resides mainly within them. For example, for those who wear glasses, which are distance-wise so near they are "in front of their nose," this instrument, when in use, is circum-worldly farther away than the picture hanging on the wall across the room. This instrument is so little near that at first one often cannot even find it. An instrument for seeing—or for hearing, as a telephone receiver—has the in conspicuouslyness we earlier characterized as belonging to what is initially at hand. The same holds (to cite another example) of the street, an instrument for walking. While we are walking it is touched at every step, seemingly the nearest and realest of what is ever at hand, sliding as it were along certain portions of the body, the soles of our feet. And yet the street is farther away than is an acquaintance coming to meet us "on the street" at a "distance" of twenty paces. It is circumspect taking-care that decides how near and how far inner-worldly at-hand beings are. That near wherein such taking-care resides is what is nearest, and this it is that regulates de-stancing.

When being-there, in taking-care, brings something into nearness, this does not entail any determination of it at a point in space having some sort of distance from some point on the body. To be nearby means to be within the range of what is initially and circumspectly at hand. Bringing near is oriented not towards a body-like I-thing, but rather towards heedful being-in-world, i.e. towards what in each case initially arises for encounter in it. For this reason, neither is the spatiality of being-there determined by providing the position at which a bodily thing is on hand. To be sure, we also say of being-there that in each instance it takes up a place. But this "taking up" must in principle be distinguished from being-at-hand at one place among others in a where-abouts. Taking up a place must be understood as de-stancing at-hand circum-worldly beings, bringing them circumspectly into a pre-uncovered where-abouts. Being-there understands its own here from its circum-worldly over-there. The here does not mean the where of something on hand, but rather the where-at of a de-stancing being-near . . . —the where-at and the de-stancing going together. In accordance with its spatiality, being-there is never here, it is rather over-there, from where it comes back to its here, yet only in the sense that it interprets its heedful being-toward . . . on the basis of what-is-at-hand-over-there. This becomes fully clear when we consider the peculiarity of the structure of de-stantiality belonging to being-in.

As being-in-world, being-there maintains itself essentially within a de-stancing. This de-stantiality—the far-ness of at-hand beings from being-there—being-there can never get around. Just how far an at-hand being is from being-there can of course be found out as a measured distance, providing it is determined in relation to a thing thought of as on hand at a place—a place that being-there took up beforehand. This distance includes a between that being-there can thereafter traverse, yet only as the distance itself becomes de-stanced. Being-there has then not at all got around its de-stantiality, it has rather taken de-stantiality along with itself—as it constantly does, because it is essentially de-stantiality, i.e. it is spatial. Being-there cannot just wander around within the given range of its de-stancings, it can only vary them. It is by way of its circumspect uncovering of space that being-there is spatial, and this in a way whereby it constantly comports itself de-stancingly (in such uncovering) to beings arising for encounter spatially.

As de-stancing being-in, being-there also has the character of directionality. Every bringing-near has already taken up in advance a direction into a where-abouts within and from which the de-stanced being comes near; for it is in this way that the being can be found in its place.* Circumspect taking-care is directional de-stancing. In such taking-care, i.e. in the being-in-world of being-there itself, a needed stock of "signs" is pre-given. As instruments, signs take over the task of explicitly supplying directions that are easy enough to follow; they explicitly hold open the various where-abouts of circumspect use—the where-to at issue in each "where it belongs," "where it is going," "where we shall take it," "where shall we bring it." Whenever being-there is, in each instance it already has, as directional de-stancing, its uncovered where-abouts. As

* Packing the car for a trip (precisely "just the thought of it") not only requires a bringing-near of each of those items to be packed, it also re-introduces the bee-lines established in the arrangement of the house—and even the arrangements in the woods, on the lake, at the hotel.
essential modes of being-in-world, both directionality and de-stantiality are governed precedently by *circumpection*.

From directionality spring the fixed directions toward the right and toward the left. Just as it takes its de-standings along, so too does being-there take its directions constantly along. The spatialization of being-there within its “bodily nature”—in which there lurks a problematic of its own, one we cannot here treat—is also prefigured in these directions. Thus it is that things at hand which are used for the body— as, for instance, gloves designed to accompany the movement of the hands—have to be aligned left or right. In contrast, a shop-tool held in and getting moved by the hand does not share in the movement specific to the hand. Thus there are no right-hand or left-hand hammers, even though they do get fitted to the hands just as gloves do.

It is to be noticed, though, that directionality, belonging as it does to de-stantiality, receives its foundation from being-in-world. Left and right are not “subjective” matters for which the [human] subject has a feeling; they are rather directions of alignment into some world already at hand. “By the mere feeling of a difference between my two sides”¹ I could never find my way around in a world. The subject having a “mere feeling” of this difference is a construct formed in disregard of the actual constitution of the subject—that being-there having this “mere feeling” is in each instance already in a world—and has to be, in order to be able to orient itself. This becomes clear in reference to the example Kant invokes in his effort to clarify the phenomenon of orientation:

Suppose that I step into a familiar but dark room which, during my absence, was rearranged so that everything that was on the left is now on the right. If I am to orient myself, the “mere feeling” of this difference is a construct formed in disregard of the actual constitution of the subject—that being-there having this “mere feeling” is in each instance already in a world—and has to be, in order to be able to orient itself. This becomes clear in reference to the example Kant invokes in his effort to clarify the phenomenon of orientation:

§24. The Spatiality of Being-there, and Space

As constitutive characteristics of being-in-world, de-stantiality and directionality determine the spatiality of being-there—destine it to be in inner-worldly space, heedfully and circumspectly uncovering it. The foregoing explication of the spatiality of inner-worldly at-hand beings, and now of the spatiality of being-in-world, satisfies the prerequisites for elaborating the spatiality of world, and for positioning the ontological problem of space.


2. [That is, I orient myself] from out of a familiar belonging-ness that I retain and then afterwards alter. [Heidegger later analyzes the temporality of what we casually refer to as “memory” (Augustine and Husserl also call it “retention”), grounding it in our enwrapping by world as “instrumental context”— in our belonging to the being of those beings we otherwise simply arrange and worry about.]
circumspect self-reference, * one grounded in a precedental understanding of signification. And now this too has been shown: circumspect being-in-world is spatial. And only because being-there is spatial by way of its de-contingency and directionality can beings circum-worldly at hand arise for encounter in their spatiality. The release of a wholeness of being-bound-up is equi-primordially a de-stantial-directional letting-be-bound within a where-abouts, i.e. a release of spatial ways in which beings at hand belong to one another. Within signification — with which being-there, as heedful being-in, is trustingely familiar — there lies the essential co-disclosure of space.

The space thus disclosed with the worldliness of world does not yet have anything like a pure manifold of three dimensions. At its most intimate disclosure, space as a pure where-in — the where-in of a metrical ordering and determining of positions — still remains concealed. The upon-which of space is precedentally uncovered in being-there: this we have already brought out with the phenomenon of a where-abouts. We understand a where-abouts as the where-to of an at-hand instrumental context, formed by all that possibly belongs to it — a context that, as de-stanced, i.e. placed, looms for encounter. The belonging-ness [at issue for the various instruments within the context] gets determined from the signification constituting the world, and it articulates each over-her and over-there of the where-to. The referential whole receiving its solidity from a for-the-sake-of-which embedded in taking-care: this is it that prefigures the where-to in general; and, within this referential whole, letting-be-bound, which itself releases beings for encounter, gets its references. Along with whatever happens to arise for encounter, there is always a bound-up-ness in a where-abouts. To the wholeness of the binding — a wholeness constituting the being of circum-worldly beings — belongs a space, one defined by the bound-up-ness while itself defining a where-abouts. On the basis of this space-generating bound-up-ness, each at-hand being becomes available and determinable in both its form and its direction. † All according to the transparency of heedful circumspection.

§24. The Spatiality of Being-there, and Space

inner-worldly at-hand beings are de-stanced and aligned.

The letting-be-bound-up constitutive for being-in-world “makes room” for . . . . This “making-room” — which we will now call clearance — releases each at-hand being in and for its spatiality. As a pre-given that uncovers, i.e. that provides the possible wholeness of place itself determined by the bound-up-ness, this clearance makes possible the orientation we in each instance factically have. Being-there can re-arrange things in a space, put things away (in their proper place), or clean up a room, only because clearing — understood as an existential — belongs to its being-in-world. But neither the particular precedently uncovered where-abouts, nor the particular spatiality, come expressly into view. In itself, spatiality is around in the inconspicuousness of at-hand beings, into which the taking-care entailed by circumspection gets absorbed — it is around for circumspection. Along with being-in-world, space is first of all uncovered in this spatiality. On the basis of the spatiality thus uncovered, space itself becomes accessible for cognition.

Neither is space in the [human] subject, nor is world in space. Rather, space is “in” world — inasmuch as the being-in-world constitutive for being-there has disclosed space. Space is not found in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world “as though” it were in a space; rather, the “subject” itself is spatial — the “subject” ontologically well understood, namely as being-there. And because being-there is spatial in the manner described, space shows itself as an a priori. This term does not imply anything like a precedental possession on the part of a subject construed initially as world-less, a subject that emits from itself a space. A-priori-ness here means: a precedental-ness in the encountering of space (as a where-abouts) during each circum-worldly encountering of at-hand beings.

The spatiality of what first arises in circumspection for encounter: this can become thematic for circumspection itself — as a task for calculation and measurement, e.g. when constructing a house or surveying land. In such thematizing, still mainly circumspect, of circum-worldly spatiality, space as it is in itself already comes into view — after a fashion. If, now, one forgoes the original (and only) possibility of access conditions either as transcendent (perfection guiding genesis) or as transcendent (coherence of on-going experience). Heidegger is offering an interpretation of the immanent conditions of any transcendence whatsoever, leaving open the “form and direction” of what arises for encounter.

---

* On “self-reference”: recall the definition of the phenomenon of world, p. 86 (with annotation). Each being arising for encounter refers to another, but such reference is grounded “self-containedly” in a whole-ness of bindings.

† Starting with Plato and Aristotle, philosophers have recognized that the “form and direction” of what we encounter condition the intelligibility at issue for us in our manual and intellectual labors; they have then interpreted these
I. Chapter Three: The Worldliness of World

In this regard, cf. Oskar Becker’s Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen in Vol. VI of this Yearbook (1923), pp. 385 ff. [Heidegger’s account of space intends to show how Kant’s positioning of space as an a priori form of intuition depends upon an abstraction from the primordial space essential to being-in-world (in Kantian terms: to “experience”), and that the sciences drawing upon this abstraction to account for “how things really are” account only for how things derivatively are. Cf. §70 on “space and time.”]

An uncovering of space that frees itself from circumspection, and only looks on at it, neutralizes every circum-worldly where-abouts into pure dimensions. The places of at-hand beings, and the circumspectly oriented wholeness of these places, sinks into a manifold of positions for things taken randomly. The spatiality of inner-worldly at-hand beings thereby loses its character of being-bound. World then forfeits its specific circum-ness, the circum-world becomes the world of nature. The “world”—the erstwhile instrumental whole at hand—gets de-spaced, becoming a context for extended things, now only on hand. The homogenous space of nature shows itself only by way of a special manner of uncovering beings arising for encounter: a manner that strips their worldly character from them in the specific way described.

In accordance with its being-in-world, being-there has, in each instance, an uncovered space pre-given to it, though unthematically. In contrast, space all by itself remains initially covered over in respect of the possibilities it harbors of something being sheerly spatial. That space essentially shows itself within a world: this does not yet decide how it has its being. Space does not need to have its being the way something spatially at hand or on hand does. It does not even have its being the way being-there does.† From the fact that space itself cannot be understood as having its being the way a res extensa does, it does not follow that space must be determined as a “phenomenon” of this res (whereupon space would be, in its being, indistinguishable from a res). Nor does it follow that the being of space could be equated with the being of the res cogitans, and be understood as merely “subjective” being—quite apart from the questionable status of the being of this subject.

The reason for the continuing perplexity regarding the interpretation of the being of space is not so much an inadequate acquaintance with the way space itself happens to work as the utter lack of transparency regarding the possibilities of being in general and its ontologically conceptualized interpretation. What is decisive for understanding the ontological problem of space lies in the task of liberating the question about the being of space from the constraints imposed by the concepts of being that happen to be available and that, moreover, are mostly crude; and this task includes bringing the problematic of the being of space in line with the clarification of the possibilities of being in general (all this with a view to the phenomenon itself and the various phenomenal spatialities).

In the phenomenon of space we shall not find the sole ontological determination of the being of inner-worldly beings, nor the primary determination among others. Even less does space constitute the phenomenon of world. Only in taking recourse to world can we understand space. It is not just that [metrical] space becomes accessible only when we deprive the circum-world of its worldly character; spatiality itself can only be discovered on the basis of world—in such a way that space does indeed co-constitute the world—given the essential spatiality of being-there itself as basically constituted by being-in-world.

† In this regard, cf. Oskar Becker’s Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Begründung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendungen in Vol. VI of this Yearbook (1923), pp. 385 ff. [Heidegger’s account of space intends to show how Kant’s positioning of space as an a priori form of intuition depends upon an abstraction from the primordial space essential to being-in-world (in Kantian terms: to “experience”), and that the sciences drawing upon this abstraction to account for “how things really are” account only for how things derivatively are. Cf. §70 on “space and time.”]

* Heidegger is reserving the possibility of at least one other way space may have its being: one looming in the way a cathedral, a story, a painting, a concert “creates a space”—i.e. discloses the space of things and of our lives as our land, our home, our ultimate autochthony. See the essays and lectures in Poetry, Language, Thought (1971), especially “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935). Cf. also my annotation on the marginalium on p. 101.
Chapter Four

Being-in-world as Being with Others and Being a Self.

The One

Chapter Four

Being-in-world as being with others and being a self.

The One

The analysis of the worldliness of world has constantly brought the whole phenomenon of being-in-world into view — without all of its constitutive factors thereby coming into relief with the same phenomenal clarity as did the phenomenon of world itself. Interpreting world by way of inner-worldly beings at hand came first because, in its everydayness (and it is in regard to this that we constantly take our thematic bearings), being-there is not just in a world but relates itself to its world in one manner by which it predominantly has its being: initially and mostly, being-there is taken over by its world.* This manner of being, namely absorption within a world, and therewith also the being-in lying at its basis, essentially determine the phenomenon that we will now pursue with the question: Who is it that being-there, in its everydayness, is? All essential structures of being-there, and thus too the phenomenon that answers this question of who, are manners in which being-there is. Their ontological characteristics are existentials. We therefore need a proper approach to the question, and a sketch of the path along which we might bring into view yet another range of the everydayness of being-there. Taking this direction in our pursuit of the phenomenon that allows us to answer the question of who, we are led to structures of being-there that are equi-primordial with being-in-world: being-with-others and being-there-with-others. The mode of everyday being-a-self has its basis in this manner of being — and the explication of this being-a-self makes clear what we might call the “subject” at issue in everydayness: the one. Thus the Chapter on the “who” of average being-there has the following structure: 1. the approach to the question about the who of being-there (§25); 2. being-there-with-others, and average being-with (§26); 3. everyday being-a-self, and the one (§27).

* About being “taken over”: see my annotation on p. 76.
§25. The approach to the question about the who of being-there

The answer to the question who this being (being-there) ever is was apparently already given with the formal indication of the basic determinations of being-there (cf. §9). Being-there is a being that is in each instance I myself, its being is in each instance mine. This determination does indicate an ontological constitution—but only indicates it. It also contains the ontic statement (a rough one) that being-there is in each instance an I, and that it is not others. The who declares itself [so it seems] out of the I itself—out of the “subject,” the “self.” The who [it seems] is what perseveres as identical throughout the shift of comportments and experiences, and which then relates itself to this manifold. Ontologically, we [would then] understand it as something on hand in a closed region, as something in each case already and constantly on hand for this region—something that, in a special sense, lies at the basis: a subjectum. This latter, as staying the same in manifold otherness, has the character of a self. One may well reject soul-substance as well as thing-likeness of consciousness and object-likeness of person: it remains the case that, ontologically, one starts out with something whose being retains, expressly or not, the meaning of on-hand-ness. Substantiality is then the ontological guideline for determining the being that serves as the answer to the question of who. At the outset, being-there is implicitly conceptualized as something on-hand. In any case, the indeterminateness of its being always implies this meaning of being. On-hand-ness, however, is the way those beings have their being that do not take their measure from being-there.*

The ontic self-evidence of the assertion that it is I who am in each case being-there should not mislead us into the opinion that the path for an ontological interpretation of what is thus “given” has been mapped out. Indeed, it remains questionable whether even the ontic content of the assertion appropriately reflects the stock of phenomena pertaining to everyday being-there. It might well be that the who of everyday being-

* See again p. 333:

…the being of being-there receives its comprehensive ontological transparency only within the horizon of the clarified being of those beings not taking their measure from being-there, and that also means: of what, not at hand and not on hand, simply “subsists.”

Heidegger’s formulations earlier in the work often seem to preclude this third possibility. See the annotation on that page.

If, when we formulate ontic-ontological assertions, the displaying of the phenomena from the way beings themselves have their being is to retain primacy even over the most self-evident answers, those that have long been customary, and over the ways of posing the problem that draw on these answers, then we must keep protecting the phenomenological interpretation of being-there from a distortion of the problematic in regard to the question we are now going to pose.

But do we not violate the rules of all sound method if our approach to the problematic does not hold to the evident given-nesses of a thematic field? And what can be less doubted than the givenness of the I? And does this givenness not contain the directive to disregard, for the purposes of elaborating primordially this one givenness, everything else that might be “given”—to disregard not only any one “world” but also the being of other “egos”? Perhaps what this kind of giving gives—the sheer, formal, reflective perception of the I—is indeed evident. This insight even provides an access to a phenomenological problematic of its own—one that, as a “formal phenomenology of consciousness,” does have a foundational meaning providing its own framework [of research—as in Husserlian phenomenology].

In the present context of the existential analysis of factual being-there, the question arises whether the aforementioned manner in which the I is given discloses being-there in its everydayness—assuming this manner discloses the I at all. Is it then a priori self-evident that the access to being-there has to be a sheerly perceptive reflection onto the I as the performer of acts? What if this kind of “giving of the self” of being-there seduces our existential analysis—is itself a seduction having its basis in the being of being-there itself? Perhaps being-there, when it first addresses itself, always declares: “I am it!”—and this all the louder when it is “not’ this being at all. What if the constitution of being-there (that it is in each instance mine) is the reason that being-there initially and mostly is not itself this being? What if an existential analysis, starting out with the givenness of the I in the aforementioned manner, fell into a trap laid by being-there itself and by an apparently obvious interpretation it gives of itself? What if it were to turn out that the ontological horizon for determining what is accessible in the mode of a sheer giving remains at bottom indeterminate? It may well be that it is always ontically correct to say of being-there that “I” am it. However,
any ontological analysis making use of such assertions must subject them to fundamental reservations. The “I” can only rightly make sense as a non-committal formal indication of something that, in actual phenomenal interconnections, might well reveal itself as its own “contrary.” In such a case, the “not-I” does not at all mean anything like a being that by nature lacks I-ness; it rather means a determinate manner in which the “I” itself has its being—as in the loss of self.

Moreover, as we have presented it, the positive interpretation of being-there also forbids us to start out from the formal givenness of the I and then advance toward a phenomenally adequate answer to the question of the who. The clarification of being-in-world showed that, initially, a mere subject without world “is” not, and is never given. And so in the end there is not given any isolated I without others. But even if “others” are there with me already in any being-in-world, this phenomenal ascertainment should not mislead us into considering the ontological structure of what is thereby “given” to be self-evident and in no need of investigation. Our task is to make phenomenally visible the manner of this being-there-with as it unfolds within its closest everydayness, and to interpret it in an ontologically appropriate way.

Just as the ontic self-evidence of the in-itself-ness of inner-worldly beings misleads us into the conviction that the meaning of this being-in-itself is ontologically self-evident and that we may overlook the phenomenon of world, so too might the ontic self-evidence that being-there is in each case mine misdirect the ontological problematic essential to it. Initially, the who of being-there is not only ontologically a problem: it also remains ontically concealed.

But is then our existential-analytic now left without any guideline at all for answering the question of the who? By no means. Still, among the indications of the essential constitution of being-there (formally presented above in §9 and §12), what serves as a guideline now is not so much the one already discussed [dealings with at-hand beings] as the one according to which the “essence” of being-there has its foundation in existence. If the “I” is an essential determination of being-there, this determination must be interpreted existentially. Only by pointing up phenomenally a determinate way that being-there has its being can we find the answer to the who. If in each instance being-there is its self only ex-sistingly, the constancy of this self requires, as the only appropriate access to its problematic, an existential-ontological way of posing the question—just as much as does its possible “inconstancy.”

But to conceive of the self “only” as one manner in which being-there has its being seems tantamount to volatilizing the real “core” of being-there. Such fears feed on the perverse supposition that being-there after all does basically have its being the way an on-hand being does—even if one avoids attributing to it the solidity of a corporeal thing. Yet the “substance” of human being is not spirit, as the synthesis of soul and body, but ex-sistence.

The answer to the question about the who of everyday being-there is to be obtained within the analysis of the one manner of being in which being-there initially and mostly maintains itself. Our investigation takes its orientation from being-in-world—that basic constitution of being-there which co-determines every mode of its being. If we were right when saying that the foregoing explication of world would also bring the other structural factors of being-in-world into view, it must also have paved the way for answering the question of the who.

The “description” of the closest circum-world, e.g. the work-world of the craftsman [pp. 70-71], showed that, along with the instruments arising in labor, the others—those for whom the “work” is destined—also “arise for encounter.” The very manner in which this being [the envisioned “product”] has its being, i.e. its bound-up-ness, includes an essential reference to possible users to whom it must be “cut to measure.” Similarly when the material is put to use: the producer of it, or its “supplier,” arises for encounter as the one who “does the service” well or badly. For example, the field along which we stroll “outside” shows itself as belonging to so-and-so keeping it in good order; the book I make use of is one I purchased at . . . , received as a gift from . . . , and the like. A boat anchored on the beach refers, in its in-itself-ness, to an acquaintance who takes it on excursions, but also a boat “strange to us” points to someone else. The others “arising” in this way within an at-hand circum-worldly instrumental context are not pasted by thought onto a thing initially merely on hand; rather, these “things” arise for encounter within a world in which they are at hand for others—a world that is also

1 Cf. Max Scheler’s phenomenological contribution in this regard: Zur Phäno-
menologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle, 1913, pp. 118 ff.; also the second edition entitled Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, 1923, pp. 244 ff.
that is, one would have to count among the items "on stock" in the "world" instances of these strange "items" whose being consists of releasing items for encounter as stock: an involuted inventory!

Heidegger is perhaps disputing Heracleitus' dictum (fragment 89): "To those awake, order is one and shared (ενα και κοινον κοσµον ειναι), whereas in mine, already from the start. In our previous analysis, we narrowed the scope of inner-worldly beings arising for such encounter down to at-hand instruments, or else to on-hand nature, but in any event to beings of a character not taking its measure from being-there. This limitation was necessary not only for the purposes of simplifying the explication, but more because the way the being-there of others arises for encounter differs essentially from at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness. The world essential to being-there releases beings not just different from instruments and things of any kind, but ones that, in accordance with the way they have their being as being-there, are themselves "in" the world in the manner [earlier described] of being-in-world — "in" the very world wherein they themselves also arise for encounter as inner-worldly. These beings are neither on hand nor at hand; rather, they are in the same way as the being-there that releases them is — they are also there, they are along with. So if one were to insist on identifying world in general with the beings arising for encounter, one would have to say: "world" is also being-there.∗

So to characterize the way others arise for encounter we orient ourselves once again toward what is in each instance our own being-there. Are we then not also starting out by selecting and isolating the "I," with the result that we have to look for a bridge leading from this isolated subject over to the others? To avoid this misunderstanding, let us take note of the sense in which we are here talking about "others." "The others" does not at all mean anything like "the rest of all those other than me — the rest from which the I distances itself." The others are rather those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself — those among whom one also is. This being-there-too, along with the others, does not have the ontological character of a being-on-hand-with them within a world. The "with" is one taking its measure from being-there, the "too" means the sameness of being — the sameness of circumspect-heedful being-in-world. The "with" and the "too" are to be understood existentially, not categorically. On the basis of this with-ly being-in-world, each world is already always one that I share with others.∗ The world essential to being-there is a with-world. The being-in [essential to being-there] is a being-with others. The inner-worldly in-itself-ness of these others is a being-there-with.

Others do not arise for encounter on the basis of a precedental apprehension on the part of a subject initially on-hand, an act distinguishing oneself from the other subjects also available — they do not arise in any primary gazing at oneself, whereby the other pole of the distinction first gets ascertained. They arise from the world in which being-there, taking care of things in circumspection, essentially resides. In opposition to the theoretically concocted "explanations" of others as being on hand, explanations easily urging themselves upon us, we must hold fast to the phenomenal condition we have already pointed up: the circum-worldly encountering of others. This initial and elemental manner in which being-there is encountered in the world extends to the way one's own being-there initially becomes "available" to oneself: one looks away from — or one doesn't at all "see" — one's "experiences" or one's own "center of action." Being-there initially finds "its own self" in whatever it pursues, uses, prevents — in the circum-worldly at-hand beings it is initially taking care of.

And even when being-there expressly addresses itself, saying "I here," this locative personal determination must be understood in terms of the existential spatiality of being-there. In interpreting this (§23), we already intimated that the "I here" does not mean a special point for an I-thing, but rather makes sense, as a being-in, in terms of the over-there of an at-hand world in which being-there resides as taking-care.

Wilhelm von Humboldt has pointed to languages that express the "I" by "here," the "you" by "there," and the "he" by "over-there"; grammatically formulated, these expressions render personal pronouns by

119 others do not arise for encounter on the basis of a precedental apprehension on the part of a subject initially on-hand, an act distinguishing oneself from the other subjects also available — they do not arise in any primary gazing at oneself, whereby the other pole of the distinction first gets ascertained. They arise from the world in which being-there, taking care of things in circumspection, essentially resides. In opposition to the theoretically concocted “explanations” of others as being on hand, explanations easily urging themselves upon us, we must hold fast to the phenomenal condition we have already pointed up: the circum-worldly encountering of others. This initial and elemental manner in which being-there is encountered in the world extends to the way one’s own being-there initially becomes “available” to oneself: one looks away from — or one doesn’t at all “see” — one’s “experiences” or one’s own “center of action.” Being-there initially finds “its own self” in whatever it pursues, uses, prevents — in the circum-worldly at-hand beings it is initially taking care of.

And even when being-there expressly addresses itself, saying “I here,” this locative personal determination must be understood in terms of the existential spatiality of being-there. In interpreting this (§23), we already intimated that the “I here” does not mean a special point for an I-thing, but rather makes sense, as a being-in, in terms of the over-there of an at-hand world in which being-there resides as taking-care.

Wilhelm von Humboldt has pointed to languages that express the “I” by “here,” the “you” by “there,” and the “he” by “over-there”; grammatically formulated, these expressions render personal pronouns by

locative adverbs. It is indeed controversial which one is the primordial meaning of locative expressions, the adverbial or the pronominal. The dispute loses its basis once we note that locative adverbs bear on the I understood as being-there. The “here,” “there,” and “over-there” are not primarily locative determinations of inner-worldly beings on hand at points in space, they are characteristics of the primordial spatiality of being-there. Supposed adverbs-of-location are determinations pertinent to being-there, their meaning is primarily existential rather than categorical. But neither are they pronouns; their meaning precedes the difference between locative adverbs and personal pronouns. Still, the genuinely spatial meaning of these expressions, their meaning for being-there, provides evidence that any theoretically undistortive interpretation of being-there must immediately see being-there in the spatial (i.e., de-stancing and arranging) “being-near” embedded in the world it takes care of. In saying “here,” being-there, absorbing itself into its world, does not direct attention to itself, but rather away from itself toward the “over-there” of something circumspectly at hand — while nonetheless meaning itself in its existential spatiality.

Initially and mostly, being-there understands itself from its world; and others, in their being-there-with, very often arise for encounter from our dealings with inner-worldly beings at hand. But even when others become, as it were, thematic in their being-there, they arise for encounter not as on-hand person-things; rather, we meet them “at their work,” i.e. primarily in their being-in-world. Even when we see others “just standing around” we never apprehend them as on-hand human-things; “standing around” is rather an existential mode of being: an un-caring, circumspection-less hanging around anything and nothing. Others arise for encounter in their being-there-within a world.

But the expression “being-there” does [seem to] clearly indicate that this one being “first of all” has its being without taking up relations with others — that afterwards it can go on to be “with” others. However, it should not be overlooked that we employ the term “being-there-with” to designate that way being-there has its being according to which it releases others as they are, namely as in a world. This being-there-with on the part of others is disclosed, and this in an inner-worldly way, for a being-there — and therefore [also] for those who are there-with — only because being-there is in itself essentially being-with. The phenomenological assertion that “being-there is essentially being-with” has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not intend to establish ontically that I am factically not on hand alone, that others of my kind are around. If the statement that “the being-in-world of there is essentially constituted by being-with” meant anything like this, being-with would not be an existential determination characterizing being-there as it shows itself in itself from its own manner of being; it would rather be an attribute we would have to ascertain on each occasion, basing ourselves on whether others happen to turn up. Being-with determines being-there existentially also when no one else is factically on hand for perception. Being-alone is, for being-there, also a mode of being-within world. Another can be missed only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with, and the possibility of being-alone serves as a proof of this [primacy of being-with]. On the other hand, my factical being-alone does not get redressed by a second specimen of “human being” arriving “next” to me — or even ten such. Even when these and more are on hand, being-there can be alone. Being-with, the facticity of being with one another, is therefore not grounded in several “subjects” coming together. Again, though, being alone “among” many does not entail, in regard to the being of the many, that they are simply on hand there. In my being “among them” [when nonetheless “alone”], they are there with me; their being-there-with [then] arises in the mode of indifference and strangeness. Missing others and finding that they are “away” are modes of being-there-with, and they are possible only because, as being-with, being-there lets the being-there of others arise for encounter in its world. Being-with is a determination of the being-there that in each case is my own; being-there-with characterizes the being-there of others inasmuch as this latter being-there is released, through its world, for a being-with.

If we are to retain being-there-with as constitutive for being-in-world, we must interpret it — just as we did circumspect dealings with inner-worldly at-hand beings (which we called, by way of anticipation, taking-care) — from the phenomenon of care; for it is as care that the

\* Heidegger plays with the ancient talk of “the many”: of πολλῶν.

\[ Note that, on this account of our “being-in-it-together,” it is (my) being-there (not I myself) that allows being-there-of-others (not the others themselves) to arise for encounter. Heidegger’s account of togetherness differs from that of thinkers such as Martin Buber and Karl Jaspers.

\[ Grammatically, the “which” here refers to “beings.” However, it makes more sense to let it refer to “dealings.”
being of being-there gets determined overall (cf. Chapter Six of the present Division). The essential character of taking-care cannot fit being-with, even though both are indeed essential manners of being toward inner-worldly beings arising for encounter. But the beings to which being-there relates in its being-with do not have their being the way at-hand instruments do: these beings are themselves being-there. They are not taken care of, they are rather cared for.

Even “taking care” of the food and the clothing, the nursing of a body that is ill, is caring-for. But we understand this expression — in keeping with our employment of “taking-care” — as a term denoting an existential. For example, the “caring-for” at issue in the factual social arrangement called “welfare” is grounded in the essential constitution of being-there as being-with. Its factual urgency gets its motivation from the deficient modes in which being-there initially and mostly maintains itself. Possible manners of caring-for are: being supportive of, working against, living without one another, ignoring one another and not mattering at all to one another. And precisely these last-named modes of deficiency and indifference characterize everyday and average being-with-one-another.* Then again, these modes of its being reveal the character of inconspicuousness and self-evidence that belong just as much to everyday inner-worldly being-there-with as it does to the at-hand-ness of the instruments daily taken care of. These indifferent modes of being-with-one-another easily misdirect an ontological interpretation into interpreting at the outset this being-with-one-another as a pure on-handness of multiple subjects. There appear to be only minute variations in the way the two have their being, and yet there is an essential ontological difference between the “indifferent” way random things come together and the not-mattering-to-one-another of beings that are with one another.

122

As for its positive modes, caring-for has two extreme possibilities. It can, as it were, take “care” away from others, stepping into their place by taking care of things for them: it can jump in for them. This caring-for takes over, for others, what had to be taken care of. These others are then displaced, they step back so that they can afterwards either take over what was taken care of, now available as finished, or completely wash their hands of it. In such caring-for, others can become dependent and dominated, even though this domination might be tacit and remain hidden from those who are dominated. This mode of caring-for, jumping-in and taking-away, in large part determines our being with one another, and it pertains mostly to our taking care of beings at hand.

In contrast to this first mode, a caring-for is possible that does not so much jump in for others as jump ahead of them in their own existentiell ability-to-be — and not to take “care” away from them, but rather to give it back to them, now really as care. This caring-for — the one essentially pertaining to authentic care, i.e. to the ex-sistence of others, and not to what it is that others are taking care of — helps others to become transparent in their care and free for it.

Caring-for proves to be an essential constitution of being-there; according to its various possibilities, caring-for is bound up with being-there in its being toward the world it takes care of as well as with its authentic being toward itself. Being-with-one-another is initially, and often exclusively, grounded in what such being-together is taking care of together. A being-with-one-another springing from a common pursuit mostly maintains itself not only within surface limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The being-with-one-another of those who are hired to do the same thing often thrives on mistrust. On the other hand, a shared commitment to the same thing gets determined from being-there being fully seized upon. This authentic bonding first makes possible the sober matter-of-fact-ness that releases others, in their freedom, for themselves.

It is between these two extremes of positive taking-care — the one jumping in and dominating, the other jumping ahead and freeing — that everyday being-with-one-another maintains itself, displaying mixed forms, the description and classification of which lie outside the limits of the present investigation.

Just as circumspection, as the manner of uncovering at-hand beings, belongs to taking-care, so considerateness and forbearance provide guidance to caring-for. These two can range through the corresponding deficient and indifferent modes of caring-for, all the way to inconsiderateness, and the kind of indulgence stemming from indifference.

World releases not only at-hand beings for encounter, it also releases being-there — others in their being-there-with. Yet these circum-worldly released beings are themselves, corresponding to their ownmost ontological meaning, a being-in within the same world in which they are

* Here as elsewhere, “deficient” and “indifferent” are to be understood latinally: “un-strung” and “not-yet-differentiated.”
there with and for others arising for encounter. Worldliness we interpreted (§18) as a referential whole of signification. Being familiar with this signification, understanding it precedently, being-there lets at-hand beings arise for encounter as uncovered in their bound-up-ness. The referential context of signification is, in the being of being-there, tied firmly to its ownmost being. And with this [its ownmost being] being-there can, by its nature, have no binding [no “dealings”]; rather, being-there is that for the sake of which being-there itself is the way it is.

Now, according to the analysis we have just completed, being-with-others belongs to the being of being-there — to that being which is essentially at issue for being-there. It follows that, as being-with, being-there essentially “is” for the sake of others. This assertion of essence must be understood as an existential one. Even when some instance of factual being-there is not turning to others, supposes itself to have no need of them, dispenses with them, it is in the manner of being-with. In being-with — this as an existential for-the-sake-of-others — these others are already disclosed in their being-there. Accordingly, this disclosedness of others (constituted precedently by being-with) co-constitutes signification, i.e. worldliness; and it is as signification-cum-worldliness that disclosedness is held fast in the existential for-the-sake-of-which. Thus the worldliness of the world — the worldliness as constituted by signification and being-with, and the world as that wherein being-there in each case essentially is already — lets circum-worldly at-hand beings arise for encounter in such a way that, in unison with these beings as circumspectly taken care of, the being-there-with of others arises for encounter. It lies in the structure of the worldliness of world that others are not initially on hand, in line with other things, as free-floating subjects, but rather show themselves, in their circum-worldly special being within the world, from the at-hand beings in it.

The disclosedness of the being-there-with of others, a disclosedness belonging to being-with, entails this: because its being is being-with, there lies already in the understanding of being belonging to being-there an understanding of others. This form of understanding, like understanding in general, is not an acquaintance growing out of cognition, it is rather a primordially existential manner in which being-there has its being, a manner first making cognition and acquaintance possible. Mutual acknowledgement is grounded in being-with as this already entails a primordial understanding: in keeping with the closest way being-in-

world-together has its being, the acknowledgement of one another initially moves within an understanding-acquaintance of what being-there circumspectly finds and takes care of, along with others, in a circum-world. It is from what is being taken care of, and with the understanding of this, that the caring-for taking-care gets understood. In this way, others are first of all disclosed in a taking-care caring-for.

Now, because caring-for maintains itself initially and mostly in deficient, or at least undifferentiated modes — in the indifference of just passing each other by — , the essential and closest recognition of one another requires that we “get to know one another.” And then when reciprocal recognition gets lost (by way of aloofness, concealing oneself, disguising oneself) there is need for special ways of getting close to others, or “seeing through them.”

But just as opening oneself up (or closing oneself off) is grounded in the particular manner in which being-with-one-another is taking shape — is indeed nothing else than this manner — so, too, any explicit effort to disclose others, in caring for them, grows out of primary being-with-them. This thematic (but still not theoretical-psychological) disclosing of others now easily becomes the phenomenon that first comes into view for the theoretical problematic of understanding “other minds.” What phenomenally “first of all” presents one way of being with and understanding one another is then taken also as what “originally” and primordially allows for and constitutes every being toward others. This phenomenon — called, not very happily, “empathy” — is then supposed to build ontologically the first bridge, as it were, from one subject (my own, given first of all as alone) to another subject (first of all completely shut off).

The being of others is of course ontologically distinct from the being of on-hand things. The being that is here “other” has its being in the way being-there does. So in one’s being with and toward others there lurks

* A paraphrase of this paragraph:

When it becomes clear that others are there with me, it also becomes clear that we share an understanding. This understanding is not based on acquired knowledge, but is the same understanding essential to our shared condition (out of which knowledge may then grow): an understanding of things around us as we are dealing with them. Our ability to recognize one another stems from this shared basis. The attention we pay to each other is built into that which we pay to things we encounter.
an essential relation of being-there to being-there. But this relation, one would like to say, is surely already constitutive for one’s own being-there — being-there having an understanding of being and therefore relating itself to itself. Thus the essential relation to others becomes projection of one’s own being toward oneself “onto another.” The other is then a duplicate of one’s own self.

However, it is easy to see that this apparently self-evident argument rests on shaky ground. Its supposition — that the being being-there has toward itself is [the same as its] being toward others — does not hold. As long as this supposition has not become evident in its legitimacy, it remains enigmatic just how it is to disclose the relation of being-there to itself [as also a relation] to others as others.

Our being toward others is not only an independent and irreducible relationship of being. As being-with, this relationship already prevails within the being of being-there. To be sure, there is no disputing that mutual recognition coming alive on the basis of being-with often depends on the extent to which one’s own being-there happens to have understood itself. But this only means that it depends on the extent to which it has made the essential being-with-others transparent to itself — has not distorted it —, this being possible only because being-there is, as being-in-world, already with others. It is not “empathy” that first constitutes being-with; rather, empathy is possible only on the basis of being-with, and is motivated by the predominant and deficient modes of being-with, these being unavoidable.

That “empathy” is not a primordial existential phenomenon (just as cognition is not) does not mean there are no problems in regard to it. A hermeneutic especially designed for it will have to show how the various possible ways being-there has its being themselves misdirect and obstruct being-with-one-another and the recognition of this being, with the result that genuine “understanding” gets suppressed and being-there flees into surrogates. Such a hermeneutic presupposes, for its possibility, a positive existential condition allowing us to understand otherness properly.* Our analysis has shown this much: being-with is an existential constituent of being-in-world. Being-there-with proves to be a distinctive way some beings arising for encounter in the world have their being. Inasmuch as being-there is at all, it has the manner of being we characterized as being-

* How “to understand otherness properly”: the question of being is essentially a question of strangeness — including that of our ability to meet “strangers.”

with-one-another. This cannot be conceived as a summative result of several “subjects” coming together. Coming across a number of “subjects” itself becomes possible only once we treat simply as “numbers” others who first of all arise for encounter as being-there-with. A “number” of others gets uncovered only by way of a determinate being with and toward one another. Such “ruth-less” being-with “reckons” with others without seriously “counting on” them or even wanting to “have anything to do” with them.

One’s own being-there, just as the being-there-with of others, arises for encounter initially and mostly from a world that is shared, and one taken care of circumspectly. In its absorption in the world it takes care of (and this also means absorption into its being with and toward others), being-there is not itself. Who is it, then, that, as everyday being-with-one-another, has taken over the being of being-there?
I. Chapter Four: Others, the Self, & the One

160

under the heading of “the impersonal one,” Heidegger reassesses at length what thinkers from Plato to Nietzsche have referred to in passing as “the many," “the masses,” the “crowd”: Who knows horses? Not the many, but an individual, or a few (Apology, 25B; Crito, 47D); indeed, the many take umbrage at the proposals of the wise. — Yet the phenomena here are complex. Aristotle defines the dialectical syllogism essential both to education and action, and therefore at issue in contemplation, as proceeding precisely from “well-received opinion” (ενδοξα), i.e. from what is “accepted by all or by most or by the wise” (Topics, 100 b 22). “What appears to all, this we say is, and one who dismisses the persuasion of all people will not be very persuasive himself” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1173 a 1).

others, a domination stemming unawares from being-there as being-with. One belongs to these others oneself and enhances their power. “The others,” as one calls them (precisely in order to conceal one’s own essential part in them), are those who “are there,” initially and mostly, in everyday being-with-one-another. The who is not this one or that one, not oneself and not a few and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter: the one.*

It was shown earlier [p. 71] how, already in each closest circum-world, the public “environment” is at hand and is getting taken care of too. In making use of a public means of transportation, in utilizing an information service (newspaper), each of the others is like the next. Such being-with-one-another completely dissolves one’s own being-there into the manner in which “others” are, so that others disappear all the more in regard to their differentiation and specificity. Within this inconspicuousness and indeterminableness, the [impersonal] one unfolds its effective dictatorial. We enjoy ourselves, seek our pleasures, the way one enjoys; we read, see, and judge literature and art the way one sees and judges; but then we also pull ourselves away from “the masses” the way one pulls oneself away; we find “shocking” what one finds shocking. This “one” (which is not determinate, and which everyone is, but not as a sum) prescribes the manner in which everydayness has its being.

The one even has its own ways of being. The aforementioned drive of being-with (what we called distantiality) is grounded in the fact that, by its very nature, being-with-one-another takes care of averageness. It is an existential characteristic of the one. It is what is at issue for the one in the one’s very being. For this reason, being-there maintains itself factically within the averageness of the proper thing to do, of what is and what is not allowed, of that to which success is accorded or denied. Prefiguring what can and may be ventured, this averageness keeps watch over every pending exception. Every priority gets quietly suppressed. Overnight, everything original is flattened into something long familiar. Everything gained by struggle becomes something easy to handle. Every mystery loses its power. The care embedded in averageness once again reveals an essential drive of being-there, one we call the leveling of all possibilities of being.

Distantiality, averageness, leveling: as manners in which the one has its being, these constitute what we are familiar with as the “public sphere.” This sphere initially sets the standards for every interpretation of world and of being-there, and it asserts its right in everything. It does this not because it enjoys a pre- eminent and primary relation to the being of “things,” and not because it has available to it an explicitly appropriate transparency of being-there, but rather because it does not get “into matters” at all, and because it is insensitive to all distinctions of level and of genuineness. The public sphere darkens everything and passes off what is thereby concealed as familiar and accessible to everyone.

The one is everywhere around — but in such a way that it has also already sneaked off whenever being-there presses for a decision. Still, because the one pre-empts all judging and deciding, it relieves each being-there of its responsibility. The one can, as it were, put up with “every-one” constantly seeking justification in it. It can most easily be held responsible, since there is no-one who has to stand in for anything. It has always “been” some-one, and yet it can be said that it was no-one. In the everydayness of being-there, most things happen by an “agency” about which we have to say: it was no-one.

Thus it is that each being-there is, in its everydayness, disburdened by the one. Not only that. With its disburdening of being, the one accommodates being-there — since there lurks within being-there a drive to take and make things easy. And because, with the disburdening of being, the one constantly accommodates each being-there, the one retains and hardens its stubborn domination.

Each is the other and no one himself. The one — with which we have answered the question who is there in everyday being-there — is the nobody to which each and every being-there, in its being-among-others, has already consigned itself.

* Under the heading of “the impersonal one,” Heidegger reassesses at length what thinkers from Plato to Nietzsche have referred to in passing as “the many,” the “masses,” the “crowd”: Who knows horses? Not the many, but an individual, or a few (Apology, 25B; Crito, 47D); indeed, the many take umbrage at the proposals of the wise. — Yet the phenomena here are complex. Aristotle defines the dialectical syllogism essential both to education and action, and therefore at issue in contemplation, as proceeding precisely from “well-received opinion” (ενδοξα), i.e. from what is “accepted by all or by most or by the wise” (Topics, 100 b 22). “What appears to all, this we say is, and one who dismisses the persuasion of all people will not be very persuasive himself” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1173 a 1).
In the essential characteristics of everyday being-among-others — distantiality, averageness, leveling, public sphere, disburdening of being, and accommodation — there lies the closest “constancy” of being-there. This constancy pertains not to the enduring on-hand-ness of anything, but rather to the manner in which being-there has its being as being-with. Having its being variously in those modes just listed, the self of one’s own being-there, along with the self of others, has not yet found itself — or has not yet lost itself. One does not stand on one’s own: one is in the mode of inauthenticity. This manner of being implies no diminishment of the facticity of being-there — no more than, as the nobody, the one is a nothing. On the contrary, in this way of having its being, being-there is an ens realissimum (assuming “reality” is understood as being that takes its measure from being-there).

However, the one is no more on hand than is being-there itself. The more obviously the one reigns, the more impalpable and hidden it is — and the less it is nothing. It reveals itself to the unprejudiced, ontico-ontological “eye” as the “most real subject” of everydayness. And if it is not accessible in the way an on-hand stone is, this says nothing at all about its manner of being. One should not decree precipitously that this “one” is “really” nothing, nor should one embrace the opinion that the phenomenon could be ontologically interpreted by “explaining” it as the result of afterwards joining together a number of subjects that happen to be on hand together. Much to the contrary, the elaboration of concepts of being must take its clues from these peremptory phenomena.

¶27. Everyday Being-a-self, and the One

It belongs to everyday being-there to seize upon matters (p. 126). One alternative is to let oneself be seized upon: “a shared commitment to the same thing gets determined from being-there being fully seized upon” (p. 122). Throughout Division Two Heidegger develops this thought — akin to Plato’s on love and Augustine’s on grace.
I. Chapter Four: Others, the Self, & the One

“given” to “myself.” Initially, being-there is the one — and mostly it remains so. If and when being-there uncovers the world on its own, bringing it near to itself, if and when it discloses to itself its authentic being, such uncovering of “world” and disclosing of being-there always takes place as a clearing away of cover-ups and obfuscations — as a shattering of the disguises with which being-there seals itself off from itself.*

With the interpretation of being-with and of being-a-self in the one, the question who [is there] in the everydayness of being-with-one-another has been answered. These considerations have also brought out a concrete understanding of the basic constitution of being-there. Being-in-world has become visible in its everydayness and averageness.

Everyday being-there draws the pre-ontological interpretation of its being from the immediate manner in which the one has its being. Any ontological interpretation initially follows this interpretive drive: coming upon being-there as an inner-worldly being, such interpretation understands being-there from its world. Not only that. Even the meaning of being, with the help of which these “subjects” are understood: this meaning, too, any “immediate” ontology derives from the “world.” However, because in one’s absorption in the world the phenomenon of world itself gets passed over, its place gets taken by inner-worldly on-hand beings, i.e. things.† The being of those beings that are there with us is [also] conceived as on-hand-ness. Thus, by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the most intimate everyday being-in-world, we can gain insight into the very root of the blunder [traditional] ontological interpretation commits when it interprets the essential constitution of being-there-with.‡ According to the everyday manner in which it has its being, ontological interpretation itself passes by and covers up this constitution.

If the being of everyday being-with-one-another, seemingly so ontologically close to pure on-hand-ness, is yet fundamentally different from it, still less can the being of the authentic self be conceived as on-hand-ness. Authentic being-a-self does not rest on an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition detached from the one; it is rather an existentiell modification of the one as itself an essential existential.

There is then an ontological gap separating the same-ness of the authentically ex-sisting self from the identity of the I persisting throughout the manifold of experiences.*

---

* Heidegger is here setting the stage for his “signature” understanding of truth.
† In Being and Time, Heidegger reserves the term “thing” for this sense: a being getting deprived of its at-hand-ness. In “The Thing” (1950), he allows the word to stand in its original sense: a focus of concern.
‡ Recall the question raised on p. 65. Heidegger is accounting for the propensity of thinkers themselves (and not just “the many”) to “miss the point.”

* Since Kant, thinkers have tried to understand the self as the (transcendental) “constant” underlying the manifold or multiplicity of personal experiences. In contrast, Heidegger takes as “constant” the (immanent) one-self, and thereby paves the way for a consideration of authentic selfhood as epiphanic. In §64 (on care and selfhood, pp. 318-321), Heidegger considers the Kantian formulation in some detail.
Chapter Five
Being-in as Such

§28. The task of a thematic analysis of being-in
At its preparatory stage, the existential analysis of being-there has being-in-world as its guiding theme. Its first goal is to bring into relief phenomenally the unitary and primordial structure of the being of being-there from which its possibilities and manners “of being” get determined ontologically. Hitherto, the phenomenal characterization of being-in-world has set its sights on the structural factor of world and on answering the question who is there in the everydayness of such being. But already when we were setting out the tasks of a preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there, we ventured an orientation regarding being-in as such,\(^1\) and illustrated this orientation in application to the concrete mode of cognizing the world.\(^2\)

The point of anticipating this sustaining structural factor (being-in) was to encircle, from the start, the analysis of individual factors within a persistent pre-view of the structural whole, and thus to guard against the rupture and fragmentation of the unitary phenomenon. It is now a matter of returning the analysis to the phenomenon of being-in, while also retaining the insights attained in the concrete analysis of world and of who. A more penetrating consideration of this phenomenon should not only force, anew and more securely, the structural wholeness of being-in-world into phenomenological view; it should also pave the way for apprehending the primordial being of being-there itself—care.

But what is there to point out about being-in-world—beyond the essential bearings of being near a world (taking-care), of being-with (caring-for), and of being-a-self (the who)? There does remain the possibility of extending the analysis, broadening it into comparative characterizations of the variations in taking-care and its circumspection, in caring-for and its considerateness—and, by sharper explication of the being of every possible inner-worldly being, contrasting being-there with

\(^1\) Cf. §12, pp. 52 ff.
\(^2\) Cf. §13, pp. 59-63.
Heidegger introduced his claim to “fundamental ontology” on p. 13. Nearly twenty years later, in his “Letter on Humanism,” he comments: “... [traditional] ontology always thinks only beings (ον) in their being. So as long as we do not think the truth of being, any ontology we come up with will still lack its proper foundation. For this reason I termed the thinking I was trying to launch in Being and Time: fundamental ontology. This it is which endeavors to get back into the ground of the matter from which any thinking of the truth of being ... so fails to understand that there is a kind of thinking that is more exacting than any kind of conceptual thinking. ...”

In which direction should a phenomenological characterization of being-in as such look? We obtain an answer by recalling what was being committed to phenomenologically formed vision when we first introduced this phenomenon: being-in in contrast to the on-hand inside-ness of two beings not taking their measure from being-there. Without question, unfinished tasks here lie in wait. With a view to a full elaboration of the existential a priori for a philosophical anthropology, what has hitherto been laid out stands very much in need of supplementation. But the present investigation does not aim for this. It aims for a fundamental ontology.* So if we are now going to embark on a thematic investigation of being-in, then indeed we should not aim to nullify the primordiality of this phenomenon by trying to derive it from other phenomena — by analysis inappropriately construed as dissolution. The underviability of anything primordial does not, however, exclude a multiplicity of essential characteristics constitutive for it. If these should happen to show themselves, then they are existentially equi-primordial. The phenomenon of equi-primordiality of constitutive factors is often disregarded in ontology — as a result of a methodologically unrestrained drive for demonstrating the provenance of everything and anything from a simple “primal ground.”†

The one being that gets essentially constituted by being-in-world is itself, in each instance, its own “there.” In its usual meaning, the word “there” suggests a “here” and an “over-there.” The “here” of an “I-here” always understands itself from an at-hand “over-there” construed as a being-toward what is over there, a being that de-stances and arranges it. The existential spatiality of being-there, one also determining its “location,” is itself grounded in being-in-world. The “over-there” is a determination of an inner-worldly being arising for encounter. “Here” and “over-there” are only possible in a “there,” i.e. if and when there is a being that, as itself the being of the “there,” has disclosed spatiality.

---

* Heidegger introduced his claim to “fundamental ontology” on p. 13. Nearly twenty years later, in his “Letter on Humanism,” he comments:

… [traditional] ontology always thinks only beings (ον) in their being. So as long as we do not think the truth of being, any ontology we come up with will still lack its proper foundation. For this reason I termed the thinking I was trying to launch in Being and Time: fundamental ontology. This it is which endeavors to get back into the ground of the matter from which any thinking of the truth of being derives. But the point from which my questioning here started is so completely different from others that its thinking is totally removed from the “ontology” found in metaphysics (including Kant’s). “Ontology,” whether it is transcendental or pre-critical, is not subject to critique because it thinks the being of beings and then forces the truth of being into concepts. It is subject to critique because it does not think the truth of being at all and so fails to understand that there is a kind of thinking that is more exacting than any kind of conceptual thinking. ...

† Throughout this work Heidegger himself speaks of phenomena as being “grounded.” In his later works he considers such talk of “ground” as committing us to “dissolving” phenomena (rather than “saving” them). The thought of “equi-primordiality” offers an alternative.
In its ownmost being, this one being bears the characteristic of un-closed-off-ness. The term “there” refers to this essential dis-closed-ness. By way of its disclosedness, this being (being-there) is itself “there” — together with world “there.”

The ontically imaged talk about the lumen naturale inherent in human being refers to nothing else but the existential-ontological structure of this one being: that it is in the manner of being its there. That this being is “illumined” means that it is in itself, as being-in-world, cleared, not cleared by some other being but rather cleared in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for a being existentially cleared in this way do on-hand beings become accessible in the light or concealed in the dark. Right from the start, being-there brings its there along; not only does it factically not “do without” its there, any being that does “do without” it is not a being having the nature of being-there. Being-there is its disclosedness.

It is the constitution of this being [this way being-there has its being] that must be laid out. However, inasmuch as ex-sistence is the essence of this being, the existential proposition “being-there is its disclosedness” also means this: the being that is at issue for this one being in its very being is that it be its “there.” Besides characterizing the primary constitution of the being of disclosedness, we shall, in the course of the analysis, need to interpret the everyday manner in which being-there is its there.

---

a "Αληθεια — open-ness — clearing, light, glowing. [Especially in his later works, Heidegger orchestrates the thought of truth (Αληθεια) with these terms: the open-ness (vs. closed-ness) of the “context” of our engagements, the clearing in which light can be shed on how things have been set on their course so that what then appears in the clearing can glow in its own right — and thereby (as he adds on p. 147) enter into our vision.]
b without, however, producing the clearing. [On “clearing” and “cleared-ness,” cf. pp. 147, 170, 350. Heidegger will always argue that the event here is one to which we bear witness, especially as readers and writers, speakers and listeners — in keeping with Plato and Aristotle, and in contrast to Bacon and Descartes.]
c Being-there ex-sists, and only this one being; ex-sistence here means the standing-out, the standing into the open-ness of the there: ek-sistence. [Heidegger here re-thinks and re-spells the word “existence” to reflect its double-edge: out beyond… but precisely thereby out into…]

The Chapter now undertaking to explicate being-in as such, i.e. the being of the there, falls into two parts: A. The existential constitution of the there. B. The everyday being of the there, and the collapsing of being-there.

The two equi-primordial constitutive manners of being the there we see in attunement and in understanding. The analysis of these two will in each case receive the necessary phenomenal confirmation by way of an interpretation of a concrete mode, one important for the subsequent problematic. And both attunement and understanding are equi-primordially determined by talk.

Under A. (the existential constitution of the there) we consider: being-there as attunement (§29), fear as a mode of attunement (§30), being-there as understanding (§31), understanding and interpretation (§32), assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation (§33), being-there, talk, and language (§34).

The analysis of the essential characteristics of being-there is an existential analysis. That means: these characteristics are not properties of on-hand beings, they are rather existential ways of being. Thus the manner in which these characteristics are in everydayness must be laid out.

Under B. (the everyday being of the there, and the collapsing of being-there) we will analyze — in accordance with [1] the constitutive phenomenon of talk, [2] the vision that lies in understanding and [3] the kind of interpretation belonging to this latter (explaining) — the following as existential modes of the everyday being of the there: re-talk (§35), curiosity (§36), and ambiguity (§37). In these phenomena a basic manner of the being of the there becomes visible — one we interpret as collapsing, a “lapsing” revealing a peculiar kind of movedness belonging existentially to being-there (§38).

A. The existential constitution of the there

§29. Being-there as Attunement

What we indicate ontologically with the term “attunement” is ontically the most familiar and most everyday: mood, being-attuned. Prior to every psychology of moods (a field lying especially fallow), it is essential to see the phenomenon of attunement as a fundamental existential, and to outline its structure.
The undisturbed equanimity as well as the inhibited ill-humor of everyday taking-care—the slippage from one to the other and back again, and into bad moods—are not, ontologically, nothing, even if they are left unheeded as supposedly the most indifferent and fleeting of phenomena. That moods get spoiled and can shift: this only means that being-there is in each instance already attuned. The often persistent, smooth-running and pallid out-of-attune-ness [apatheia], not to be confused with being badly attuned [e.g., being irritable], is so far from being nothing that it is in this unattunedness that being-there becomes weary of itself: being has become manifest as a burden. a Why, one does not know. And being-there can know no such thing because the possibilities of disclosure embedded in knowledge fall way short of the primordial disclosing happening in moods—wherein being-there is brought before its being as there. Then again, an elevated mood can alleviate the manifest burden of being; this mood-possibility, even though alleviating, also discloses the burdensome character of being-there. Moods make it manifest “how one is and how one is getting on.” In this “how one is,” attuned-ness brings being-there into its “there.”

In such attuned-ness being-there is always already disclosed, in a mood, as the one being to which being-there has been entrusted in its very being—the being that it has, ex-sistingly, to be. To be disclosed does not mean to be known as such. And, precisely within the most indifferent and harmless everydayness, the being of being-there can burst in as a naked “that it is and has to be.” Pure “that it is” shows itself, the wherefrom and the whereto remaining in the dark. That by and large being-there does not “give in” to such moods, i.e. does not pursue the disclosing they offer, does not let itself be brought before what they disclose: this is no proof against, but rather evidence for the phenomenal reign of mood-based disclosedness of the being of the there in its “that it is.” Ontical-existentially, being-there mostly evades the being disclosed in mood. Ontological-existentially, this means: precisely in whatever it is toward which a mood is not turning, being-there is unveiled in its consignment to its there. Even in evasion, the there is as disclosed.*

This characteristic of being-there—one veiled in its wherefrom and its whereto, but in itself all the more unveiledly disclosed—, this “that it is”: this we call its throwed-ness into its there. This one being is thrown in such a way that, as being-in-world, it is the there. The term “throwness” intends to suggest the facticity of consignment. The “that it is and has to be” disclosed in the attunement of being-there is not the “that . . .” expressed ontologically and categorially by the factuality belonging to on-hand-ness. This factuality is only accessible in the kind of determination [of things] wherein we look on [at them]. Rather, the “that . . .” disclosed in attunement must be conceived as an existential determination of the one being that is in the manner of being-in-world. Facticity is not the factuality of a factum brutum of an on-hand being, it is rather a characteristic of the way being-there is, the characteristic of being taken up into ex-sistence, even though this characteristic is initially pressed to the side. The “that . . .” of facticity is never found by just looking on at things.

Beings having the character of being-there are their there in such a way that they find themselves attuned in their throwness. In attunement, being-there is always already brought before itself, it has always already found itself—not as coming across itself in perception, but as finding

---

a “burden”: what must be borne; human being is consigned to being-there, assigned to it. Bearing it: taking it upon oneself from out of one’s belongingness to being itself. [Heidegger here distinguishes the burden and our bearing it from the everyday interpretation of burdens as unpleasantnesses and of our task of steeling ourselves against them. His account of attunement as disclosure, one prior to the possibilities of cognition (whether understood in the Aristotelian or in the Kantian manner), has always left some readers thinking he is celebrating the “emotional side of life” at the expense of cognitive accomplishment. So he keeps reminding us that the question here is how we find ourselves finding our circumstances—a two-fold unitary phenomenon prior both to intellectual accomplishment of any kind and to how we happen to feel about things; however, recognition of this priority depends on recognizing the priority of world.]

* Plato and Aristotle inaugurated philosophy as the technique of unveiling what otherwise remains hidden (horse-trainers themselves think they must first of all train horses, a philosopher unveils their commitment first of all to what-horses-need-to-be): this technique is knowledge-bound both in its reference (the knowledge horse-trainers have) and in its embodiment (the knowledge intellectual have about human engagements with nature). Heidegger is inaugurating a thinking much closer to that of the novelist or playwright who portrays characters evading the disclosure of their there while revealing to us their consignment to this disclosure. Some contemporary French thinkers are also inclined to understand psychoanalysis as engaging first the analyst and then the patient in this double play.
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

itself attuned. As a being consigned to its being, it also remains consigned to its always already having to have found itself — found in a finding sprung not so much from a direct seeking as from a fleeing. Mood does not disclose by our looking at thrownness, but by our turning toward or away from it. Mostly, mood does not turn us toward the burdensome character of being-there it otherwise manifests — least of all as we are alleviated in an elevated mood. But such turning-away is what it is precisely in the manner of an attunement.

Phenomenally, both what and how mood discloses would be completely misunderstood if what is disclosed were conflated with what an attuned being-there “at once” recognizes, knows, and believes. Even when being-there is “certain” in its belief regarding “where it’s going” — or thinks it knows, and can explain rationally, — as the counterpart to rationalism — talksonly with a squinting glance at that to which rationalism is blind.

That, factically, a being-there can, should and must become master of its moods: this might, in certain possibilities of ex-sistence, suggest a primacy of volition and cognition. But we ... denying mood as a primordial manner in which being-there has its being — a manner in which it is disclosed to itself prior to every cognition and volition, and beyond the disclosive range of these. And, moreover, we never master a mood in a way free of mood, but by way of a corresponding counter-mood. As a first ontological characteristic of the way attunement works, we have this: Attunement discloses being-there in its thrownness, and does so initially and mostly in the mode of evasive turning-away.

Already here we can see that attunement is far removed from anything like finding out a psychic condition. So little does it have the character of an apprehension (one turning around and looking back) that every such immanent reflection can only therefore find out “experiences” because the there is already disclosed in attunement. A “mere mood” discloses the there more primordially [than any finding out] — but also closes it off all the more stubbornly than any non-perception.

Bad moods show this. In a bad mood, being-there becomes blind to itself, the circum-world it takes care of gets veiled over, the circumspection embedded in taking-care is misled. This attunement hardly requires reflection; it rather overwhelms being-there as it unreflectingly dedicates itself to and expends itself in the “world” it takes care of. Mood overwhelms. It comes neither from “without” nor from “within”; it rather arises directly from being-in-world as a manner of being-there. Thus we pass from a negative delimitation of attunement (its contrast with reflective apprehension of a “within”) to a positive insight regarding its disclosive character. Mood has in any case already disclosed being-in-world as a whole, and first makes it possible for us to direct ourselves toward something. Being-attuned does not initially bear on anything psychical; it is not an inner condition that then reaches out, in some mysterious way, and rubs its colors off onto things and persons. And this shows a second way attunement essentially works: it is a basic existential manner in which world, being-there-with, and ex-sistence (for ex-sistence is essentially being-in-world) are equi-primordially disclosed.

Along with these two essential determinations of attunement — the disclosing of thrownness and the concomitant disclosing of the whole being-in-world — there is a third, one that contributes above all to a more penetrating understanding of the worldliness of world. Earlier it was noted that it is world, one already disclosed, that allows anything inner-worldly to arise for encounter. Belonging to being-in, this precedentally disclosedness of world is co-constituted by attunement. The letting-arise-for-encounter is primarily circumspective rather than simply a sensing or a gawking. Thus, in regard to attunement, we can now see more sharply that circumspectly concerned letting-arise-for-encounter has the character of being struck by things. Yet being struck by at-hand beings — by their being unserviceable, resistant or threatening — only becomes ontologically possible because, precedentally, being-in is existentially determined in such a way that inner-worldly beings having arisen for encounter can become a concern for it. This becoming-a-concern is grounded in attunement; it is as an attunement that becoming-a-concern has disclosed the world to be, for example, threatenable. Only what arises in the attunement of fearing — or, for that matter, of fearlessness — can uncover

1 Cf. §18, pp. 83 ff.
as threatening a being at hand in a circum-world. The attunedness of
time and space as such exists existentially the way being-there is open to its
world.*

And only because the “senses” belong ontologically to a being
having its being in the manner of an attuned being-in-world can they be
“touched” and “have sense for . . . ” — so that what it is that touches can
show itself in an affect. Anything like affects could not come about,
even under the strongest pressure and resistance — resistance would
remain essentially undiscovered — if attuned being-in-world were not
dependent on inner-worldly beings becoming a concern, in a way
prefigured by moods. Within attunement lies existentially a disclosive
dependence on world, and from world beings can arise for con-
cerned encounter. Indeed, it is an ontological principle that we must
leave to “mere mood” the primary dis- or un-covering of world. Pure
intuiting, even if it penetrates to the innermost core of the being of
something on hand, is never capable of discovering anything even
vaguely threatening.†

That everyday circumspection makes mistakes owing to the way
attunement primarily discloses the world — that to a large extent it gets
deceived — is, when measured against the idea of an absolute “world”-
cognition, a µη δὲν [a “non-being”: doesn’t account for anything one way
or the other]. But such ontologically unjustified assessment completely
misunderstands the existential positivity of such deceivability. Precisely
here, in the unsteady, mood-bound flickering seeing of “world,” at-hand
beings show themselves in their specific worldliness, never the same from
day to day.‡ Theoretical looking-on has always already dimmed the
world down to the uniformity of things purely on hand — a uniformity
within which, of course, there lies a new abundance of things dis-
coverable by way of pure determination. Yet even the purest θεωρια
[theoria] has not left every mood behind; even to such theoretical
looking-on, beings henceforth merely on hand show themselves in the
way they purely look only when this “theorizing” can let them come
upon itself in calm dwelling near . . . , in ροστανη and διαγωνη [in being
at ease and in being amused].§ — But showing that and how the existencial-ontological constitution of cognitive determination stems from
attunement: this is not to be confused with trying to surrender science
ontically to “feeling.”

Within the problematic of the present investigation, we cannot
interpret the various modes of attunement and their foundational
interconnections. Under the heading of “affects” or “feelings,” these
phenomena have long been ontically familiar, and have always been
contemplated in philosophy. It is no coincidence that in our tradition the
first systematically developed interpretation of affects does not unfold in
the framework of “psychology.” Aristotle investigates the παθη [the way
things affect us] in Book Two of his Rheticic. This work must be
understood as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of
being-with-one-another — contrary to the traditional construal of rhetoric
as some sort of “academic discipline.” The public sphere, as the manner
in which in the one has its being (§27), not only has its attunedness overall,
it needs mood and “fabricates” it for itself. It is both into and out of the
public sphere that the orator speaks. Orators need an understanding of
the possibilities of mood in order to arouse and to direct it in the right
way.

It is well known that the Stoics carried the interpretation of the
affects further, and that Patristic and Scholastic theology passed this
tradition on to modernity. It escapes notice that, since Aristotle, the
fundamental ontological interpretation of what it means to be affected has
hardly been able to make a single significant step forward. On the
contrary: affects and feelings thematically fall among psychic

---

* Besides accounting phenomenologically for the role of mood in the disclosure of being-there, Heidegger is here eliciting the conditions for the possibility of the kind of philosophy emerging in the works of Plato and Aristotle: the mood of wonder, the sense of urgency about things (“at issue” and “of concern” is not only our own being-there, but also the things arising for encounter), and the openness to things as they are in themselves. His lecture “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) re-orchestrates Being and Time in this key.
† Heidegger here controverts the thesis of Husserlian phenomenology.
‡ The specific worldliness is new each day: δ ηλιος, according to Heracleitus, νέος θρηνη έστιν (Aristotle, Meteorology, 355 a 13).
§ Cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 982 b 22 ff. [Heidegger here again conflates the theory embodied by modern scientific investigation and the “theory” inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle. Already in a marginalium on p. 62, he recants: modern “looking-on” at things as they “purely look” both requires more than just “looking away” and differs in origin from the contemplation of εδος inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle — even if the two are distant relatives.]
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

phenomena, mostly as a third class after representation and volition. They sink into the status of epiphenomena.

It is the merit of phenomenological research to have forged a freer view of these phenomena. Not only that. Scheler directed the problematic toward the foundational interconnections between acts “representing” and acts “taking an interest”—mainly by resuming the challenges set by Augustine and Pascal. Here too, of course, the existential-ontological foundations of this phenomenon of “act” remain entirely in the dark.

Attunement not only discloses being-there in its thrownness, and in its dependence upon the world in each instance already disclosed along with its own being. Attunement is even the existential manner in which being-there constantly gets consigned to the “world,” lets “world” become a concern for it in such a way that it in some fashion evades its own self. The existential constitution of this evasion will become clear in the phenomenon of collapsing.

Attunement is a basic existential manner in which being-there is its there. It not only characterizes being-there ontologically; owing to its power of disclosing, it is also of fundamental methodological significance for the present existential analysis. Just as any ontological interpretation whatsoever, our analysis is only capable of listening in, as it were, on the beings that have already been disclosed in their being. And it will stick to those disclosive possibilities of being-there that are pre- eminent and most far-reaching—in order, that is, to receive from these possibilities its enlightenment regarding those beings. Any phenomenological interpretation must relinquish to being-there itself the possibility of primordial disclosure—and let it interpret itself, as it were. It only accompanies the disclosure, in order existentially to elevate into conceptual form the phenomenal content of what is disclosed.

With a view to the subsequent interpretation of one such basic, existentially and ontologically loaded attunement, dread (cf. §40), we will now illustrate the phenomenon of attunement even more concretely in the determinate mode of fear.

§30. Fear as a Mode of Attunement

The phenomenon of fear invites consideration of three aspects: we analyze that in the face of which there is fear, the fearing itself, and that for which there is fear. These possible and intertwining aspects are not accidental. With them, the overall structure of attunement comes to the fore. We shall complete the analysis by indicating the possible modifications of fear, each one of which touches upon one of the structural factors.

That in the face of which there is fear, what “inspires fear,” is in each instance something inner-worldly arising for encounter, a being having its being either as at hand, on hand, or there-with. There is no point in reporting ontically on the multiple things often “inspiring fear”; our task is rather to determine phenomenally what makes things inspire fear, their fearsome- ness. What belongs to the fearsome as such that arises for encounter in fearing? That in the face of which there is fear has the character of a threat. There are several dimensions of such threat: 1. What arises for encounter has a special kind of bound-up-ness, that of harmfulness. It shows itself within a context of binding. 2. This harmfulness focuses on a determinate range of things affected by it. Determined in this manner, it itself arises from a determinate whereabouts. 3. This where-about is itself familiar, as is what arises within it, yet there is something “uncanny” going on. 4. As threatening, what is harmful is not yet near enough to be dealt with effectively, but it is coming near. In such coming-near its harmfulness radiates: herein lies its threatening nature. 5. This coming-near takes place within a near- byness. Anything remains veiled in its fearsomeness, so long as it is far off

1 Cf. Aristotle’s Rhetoric, B 5, 1382 a 20 through 1383 b 11. [Aristotle’s account of fear concentrates on our fear of others.]

---

1 Cf. Œuvres de Blaise Pascal (as cited on p. 4 above), p. 272 (“The Art of Persuasion”):

Et de là vient qu’au lieu qu’en parlant des choses humaines on dit qu’il faut les connaître avant que de les aimer, ce qui a passé en proverbe, les saints au contraire disent en parlant des choses divines qu’il faut les aimer pour les connaître, et qu’on n’entre dans la vérité que par la charité, dont ils ont fait de leurs plus utiles sentences.

[“...instead of saying (when speaking of human things) that one must know them before loving them, ... the saints say (when speaking of divine things) that one must love them in order to know them, and that one only enters truth by way of charity...”] Cf. also Augustine, Contra Faustum, Book 32, in Opera (Migne, Patrologiae Latinae, vol. VIII): non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem [“one does not enter truth except by way of charity”].
— even when it can be harmful to the highest degree, and even when it comes constantly closer. When it is coming near within a nearby-ness, what is harmful becomes threatening: it can strike, or it might not. In the coming-near, this “it can, but then in the end it might not” intensifies. It’s scary, we say. 6. From this then: as coming near in a nearby-ness, what is harmful carries in itself the unveiled possibility of not occurring, or passing us by — which does not diminish or extinguish the fearing, but rather extends it.

The fearing itself is a releasing of whatever it is that threatens in the manner just characterized — letting it be a concern. It’s not that some future evil (malum futurum) first gets ascertained and then feared. But fearing does not even first confirm that something is coming near; rather, it first uncovers what comes near in its being fearsome. Once fearing, fear can then, while expressly looking around, “become clear” about what inspires the fear. Circumpection sees what inspires fear because such inspection is in the attunement of fear. Fearing — as a slumbering possibility of attuned being-in-world (“timidity”) — has already so disclosed the world that within it something scary can come near. The essential and existential spatiality of being-in-world sets the stage for this ability of things to come near.

That for which fear fears is the being itself that is fearing — being-there. Only beings whose being is, in their very being, at issue, can fear for themselves. Fearing discloses being-there in its vulnerability, in its abandonment to its own devices. Fear always unveils being-there in the being of its there, even if it does so in varying degrees of explicitness. If we fear for house and home, this affords no counter-example to the foregoing account of the for-what of fear. After all, as being-in-world, each being-there has its being in taking care of something. Mostly and initially, being-there is according to what it takes care of. The vulnerability of this latter is a threat to its own being in it. For the most part, fear discloses being-there in a privative manner. It confuses us, makes us “lose our heads.” While fear lets the endangered being-in become visible, it also shuts it down, with the result that, once the fear has subsided, being-there must take stock of itself all over again.

As a fearing for itself, being afraid of something always discloses equi-primordially — whether privatively or positively — inner-worldly beings in their threat, and being-in as getting threatened. Fear is a mode of attunement.

§30. Fear as a Mode of Attunement

Then, too, being afraid of . . . can also involve others, in which case we speak of fearing for them. This fearing for others does not relieve them of their fear. This is already excluded inasmuch as the others for whom we fear need not at all be afraid. We mostly fear for others precisely when they are not fearing, and are plunging rashly into threatening situations. Fearing for . . . is a manner of co-attunement with others, yet not necessarily a shared fearing for the group or even a fearing with one another about something else. One can be afraid of what might happen to others without fearing for oneself. Examined more carefully, however, this being afraid of . . . is indeed a fearing for oneself: one is “scared” about one’s being-with-others — that someone may be torn away from one. What is scary does not have its focus directly on those who are co-fearing. After a fashion, being afraid of what might happen to others finds itself untouched; and yet it is touched — touched along with others as all at once are touched in being-there-with. It is for this being-there-with that such being afraid of . . . fears. Being afraid-of-what-might-happen-to-others is therefore not a weakened form of fearing for oneself. Not at issue are degrees of “emotional tones,” but rather existential modes. Neither does this being afraid of . . . lose its specific genuineness if it happens not “really” to fear.

The constitutive factors of the full phenomenon of fear can vary. Thus there evolve differing essential possibilities for fearing. [1] To the structure of whatever threatens there belongs a coming-near within a nearby-ness. When, in its “well, not yet, but at any moment,” something threatening bursts suddenly into the being-in-world within which one is absorbed in taking care of things, fear becomes fright. Thus in the threat we must distinguish between the coming-most-near on the part of what threatens and the manner in which this coming-near arises: suddenness. [2] That in the face of which there is fright is usually something familiar and trusted. If, then, what threatens has the character of something totally strange, fear becomes horror. And [3] where something threatening not only has the character of something terrifying but also arises in the way something frightening does, i.e. in suddenness, fear becomes terror. Other transformations of fear we recognize as bashfulness, shyness, fretfulness, suspiciousness. As possibilities of finding-oneself-attuned, all modifications of fear indicate that, as being-in-world, being-there is “timid.” This “timidity” must be understood not in the ontic sense of a factual disposition belonging to an individual, but
rather as an existential possibility of the attunement belonging essentially to being-there as such—not, of course, the only one.

§31. Being-there as understanding

Attunement is one of the existential structures in which the being of the “there” maintains itself. Equi-primordially with this one, understanding constitutes this same being. In each instance, attunement has its own understanding, if only by way of suppressing it. Understanding is always attuned. When we now interpret this understanding as a fundamental existential, it is essential to notice that this phenomenon is conceived as a basic mode of the being of being-there. Then, too, “understanding” in the sense of one possible manner of cognition among others—one distinct from, say, “explaining”—must be interpreted (along with this latter) as essentially derived from the primary understanding co-constituting the being of the there overall.

Now, our earlier investigation already came upon this primordial understanding—without letting it become explicitly thematic. Being-there is its there ex-sistingly: this entails that world is “there” and that the being-there of the world is being-in.* And this being-in is similarly “there”—namely, as that for the sake of which being-there is. In this for-the-sake-of-which, ex-sisting being-in-world is disclosed as such. This disclosedness was called understanding.† Within this understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, the signification grounded in it is co-disclosed. As disclosing both the for-the-sake-of-which and signification, the disclosedness occurring in understanding pertains to being-in-world in its entirety. Signification is that upon which world as such is disclosed.‡ For-whose-sake and signification are disclosed in being-there: this entails that being-there is a being which, as being-in-world, is an issue for itself.

---

*a [rather.] fundamental-ontologically, i.e. from its bearing on the truth of being. [Heidegger underscores the difference between the ontological analysis of “understanding” he himself proposes and the more narrowly existential analysis proposed by thinkers such as Karl Jaspers and Jean-Paul Sartre.]

*b One of the few instances where the expression “being-there” pertains primarily to world rather than to our being there in a world.

† Cf. §18, pp. 85 ff.

‡ Regarding the phrase “upon which,” see my annotation on p. 86.
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

Heidegger often detects undisturbed soil in colloquial expressions like "knowing where things are heading," "knowing what's up," "knowing what's in it for me": where prepositions and pronouns waver in meaning. Although Heidegger here dialogues mainly with Kant, there are also echoes of the Aristotelian thought that the beings we encounter are their ability (power, potentiality: δύναμις). By grounding the discovery of their ability in the conditions of being-there dealing with them, Heidegger paves the way for an understanding of them which "precedes" the kind of understanding committed to the fixities (εἶδος, τέλος) inherent in the Platonic-Aristotelian understanding—as well as in the modern technological understanding.

Understanding is the existential being of the ability-to-be that belongs to being-there itself as its own—and this in such a way that this existential being discloses in itself the "where it's going" belonging to the being of being-there. We must now apprehend more sharply the structure of this existential.

As a disclosing, understanding always bears on the whole basic constitution of being-in-world. As ability-to-be, being-in is in each instance an ability-to-be-in-world. World is not merely, qua world, disclosed as possible signification; rather, the release of inner-worldly beings sets these beings free in their possibilities. At-hand beings are uncovered as such in their ability to render service, be used, cause harm.

The wholeness of the binding unveils itself as the categorical whole of a possibility lurking in the interconnection of at-hand beings. But even the "unity" of manifold on-hand beings, the unity we call "nature," only becomes discoverable on the basis of the disclosedness of a possibility lurking in it. Is it an accident that the question about the being of nature focuses on the "conditions of its possibility"? Where does such questioning find its foothold? Out of respect for this questioning, another question cannot be avoided: Why are beings not taking their measure from being-there understood in their being if they are disclosed in regard to the conditions of their possibility? Kant presupposes as much, perhaps correctly. But this presupposition is one we can least of all leave uncertified in its correctness.

Why does understanding always press into possibilities—whatever the essential dimensions of what is disclosable in it? It is because understanding has in itself the existential structure we call projection. Understanding projects the being of being-there just as equi-primordially onto its for-the-sake-of-which as onto the signification, i.e. the worldliness of its particular world. This character of projection belonging to understanding constitutes being-in-world in regard to the disclosedness of its there as the there of an ability-to-be. Projection is the existential constitution of the space in which a factual ability-to-be can play itself out—it is the way this space, this play, has its being. And as thrown being-there, being-there is injected into this projecting as its own manner of being. Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself within a plan already thought out, a plan according to which being-there might arrange itself; rather, as being-there, it has in each instance already projected itself, and is—so long as it is—projectingly. Being-there understands itself always already—and always will, so long as it is—from possibilities. The character of projection belonging to understanding entails also this: understanding does not itself thematically apprehend that onto which it projects, namely the possibilities. Such apprehension removes from whatever is projected precisely its character as possibility, drops it down into being a given, an assumed inventory—whereas projection, in its casting ahead, draws the possibility before itself as a possibility [not as a plan], and lets it be as such. As a projecting, understanding is the manner in which being-there has its being—a way in which it is its possibilities, and these as possibilities.

On the basis of this manner of being, one constituted by the existential we call projection, being-there is constantly “more” than it factually is—supposing one wanted, supposing one could make an inventory of it as an on-hand being. But it is never more than it factually is—because its ability-to-be belongs to its facticity. Then too, being-there is never less than its facticity; i.e., whatever it is is not yet in its ability-to-be, it is existentially. And only because the being of the there

---

§31. Being-there as Understanding

understood it. As such understanding, it “knows” where it’s going, i.e. wherein its ability-to-be lies. This “knowing” does not first grow out of an immanent self-perception; rather, it belongs to the being of the there—which is essentially understanding. And only because being-there is understood is there can it go wrong and fail to recognize things. In its ability-to-be, then, it is entrusted to its possibility—entrusted to find itself all over again in its possibilities.

Understanding is the existential being of the ability-to-be that belongs to being-there itself as its own—and this in such a way that this existential being discloses in itself the “where it’s going” belonging to the being of being-there. We must now apprehend more sharply the structure of this existential.

As a disclosing, understanding always bears on the whole basic constitution of being-in-world. As ability-to-be, being-in is in each instance an ability-to-be-in-world. World is not merely, qua world, disclosed as possible signification; rather, the release of inner-worldly beings sets these beings free in their possibilities. At-hand beings are uncovered as such in their ability to render service, be used, cause harm.

The wholeness of the binding unveils itself as the categorical whole of a possibility lurking in the interconnection of at-hand beings. But even the “unity” of manifold on-hand beings, the unity we call “nature,” only becomes discoverable on the basis of the disclosedness of a possibility lurking in it. Is it an accident that the question about the being of nature focuses on the “conditions of its possibility”? Where does such questioning find its foothold? Out of respect for this questioning, another question cannot be avoided: Why are beings not taking their measure from being-there understood in their being if they are disclosed in regard to the conditions of their possibility? Kant presupposes as much, perhaps correctly. But this presupposition is one we can least of all leave uncertified in its correctness.

Why does understanding always press into possibilities—whatever the essential dimensions of what is disclosable in it? It is because understanding has in itself the existential structure we call projection. Understanding projects the being of being-there just as equi-primordially onto its for-the-sake-of-which as onto the signification, i.e. the worldliness of its particular world. This character of projection belonging to understanding constitutes being-in-world in regard to the disclosedness of its there as the there of an ability-to-be. Projection is the existential constitution of the space in which a factual ability-to-be can play itself out—it is the way this space, this play, has its being. And as thrown being-there, being-there is injected into this projecting as its own manner of being. Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself within a plan already thought out, a plan according to which being-there might arrange itself; rather, as being-there, it has in each instance already projected itself, and is—so long as it is—projectingly. Being-there understands itself always already—and always will, so long as it is—from possibilities. The character of projection belonging to understanding entails also this: understanding does not itself thematically apprehend that onto which it projects, namely the possibilities. Such apprehension removes from whatever is projected precisely its character as possibility, drops it down into being a given, an assumed inventory—whereas projection, in its casting ahead, draws the possibility before itself as a possibility [not as a plan], and lets it be as such. As a projecting, understanding is the manner in which being-there has its being—a way in which it is its possibilities, and these as possibilities.

On the basis of this manner of being, one constituted by the existential we call projection, being-there is constantly “more” than it factually is—supposing one wanted, supposing one could make an inventory of it as an on-hand being. But it is never more than it factually is—because its ability-to-be belongs to its facticity. Then too, being-there is never less than its facticity; i.e., whatever it is is not yet in its ability-to-be, it is existentially. And only because the being of the there
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

is constituted by understanding and by its character of projection — because it is what it becomes (or does not become) — can it say to itself understandably: “Become what you are!”

Projection always bears on the entire disclosedness of being-in-world; as ability-to-be, understanding itself has possibilities that are prefigured by the range of what is disclosable in it. Understanding can settle down primarily into the disclosedness of world, i.e. being-there can understand itself initially and mostly from its world. Or then again, understanding can cast itself primarily into the for-the-sake-of-which, i.e. being-there can ex-sist as itself. Understanding takes either authentic form, one springing from its own self, as such, or inauthentic form. The “in-” of inauthentic does not imply that being-there is cut off from its self and “only” understands its world. World belongs to its being-a-self as being-in-world. Both authentic understanding and inauthentic understanding can turn be either genuine or ingenuine.* As ability-to-be, understanding is thoroughly permeated by possibility. Inserting oneself into one of those basic possibilities of understanding, one does not get rid of the other. Precisely because understanding in each instance bears on the entire disclosedness of being-there as being-in-world, any self-insertion taking shape in understanding is an existential modification of

a But who are “you”? You are as the one that you cast away — and, as this one, you become. [Nietzsche repeatedly remarks that one must, and can only, become the one that one already is (e.g., The Gay Science, §270; Human, All Too Human I, §263; Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book Four, “The Honey Sacrifice”). Heidegger’s qualification resonates also with the New Testament: to find yourself you must lose yourself (Matthew, 10:39 & 16:25).]

b But not qua subject and individual, or qua person. [Heidegger is ever more intent on underscoring the distinction between selfhood in the sense of agency, individuality or personality, and “selfhood” in the sense of the fulfillment of the “situation” in which agency, individuality and personality — as well as such “shared” phenomena as community, landscape and institutions — might have their place.]

* While Heidegger elaborates on authentic vs. inauthentic understanding, he nowhere analyzes how these can be either genuine or ingenuine. Yet the distinction recurs — e.g. on p. 148 we are asked to turn toward the “inauthentic understanding” (of world) in the “mode of its genuineness.” And on p. 169 we read that “every genuine understanding, interpretation, communication, rediscovery and renewed appropriation” unfolds “in and from and against the everyday interpretation already in force.”

§31. Being-there as Understanding

projection as a whole. In the understanding of world, being-in is always co-understood; understanding of ex-sistence as ex-sistence is always an understanding of world.

As a factual being, being-there has in each instance already transposed its ability-to-be into one possibility of understanding.

In its character of projection, understanding constitutes existentially what we call the vision belonging to being-there. Subsisting existentially along with the disclosedness of the there, this vision is being-there — equi-primordially so, according to the basic manners with which we have already characterized its being: as the circumspection embedded in taking care of things, as the consideration embedded in caring for others, as the envisioning of its own being, i.e. that for the sake of which it in each instance is what it is. The vision that bears primarily and as a whole on ex-sistence we call transparency. We choose this term to designate what normally goes under the name “self-knowledge” in order to indicate that the issue here is not a perception consisting of tracking down and looking at a point where the self can be found, but rather an understanding consisting of grasping the entirety of being-in-world by seeing through the essential factors constituting it. A being that is ex-sistingly only “sights” itself inasmuch as it has become transparent to itself equi-primordially in its being engaged in a world and in its being with others, these being the constitutive factors of its ex-sistence.

Conversely, the opacity of being-there is rooted neither solely nor primarily in “ego-centric” self-deception; it is rooted just as much in a failure to recognize the world.

The expression “vision” must, of course, be protected from a misunderstanding. It corresponds to the cleared-ness that we characterized [on p. 133] the disclosedness of the there to be. Such “seeing” does not only not mean the perception effected by the bodily eyes; it also does not mean the pure non-sensory perception of an on-hand being in its on-hand-ness. For the existential meaning of vision, we lay claim only to one peculiarity of seeing: that it lets those beings accessible to it arise for encounter as they are in themselves — as not covered over. Of course, each of the “senses” does this within its own intrinsic range of discovery. However, from the beginning, the tradition of philosophy takes its orientation from “seeing” as the manner in which it gains access to beings and to their being. To keep the connection with this tradition, we can formalize vision and seeing so broadly that we thereby obtain a
universal term characterizing as an access every single access to beings and to being.

By showing how all vision is grounded primarily in understanding—the circumspection essential to taking care of things is understanding in the form of intelligibility—we strip from pure intuition its primacy. Noetically, this primacy corresponds to the traditional primacy of on-hand beings.* Both “intuition” and “thinking”\(^a\) are already distant derivates of understanding. The phenomenological “intuition of essences” is also grounded in existential understanding. About this latter kind of seeing we can rightly make a judgement only when we have obtained the explicit concepts of being and its structures. It is only as these concepts that phenomena in the phenomenological sense emerge.\(^1\)

The disclosedness of the there in understanding is itself a manner in which the ability-to-be of being-there unfolds. In the projectedness of its being both onto the for-the-sake-of-which and onto signification (world), there lies a disclosedness of being in general.\(^b\) In this projecting onto possibilities, an understanding of being is already anticipated. In projection, being is understood,\(^c\) it is not ontologically conceived. Those beings having their being in the manner of an essential projection of

---

\(^a\) Heidegger here refers to the phenomenological intuition (of essences) proposed by Husserl. See p. 138, the comments on “pure intuiting.”

\(^1\) A rather strong statement of the circularity into which Heidegger’s account intends to move us. Cf. pp. 7-8, 152-153, 314-316.

\(^b\) How does disclosedness “lie” in this [double projectedness: onto both signification and “who it’s for”]? And what does being here mean? [Heidegger recognizes the prematurity of his original sentence, which only seemingly justifies his oft-repeated claim that “understanding of being” is already “built into” being-there—here, into projection.]

\(^c\) This does not mean that being “comes” by the grace of projection. [Rather, the other way around: projection “comes” from the draw of being.]
understood — understands it as something now understood. In interpretation, understanding does not become something else; rather, it becomes itself. Interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; understanding does not result from interpretation. Interpretation does not consist in taking note of something on hand; rather, it is the elaboration of the possibilities projected in understanding. In keeping with the train of our preparatory analyses of everyday being-there, we now pursue the phenomenon of interpretation by turning to the understanding of world — to the inauthentic understanding of it, yet in the mode of its genuineness.

It is from the signification disclosed in the understanding of world that our being near to at-hand beings, taking care of them, allows us to understand what sort of bound-up-ness can pertain to whatever it is that arises for encounter. Circumspection uncovers ...: this means that the “world” already understood gets interpreted. What is at hand enters explicitly into vision that understands. Every preparing of things, setting them aright, improving and supplementing them is an accomplishment proceeding in the following manner: beings circumspectly at hand are “taken apart” in the [complexity of their] in-order-to — and taken care of in the “taken-apart-ness” that thereby becomes visible. What has been “taken apart” in such circumspection of its in-order-to — what has now been understood explicitly as taken apart — has the structure of something as something. To the circumspective question what this determinate at-hand being might be, the circumspectly interpretive answer is: it is for ... Stating what it is for does not simply name something; rather, the named being is understood as that as which the thing in question is to be taken. Whatever has been disclosed in understanding — this now as understood — is always already accessible in such a way that, from it, its “as what” can be explicitly extracted. This “as” makes up the structure of the explicitness of what has been understood; it constitutes the interpretation. Dealings, circumspective and interpretive, with circum-worldly at-hand beings — dealings “seeing” these beings as tables, doors, cars, bridges — need not necessarily also take what has been circumspectly interpreted and “lay it all out” into a determinative assertion. The sheer pre-predicative seeing of beings at hand already, in itself, understands and interprets. But does not the absence of this “as” constitute the sheerness of a pure perception of something? The seeing embedded within this vision is in each instance already understanding and interpreting. It contains within itself the explicitness of the referential relations (the explicitness of the in-order-to) belonging to the wholeness of binding through which what arises sheerly for encounter is understood. Articulation of what is understood — the joining back together occurring in the interpretive bringing-near of beings that follows the guideline of the “something as something” — comes before any thematic assertion about it. In an assertion there does not first emerge the “as”; rather, the “as” here only gets expressed, which is only possible if and when it is available to be expressed. That the explicitness of an assertion may be absent when we simply look on at things does not justify claiming that this sheer looking-on does not involve articulative interpretation, and so does not involve the as-structure either. Sheer seeing of the things nearest to us in our having to do with them: this bears within itself the interpretive structure so primordially that precisely to apprehend something as, so to speak, free of the as requires a certain re-adjustment on our part. When we merely stare at something, this having-it-merely-before-us comes before us as a no-longer-understanding-it. This as-free apprehension is a privation of the seeing that sheerly understands: it is not more primordial than such understanding, it is rather derived from it. That this “as” remains ontically unstated should not mislead us into overlooking it as an a priori existential constitution of understanding.

But if every perception of at-hand instruments is already understanding and interpreting — already lets something arise for circumspective encounter as something — does that then not imply exactly this: experienced first is a being purely on hand, one that is then taken as a door, as a house? This would be to misunderstand the specific disclosive function of interpretation. It does not, as it were, cast a “significance” onto naked on-hand beings, it does not glue value onto them; rather, for each inner-worldly being arising for encounter there is already a bound-up-ness disclosed in world-understanding, and it is this being-bound-up that is “laid out” in the interpretation.

At-hand beings are always already understood from out of a wholeness of being-bound-up. This wholeness need not be explicitly grasped by a thematic interpretation. Even when it is permeated by such an interpretation, it recedes once again back into an unextracted intelligibility. And precisely in this [unextracted] mode the wholeness of being-bound-up is the essential foundation of everyday circumspect interpretation. Interpretation is grounded in a pre-having. In its being-toward a wholeness of being-bound-up that is already understood (and
In his 1935 "Origin of the Work of Art" (cf. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 26), Heidegger illustrates world-bound perception: In the appearing of things, we initially never really perceive, as the [empiricist] account claims, a throng of objects, each an individual thing, but rather a throng of pure sounds, each a mere sound. To hear a pure sound we must listen away from the thing, divert our ears from it, i.e. listen abstractly. See also the last paragraph on p. 163. This account has inspired much "phenomenology of perception" (e.g., Maurice Merleau-Ponty's). The pre-structural, pre-interpretive character of interpretation roughly parallels that of intellectuality investigation (cf. p. 5 above); taken together, these accounts have also inspired much "phenomenology of text-interpretation" (e.g., Hans-Georg Gadamer's).

How is the character of this "pre-" to be conceived? Is it enough to say formally that it is "a priori"? Why does this structure belong to understanding — to what we now recognize as a fundamental existential of being-there? How does this structure of the "as," the one belonging to what is interpreted itself, relate to the structure belonging to understanding? This phenomenon is manifestly not one we can break down into "pieces." But does that then exclude analyzing it primordially? Should we consider such phenomena as "ultimates"? If so, we would have to ask why. Or do the pre-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation reveal an existential-ontological connection with the phenomenon of projection? And does this phenomenon point back to a primordial constitution of being-there, a way it has its being?

Before we answer these questions (the foregoing analysis falls way short of equipping us for answering them) we must investigate whether what has become visible as the pre-structure of understanding the as-structure of interpretation does not already present us with a unitary phenomenon — a phenomenon abundantly employed in considerations of philosophical problems without the primordiality of ontological explication that should accompany such universal usage.

In the projection essential to understanding, beings are disclosed in their possibilities. This character of possibility corresponds in each instance to the manner in which the beings that are in their possibilities are disclosed. This character of possibility corresponds in each instance to the manner in which the beings that are in their possibilities are disclosed. When an inner-worldly being is uncovered along with the being of being-there, i.e. when it comes into an understanding, we say that it makes sense — has meaning. But, strictly speaking, what is understood is not the meaning but rather the being, or its being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something gets held. What is articulable in the course of the disclosing and its understanding: this we call meaning. The concept of meaning embraces the formal framework of whatever necessarily belongs to anything interpretation articulates understandingly. Meaning is that upon which projection projects: it is the upon-which (structured by pre-having, pre-seeing and pre-ceiving) allowing each something to become intelligible as something. Inasmuch as understanding and interpretation make up the existential constitution of the being of the there, meaning must be conceived as the formal-
existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding. Meaning is an existential of being-there, it is not a property either adhering to a being, lying “behind” it, or floating somewhere as a “realm between.” Only being-there “makes sense”—and it does so inasmuch as the disclosedness of being-in-world can be “filled full” by the beings uncoverable within it. It is therefore only being-there that can be meaningful or meaningless. This implies: its own being, as well as the beings that are disclosed along with its being, can either be appropriated in an understanding or remain withheld in a non-understanding.*

If we hold fast to this fundamental, ontological-existential interpretation of the concept of “meaning” we must conceive as unmeaning those beings not having their being the way being-there does—as essentially bare of meaning. Here, “unmeaning” signifies no value judgement, it simply expresses an ontological determination. And only what is unmeaning can be senseless. As arising for encounter within being-there, on-hand beings can, as it were, collide with the being of being-there—e.g., natural occurrences can break in and destroy [i.e., be “senseless”].

And, if we raise a question about the meaning of being, our investigation does not worry about deep meanings, does not ruminate on anything standing behind being; rather, it unquestioningly addresses itself directly to being itself inasmuch as it protrudes itself into the intelligibility essential to being-there.† The meaning of being can never be contrasted with beings—or with being construed as a “ground” supporting beings, since “ground” only becomes accessible as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.

As the disclosedness of the there, understanding always bears on the whole of being-in-world. In every understanding of world, ex-sistence is co-understood, and vice versa. Moreover, every interpretation moves within the pre-structure we have characterized. Every interpretation that intends to provide an understanding has to have already understood what is being interpreted. This fact has always been recognized, if only in the area of derivative manners of understanding and interpreting—in philosophical interpretation. Philological work belongs to the range of scientific cognition. Cognition of this sort requires a rigor of justificatory demonstration. Scientific proof is not permitted to presuppose whatever it is supposed to justify. If, then, interpretation must in each instance already move within what is understood, thereby obtaining its nourishment, how can it ever fructify scientific results without moving in a circle—especially if the particular understanding presupposed is one moving within our shared recognitions regarding man and world? According to the most elementary rules of logic, such a circle is a circulus vitiosus. So the business of historiographical interpretation is banned a priori from the domain of rigorous cognition. If this factum of the circle in understanding cannot be removed, historiography [it seems] must settle for less rigorous possibilities of cognition. One allows it to call upon the “spiritual significance” of its “objects” to compensate somewhat for this defect. But of course it would be more ideal, also in the opinion of historiographers themselves, if the circle could be avoided, and if there were hope for someday creating an historiography that would be just as independent of the observer’s standpoint as the cognition of nature supposedly is.

Yet to see in this circle a vitiosum, and to look for ways of avoiding it—even to “feel” it as an unavoidable imperfection—is to misunderstand right from the start. It is not a question of adapting understanding and interpretation to a determinate ideal of cognition—an ideal that is merely a sub-variety of understanding, and one that has wandered off into the legitimate task of accounting for on-hand beings in their essential unintelligibility. Satisfying the basic conditions of possible interpretation consists rather in not at the outset misconstruing it in regard to the essential conditions whereby it can be done. What is decisive is

---

* This paragraph sets the reader up for a manifold of further reflections, both of “logical” and of “existential” purport. The basic phenomenon is “things making sense” (things make “little or no sense” only against the background of “making sense”). Strictly speaking, we understand beings directly (how and that they are), whereas this understanding is embraced by the signification of a referential context (a world), so that each item arising for encounter signifies something else—ties in with other items (in a local “binding”: p. 87). So we are asked to distinguish logically between meaning and signification. Furthermore, only being-there can be full or empty of meaning: but any fullness will come about only as what arises for encounter itself provides the “filling”—if only we “take it as our own”: thus Heidegger will later speak of “the nothingness of world” (e.g., pp. 276-7 and 343).

† Cf. Aristotle’s On the Heavens, 294 b 10: one who is to enquire will must be enstatic (ἐνστατικόν) in keeping with what is intimately enstatic within the field under investigation: one must stand up to what stands out—in express contrast to accounting for objections leveled either by others or by oneself.
not to get out of the circle, but rather to get into it in the right manner. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which some particular variety of cognition moves, it is rather the expression of the existential pre-structure of being-there itself. The circle is not to be dragged down to the level of a vitiosum, not even to one that is tolerated. In it there lies buried a positive possibility of primordial cognition — a possibility that, of course, can only be conceived in a genuine manner when interpretation has understood that its first, its constant, and its ultimate task is not to let, in each instance, pre-having, pre-seeing, and pre-ceiving be pre-given to it by fancies and popular conceptions, and rather to secure its scientific theme in the course of elaborating these three from the matter itself. Because, in keeping with its existential meaning, understanding is the ability-to-be of being-there itself, the ontological presuppositions of historiographical cognition exceed at their foundations the idea of rigor in the most exact of sciences. Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiography, it is only more narrow in regard to the range of the existential foundations that are relevant for it.

The “circle” essential to understanding belongs to the structure of meaning. This latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of being-there — in interpretative understanding. A being for which, as being-in-world, its own being is at issue has an ontological structure of circularity. However, one must be careful to avoid characterizing ontologically anything like being-there with the phenomenon of “circle” in the sense that this term has when applied to the way on-hand beings have their being (constant inventory).

§33. Assertion as a Derived Mode of Interpretation

Every interpretation is grounded in understanding. What in interpretation has been articulated [joined at the joints], and has overall been prefigured in understanding as articulable [joinable], is meaning. Inasmuch as an assertion (a “judgement”) is grounded in understanding, presenting and enacting a derived form of interpretation, it too “has” a meaning. However, this meaning cannot be defined as something “about” a judgement that accompanies the rendering of it. In the present context, the explicit analysis of assertion serves several purposes.

For one thing, a consideration of assertion allows us to demonstrate in what way the “as”-structure constituting understanding and interpretation is modifiable. In doing this, we bring understanding and interpretation into a sharper focus. Then too, the analysis of assertion has a pre-eminent place within the problematic of fundamental ontology, since in the decisive beginnings of ancient ontology λόγος served as the sole guideline for accessing beings as they really are, and for determining the being of these beings. And finally, ever since ancient times assertion has been considered to be the primary, the authentic “locus” of truth. The phenomenon of truth is so closely connected with the problem of being that in the course of the present investigation we will have to face the problem of truth head on. Indeed, our investigation is already caught in its sway. The analysis of assertion should prepare us for this problematic as well.

In what follows we ascribe three significances to the term “assertion”; they are drawn from the phenomenon so designated, they hang together, and in their unity they delimit the full structure of assertion:

1. Assertion signifies primarily pointing out. We thereby keep to the primordial and original meaning of λόγος as ἀποφανσίς — letting beings be seen from themselves. In the assertion, “The hammer is too heavy,” what is uncovered for vision is not a “meaning” but rather a being — in the manner of its at-hand-ness. Even if it is not within reaching distance, not “visibly” near, the pointing bears on this one being.

---

\(^a\) But this “its own being” is in itself determined by an understanding of being — i.e. by a standing-in within the clearing of presence — whereby neither the clearing as such nor the presence as such is [rightly] represented thematically. [On presence, cf. pp. 105 (marginalia on nearness and presence), 235 (on presencing, arrival, and event of “coming into its own”), and 320 (on “presence” as what constantly accompanies changing phenomena).]

\(^*\) In The Question Concerning Technology (1977), this term (translated as “standing-reserve”: p. 17) takes on special meaning; here only adumbrated: modernity commits itself to understanding “what’s real out there” first of all as “stock” for public projects. Already in Being and Time Heidegger detects in the ancient concern for “constancy in nature” a preparation for this modern commitment, and argues that it is ontologically derivative.

\(^*\) Cf. pp. 32 for Heidegger’s first account of “apophantical talk”: In talk (ἀποφανσίς) that is genuine, what is said will be drawn from what is talked about, so that any talked communication will, in what it says, make manifest, and therefore accessible to others, what it talks about.
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

198

In the initial fullness of a circumworld, each being swarms with others, dazzling us. Assertion dims down one being ... 138: “Theoretical looking-on has always already dimmed the world down to the uniformity of things purely on hand...”

Especially in German idealism (Hegel, ...) “positing” is the term describing the basic act of intelligence: we make sense of things by “positioning” them, and logical analysis highlights the intricacies of this act. Corresponding to the Latin-based word is the Greek θέσις, from which we derive our English “theme” and “thesis.”

2. Assertion enacts something like predication. A “predicate” is “asserted” of a “subject”: the first determines the second. In this significance of assertion, what is asserted is not really the predicate, but rather “the hammer itself.” In contrast, what does the asserting, i.e. the determining, lies in the “too heavy.” In this second significance of assertion, what is asserted, what gets determined, has its content narrowed down in comparison with the what-is-asserted arising in the first significance of this term. There, predication is what it is only as pointing out [the hammer]. The second significance of assertion has its foundation in the first. The two members of a predicative articulation — subject and predicate — grow up within the pointing-out. The determining does not first of all uncover; as a mode of pointing out, it initially functions precisely to limit seeing to what shows itself as such — to the hammer — in order, by this explicit limitation of the direction of our looking, to make explicitly manifest, in its determinateness, what manifests itself. In regard to what is already manifest — to the “too-heavy” hammer — the determining initially moves back a step: the “positing of the subject” dims the being down to “that hammer there” so that its de-dazzling can let what is manifest be seen in its determinable determinateness.

Positing a subject, positing a predicate, and positing them together: these acts are thoroughly “apophantic” in the strict sense of the word.

3. Assertion signifies communication, saying something to others. As communication, assertion relates directly to assertion in the first two meanings. It lets others see what gets pointed out — by way of...

---

* In the initial fullness of a circumworld, each being swarms with others, dazzling us. Assertion dims down one being (separates it from the swarm) so that it can appear in focus by itself; it dispels the initial dazzle, but also suppresses its world. In contrast, the best of all talking retains the fullness, making it transparent. Cf. p. 138: “Theoretical looking-on has always already dimmed the world down to the uniformity of things purely on hand...”

† Especially in German idealism (Hegel, ...), “positing” is the term describing the basic act of intelligence: we make sense of things by “positioning” them, and logical analysis highlights the intricacies of this act. Corresponding to the Latin-based word is the Greek θέσις, from which we derive our English “theme” and “thesis.”

§33. Assertion as a Derived Mode of Interpretation

199

determining it. Such co-letting-see shares with others whatever, in its determinedness, gets pointed out. What is “shared” is being-toward what gets pointed out, this being-toward as a seeing in common, one that must be held fast as being-in-world — namely, in that world from which what gets pointed out arises for encounter. To assertion (understood existentially now as com-communication) belongs out-spoken-ness. In communicative form, what gets asserted is something the one asserting can “share” with others without these others themselves having, in reach and in visible range, the beings pointed out and determined. What gets asserted can be “passed on.” The scope of shared seeing, of sharing with one another, broadens. Simultaneously, though, what gets pointed out can, in its being passed on, become once again veiled over; yet even the knowledge and familiarity growing out of such hear-say always has the beings themselves in view and is not just “affirming” a “commonly accepted meaning” that is getting passed around. Hear-say, too, is a being-in-world, a being-toward what is getting heard.

The theory of judgement that, nowadays, takes its orientation from the phenomenon of “validity,” is not something we shall here discuss at any length.* It is enough to indicate the many ways in which this phenomenon of “validity” is questionable — a phenomenon that, since Lotze, † is generally claimed to be so “basic” that it cannot be traced any further back. It is only thanks to its ontological unclarity that it can assume such a role. No less opaque is the “problematic” that has settled around the idolization of this word. [1] For one thing, validity means the “form” of actuality enjoyed by the content of the judgement inasmuch as it persists unchanged relative to the changeable “psychical” process of judgement. Given the overall condition of the question of being that we characterized in the Introduction, we can hardly expect that this “validity” (as “ideal being”) is distinguished by any special ontological clarity. [2] Then, too, validity has the sense of the validity of the meaning of a judgement — that the judgement holds for its...

* Logic textbooks in English often confine “validity” to the question whether premisses “really generate” a proposed conclusion. In the broader modern European tradition, “validity” covers every question regarding whether a configuration (proposition, theory, ...) “holds up.” In any case, the “nowadays” of this theory of judgement is now bygone — but not the passion for formulating “what holds up.”

† Rudolf Hermann Lotze, 1817-1881, German philosopher and logician.
intended “object” — and in this way it shifts into the significance of “objective validity,” or just plain objectivity. [3] Furthermore, the meaning that “holds” of beings in this way, and is in itself “timeless,” again “holds” in the sense of holding for every rational being who judges. Valid here means obligatory: “universally valid.” If one goes on to advocate a “critical” epistemology (according to which the “subject” does not “really” attain to the object “outside itself”), validity understood as what holds of the object (as objectivity) is based in the constant inventory of true (!) meaning that is itself valid.* — These three significances of “validity” (as a kind of ideal being, as objectivity, and as obligatoriness) are not only opaque in themselves, they constantly meld themselves into one another. Methodological caution requires that we do not choose such shimmering concepts to guide our own interpretation. The concept of meaning we shall not restrict right off to its significance as the “content of judgement”; rather, we understand it as the existential phenomenon already characterized [on p. 151], the phenomenon wherein the formal framework of what is disclosable in understanding and articulable in interpreting becomes visible overall.

Gathering the three significances of “assertion” into a unitary view of the full phenomenon, we arrive at its definition: **Assertion is a pointing-out that communicates and determines.** We still have to ask: By what right can we take assertion as a mode of interpretation at all? If this is indeed what assertion is, the essential structures of interpretation must recur in it. The pointing-out effected by an assertion proceeds on the basis of what has already been disclosed (or circumspectly uncovered) in understanding. An assertion is not a free-floating comportment, one that would be at all able to disclose beings on its own; rather, it always maintains itself on the basis of being-in-world. What was earlier shown in relation to world-cognition holds no less for assertion. [1] It stands in need of a pre-having of what has been disclosed overall, this being what an assertion points out by way of determining what it is. [2] Furthermore, in this endeavor to determine, there already lies a directed view onto what is to be asserted. In the performance of the determination, the function of the one doing it is to take over that upon which the pre-given being is drawn into focus. **Assertion stands in need of a pre-seeing in which the predicate — implicitly enclosed in the being itself and now to be brought out and applied — gets loosened up, so to speak.** [3] As a communication determining a being, there belongs to each assertion an articulation of what is pointed out, an articulation structured by significance. Assertion moves within a determinate conceptuality: “The hammer is heavy” or “Heaviness applies to the hammer” or “The hammer has the property of heaviness.” Such pre-seeing always co-lurks in an assertion, although for the most part it remains inconspicuous because the language in which it happens to be formulated already contains within itself a developed conceptuality. As any interpretation, assertion necessarily has its existential foundations in pre-having, pre-seeing, and pre-seeing.

But in what respect does assertion become a derived mode of interpretation? What has been modified in it? This modification we can point out by attending carefully to limiting cases of assertion, ones that, in logic, serve as normal cases and prime examples of the “simplest” phenomena of assertion. What logic asks us to focus on under the heading of categorical proposition — e.g., “the hammer is heavy” — this has itself already been “logically” understood, prior to any analysis. Without any examination, it presupposes the “meaning” of the proposition to be: this thing we call hammer has the property of heaviness. There are no such assertions “right away” in heedful circumspection. Indeed, though, circumspection does have its own specific manners of interpretation, ones that (in relation to the “theoretical judgement” just cited) could be formulated to read: “This hammer’s too heavy” or even “Too heavy — gimme the other hammer.” The primordial performance of the interpretation lies not in a theoretical proposition, but rather in setting the inappropriate tool aside, or exchanging it for another — all within a circumspect taking-care, and “without wasting words.” From the lack of words we should not infer a lack of interpretation. On the other hand, a circumspectly out-spoken interpretation is not necessarily already an assertion in the sense defined [on p. 156]. **By what existential-ontological modification does assertion emerge out of circumspect interpretation?**

The being held in pre-having, e.g. the hammer, is initially at hand

---

* An example of circularity “in the sense that this term has when applied to the way on-hand beings have their being (constant inventory)”; p. 153 above.

1 Cf. §13, pp. 59 ff.
as a tool. Should this being become the “object” of an assertion, a radical change in the pre-having is effected in advance, already with the propositional form. The at-hand with-ness built into having to do with things, into bringing affairs to completion, becomes the about-ness essential to an assertion pointing it out. Pre-seeing now aims for what is on hand “about” what is at hand. This just-seeing, looking-on, veils the at-hand being as at hand. Within this un-covering of on-hand-ness (one covering up at-hand-ness), the on-hand being arising for encounter gets determined in its being on hand in such-and-such a way. It is only now that an opening occurs through which there is access to anything like properties. Whatever it is as which the assertion determines the on-hand being to be: this is drawn from the on-hand being as on hand. The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is being understood, the “as” no longer reaches out into the wholeness of a being-bound up. In regard to its possibilities of articulation as stemming from referential relations, it is cut off from the significature constituting circum-worldliness. The “as” gets forced back onto the uniform level of beings merely on hand. It sinks into being the structure of the kind of merely-letting-be-seen of on-hand beings, a kind that determines them. This leveling-down of the primordial “as” of circumspect interpretation to the “as” of determining beings in their on-hand-ness: here is the virtue of assertion. Only in this way does assertion attain to the possibility of exhibiting something so that we just look at it.

Thus assertion cannot disown its ontological provenance from the interpretation essential to understanding. The primordial “as” of the interpretation (ἐρμηνεία) arising in circumspect understanding we call the existential-hermeneutic “as” — in contrast to the apophantic “as” at work in assertion.

Between the interpretation still wrapped up and veiled over in heedful understanding, and the extreme counter-case of a theoretical assertion about on-hand beings, there are many intermediate gradations: assertions about what’s happening in the environment, portrayals of things at hand, “reports on the situation,” the recording and settling of “the facts of the case,” description of situations, narration of incidents. Such “statements” are not reducible to theoretical propositions without an essential distortion of their meaning. They have their “origin” in circumspect interpretation, just as these others do.

With the progress of cognition regarding the structure of λογος, it was inevitable that this phenomenon of the apophantic “as” would come into view in some form or other. The manner in which it was at first seen is not accidental, and it could not but have had an effect on the subsequent history of logic.

In philosophical considerations, λογος itself is a being and, according to the orientation of ancient ontology, an on-hand being. Words are first of all on hand, i.e. findable the way things are found, and so is any sequence of words as that in which a λογος is verbalized. This first search for the structure of such on-hand λογος finds a multiplicity of words on hand together. What accounts for the unity of this togetherness? As Plato knew, this unity lies in the nature of λογος: it is always λογος τινος — an account of something. In view of the being manifested in λογος, words are put together to form one word-whole. Aristotle looked more to the roots: every λογος is both συνθεσις and διαιρεσις — not just the one (synthesis as a “positive judgement”) or the other (division as a “negative judgement”). Every assertion, whether it affirms or denies, whether it is true or false, is equi-primordially συνθεσις and διαιρεσις. The demonstration of something involves both putting it together and taking it apart. Yet Aristotle did not push the analytical question to the point of seeing the problem: Which phenomenon within the structure of λογος permits and requires every assertion to be characterized as synthesis and diairesis?

What needs to be phenomenally accounted for in the formal structures of “connecting” and “separating” — more exactly: in the unity of these — is the phenomenon of the “something as something.” In keeping with this structure, anything is understood in regard to something else — in taking the one together with the other, and in such a way that this confronting (that understands) at once takes apart — interprets — the elements taken together (articulated). Should this phenomenon of the “as” remain concealed — above all, should it remain veiled in its existential origin within the hermeneutical “as” — then Aristotle’s phenomenological approach to the analysis of λογος collapses into a superficial “theory of judgement” where judging is a connecting or separating of representations and concepts.*

* Heidegger's formulation anticipates a hermeneutic principle of reading: readers “always already” inherit an understanding of what they are reading about (e.g. “traditional logic” or “Christianity”), and whether what they read is “true”
Connecting and separating then invite further formalization to become a “relating.” In logistic,* judgement is dissolved into a system of “attributions”—it becomes the “object” of “calculation” but not a theme of ontological interpretation. At any one time, the possibility or impossibility of an analytic understanding of σύνθεσις and διάρρηξις—of “relation” in judgement overall—is tightly bound up with the state of the fundamental ontological problematic.

Just how much this problematic works itself into the interpretation of λόγος—and, in reverse, just how much the concept of “judgement,” in a remarkable rebound, works itself into the ontological problematic—is shown by the phenomenon of the copula. In this “linkage” it comes to light that the synthesis-structure is approached from the outset as self-evident, and that it has also retained the function of setting the standard for interpretation. But if the formal characteristics of “relation” and “connection” can contribute nothing phenomenally to the structural analysis of λόγος to show how it actually works, then in the end the phenomenon termed “copula” has nothing to do with linkage or connection. For then the “is,” along with the interpretation of it (whether the “is” be expressed linguistically all by itself, or indicated in a verbal suffix), leads into the whole problem of existential analysis—assuming that assertion and some understanding of being are essential possibilities of being-there itself. The elaboration of the question of being (cf. Part One, Division Three†) will once again encounter this peculiar phenomenon of being within λόγος.

The point of showing the derivation of assertion from interpretation and understanding was only to make it clear, in a provisional fashion, that the “logic” of λόγος is rooted in the existential analysis of being-there. The recognition that the [traditional] interpretation of λόγος has been ontologically inadequate also sharpens our insight into the non-primordiality of the methodological basis on which ancient ontology has grown. Here, λόγος gets experienced as an on-hand being and is interpreted accordingly, whereupon the being it points out has the meaning of on-hand-ness. This meaning of being does not get contrasted with other essential possibilities, and remains undifferentiated—with the immediate result that being in the sense of formal being-something melds with it, without the possibility of achieving even a purely regional partition of the two.*

§34. Being-there and Talk. Language
The fundamental existentials constituting the being of the there and the disclosedness of being-in-world are: attunement and understanding. In understanding there is contained the possibility of interpretation, the appropriation of what is understood. Inasmuch as attunement is equi-primordial with understanding, it maintains itself within some one understanding. And so too, there corresponds to attunement a certain interpretability. With assertion, then, we made visible an extreme derivate of interpretation. And the clarification of the third significance of assertion as communication (saying something to others) led us into the concept of saying and speaking, a concept so far left intentionally unconceived. That it is only now that language becomes a theme should serve as a forewarning that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of the disclosure essential to being-there. The existential-ontological foundation of language is talk. Already in the course of our interpretation of attunement, understanding, interpretation and assertion, we have constantly made use of this phenomenon of talk

* Husserl [This is Heidegger’s judgement on Husserl: he melds being-on-hand and being-something (a special case of the conflation of being and beings: of the event of fullness and the determinations we make of it—in Aristotelian terms, of subject and predicate, οὐσία and ὄν.)]
- suppressing it, as it were, in the thematic analysis.

Talk is existentially equi-primordial with attunement and understanding. Even prior to any appropriative interpretation, intelligibility is already joined together. Talk is the articulation [joining, jointedness] of intelligibility. It therefore already lies at the foundations of interpretation and assertion. What is articulable in interpretation, all the more primordially now in talk, we called meaning. Whatever it is that, in a talking articulation, is joined together: this we call the significant whole. This whole can get dissolved into significances. As what is joined together in what is articulable, significances are always meaningful. If now talk, the articulation of the intelligibility of the there, is a primordial existential of disclosedness, and if this latter is primarily constituted by being-in-world, talk must essentially have a specifically worldly kind of being. The attuned intelligibility of being-in-world ex-presses itself as talk. The significant whole essential to intelligibility takes the floor. To significances words accrue. It is not the case that word-things get equipped with significances.

Language [any one language] is talk having become out-spoken [into hearing/speaking]. As that in which talk has its own “worldly” being, this word-whole [vocabulary] becomes available as an inner-worldly being in the manner that at-hand beings do. It can be broken down into on-hand things — “words.” Existentially, talk is [some one] language because the one being whose disclosedness it articulates in its meanings has its being as a thrown and “world”-dependent being-in-world.\(^a\)

As an existential constitution of the disclosedness of being-there, talk is constitutive for the ex-sistence of being-there. Both hearing and keeping silent belong, as possibilities, to the speaking issuing from talk. In these phenomena the constitutive function of talk for the existentiality of ex-sistence becomes fully clear. Right now, though, our task is to elaborate the structure of talk by itself.

Talking is “significance-inducing” articulation of intelligibility of§34. Being-therewith being-in-world to which being-with belongs and which in each instance maintains itself in a determinate manner of taking care of things along with others. This being-with-others is “talkative” in the modes of assenting, refusing, demanding, warning — as pronouncement, consultation, intercession, then too as “making claims” and as the kind of talking taking the form of “giving a talk.” Talking is talk about...

What the talk is about does not necessarily, indeed it mostly does not have the character of a theme, as does an assertion intending to determine something. Even a command is issued about something. A plea has its own about. A plea is not without its “about.” Talk necessarily has this structural moment because it co-constitutes the disclosedness of being-in-world — because in its own structure it is modeled after this basic constitution of being-there. Whatever talk is talking about always gets “addressed” in some determinate respect and within certain limits. In every talk there is also the talking as such — something said in the course of wishing, asking, expressing one’s opinion about . . . , this just as a saying. In this latter, talk gets shared — communicated.*

The phenomenon of communication must be understood — as our analysis has already shown — in an ontologically broad sense. The kind of “communication” occurring in an assertion (e.g., supplying information) is a special case of communication understood existentially and foundationally. In communication taken in its existential and foundational sense, there unfolds an articulation of being-with-one-another-that-understands. It carries through a “sharing” of co-attunement and of a particular understanding of being-with. Communication is never anything like transfer of [personal] experiences (e.g., opinions or wishes) from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Being-therewith is already essentially manifest in co-attunement and co-understanding. Being-with gets “expressly” shared in talk — i.e., it already is shared, it is only unshared in the sense of not being grasped and appropriated.

Talk about . . . that communicates in the talking: all such talk

\(^a\) Thrownness is essential to language. [Heidegger underscores the thought that language first belongs to our “situation,” a world—and only derivatively to us—so that we might belong to it. There are different senses of “language” here at issue. In French, one more easily distinguishes between a language (a tongue: une langue) and language in the sense of the “jointedness” essential to a field or work or study (le langage of music, for instance). Talk (French speakers might say “discourse”) underlies both.]

\(^*\) No matter what our native tongue, it is difficult to distinguish two meanings of “what is said” (as when we are trying to recall or prepare a talk): what it is we are focussing on or are asked to focus on (what is addressed: the “about” of the talking) and the linguistic gestures we are issuing or witnessing (the talking itself: the coherent sequence of “words”). The two stem from a prior unity.
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

208

What gets “spoken out,” or “ex-pressed,” is the there; i.e., being ex-posed [“exposure” here understood] as a location that is open [rather than as merely a vulnerability].

See Heidegger’s much later (1957-8) lecture “The Nature of Language” (in On the Way to Language, 1973). Ernst Cassirer understood language as “symbolic form” (cf. the annotation on p.51); Wilhelm von Humboldt understood it as immediately has the character of speaking out. Talking, being-there becomes out-spoken, but not because it is first of all something inside and cut off from the outside, but rather because it is, as being-in-world, already and understandably “outside.” What gets spoken out is precisely the way we are outside, i.e. the particular manner of attunement (mood) — and it has been shown that this bears on the entire disclosedness of being-in. The linguistic indicator of the evincing essential to talk — the evincing of attuned being-in— lies in tonal emphasis and modulation [of the voice], in the tempo of the talk and in the “way one speaks.” The communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, i.e., the disclosing of ex-sistence, can become the special intent of “poetic” talk.

Talk is the meaning-based joining-together of the attuned intelligibility of being-in-world. To this joining-together there belong, as constitutive factors, the about-which of the talk (what is addressed), the talking as such, communicating, and evincing. These are not properties that we might merely gather up empirically from language, they are rather existential characteristics rooted in the essential constitution of being-there — ones first making anything like language ontologically possible. In the factual linguistic configuration of some one instance of talk some of these factors might be missing, or just not noticed. That often one or another is “literally” not expressed only indicates a determinate kind of talk — a kind that, in so far as it qualifies as talk, must lodge in the wholeness of the structure mentioned.

Attempts to grasp the “nature of language” have always taken their orientation from one or the other of these factors — and then conceived language by taking as their guideline the idea either of “expression,” of “symbolic form,” of communication as “assertion,” of “announcing” [personal] experiences, or of “configuring” life itself. But nothing would be gained for a fully adequate definition of language if we were to cram these various pieces together syncretistically. The all-decisive task is to elaborate in advance the ontological-existential whole of the structure of talk, basing ourselves on the analysis of being-there.

§34. Being-there and Talk. Language

209

announcing the configurations of life in various cultures; early modernity understood language-at-its-best as expression (of thoughts and feelings) and communication (of determinations).

* The “friend” here is the “call of conscience” essential to being-there; see the last paragraph on p. 287. Perhaps, too, there is an echo of Aristotle’s account of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics, Book Nine, Chapter 4: to have friends one must first be a friend to oneself (“the wicked seek company to pass their days, and flee from themselves; for when alone they recall much that is disgusting and anticipate the same, but in company with others they forget”).

† Cf. the annotation on p. 150. As Heidegger goes on to say, “hearkening” is a kind of reflexive hearing: we ask ourselves what it is we hear — but, he argues, not “from scratch.”
artificial and complicated disposition. But that we first of all hear motorcycles and wagons is phenomenal proof that, as being-in-world, being-there in each instance already resides near beings at hand in an inner-worldly manner—and does not at all start out with “sensations” whose swirl would first have to be formed in order to provide the springboard from which the subject springs in order finally to arrive at a “world.” As essentially a being that understands, being-there is first of all near what is understood.

Also when explicitly listening to the talk of another, we first of all understand what is said—more exactly, right from the start we are already with the other near the beings the talk addresses. We do not first of all hear what is pronounced in the announcement. Even in cases where the speaking is unclear or the language foreign, we first of all hear unintelligible words and not a multiplicity of tonal data.

When “naturally” listening to what a talk is about we can indeed listen simultaneously to the manner in which it is being said—to the “diction.” But we only do this within a precedential co-understanding of the talking. For only then is there the possibility of assessing this manner with a view to whether it properly fits what the talk is about, the theme addressed.

The same holds when we answer another: counter-talk springs first of all directly from the understanding of what the talk addresses, this latter being already “shared” in being-with.

Only in cases where the existential possibility of talking and hearing are given can someone hearken. One who “can’t listen” and “has to suffer the consequences” might very well be capable of hearkening—and precisely for that reason. It’s a privative kind of hearing that only listens-in. Talking and hearing have their ground in understanding: this latter springs neither from talking a lot nor from listening in on everything. Only one who already understands can listen attentively.

The very same ontological fundament gives rise to another essential possibility of talking: keeping silent. One who keeps silent in a discussion can more authentically “get others to understand”—i.e., build up an understanding—than one who is never short of words. Speaking at great length about something does not in the least guarantee that an understanding will thereby be furthered. On the contrary: addressing something long-windedly conceals it, casts whatever is understood into a sham-clarity, i.e. the unintelligibility of triviality. Yet, keeping silent does not mean being mute. Indeed, those who are mute are driven to “speaking.” They not only have not proven that they can keep silent, they lack even the possibility to prove anything of the sort. And those by nature inclined to speak very little are no more able than those who are mute to show that they are keeping silent, or that they can do so. Only in genuine talking is authentic keeping-silent possible. In order to keep silent, being-there must have something to say, i.e. have available an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. Then one’s reticence makes something manifest, and quashes the “re-talk.” As a mode of talking, reticence articulates the intelligibility of being-there so primordially that it is from reticence that genuine ability-to-hear and transparent being-with-one-another arise.

Because talk is constitutive for the being of the there, i.e. for attunement and understanding, and because being-there entails being-in-world, being-there has already, as talkative being-in, spoken out. Being-there has language. Is it an accident that the Greeks, whose everyday existing had transposed itself mainly into talking with one another, and who also “had eyes” to see, determined the nature of human being—in their pre-philosophical as well as in their philosophical interpretation of being-there—as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον? The later interpretation of this definition of human being taking it to mean animal rationale, “rational animal,” may not be “false” but it does conceal the phenomenal soil from which this definition of being-there is taken. The human being shows itself as a being that talks. This does not signify that it has the possibility

---

* Funerary ceremonies could serve as examples, and of course histrionics. Yet the same thought bears on various kinds of writing: translators, for instance, must fine-tune (even “intone”) formulations with a precedential “ear” to what might be co-addressing all concerned.

† The phenomenon here may be illustrated by the child who “won’t listen” to the injunctions of its parents: it may still be hearkening all too well to what its parents are driving at (including the “price it will have to pay”).

§ 34. Being-there and Talk. Language

The phenomena may be illustrated by the child who “won’t listen” to the injunctions of its parents: it may still be hearkening all too well to what its parents are driving at (including the “price it will have to pay”).

---

* And what is it that it has to say? ([the event of] being) [Authentic and full disclosedness of being-there includes the disclosure of “world, being-in, and self” (p. 200). Recall: being-there ≠ human being.]

† Human being as the being that “gathers”; gathering onto [the event of] being—having its being in the openness provided by beings (but this in the background). [Greek λέγειν does mean both “talking” and “gathering.”]
of voicing announcements, but rather that this being is in its manner of un-covering world and being-there itself. The Greeks have no word for “language,” they understood this phenomenon “first of all” as talk. However, because in their philosophical considerations λόγος mainly came into view as assertion, their elaboration of the basic structures of the forms and components of talk took this logos [i.e., assertion] as its guideline. Grammar sought its foundations in the “logic” of this logos. But this logic is based on the ontology of on-hand beings. The basic “categories of meaning” now available — ones that passed [from grammar] over into subsequent linguistics, and still basically set the standard — take their orientation from talk as assertion. If, then, we take this phenomenon of talk in the basic primordiality and breadth of an existential, there emerges the necessity of shifting linguistics onto foundations that are ontologically more primordial. The task of liberating grammar from logic requires precedentially a positive understanding of the basic a priori structures of talk in general as an existential; we cannot perform this task after-the-fact — by improving and expanding what we receive from our traditions. With a view to this task, we must ask about the basic forms of a possible meaning-based articulation belonging to understanding overall, and not just to inner-worldly beings as these get cognized in theoretical observation and formulated in propositions. A doctrine of meaning does not emerge on its own from a comprehensive comparison of a great many languages and a great variety of them. Nor is it enough to take over some philosophical horizon, such as the one in which Wilhelm von Humboldt turned language into a problem. Any doctrine of meaning has its roots in the ontology of being-there. Whether it thrives or withers depends on the destiny of this ontology.¹

In the end, philosophical research must someday resolve to ask just in what way language does have its being. Is it an inner-worldly at-hand instrument, or does it have its being the way being-there has its being — or neither of these? In what manner is the being of language such that there can be “dead” languages? What does it mean that a language can grow and decline? We possess a science of language, linguistics, and the being of the beings it takes as its theme is obscure; veiled is even the horizon for the investigative question regarding it. Is it an accident that meanings are initially and mostly “worldly” meanings — ones prefigured by the signification essential to world, and even mainly “spatial” — or is this “fact” existentially-ontologically necessary and, if so, why? Philosophical research will have to give up trying to be “philosophy of language” in order to pursue, questioningly, the “matters themselves” and to position itself in a conceptually clarified problematic.

The foregoing interpretation of language has intended only to point out the ontological “place” for this phenomenon within the essential constitution of being-there — and, above all, to prepare for the upcoming analysis: the attempt to bring into view, in an ontologically more primordial manner and in connection with other phenomena, the everydayness of being-there, taking as our guideline one fundamental manner in which talk has its being.

B. The everyday being of the there: the collapsing of being-there

Taking recourse to the existential structures of the disclosedness of being-in-world, our interpretation has in some ways lost sight of the everydayness of being-there. Our analysis must regain this phenomenal horizon, the one we thematized at the outset. The question that now arises reads: What are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of being-in-world in such as this latter maintains itself in the essential manner of the one, i.e. in the mode of everydayness? Does such everyday being have its own specific attunement, a particular understanding, talking, and interpreting? It becomes all the more imperative to answer these questions when we recall that being-there initially and mostly dissolves into the one and gets ruled by it. As thrown being-in-world, isn’t being-there precisely thrown, first of all, into the public sphere of the one? And what does this public sphere signify if not the specific disclosedness of the one?

If understanding must be conceived primarily as the ability-to-be essential to being-there, then our task is to extract, by way of an analysis of the understanding and interpreting belonging to the one, the essential possibilities that being-there, as the one, has disclosed and taken as its own. These possibilities themselves then make manifest an essential drive of everydayness. And, finally, this drive, when explicated in an ontologically adequate manner, must reveal a primordial manner in which

¹ Cf., regarding the doctrine of meaning, Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, Vol. II, the first, fifth and sixth investigation. Then too, the more radical version of the problematic in his Ideas I, §§123 ff., pp. 255 ff. [English translation, pp. 318 ff.]
being-there has its being — and in such a way that the phenomenon we have called thrownness can be exhibited in its existential concretion.

What is first of all required is that we make visible the disclosedness essential to the one, i.e. the everyday manner of talk, vision, and interpretation, and that we do this in reference to certain phenomena. In regard to these phenomena, it may not be superfluous to note explicitly that the intention of our interpretation is purely ontological and far removed from any moralizing critique of everyday being-there, and from any aspiration to engage in a “philosophy of culture.”

§35. Re-talk

The expression “re-talk” is not here to be employed in a degrading sense. Terminologically, it signifies a positive phenomenon, one constituting the essential manner of the understanding and interpreting belonging to everyday being-there. Talk mostly speaks out, and it has always already spoken out. It is language. In anything that has been spoken there then lies already an understanding, an interpretation. As such out-spoken-ness, language harbors in itself an interpreted-ness of some understanding of being-there. This interpreted-ness is no more on-hand than is language; rather, it is essential to being-there. It is to this interpreted-ness that being-there is initially and, within certain limits, constantly entrusted; it rules over and shares out the possibilities of average understanding and the attunement belonging to this understanding. The out-spoken-ness of talk preserves an understanding of the world disclosed, and equiprimordially an understanding of being-there-with-others and of one’s own being-in: it preserves such understanding in the whole of its articulated interconnections of significance. The particular understanding already embedded in this way within such out-spoken-ness pertains as much to the discovered-ness of beings already achieved and transmitted as it does to the particular understanding of being and the available possibilities and horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual articulation. Beyond merely indicating the factum of this interpreted-ness of being-there, we must now ask about the existential manner in which such talk, both spoken-out and speaking-out, has its being. If it cannot be conceived as something on hand, what is its being? And what does its being imply, basically, about the way everyday being-there has its being?*

Talk speaking out is communication. Its being lies in the drive to bring those who are hearing [what is said] into being a part of the disclosive being-toward what the talk is addressing.

With the average intelligibility already lying in the language spoken and speaking out, communicative talk can to a large extent be understood without those hearing [what is said] bringing themselves into a primordially-understanding being-toward what the talk is about. One understands not so much what is being addressed; one rather just listens to the talking itself, as a talking. It is the latter that gets understood — the former only “kind of,” and casually; speakers and listeners “mean the same thing” because they understand what is said in the same averageness.

Hearing and understanding have precedentially attached themselves to the talking itself. Communication does not “share” the primary essential relation to what is being addressed; rather, being-with-one-another moves along within a talking-with-one-another that attends to the talking itself. What’s important for such being-with-one-another is that the talking goes on. The having-been-said, the dictum, the formulation: these now stand in for the genuineness of talk, its bearing on the matter itself and the understanding at issue in it. And because talking has lost (or perhaps never even had) the primary bearing on what is addressed, it does not communicate in the manner of any primordial appropriation of it; rather it communicates by way of unceasing and echoing talk. The talking itself inscribes ever larger circles and takes on the character of authority. Matters stand in such-and-such a way because that’s what people say. In the course of such echoing and unceasing talk — wherein the initial lack of ground to stand on evolves into a complete groundlessness — re-talk takes shape. And such re-talk is not confined to verbal echoing, it extends to writing — as “re-writing.” Here, the echoing is not so much grounded in hear-say. Rather, it draws its nourishment from skimming written works. The average understanding readers acquire [from such “re-writes”] will never foster their ability to

* In 1924 Heidegger wrote a summary of Being and Time, one in which the status of re-talk appears even more clearly as structuring academic discourse and thereby posing an obstacle to the present effort to think the matters themselves directly. See Collected Works, Vol. 64, especially pp. 29-36.
distinguish between what is primordially created and achieved and what is merely being echoed. More: the average understanding of something does not even want this distinction, has no need of it — because, after all, it understands everything.

The groundlessness of re-talk does not block the entrance to the public sphere: it favors it.* Re-talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any precedential appropriation of the matter itself. Re-talk even shields one from the danger of foundering in the effort to appropriate it. As what anybody can pick up, re-talk not only relieves one of the task of understanding matters genuinely, it builds up an undifferentiated intelligibility from which nothing is barred.

Talk, while belonging essentially to the basic constitution of being-there and co-conditioning its disclosedness, has this possibility of becoming re-talk — and, in the form of re-talk, the possibility of not holding being-in-world open within an articulate understanding, but rather closing it off: of covering over inner-worldly beings. For this there is no need of any intention to deceive. It is not essential to re-talk that it include a conscious pretension to be something it is not. That what is said, and keeps being said, is said groundlessly: this is enough to distort every dis-closing into a closing-off. For anything that is said always gets initially understood as “saying how things are”: as uncovering. In accordance with its own peculiar omission to get back to the basis in what is addressed, re-talk is essentially a closing-off.

This gets even more intensified as re-talk, having supposedly achieved an understanding of what is addressed, employs this supposition to defer, in a peculiar way to suppress and repress, each new questioning and every effort to come to grips with a matter.

This interpreted-ness of re-talk has already entrenched itself in each instance of being-there. We become initially acquainted with much in this manner, and quite a bit never gets beyond such average understanding. Being-there can never escape from the everyday interpreted-ness into which it has initially grown. Every genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, every re-discovery and re-appropriation unfolds within it, out of it, and against it. It is not the case that being-there could ever find itself placed, untouched and untempted by this interpreted-ness, before the open country of a “world-in-itself” in order only to look at what arises for encounter. The dominance of public interpreted-ness has even decided already upon the possible ways of being attuned, i.e. upon the basic manner in which being-there can find the world mattering to it. The one pre-figures the attunement, it determines what and how one “sees.”

Re-talk — talk that closes-off in the way just characterized — is the essential manner in which being-there unfolds its uprooted understanding of itself. However, re-talk does not present itself as an on-hand condition evident in something on hand; rather, it is itself existentially uprooted, and this in the manner of constant uprootedness. Ontologically, this means: as being-in-world, being-there — the being-there maintaining itself in re-talk — is cut off from its primary, from its primordial and genuine, from its essential relations to world, to being-there-with, to being-in itself. It maintains itself in a floatation — and, in this floatation, it is all the while still near its “world,” with others, and related to itself. Only a being whose disclosedness is constituted by attuned and understanding talk — i.e. its there, its being-in-world in this ontological constitution — has the essential possibility of such uprootedness. Far from comprising a non-being of being-there, such uprootedness comprises its most everyday, its most stubborn “reality.”*

Yet it lies in the self-evidence and self-assuredness of average interpreted-ness that, under the protection of being-there itself, the uncanniness of this floatation, one in which it can easily drift more and more into groundlessness, remains concealed from any one instance of being there.†

---

* Here and further on, the sense of “groundless” is that of “having no ground to walk on, to sink one’s roots in: no home.” Already on p. 21 Heidegger introduces the thought that “tradition uproots” (so that one of the tasks of contemplation is to re-root it, i.e. re-ground world). The “public sphere” (itself a positive outgrowth of being-in-world) takes on the role of standard-setting precisely when being-there loses its ground, its autochthony. — The other sense of “ground,” that of “reason” or “justification,” is one Heidegger intends to locate as a secondary phenomenon, one that becomes the source of nihilism when construed as primary.

† Cf. the question raised in Plato’s Sophist (236E ff.): How can talk engage both being and non-being — engage us in this “contradiction”? Heidegger’s account of re-talk prepares the way for reconsidering the possibilities of truth in (1) peer literature (Aristotle’s “received opinions”: ενδοξα; cf. also Sophistical Refutations, 175 a 31), (2) history (both in the sense of the tradition informing being-there and in the sense of re-telling it),
§36. Curiosity

When analyzing the understanding and disclosedness of the there in general, we referred to the lumen naturale and called the disclosedness of being-in the clearing of being-there*—a clearing in which anything like vision first becomes possible. Vision we conceptualized (with a view to the basic manner of any disclosing happening in being-there, i.e. with a view to understanding) to mean the intrinsic appropriation of those beings to which being-there comports itself according to its own essential possibilities of being.†

The basic constitution of vision shows itself in a peculiar drive, inherent in everydayness, to “see.” We designate this drive with the term curiosity. What this term characterizes is not confined to seeing; what it expresses is the drive to let the world arise for encounter in a peculiar kind of perception. It is with a fundamental existential-ontological intention that we interpret this phenomenon; we do not take our orientation narrowly from cognizing [the world]—which already early on, and not by chance in Greek philosophy, was understood to be based on the “desire to see.” The first treatise in the collection of Aristotle’s treatises on ontology begins with the statement πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εὑρέων δρέποντα φώτη— in the being of human being there lies essentially the care of seeing.¹ This thought inaugurates an investigation aspiring to discover, within this manner in which being-there

¹ Heidegger first introduces the notion of “a clearing” on p. 133. The metaphor of “a clearing” (as in the woods: it “lets the light in”) recurs as crucial to the consideration of truth and temporality (cf. pp. 351 and 408). It allows us to experience “space” concretely, i.e. in our dealings, as when we straighten things out, set things up in a room: in this sense, “clearance—understood as an existential—belongs to being-in-world” (p. 111).

† Heidegger first defines “vision” on p. 146 ff. Its primary phenomenal form is circumspection (with regard to things we take care of) and consideration (with regard to those we care for).

I Metaphysics, 980 a 21. [The opening line; more literally: “all people by nature desire to have seen”—where “having seen” takes the casual sense of “knowledge,” and is often translated accordingly.]
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

220

Heidegger repeats these thoughts on p. 346. Already on p. 69, he claims that cognition, as a “looking-on” (observational reason, Hegel calls it), can only discover “how things look”—only on-hand beings, never at-hand beings. On p. 61, Heidegger remarks (and seems to retract in a marginalium) that the Platonic-Aristotelian concern for ειδος is trapped in such “looking on at how things look” (he reasserts the thought on p. 138). Throughout, Heidegger is quietly locating the drive for “pure cognition” in curiosity—in a privation (even a failure), not in a love of wisdom.

Being-in-world is initially absorbed in the world taken care of. Taking care of things takes its lead from circumspection uncovering at-hand beings and retaining these in their uncoveredness. Circumspection provides every procurement, every performance, with the path it follows, the means of implementation, the proper occasion, the right moment. Taking-care can come to rest, as when we interrupt the performance to take a rest, or when we have finished the job. At rest, taking care does not disappear; rather, circumspection is set free and is no longer tied to the work-world. When resting, care settles into such liberated circumspection. Circumspect uncovering of a work-world has the essential character of de-stancing. Liberated circumspection no longer has anything at hand, the bringing-near of which it takes care of. As essentially de-stancing, this circumspection seeks new possibilities of de-stancing; this means that it drives beyond the at-hand beings closest to it, and out into a distant and strange world. Care becomes caring about possibilities of seeing the “world” only in the way it looks—where the seeing is itself resting and tarrying. Being-there seeks what is distant simply in order to bring it near in the way it looks. Being-there allows itself to be taken along solely by how the world looks—a manner of being in which it is concerned to get rid of itself as being-in-world, get rid of its being near the everyday at-hand beings closest to it.*

In its liberation, curiosity does not care about seeing something in order to understand it, i.e. in order to enter into a being-toward it, but rather in order only to see it. It seeks what is new in order to jump anew to something else new. What this “caring to see” aims for is not to grapple with something and to enter knowingly into the truth; it rather aims for possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. It is for this reason that curiosity is characterized by a special way of undwelling with what is closest. And for the same reason it does not seek the leisure of contemplative dwelling, but rather unrest and excitement—by way of the ever-new, the change in what arises for encounter.* In its undwelling, curiosity provides the constant possibility of dispersion. Curiosity has nothing to do with the wonder arising in the contemplation of beings—και τὸ θαυμάζειν.† Curiosity is not interested in being brought into non-understanding by way of amazement; it provides a knowing—but merely in order to have known. These two factors constituting curiosity—undwelling in the circum-world taken care of, and dispersion into new possibilities—are grounded in the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon: in what we call homelessness. Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of being-in-world reveals a new manner in which everyday being-there has its being—a manner in which it constantly uproots itself.

Re-talk also prescribes the paths of curiosity; it declares what one must have read, what one must have seen. In its being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is entrusted to re-talk. These two essential and everyday modes of talk and vision are not simply on hand together in their uprooting drive; either one of these manners of being rips the other along with it. Curiosity, from which nothing is barred, re-talk, for which nothing remains un-understood: these two offer themselves, i.e. offer to any being-there adopting these ways of being, the guarantee of a presumably genuine “lively life.” And with this presumption there comes into evidence a third phenomenon characterizing the disclosedness of everyday being-there.

§37. Ambiguity

When, in everyday being-with-one-another, things start happening which

contemplative dwelling, but rather unrest and excitement—by way of the ever-new, the change in what arises for encounter.* In its undwelling, curiosity provides the constant possibility of dispersion. Curiosity has nothing to do with the wonder arising in the contemplation of beings—και τὸ θαυμάζειν.† Curiosity is not interested in being brought into non-understanding by way of amazement; it provides a knowing—but merely in order to have known. These two factors constituting curiosity—undwelling in the circum-world taken care of, and dispersion into new possibilities—are grounded in the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon: in what we call homelessness. Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of being-in-world reveals a new manner in which everyday being-there has its being—a manner in which it constantly uproots itself.

Re-talk also prescribes the paths of curiosity; it declares what one must have read, what one must have seen. In its being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is entrusted to re-talk. These two essential and everyday modes of talk and vision are not simply on hand together in their uprooting drive; either one of these manners of being rips the other along with it. Curiosity, from which nothing is barred, re-talk, for which nothing remains un-understood: these two offer themselves, i.e. offer to any being-there adopting these ways of being, the guarantee of a presumably genuine “lively life.” And with this presumption there comes into evidence a third phenomenon characterizing the disclosedness of everyday being-there.

§37. Ambiguity

When, in everyday being-with-one-another, things start happening which

contemplative dwelling, but rather unrest and excitement—by way of the ever-new, the change in what arises for encounter.* In its undwelling, curiosity provides the constant possibility of dispersion. Curiosity has nothing to do with the wonder arising in the contemplation of beings—και τὸ θαυμάζειν.† Curiosity is not interested in being brought into non-understanding by way of amazement; it provides a knowing—but merely in order to have known. These two factors constituting curiosity—undwelling in the circum-world taken care of, and dispersion into new possibilities—are grounded in the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon: in what we call homelessness. Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of being-in-world reveals a new manner in which everyday being-there has its being—a manner in which it constantly uproots itself.

Re-talk also prescribes the paths of curiosity; it declares what one must have read, what one must have seen. In its being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is entrusted to re-talk. These two essential and everyday modes of talk and vision are not simply on hand together in their uprooting drive; either one of these manners of being rips the other along with it. Curiosity, from which nothing is barred, re-talk, for which nothing remains un-understood: these two offer themselves, i.e. offer to any being-there adopting these ways of being, the guarantee of a presumably genuine “lively life.” And with this presumption there comes into evidence a third phenomenon characterizing the disclosedness of everyday being-there.

* Cf. Pindar’s 3rd Pythian Ode, 21-22:

There is a tribe of the human sort, full of futilities, that, ashamed of the things that are near, yearningly looks to what is afar, vainly hunting down expectancies forever unfulfilled

Yet Heidegger asks us to detect this “yearning look” in being-there itself, prior to all shame or other incidental causes.

† That is, curiosity in Heidegger’s sense has nothing to do with the philosophic temperament. Plato has Socrates say that “there is no other origin of philosophy than wonder” (τὸ θαυμάζειν: Theaetetus, 155D)—a thought repeated by Aristotle (Metaphysics, 982 b 12, where he remarks that the lover of stories is also a lover of wonders).
are accessible to everyone, and about which everyone can say everything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what not. This ambiguity extends not only to the world, but equally much to being-with-one-another as such, and even to the way being-there relates to itself, in its own being.

Everything appears to be genuinely understood, grasped, and formulated, yet basically it isn’t — or appears not to be, yet basically is. Ambiguity affects not only the ways we find and handle things accessible in use and enjoyment, it lodges itself in the way we understand things — in understanding as ability-to-be: in the manner we project, and in the pre-construal of the possibilities of being-there. Not only does everyone know and discuss what’s around and what’s coming, everyone also knows already how to talk about what should really be happening, what’s not yet the case but “really” has to be done. Everyone has already “surmised,” is already “onto” what others are “surmising” and are “onto.”

This “being onto” (based on hear-say: whoever is genuinely onto something doesn’t speak about it) is the most entangling manner in which ambiguity presents the possibilities of being-there — so that these possibilities already get stifled in their power.

Thus, if something one has surmised and felt is indeed transposed into a deed, then it is precisely ambiguity that has made sure that interest in what has been actualized promptly fades away. After all, so long as there is the possibility of merely “co-surmising” these matters without any commitment to them, such interest subsists only in the form of curiosity and re-talk. Being-in-there-with-one-another loses its cohesion the moment what one was surmising gets carried out — if, and so long as, one is onto it. For the carrying-out of something forces being-there back onto the self it happens to be: re-talk and curiosity lose their power. And they immediately take revenge: in the face of the carrying-out of what one had been co-surmising, re-talk easily steps in with the judgement: anyone could have done that just as well — for everyone had been surmising it. Re-talk is after all indignant that what was surmised and constantly insisted upon should actually happen. For it has thereby been robbed of the opportunity to go on surmising it.

Now, since the time at issue for a self-engaging being-there — given the reticence essential to carrying something out and even failing genuinely at it — differs from the time at issue in “fast-living” re-talk (viewed publicly, the former is essentially slower than the latter), re-talk has long since gone onto something else — something new at the time. What had earlier been thought of, and has now been carried out, has come too late — in comparison with what is now new. In their ambiguity, re-talk and curiosity see to it that whatever is genuinely and newly created is outdated the moment it arrives in the public sphere. Anything genuinely and newly created can be liberated in its positive possibilities only once re-talk — its power of covering up — has been rendered ineffective, and when “common” interest has died away.

The ambiguity of public interpretedness makes it out as though such pre-emptive discussing and curiosity-based thinking were the authentic happening, and it brands all accomplishment and action as after-the-fact and peripheral. Thus, in the one, the understanding essential to being-there constantly mis-assesses, in its projects, the genuine possibilities of being. Being-there is always “there” ambiguously, i.e. in the public disclosedness of being-with-one-another, where the noisiest re-talk and the cleverest curiosity keep the “affair” going — there, where everyday everything, and basically nothing, happens.

Such ambiguity always feeds curiosity with what it seeks and gives re-talk the appearance as though everything were decided in it.

Yet this essential manner in which being-in-world gets disclosed also rules over our being-with-one-another. Others are initially “there” on the basis of what one has heard about them, how one talks about them, what one knows about them. Re-talk initially cuts into primordial being-with-one-another. Initially and mostly, each pays attention to the others: to how they behave and to what they will say about how they behave.

Being-with-one-another in the one is not at all a settled and indifferent side-by-side-ness; it is rather a tense and ambiguous paying-attention-to-one-another, a furtive eavesdropping-on-one-another. Behind the mask of a for-one-another there is a game of against-one-another.

In all this it is to be noticed that ambiguity does not at all spring from an explicit intent to deceive or distort, that it is not first of all evoked by any individual being-there. It already lies in our being-with-one-another in a world — in thrown being-with-one-another. And precisely in public it remains concealed, and one will always object that this interpretation of the interpretedness constituting the one does not fit. It would be a misunderstanding to try to confirm the explication of these
phenomena by looking to the one for agreement on it.*

The phenomena of re-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity have been exhibited in such a way that already an essential interconnection among them becomes evident. It is now a question of grasping existentially and ontologically the manner in which this interconnection has its being. The basic way in which everydayness has its being is to be understood within the horizon of the essential structures of being-there which we have hitherto obtained.

§38. Collapsing and thrownness
Re-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity characterize the ways in which being-there is, in its everydayness, its “there”—the disclosedness of being-in-world. As existential determinations, these characteristics are not on hand in regard to being-there, they co-constitute its being. In these three, and in their essential interconnectedness, we find unveiled a basic manner in which everydayness has its being. This manner we call the collapsing of being-there.

This term (which does not express any negative evaluation) intends to highlight this: being-there is initially and mostly near the “world” it takes care of. This absorption in . . . generally has the character of being lost in the public sphere of the one. Initially, being-there has always already fallen away from itself in regard to its authentic ability-to-be: it has collapsed onto its “world.” This collapsedness onto the world refers to the absorption in being-with-one-another—inasmuch as this latter is guided by re-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. What we called the

* On these pages, Heidegger’s account of ambiguity only highlights the oscillation (ambivalence, “bad faith”) that will “always already” challenge creative effort; ambiguity accompanies the “liberation” of idleness—what tends to happen, existentially, when “circumspection is set free and is no longer tied to the work-world” (p. 172). Later, Heidegger recurs to the theme when accounting (1) for death: the ambiguity of fear and dread (pp. 253-5); (2) for the “loss of hearing” engendered by the noise of ambiguity—in contrast to the noise-lessness of the call to be a self: conscience (p. 271); (3) for the lostness in the intelligible ambiguity of the public sphere: the opposite to letting oneself be called out of this lostness in the one (p. 299); and (4) for how the possibilities of ex-sistence can be made unrecognizable by ambiguity, while still being familiar (p. 383). Only once does “ambiguity” refer to oscillation in the meaning of words (“history” wavers in meaning: p. 378).

inauthenticity of being-there will now receive sharper focus by way of an interpretation of this collapsing. In no way does in- or non-authentic mean “really not”—as though in this mode of being being-there had utterly lost its being. Far from meaning anything like no-longer-being-in-the-world, inauthenticity constitutes precisely a pre-eminent being-in-world: a mode of being entirely taken up by the “world,” and by being-there-with others in the one. This not-being-itself serves as a positive possibility of the one being that essentially absorbs itself into a world as it takes care of things. As the manner closest to us in which being-there has its being, the manner in which it mostly maintains itself, this not-being must be conceptualized.*

So, too, the collapsedness of being-there must not be construed as a “lapsing” from a purer and a higher “original condition.” Not only do we have no experience of this ontically, ontologically we have no possibilities and no guidelines for interpreting it.

It is from itself that, as factual being-in-world, being-there has already fallen away, is as collapsing. And it is collapsed onto its world, what belongs to its being—not onto any one being it may or may not run up against in the progress of its being. Collapsing is an existential determination of being-there itself; it says nothing about being-there as something on hand, nor anything about on-hand relations to any being from which it “descends” or with which it has subsequently entered into a commercium.

The ontological-existential structure of collapsing would also be misunderstood if one were to take it as making a bad ontic quality deserving to be condemned, a feature that might be eliminated in some advanced stages of our culture.

When we first indicated being-in-world as a basic constitution of being-there, then too when we characterized the structural factors

1 Cf. §9, pp. 42 ff.

* Readers must be patient to discover how the “positive possibility” of not being oneself can serve as the basis for creative possibilities. One example (p. 344): the power of dread (of not-being) takes us back into the uncanniness of our situation and thereby gives us the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be.

† Many traditions suggest the contrary: we “lose out” by attaching ourselves to beings—to this or that being (either in the sense of an individual person or thing in our environment or in the sense of the attributes these persons or things happen to have).
I. Chapter Five: Being-in as Such

226

constituting it, we did not go beyond analyzing the constitution itself: we left unconsidered the manner in which this constitution has its being phenomenally. To be sure, we described the basic possible manners of being-in (taking care of, caring for). Yet we left undeveloped the question about the everyday modes in which these manners have their being. And it became evident, too, that being-in is anything but a merely contemplative or active confrontation (i.e., a being-on-hand-together) of a subject and an object. Nevertheless, it must still have seemed that being-in-world served as a rigid framework within which all the possible comportments on the part of being-there could run their course without affecting the “framework” itself in its being. But this supposed “framework” co-constitutes the way being-there has its being. An existential mode of being-in-world becomes evident in the phenomenon of collapsing.

Re-talk discloses to being-there the way it understands and relates to its world, others, and itself—but in such a way that this being-toward . . . takes place in the mode of a groundless floating. Curiosity discloses each and every thing—but in such a way that being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity conceals nothing from the understanding of being-there—but only in order to hold being-in-world down in its uprooted everywhere-and-nowhere.

With the ontological elucidation of the manner in which everyday being-in-world has its being (as this manner shows itself in these three phenomena), we first gain the existentially adequate determination of the basic constitution of being-there. Which structure shows the “moved-ness” of collapsing?

Re-talk, along with the public interpretedness it includes, gets constituted in being-with-one-another. It is not on hand in the world as a detached product derived from being-with-one-another and having its own being. And just as little does it allow us to volatilize it into a “universal” which, because it essentially belongs to nobody, is “really” nothing and occurs as “real” only in the speaking of some individual being-there. Re-talk is the way being-with-one-another itself has its being: it does not first arise by way of certain circumstances affecting being-there “from the outside.” If, then, being-there itself, in its re-talk and public interpretedness, offers the possibility of losing itself in the one, of collapsing into groundlessness, that means: being-there furnishes itself with the constant temptation to collapse. Being-in-world is in itself tempting.

In this way having already been led into temptation, public interpretedness holds being-there firmly in its own collapsedness. Re-talk and ambiguity—the having-seen-everything and the having-understood-everything—give shape to the presumption that the disclosedness of being-there available and dominant in this fashion might be able to guarantee the sureness, genuineness and fullness of all its possibilities of being. The self-assurance and firmness of the one radiates a growing sense that there is no need to develop any authentic and attuned understanding of where we find ourselves. The presumption of the one to direct and nourish a full and genuine “life” imbues being-there with a tranquilization for which everything is “in perfect order” and to which all doors are open. As collapsing and already tempting itself, being-in-world is also tranquilizing.

However, this tranquilization in inauthentic being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity; rather, it prods one into unrestrained “bustle.” The having collapsed onto some “world” does not now come to rest. Temptational tranquilization intensifies the collapsing. Especially now in regard to the interpretation of being-there, the opinion can emerge that understanding the strangest cultures, and the “synthesis” of these with one’s own, might lead to enlightenment of being-there about itself: an enlightenment that would leave nothing out of account and would finally be genuine.* Many-sided curiosity and restless polymathy take on the appearance of a universal understanding of being-there. Yet it remains basically undetermined and unquestioned what there is to be understood; there is no understanding that understanding is itself an ability-to-be, one that must become free solely in its ownmost being-there. In this tranquilized self-comparing with everything, one “understanding” everything, being-there gets prodded into an alienation wherein its ownmost ability-to-be gets concealed. As tempting and tranquilizing,

* Heidegger later resumes the theme of “movedness” (announced on p. 134): the “throw of being thrown” (p. 348) and the “happening of being-there” (pp. 374 ff.). The word translates κινησις, which our Aristotelian tradition locates in nature and moderns locate in us: a mixture of an “ability” to be moved by things and an ability to move them. Heidegger locates it in world.

* Cf. p. 21: up-rooted, being-there is left with a “phantasmagoria” of interests in “standpoints of philosophizing, and in the remotest and strangest cultures” in an effort “to veil its own groundlessness.”
Again, though, this alienation cannot be taken to mean that being-there is factically torn away from itself; on the contrary, it prods being-there into a manner of being keen on the most exaggerated “self-dismemberment” that is tempted into all sorts of possible interpretations, with the result that even the “characterologies” and “typologies” issuing therefrom already become too numerous to keep in view. Still, this alienation—which closes off being-there from its own authenticity and possibility (even the possibility of genuinely foundering)—does not consign being-there to something other than itself, it rather goads it into its inauthenticity, into a possible manner of being itself. In its own movedness, the tempting and tranquilizing alienation constituting the collapsing of being-there brings being-there to the point where it gets entangled in itself.*

These phenomena we have pointed out—temptation, tranquilization, alienation, and self-entangling (entanglement)—characterize the specific manner in which collapsing has its being. We call this “moved-ness” of being-there, one essential to its own being: downfall. Being-there falls away from itself into itself—into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness. Yet public interpretedness keeps this fall concealed from being-there, and in this way: the fall is interpreted as “getting ahead” and “really living.”†

* Entangled in itself—not taken out of itself, not placed on the brink of transcendence. In his 1925 work Der Kampf mit dem Dämon, which he himself calls a “characterology” and a “typology,” Stefan Zweig detects in the alienation of Kleist, Hölderlin and Nietzsche not just a drive to self-destruction, but more significantly a drive beyond the finite into the infinite; in this he follows Plato’s understanding of eros and mania. While Zweig’s account may hold for these authors in their creative mode, Heidegger’s underscores the end result: the inability to take being-there as one’s own. The difference has far-reaching implications: on the traditional interpretation, wisdom and the like require a movement away from the finite (the earthly), whereas on Heidegger’s such developments allow one to embrace it.

† Readers might recall that the study of foreign cultures comprised, from its very beginning in the early 19th century, one essential mainstay of the modern university (think of the founding of the University of Berlin by W. von Humboldt, assisted by his brother Alexander). By the end of the 20th century, it became evident that “cultural studies” in general have taken over the study of being-there. Heidegger’s account of collapsing, and especially of alienation and entangling, recalls the destiny of our institutions of higher education. Derrida and Foucault resume these reflections; cf. the former’s response to Claude Lévi-Strauss in “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (Writing and Difference), and the latter’s remarks on psychoanalysis and ethnology at the end of Les mots et les choses.

The manner in which downfall moves into, and within, groundlessness of inauthentic being—being within the one—constantly rips understanding loose from the projecting of authentic possibilities, rips it into the tranquilized presumption that it has everything, or that it achieves everything. This constant ripping-loose from authenticity—always disguised as authenticity itself—together with this ripping into the one, characterizes the movedness of collapsing as vortex.

Collapsing not only determines, existentially, being-in-world. Its vortex also manifests the throw, the movedness, characterizing thrownness that can become conspicuous to being-there itself in its attunement. Not only is thrownness not an “accomplished fact,” it is also not an isolated factum. It belongs to its facticity that, so long as it is what it is, it remains in the throw and gets dragged into the inauthenticity of the one. Thnownness—in which facticity can be seen phenomenally—belongs to being-there, to that being for whom, in its own being, its being is at issue. Being-there ex-sists factically.

But, along with this account of collapsing, have we not exhibited a phenomenon that directly contravenes the determination with which we registered the formal idea of ex-sistence? Can we conceive being-there this way—as a being whose being is such that its ability-to-be is an issue for it—if this being is precisely one that has lost itself and that, in collapsing, “lives” apart from itself? Yet collapsing onto the world is a phenomenal “proof” against the existentiality of being-there only if being-there is posited at the outset as an isolated I-subject, as a self-point from which it moves away. Then the world is an object. Collapsing onto the world is then re-interpreted as a being-on-hand in the manner of an inner-worldly being. If, however, we hold fast to the being of being-there as we explicated its constitution as being-in-world, it becomes evident that collapsing, as an essential manner of this being-in, presents the most elemental proof for the existentiality of being-there. What is at issue in collapsing is nothing other than the ability-to-be-in-world—even though in the mode of inauthenticity. Being-there is only able to collapse because its being-in-world (already understanding and attuned) is at issue.

§38. Collapsing and Thrownness 229
for it. On the other hand, authentic ex-sistence is nothing that floats above collapsing everydayness; it is, existentially, only a modified grasp of it.

Neither does the phenomenon of collapsing offer anything like an “after-dark” view of being-there, a property ontically occurring and possibly serving to complete the picture with a harmless aspect of being-there. Collapsing unveils an essential ontological structure of being-there itself, one that, far from determining its after-dark side, constitutes every one of its days—in their everydayness.

Thus our existential-ontological interpretation makes no ontic assertion regarding the “corruption of human nature”—not because we do not have the necessary means of proving this, but because our problematic is located prior to any such corruption or uncorruptedness. Collapsing is an ontological concept of movement. Here, there is no ontic decision whether man is “drowned in sin,” is in a status corruptionis, whether he shifts into a status integritatis or finds himself in a stage in-between, in a status gratiae. Any faith and any “world-view” will have to come back to the existential structures we have expositied—if they make any assertions one way or the other, and if they assert anything about being-there as being-in-world—assuming that their assertions also make any claim to a conceptual understanding.*

* Heidegger’s account of collapsing (illustrated in curiosity, re-talk, and ambiguity) has a silent interlocutor as well: Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918-1922). This wide-ranging and thought-provoking work—anything but silent during the 1920s, when Heidegger was writing his own work—addresses many of the same questions and employs many of the same terms: most prominently, the difference between being-there and being-awake and the relation between beginning and ending, then also the workings of space and time, language and dread, understanding and feeling, history and destiny. Yet Spengler’s work focuses attention on culture as the basic unit and raises the question of collapsing in this generalized context—how, namely, a culture gradually loses its roots, becomes self-contained, and eventually expresses itself (as “civilization”) in pure expansion rather than in recovery of its original impulses. Spengler underpins his account of epochs with an understanding of time as linear. —In contrast, Heidegger’s work focuses attention on instances of being-there-in-a-world and detects in each instance a basic tendency toward rootlessness — where curiosity, re-talk and ambiguity replace the original engagement with circumstance that has originated careful discernment, refreshing discourse and decisive response. And in Division Two the work shows how each instance of being-there, viewed from the inside (as being-in-world) rather than globally (as a culture or civilization), engages us in a more original temporality, one essentially inviting us to re-begin rather than to resign ourselves to endings—whereupon history and destiny take on richer meanings, at least for those engaged in creative work, i.e. work recovering beginnings. In short, Heidegger’s account intends to show how contemplation becomes possible and even needful. —Still, his account remains in dialogue with Spengler’s. In my annotation on p. 416 I point out one example where the two obviously respond to the same text regarding primordial time-reckoning. For another vigorous contrast between the two accounts, consider the topic of language, as addressed by Spengler in Volume Two, Chapter II, Section 2, especially §10, “On Language,” which begins: “Whoever intends to penetrate the essence of language should leave aside all scholarly investigation of words and consider carefully how a hunter speaks with his dog” (Der Untergang des Abendlandes [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1923, 1998], pp. 712 ff.). True to his “morphological” (quasi-phenomenological rather than causal) method, Spengler, like Heidegger, detects in any situation the presence of language—which only under relatively incidental conditions takes the form of tongue-induced articulated sounds and formally structured visual sequences.
Chapter Six
Care as the Being of Being-there

§39. The question about the primordial wholeness of the structural whole of being-there

Being-in-world is a whole structure—primordially and constantly. In the preceding Chapters (Two through Five) it was elucidated phenomenally as a whole and, always taking this whole as the basis, in its constitutive factors. The pre-view of the whole of the phenomenon offered at the beginning has now lost the vacuity it had as a first general prefiguration. On the other hand, though, the phenomenal multiplicity of the constitution of the structural whole—the multiplicity of its everyday manner of being—can now easily block the unified phenomenal view of the whole as it is in itself. But this view must be kept all the more free, must be held all the more steadfast, as we now raise the question toward which the preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there strives: How is the wholeness of the structural whole we have elicited to be determined existentially and ontologically?

Being-there ex-sists factically. The question bears on the ontological unity of existentiality and facticity, or on the way facticity essentially belongs to existentiality. On the basis of the attunement essentially belonging to it, being-there has a manner of being in which it is brought before itself and in which it is disclosed to itself in its thrownness. Yet thrownness is the manner in which that being has its being that is itself, in each instance, its possibilities—and in such a way that it understands itself in and from these possibilities (projects itself onto these). Being-in-world—to which being-near-beings-at-hand belongs just as primordially as does being-with-others—is, in each instance, for the sake of itself. Still, this self is initially and mostly inauthentic: it is the one-self.

§40. The basic attunement of dread as a pre-eminent disclosedness of being-there

§41. The being of being-there as care

§42. Confirming the existential interpretation of being-there as care in reference to a pre-ontological self-interpretation of being-there

§43. Being-there, worldliness, and reality

(a) Reality as a problem of being, and the provability of the “outside world”
(b) Reality as an ontological problem
(c) Reality and care

§44. Being-there, disclosedness, and truth

(a) The traditional concept of truth, and its ontological foundations
(b) The primordial phenomenon of truth, and the derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth
(c) The manner truth has its being, and the presupposition of truth

---

1 Cf. §12, pp. 52 ff. [In Chapter Two, the prefiguration of being-in-world: the first discussion of categories and existentials, of being near a world, of facticity, of existential spatiality, of taking-care, and of cognition (as committed to beings as on-rather than at-hand).]
Being-in-world has always already collapsed. Accordingly, the average everydayness of being-there we may determine as collapsing-disclosed, thrown-projecting being-in-world for which its ownmost ability-to-be is at issue—as regards both its being near “world” and its being with others.

Could we ever grasp in its wholeness this structural whole of the everydayness of being-there? Does the being of being-there allow itself to come into relief as a unit in such a way that, from it, the essential equi-primordiality of the structures already pointed out becomes intelligible—along with the existential possibilities of modification that belong to it? Is there a path leading phenomenally to the being of being-there, one taking its lead from the basis our present existential analysis has established?

This much can be said in a negative vein: the wholeness of the structural whole is not phenomenally to be reached by assembling its elements. For this we would need a blueprint. The being of being-there—of the being that ontologically carries within itself its structural whole—becomes accessible as such [only] in a full penetrating look through this whole onto a single phenomenon, one primordially unified and already lying in the whole—so that it grounds ontologically each structural factor in its structural possibility. For this reason, a “comprehensive” interpretation cannot simply gather up and paste together what has already been accounted for. The question bearing on the basic existential character of being-there is essentially distinct from any question bearing on the being of on-hand beings. No everyday experience occurring within a circum-world, and directed (whether ontically or ontologically) toward inner-worldly beings, can bring being-there ontically to the fore so that we might analyze it ontologically. Similarly, the immanent perception provided by experiences lacks ontologically adequate guidelines. On the other hand, the being of being-there should not be deduced from an idea of human being. Might we be able to extract from our interpretation of being-there, as we have already worked it out, what sort of ontic-ontological access to itself it itself insists upon as the only appropriate one?

Some understanding of being belongs to the ontological structure of being-there. Simply by being, being-there is disclosed to itself in its being. Attunement and understanding constitute the manner in which this disclosedness is. Is there an understanding-attunement of being-there in which it is disclosed to itself in a pre- eminent way?

If the existential analysis of being-there is to retain foundational clarity regarding its fundamental-ontological function, it must—in order to master its provisional task, i.e. the task of laying out the being of being-there—search out one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure lurking in being-there itself. The manner of this disclosing, one in which being-there is brought before itself, must occur in such a way that, in it, being-there itself becomes accessible by becoming in some sense simplified. For then, along with what is disclosed in this manner, the structural wholeness of the being of being-there—what we are seeking—comes to light in elemental fashion.

As one attunement satisfying such methodological requirements, the phenomenon of dread will locate the basis of our analysis. The elaboration of this basic attunement, the ontological characterization of what gets disclosed in it, starts out from the phenomenon of collapsing and distinguishes dread from the phenomenon of fear that we analyzed earlier and that is related to the phenomenon of dread. As a possibility of being essential to being-there, dread, along with what in it gets disclosed for being-there itself, offers the phenomenal basis for an explicit apprehension of the primordial wholeness of being essential to being-there. The being of being-there reveals itself as care. The ontological elaboration of this basic existential phenomenon requires that we distinguish it from phenomena that might initially be identified with care. Such phenomena are: will, wish, addiction, passion. Because these are all founded in care, care cannot be derived from them.

Like any ontological analysis, the ontological interpretation of being-there as care, along with whatever it achieves, is far removed from what lies accessible to the pre-ontological understanding of beings—even to the ontic cognizance of them. It should come as no surprise that the common understanding is taken aback by what is ontologically cognized—given what is ontically familiar to such understanding, and exclusively so. Still, already the presently attempted ontic approach to the ontological interpretation of being-there qua care might well seem far- fetched and

* Very often reflexive formulations like “reveals itself” stand in for the middle voice: “lets get revealed.” Here, however, the point is that we (in our intellectual stance) must find out how being-there itself (“pre-ontologically,” i.e. pre-intellectually) does indeed reveal itself—prior to our efforts to formulate the revelation, i.e. prior to our agency, intellectual or not.
The analysis of being-there that pushes toward the phenomenon of care intends to prepare for the fundamental-ontological problematic, the question about the meaning of being in general. In order to steer our sights onto this question while starting from what we have so far obtained (and going beyond the special task of an existentially a priori anthropology), we must look back and grasp even more penetratingly those phenomena that are most intimately connected with our guiding question—the question of being. These phenomena are just those we have hitherto explicated as manners of being: at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness—manner determining those inner-worldly beings not having the character of being-there. Because the ontological problematic has long understood being primarily in the sense of on-hand-ness (“reality,” the actuality of the “world”), but has left the being of being-there ontologically undetermined, there is need for an account of the ontological inter-connection of care, worldliness, at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness (“reality”). This will lead to a sharper determination of the concept of reality—in the context of a discussion of the ways realism and idealism, taking their orientation from this idea, pose their questions epistemologically.

Beings are independently of experience, cognizance and apprehension— whereby they are disclosed, discovered and determined. Being, however, is only within the understanding of that being to whose being some sort of understanding of being belongs. For this reason, being can be un-conceptualized, but it can never be entirely un-understood. In the ontological problematic, being and truth have from ancient times been brought together, if not identified with one another. This documents the necessary connection between being and some understanding—a even though this connection may be concealed in its primordial foundations. For this reason, an adequate preparation for the question of being stands in need of an ontological clarification of the phenomenon of truth. This clarification initially proceeds on the basis of what the foregoing interpretation has achieved regarding the phenomena of discloseness and discoveredness, interpretation and assertion.

In keeping with these considerations, we shall round out the preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there with the following themes: the basic attunement of dread as a pre-eminent discloseness of being-there (§40); the being of being-there as care (§41); the confirmation of our existential interpretation of being-there as care in reference to a pre-ontological self-interpretation of being-there (§42); being-there, worldliness and reality (§43); and being-there, discloseness, and truth (§44).
from itself—itself as authentic ability-to-be-a-self. And this phenomenon of flight from its self, and from its authenticity, does at least seem to offer a suitable phenomenal basis for the following investigation. Yet in such flight being-there precisely does not bring itself before itself. In keeping with the most salient trait of collapsing, turning-away leads away from being-there. However, when considering such phenomena, the investigation must be careful not to conflate their ontic-existential characterization with their ontological-existential interpretation—or: not to overlook in the former the positive phenomenal support for the latter.

In collapsing, the authenticity of being-a-self is indeed existentially closed off and repressed, but this closed-off-ness is only the privation of a dis-closed-ness that manifests itself phenomenally in that the flight of being-there is flight in the face of itself. And it is precisely here—within flight's in-the-face-of—which—that being-there “catches up” with being-there. Only inasmuch as being-there is ontologically, by its very nature, brought before itself by way of the disclosedness belonging to it, can it flee in the face of it. Of course, within this collapsing-turning-away, that in the face of which the flight flees is not apprehended; it is not even experienced in any turning-toward. Still, though, it is “there,” disclosed within the turning away from it. Owing to its character of disclosedness, this existentiell-ontic turning-away offers us—phenomenally—the possibility of grasping existential-ontologically just what it is in the face of which the flight flees. Within the ontic “away from” that lies in the turning-away, we can, in our own phenomenologically interpretive “turning-toward,” understand the flight's in-the-face-of-which, and bring it out conceptually.

In this way, as we take our orientation from the phenomenon of collapsing, we are in principle not irreversibly condemned to experience ontologically something that goes beyond the being-there disclosed within the phenomenon. On the contrary, it is precisely here that our interpretation is least of all consigned to an artificial self-apprehension of being-there. It simply completes the explication of what being-there itself discloses ontically. If, in our interpretation, we keep company with, and keep after, what happens in attuned understanding, the possibility of pushing forward to the being of being-there becomes all the greater the more primordial the phenomenon is that serves methodologically as a disclosive attunement. That dread provides us with such a phenomenon: this is first of all just a claim.

§40. The Basic Attunement of Dread

We are not entirely unprepared for the analysis of dread. However, it is still obscure how it hangs together ontologically with fear. There is obviously a phenomenal kinship. An indication of this is the fact that the two phenomena are mostly not distinguished from one another: what is fear gets designated as dread and what has the characteristic of dread gets called fear. Proceeding step by step, we now attempt to push forward to the phenomenon of dread.

The collapsing of being-there onto the one and onto the “world” taken care of: this we called a “flight” from itself. But not every shrinking back from . . . , not every turning-away from . . . , is necessarily a flight. The shrinking-back founded in fear, the retreat in the face of what fear discloses—in the face of what is threatening—this shrinking-back has the character of flight. The interpretation of fear as attunement showed that the in-the-face-of-which of fear is in each instance something inner-worldly, a being within some determinate where-abouts, one coming closer within what is nearby, one detrimental, and one that need not actually present itself. In collapsing, being-there turns away from itself. The in-the-face-of-which of this shrinking-back must, by its overall character, be threatening; yet it is a being having its being the way the being that is shrinking back has its being: it is being-there itself. The in-the-face-of-which essential to this shrinking-back cannot itself be construed as “scary” because only inner-worldly beings arising for encounter can be such. The threat, the one thing that can be “scary,” and can be uncovered in fear, always comes from some inner-worldly being.

So neither can the turning-away characteristic of collapsing be a fleeing founded on a fear of inner-worldly beings. So little is the turning-away grounded in this manner that it precisely turns toward inner-worldly beings—it is absorbed into them. The turning-away characteristic of collapsing is rather grounded in dread, and it is dread that first makes fear possible.

To achieve an understanding of the talk about the collapsing-flight of being-there in the face of itself, we must recall being-in-world as the basic constitution of this one being. The in-the-face-of-which of dread is being-in-world as such. How does that in the face of which dread dreads distinguish itself phenomenally from that in the face of which fear fears? The in-the-face-of-which of dread is no inner-worldly being. For this reason there can be no binding with it. The threat does not have the character of some one thing determinately detrimental, something
affecting the one who is threatened in some determinate way regarding a particular factual ability-to-be. The in-the-face-of-which of dread is entirely undetermined. This indeterminateness not only leaves it factically undecided which inner-worldly being is threatening; it tells us that inner-worldly beings are not “relevant” at all. Nothing at hand or on hand within one’s world serves as that in the face of which dread dreads. The wholeness of being-bound-up uncovered in an inner-worldly manner, the wholeness of at-hand and on-hand beings, has no import at all. It implode. The world has the character of complete non-signification.* In dread, there arises for encounter no one thing with which, as something threatening, it can be bound up.

And so neither does dread “see” a determinate “here” or “over-there” from which what threatens is approaching. Characteristic of the in-face-of-which of dread is that what does the threatening is nowhere. This “I don’t know” is precisely that in the face of which dread dreads. Yet it is not that “nowhere” means nothing; rather, herein lurks one’s whereabouts just as it is—a disclosedness of world just as it is, and for one’s essentially spatial being-in. For this reason, too, what threatens cannot approach from a determinate direction within what is nearby: it is already “there”—and yet nowhere. It is so near that it squeezes in on one, takes one’s breath away, … and yet is nowhere.

In the in-the-face-of-which of dread the “It’s nothing and nowhere” becomes manifest. The recalcitrance of inner-worldly “nothing and nowhere” means, phenomenally: the in-the-face-of-which of dread is world as such. The complete non-signification evinced in the “nothing and nowhere” does not mean absence of world; rather, it says that inner-worldly beings in themselves are so lacking in import that, precisely on the basis of this non-signification of what is inner-worldly, world in its worldliness now becomes obtusive by itself.†

What here squeezes-in is not this or that, nor is it everything on hand at once, taken as a sum; rather, it is just the possibility of beings being at hand, i.e. world itself. When dread has subsided, everyday talk habitually remarks: “It was really nothing.” Such talk does indeed specify ontically what it was. Everyday talk aims for taking care of and talking about at-hand beings. That in the face of which dread dreads is nothing having the character of inner-worldly beings. Still, this nothingness on the part of at-hand beings—of those beings circumspect talk alone understands—is not a total nothingness. It is grounded in the primordial “something”—i.e. in world. However, world belongs, ontologically and essentially, to the being of being-there as being-in-world. So if it turns out that the in-the-face-of-which of dread is nothingness, i.e. world, this means: that in the face of which dread dreads is being-in-world itself.¶

Reflexive dread discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not that one first of all and by deliberation looks away from inner-worldly beings and thinks just the world (in the face of which dread then arises); rather, it is dread, as a mode of attunement, that first discloses the world as world.* However, this does not mean that in dread the worldliness of world gets conceptualized.

Dread is not only dread in the face of…: as an attunement, it is also dread about… That about which dread dreads is not a determinate manner in which being-there is, not a determinate possibility of being-there. The threat itself is indeed indeterminate, and for that reason it cannot intrude threateningly upon this or that factically concrete ability-to-be. That about which dread dreads is being-in-world itself. In dread, circum-worldly beings, inner-worldly beings in general, fade away. The “world” is not capable of offering anything anymore, least of all being-there-with-others. In this way, dread takes away from being-there the possibility of understanding itself, collapsingly, from the “world” and its

---

* Heidegger defines signification on p. 87: “The relational whole of this signifying [being-bound-up-ness] we call signification.”†

† Recall that, in §16, Heidegger reviewed recalcitrance, obtrusiveness, and conspicuousness as modes in which inner-worldly beings disrupt reference. It is now world itself that becomes recalcitrant and obtrusive.

‡ So “nihilism” has nothing whatsoever to do with it. [Heidegger here finds confirmation that his own work does not intend to promote the view that “everything is meaningless”: a charge that some readers have leveled at him, especially after his inaugural lecture of 1929, “What is Metaphysics?”—which takes the experience of nothingness as its central theme.]

¶ [This being-in-world is to be understood] as what foreordains being as such; what is entirely unhoped for and cannot be settled—what disconcerts. [Cf. the marginalium on p. 42: what is essential about being-there is that it has to be—it is fore-ordained in this sense. This foreordination is now that of being—being in an inclusive sense, not just the being of being-there.]

* Thus dread becomes the condition of the possibility of phenomenological analysis itself. Rather than “wonder” or “curiosity,” let alone “leisure.”
public interpretedness. It throws being-there back upon that about which it reflexively dreads—its own ability-to-be-in-world. Dread individuates being-there onto its ownmost being-in-world—and, as understanding, this being-in-world is essentially one that projects itself onto possibilities. Thus, with the about-which of its reflexive dreading, dread discloses being-there as being-possible—as what it alone, and from itself, can, as individuated, be in its individuation.

Dread manifests, within being-there, its being toward its ownmost ability-to-be, i.e. its being-free for the freedom of choosing itself, seizing upon itself. Dread brings being-there before its being free for… (propensio in…) the authenticity of its being as a possibility it always already is. But this being is also that to which being-there, as being-in-world, is entrusted.

That for the sake of which dread dreads reveals itself as that in the face of which it dreads: being-in-world. The self-sameness of the in-the-face-of-which and the for-the-sake-of-which extends even to the reflexive dread itself. For, as attunement, reflexive dreading is a basic manner of being-in-world. The existential self-sameness of the disclosing and what gets disclosed (so that, in this latter, world as world, being-in as individuated, pure, thrown ability-to-be is disclosed) makes it clear that, with this phenomenon of dread, we have thematized for interpretation a pre-eminent attunement. In this way, dread individuates and discloses being-there as “solus ipse” [only itself]. Far from relocating an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of some world-less event, this existential “solipsism” brings being-there before its world as world—and therewith itself before itself as being-in-world—and this precisely in an extreme sense.

That dread, as a foundational attunement, discloses in such a manner: of this, the everyday interpretation of being-there, its everyday talk, once again offers the most unprejudiced confirmation. Attunement, we earlier said [p. 134], makes manifest “how one is, how it’s going.” In dread, one finds things “uncanny.” What here initially comes to expression is the peculiar indeterminateness of whatever it is near which being-there finds itself in dread: the nothingness and the nowhere. Moreover, uncanniness here also entails not-being-at-home. When we first offered a phenomenal indication of the basic constitution of being-there, and a clarification of the existential meaning of being-in as distinct from the categorial meaning of “inside-ness,” we determined being-in as dwelling near…, being trustingly familiar with….

§40. The Basic Attunement of Dread

In contrast, dread fetches being-there back out of its collapsing absorption in its “world.” Everyday familiarity disintegrates. Being-there is individuated—this, however, as being-in-world. Being-in enters into the existential “mode” of not-at-home. The talk of “uncanniness” means just this, and nothing more.

So now it becomes phenomenally visible in the face of what collapsing, as flight, flees. Not in the face of inner-worldly beings, but precisely toward these—beings near which taking-care can reside in tranquilized familiarity, lost in the one. The collapsing flight into the at-home of the public sphere is flight in the face of the not-at-home, i.e. of the uncanniness lurking in being-there as thrown being-in-world—as entrusted to itself in this thrown being. This uncanniness constantly stalks being-there, and threatens (if not always expressly) its everyday lostness in the one. This threat is factically compatible with a complete security and sufficiency of everyday taking-care. Dread can well up in the most harmless situations. Nor is there any need of darkness—in which things do more easily become uncanny to us. In the dark there is, in a very strong sense, “nothing” to see—even though the world is still “there,” and more obtrusively so.

If we interpret the uncanniness of being-there existential-ontologically as the threat that comes upon being-there itself from itself, this does not mean we are claiming that uncanniness is, in any factual dread, always already understood in this sense. The everyday manner in which being-there understands the uncanniness is that of collapsing turning-away, one that “dims” the not-at-home. However, the everydayness of fleeing shows this much phenomenally: as a basic attunement, dread belongs to the essential constitution of being-there, of being-in-world, a constitution that, as existential, is never on hand but rather is itself always in a mode of factual being-there, i.e. of attunement. The being-in-world that is tranquilized and trustingly familiar is a mode of the uncanniness of being-there, and not the other way around. Not-

1 Cf. §12, pp. 53 ff.
2 Cf. §27, pp. 126 ff.
§40. The Basic Attunement of Dread

being-at-home\textsuperscript{a} must be conceptualized existential-ontologically as the more primordial phenomenon.

And only because dread determines latently, always already, being-in-world, can being-in-world, as being near a “world”\textsuperscript{1} [a collection of things], attuned and taking-care, be afraid. Fear is inauthentic dread, dread that has collapsed onto its “world” and that is concealed from itself.

Factually then, the mood of uncanniness remains for the most part existentially not understood. Moreover, “real” dread is rare, given the predominance of collapsing and of the public sphere. Often, dread is “physiologically” conditioned. In its fickety, this factum is an ontological problem, and not just in regard to how it is ontically caused and how it runs its course. Dread can only be triggered physiologically because being-there, at the very basis of its being, already dreads.\textsuperscript{*}

Even more rare than the existentiell factum of authentic dread are the attempts to interpret this phenomenon in its fundamental existential-ontological constitution and function. In part, the reasons for this lie in the general neglect of the existential analysis of being-there. But, more especially, the reasons lie in the mis-construal of the phenomenon of attunement.\textsuperscript{1} The factual rarity of the phenomenon of dread should not detract from its suitability for assuming a fundamental methodological function in our existential analysis. On the contrary, the rarity of the phenomenon indicates how much being-there (mostly concealed from itself, in its authenticity, by the public interpretedness of the one) becomes disclosable within this basic attunement, and in a primordial way.

To be sure, it belongs to the nature of every attunement to disclose, in each instance, being-in-world in its entirety (world, being-in, self). Yet in dread, because it individuates, there lurks the possibility of a pre-eminent disclosing. Such individuation fetches being-there back out of its collapsing, and makes authenticity and inauthenticity manifest to it, as possibilities of its being. In dread these basic possibilities of being-there — in each case mine\textsuperscript{a} — show themselves “all by themselves”: undistorted by the inner-worldly beings to which being-there initially and

\textsuperscript{a} (dis-own-ment) [Offered as a thought on the relevance of dwelling on “not-being-at-home,” this one-time neologism ties in with a number of interrelated thoughts on the root word “own” (much in evidence in Heidegger’s later works). Instead of proposing that our basic task is to find out, or to figure out, what and how things are, Heidegger aims for a thinking that engenders (or is engendered by — if only we had a middle voice!) “things coming into their own”— and this as an event rather than as either a discovery or a fabrication on our part. Our relation to this event is then first of all its refusal, our loss of it: a being disowned. In Being and Time, taking world as our own (authenticity: owning up to being owned) is understood as a prerequisite for any genuine articulation of the question of being. Without this “development,” we will only look for what we ourselves can own: property, both in the sense of “estate” (Greek: οὐσία) and in the sense of “essential feature” — phenomenological evidence that we have lost both.]

\textsuperscript{*} With today’s panoply of legal mood-changing drugs, both patients and therapists can now officially “blame the body” for the phenomenon of dread.

\textsuperscript{1} It is no coincidence that the phenomena of dread and fear (for the most part not distinguished) have come up ontically — and even ontologically, but within very narrow limits — within the purview of Christian theology. It has always happened when the anthropological problem of the being of man in its bearing

on God has gained primacy, and when phenomena like faith, sin, love, and repentance have guided the posing of questions. Cf. Augustine’s doctrine of timor castus and servilis [fear that is pure vs. fear that is servile], much discussed in his exegetical writings and in his letters. Regarding fear in general, cf. De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus—question 33: de metu; question 34: utrum non aliud amandum sit, quam metu carere; question 35: quid amandum sit (Migne edition, Vol. VII, pp. 23 ff.).

Luther treated the problem of fear (other than in the traditional connection with poenitentia and contritio [penance and contrition]) in his commentary on Genesis — here, of course, much less conceptually but then all the more edifyingly; cf. his Enarrationes in genesis, Chapter 3 (Erlanger edition of his works, Exegetica opera latina, Vol. 1, pp. 177 ff.).

Søren Kierkegaard it was who went farthest in the analysis of the phenomenon of dread, and once again in the theological context of a “psychological” exposition of the problem of original sin. Cf. The Concept of Dread, 1844.

\textsuperscript{a} [This “in each case mine” is to be taken] not egoistically, but rather in the sense of being thrown into taking [being-there] over. [Heidegger emphasizes how the “instantial mine-ness” introduced on p. 53 is to be understood: the being-there under investigation is always “my problem”, being-there has to be. Cf. Kierkegaard’s formulation in The Sickness unto Death: “The self is, κατα δύναμιν, just as possible as it is necessary; for though it is itself, it has to become itself. Inasmuch as it is itself, it is the necessary, and inasmuch as it has to become itself, it is a possibility.” But, Heidegger insists, this drama is played out on the stage of world, with the self appearing on the stage in different guises — even, but not primordially, as a Cartesian ego.]
mostly attaches itself.

To what extent have we now, with our existential interpretation of dread, gained a phenomenal basis for answering our guiding question about the being of the wholeness of the structural whole of being-there? *

§41. The being of being-there as care

With the intention of ontologically apprehending the wholeness of the structural whole, we must first of all ask: Is the phenomenon of dread, along with what gets disclosed in it, capable of giving (phenomenally and equi-primordially) the whole of being-there — in such a way that, with a view to this givenness, our searching look onto that wholeness can fulfil itself? It is easy to list formally the factors lying in it: as an attunement, reflexive dread is a manner of being-in-world; its in-the-face-of-which is thrown being-in-world; its for-the-sake-of-which is ability-to-be-in-world. Accordingly, the full phenomenon of dread shows being-there as factically ex-sisting being-in-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this one being are existentiality, facticity, and collapsedness. These existential determinations do not belong to a composite as its pieces, such that one or another might on occasion be missing; rather, there is a primordial interconnection spun in them, one constituting the searched-for wholeness of the structural whole. In the unity of those essential determinations of being-there the being of being-there can be grasped as such, and ontologically. How is the unity itself to be characterized?

Being-there is a being for which, in its being, its being is at issue. In [the analysis of] the essential constitution of understanding this “being at issue” was clarified: understanding is a reflexively projective being toward an ownmost ability-to-be. This it is for which being-there is, in each instance, how it is. In each instance, being-there has already, in its being, assembled itself with a view to a possibility of itself. In dread, being-free for its ownmost ability-to-be, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, shows itself in a primordial and elemental concretion. Ontologically, however, this being toward its ownmost ability-to-be means: in each instance, being-there is, in its being, already ahead of itself. Being-there is always already “out beyond itself” — not as a comportment to some other being that it is not, but rather as a being toward the ability-to-be that it itself is. This essential structure of the essential “being at issue” we apprehend as the being-ahead-of-itself of being-there.

Yet this structure bears on the whole of the constitution of being-there. The being-ahead-of-itself does not signify anything like an isolated drive within a worldless “subject”; rather, it characterizes being-in-world. But it belongs to being-in-world that it is entrusted to itself — that it is in each instance already thrown into a world. In dread, the abandonment of being-there to itself shows itself in a primordially concrete way. More fully formulated, the being-ahead-of-itself means: being-ahead-of-itself while already being in a world. As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen phenomenally, what we earlier brought out in the analysis of worldliness is also clarified. At that point this much became clear: the referential whole of signification (as what constitutes worldliness) is “anchored” in a for-the-sake-of-which. That the referential whole, along with the manifold relations of the in-order-to, is bound up with what is at issue for being-there: this does not mean that an on-hand “world” of objects is welded onto a subject. That these two are bound up with one another is rather the phenomenal expression of the primordial, the whole constitution of being-there, the wholeness of which is now brought into relief explicitly as a being-ahead-of-itself-in . . . In other words: ex-sisting is always factual. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.

And again: the factual ex-sisting of being-there is not only in general, and undifferentiatedly, a thrown ability-to-be-in-world. It is rather, and in addition, always already absorbed into the world it takes care of. Within this collapsing being-near . . . there is announced — expressly or not, understood or not — a fleeing in the face of the

* The question of wholeness here (and in the first three Chapters of Division Two) initially appears as merely “formal”. What “principle” allows us to contemplate the “unity” of the multiplicity? Gradually, however, the questions shifts into: How does being-there itself “get made whole”? This latter version then corresponds to (or competes with) Plato’s question about the unity of the soul in parallel with the unity of the city. Heidegger’s version bears neither directly on the soul (self) nor directly on beings (nature), but on “being-in-world,” so that any “getting made whole” will essentially include what we take care of and who we care for. — Cf. the story of Yudhisthira’s encounter with Indra, as recounted in the introduction to Bhagavad-Gita, translated by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood (Hollywood: Vedanta Press, 1944), pp. 26-27.
uncanniness; this uncanniness mostly remains concealed in latent dread, since the public sphere of the one suppresses all unfamiliarity. Within the ahead-of-itself-already-in-a-world there lies, essentially included, a collapsing being-near the inner-worldly at-hand beings taken care of.

So the formally existential wholeness of the ontological structural whole of being-there must be formulated to have the following structure: the being of being-there entails being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(world), and this as being-near (inner-worldly beings arising for encounter). This being [of being-there] satisfies the meaning of the term care, a term we employ in a purely ontological-existential sense. Excluded from this meaning is every ontically understood drive to be, say, care-loaded or care-free.

Because being-in-world is essentially care, our earlier analyses could formulate being near at-hand beings as taking-care, and being with the being-there of others (the being-there-with arising in a world) as caring-for. Being-near... is taking-care because it gets formed, as a way of being-in, by way of its basic structure, namely care. Care does not characterize just existentiality — supposedly absolved of facticity and collapsing; rather, it comprises the unity of these essential determinations [of being-there]. So, too, care does not primarily and exclusively refer to an isolated comportment of the I to itself. The expression “self-caring” — analogous to taking-care and caring-for — would be a tautology. Care cannot mean a special comportment to a self because being-ahead-of-itself already characterizes its comportment ontologically. And in this determination both the other structural factors are co-posed: the already-being-in... and the being-near... .

In being-ahead-of-itself (this as a being toward its ownmost ability to be) there lies the existential-ontological condition of the possibility of being-free for authentic existentiell possibilities. It is for the sake of the ability to be that being-there in each instance is how it factically is. Now, inasmuch as this being toward ability-to-be is itself determined by freedom, being-there can comport itself unwillingly toward its possibilities: it can be inauthentically — and factically is this way, initially and mostly. Authentic for-the-sake-of which then remains unseized upon, the projection of its ability-to-be is abandoned to the disposition of the one. Thus the “self” in the being-ahead-of-itself means the self in the sense of the one-self. Even in its inauthenticity, being-there remains essentially ahead-of-itself — just as the collapsing-fleeing of being-there in the face of itself still shows its essential constitution: that for this one being its being is at issue.

As a primordial structural wholeness, care lies existentially-a-priori “before” i.e. already already within every factical “comportment” and “predicament” of being-there. Thus this phenomenon in no way expresses a primacy of “practical” over theoretical behavior. Determining things by just looking-on has the character of care — no less than does “political action” or enjoying oneself by taking a rest. “Theory” and “practice” are possibilities in which that being can be whose being must be determined as care.

For these reasons, too, any attempt will fail that takes the phenomenon of care (a phenomenon having a wholeness that is essentially un-sunderable) and tries to trace it back to special acts or drives — such as willing and wishing, passion or addiction — or tries to build it up from these.

Willing and wishing are rooted, in an ontologically necessary way, in being-there as care; they are not simply ontologically undifferentiated experiences occurring in “flow” (the meaning of which remains entirely undetermined). The same holds no less of passion and addiction; they too are grounded in care — insofar as they can be at all displayed purely in being-there. This does not preclude that passion and addiction might also be ontologically constitutive for beings merely “living.” However, the basic ontological constitution of “living” is a problem in its own right, and can only be unravelled, by way of a reductive privation, from the ontology of being-there.*

* For the “complications” of self-caring (ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμελείσθαι), see Plato’s Alcibiades (127D ff.): one must “know oneself” in order to take care of oneself — and such care, though distinct from caring about what belongs to oneself, spills over precisely into caring for the city. Cf. Michel Foucault’s comments shortly before his death: while the original Greek philosophers were concerned about developing the τέχνη of living, the Epicureans, Seneca, Pliny and others narrowed the field down to the care of the soul (Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 1983, pp. 234-5). A fuller development of these thoughts is now available in his L’herméneutique du sujet: cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982 (Paris, 2001).
Care is ontologically “earlier” than such phenomena, and these we can of course always “describe” appropriately—within certain limits—without the full ontological horizon needing to be visible, or even recognized at all. For the purposes of the present fundamental-ontological investigation (that aims neither for a thematically complete ontology of being-there, nor even for a concrete anthropology), an indication of how these phenomena are grounded in care will have to suffice.

The ability-to-be for the sake of which being-there is: this itself has its being in the manner of being-in-world. Accordingly, within this ability-to-be lies ontologically a relation to inner-worldly beings. Care is always, even if only privatively, taking-care and caring-for. In willing, an understood being, i.e. a being projected onto its possibility, gets seized upon—either to be taken-care-of or to be brought into its being by way of caring-for. It is for this reason that in each instance something willed belongs to willing—something already determined from a for-the-sake-of-which. Constitutive for the ontological possibility of willing are: a precedential disclosedness of the for-the-sake-of-which in general (being-ahead-of-itself), a disclosedness of what can be taken care of (world as the where-in of already-being), and the understanding self-projection of being-there onto an ability-to-be geared toward a possibility of the being that is “willed.” In the phenomenon of willing the foundational wholeness of care peeks through.*

look to this genus (in the decades prior to *Being and Time*, to the “irrational”—whether internally to “personal experience,” or externally to biology). By turning attention to being-there, Heidegger offers an alternative way of understanding the human condition.

* Since Nietzsche, many European thinkers have tried to understand willing as foundational. Reading “power” in place of the broader “ability-to-be” and the substantive “will” in place of the verbal “willing,” we might especially appreciate Heidegger’s “derivation” of willing from care: whereas “will to power” only means expressing oneself by exerting and inserting oneself “aimlessly” (i.e., for the sake of self-expression), care as taking-care and caring-for have definite directions supplied by the “intentionality” of being-in-world. The ability-to-be “always at issue” pertains most primordially to being-there itself: it therefore unfolds most authentically within care (of circumstance, for others) and for this reason binds and directs “willing” to something “willed.” Yet “will to power” remains our pre-dominant inheritance from the Enlightenment.

As factual, the understanding self-projection of being-there is in each instance already near an uncovered world. From this world it takes its possibilities—initially, those in keeping with the interpretedness provided by the one. From the start, this interpretation has restricted the possibilities of choice to the range of what is familiar, achievable, bearable: to what is fitting and proper. This leveling down of the possibilities of being-there to what is initially available in everydayness effects also a dimming down of possibilities as such. The average everydayness of taking-care becomes blind to possibilities and tranquillizes itself with what is merely “actual.” This tranquillization does not exclude extensive hustle on the part of taking-care; it rather arouses it. Willed are then not positive new possibilities; rather, what is [already] available gets “tactically” altered in such a way that the illusion arises that something is happening.

Still, under the leadership of the one, tranquilized “willing” signifies not an extinction of being-toward ability-to-be, but only a modification of it. Being-toward-possibilities here shows itself mostly as mere wishing. In a wish, being-there projects its being onto possibilities that not only remain un-seized-upon in taking-care: the fulfillment of these possibilities is not even considered or expected. On the contrary, the predominance of being-ahead-of-itself in the mode of mere wishing entails a non-understanding of factual possibilities. The being-in-world whose world is primarily projected as a wish-world has been lost, has no foothold, in what is available—but in such a way that what is available, i.e. what is indeed at hand, is (in the light of the wish-world) never enough. Wishing is an existential modification of the reflexive projection that, while understanding and having collapsed into its thrownness, now simply hankers after possibilities. Such hankering closes off the possibilities; what is then “there” in this hankering-that-wishes becomes the “real world.” Wishing ontologically presupposes care.

In hankering, the already-being-near . . . has primacy. The being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-in is modified accordingly. Hankering, itself a collapsing, makes manifest the addiction of being-there: it wants to “get lived” by the world in which it happens to be. Addiction shows the character of being-after . . . . The being-ahead-of-itself has gotten lost in a “merely-always-being-near . . . .” The “go for it!” of addiction is a letting-on oneself-be-pulled by whatever the hankering is after. When being-there sinks, as it were, into an addiction, it’s not that there’s simply an
addiction on hand; rather, the full structure of care is modified. Having become blind, being-there turns all possibilities to the service of the addiction.

In contrast, the passion “to live” is a “go for it!” that generates the impulsion from itself. It’s a “go for it at any price!” Passion tries to repress other possibilities. Here, too, the being-ahead-of-itself is inauthentic, even though being overcome by passion comes from the impassioned one himself. Passion can overwhelm any particular attunement and understanding. However, being-there is not then—and never is—“mere passion,” to which other comportments of mastery and leadership are sometimes added; rather, passionate being-there is, as a modification of being-in-world in its entirety, always already care.

In the form of pure passion, care has not yet broken free—even though it is care that first makes it ontologically possible for being-there to be troubled by and from itself. Contrariwise, in the form of addiction, care is always already in chains. Addiction and passion are possibilities rooted in the thrownness of being-there. The passion “to live” cannot be annihilated, the addiction “to get lived” by the world cannot be extirpated. But, because and only because they are grounded ontologically in care, both can be ontically and existentially modified, by way of care, as authentic.*

The expression “care” names a [single] basic existential-ontological phenomenon, one that nonetheless is not simple in its structure. The ontologically elemental wholeness of the structure of care cannot be reduced to an ontic “primal element”—just as being cannot be “explained” from beings. In the end it will be shown that the general idea of being itself is as far from being “simple” as is the being-of-being-there. The determination of care as a being-ahead-of-itself—while-already-being-in...—[and this] as a being-near...: this determination makes it clear that this phenomenon, too, is in itself structurally joined together. But is this then not a phenomenal indication that the ontological question must be pushed still further, toward the exhibition of a phenomenon even more primordial, one that supports the unity and the wholeness of the structural manifold of care?* Before our investigation turns to this question, there is need for a retrospective and sharpened appropriation of what we have so far interpreted with a view to the fundamental-ontological question about the meaning of being in general [§§43 & 44]. Yet, before that, it should be shown that what is ontologically “new” about this interpretation is ontically quite old. The explication of the being of being-there as care does not force being-there into a contrived idea; rather, it provides us existentially with a way of conceptualizing what is already disclosed ontically and existentially.

§42. Confirming the existential interpretation of being-there as care in reference to a pre-ontological self-interpretation of being-there

In the foregoing interpretations that finally led to the exhibition of care as the being of being-there, everything depended on arriving at the appropriate ontological foundations for the one being that in each instance we ourselves are, and that we [normally] call “human being.” To meet this challenge, the analysis had to be wrenched out of directing itself according to the traditional but ontologically unclarified and basically questionable starting point, as this latter is prescribed by the traditional definition of man [p. 48: animal rationale]. Measured by this definition, the existential-ontological interpretation may well disconcert—especially if “care” is simply taken ontically as “worry” or “distress.” For this reason it is relevant to call in a pre-ontological testimonial, even though its force as a proof is “only historical.”

But let’s remember: in this testimonial, being-there speaks out about itself and from itself “primordially”: not determined by theoretical interpretations, and without any intention of forming such an interpretation. Moreover, consider this: the being of being-there is characteristically historical—something that we will eventually have to demonstrate [Division Two, Chapter Five]. If being-there is, as the basis of its being, “historical,” an assertion coming from its history and going back into it—and, moreover, lurking prior to all science—carries special

* Heidegger’s account of addiction and passion (the more or less desperate need to have vs. the more or less desperate need to do: both as truncated manifestations of care) contributes most obviously to the effort to overcome the “active-passive” dichotomy permeating western thought from Plato onwards. Yet it also paves the way for overcoming a similar duality that, at the time of Toynbee and Ortega y Gasset, permeated historiography: the debate over whether the movements of peoples stemmed from problems undergone or projects envisioned.

* The phenomenon supporting the unity and wholeness of care will be temporality—the topic of Division Two.
The following pre-ontological evidence for the existential-ontological interpretation of being-there as care the author came upon in an essay by Konrad Burdach: “Faust und Sorge,” in Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, I (1923), pp. 1 ff. Burdach shows that Goethe got the fable (which comes down to us from Hyginus as fable 220) from Herder, and worked on it for Part Two of his Faust. Cf. especially pp. 40 ff. — The text cited is that of Franz Buecheler: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Vol. 41 (1886), pp. 5 ff. The [German] translation is that of Burdach, pp. 41 ff.

The following self-interpretation of being-there is recorded in an ancient myth:¹

*Cura cum fluvium transiret, vidit cretosum lutum sustulitque cogitabunda atque coepit fingere.*

dum deliberat quid iam fecisset, Jovis intervenit.

*rogat eum Cura ut det illi spiritum, et facile imperat.*

cui cum vellet Cura nomen ex sese ipsa imponer.

*Jovis prohibuit suamque nomen ei dandum esse dictat.*

dam Cura et Jovis discipient, Tellus surrexit simul suamque nomen esse volui cui corpus praebuerit suum.

*sumpserunt Saturnum iudicem, sic aecus iudicat:* *tu Jovis quia spiritum dedisti, in morte spiritum,*

*quaeTellus, quia ... quamdiu vixerit.*

*Cura enim qua prima finxit, teneat quandiu viserit.*

*sed quae nunc de nomine eius vobis controversia est,*

*homo vocetur, quia videtur esse factus ex homo.*

Once when Care was crossing a river she saw some clay and, thoughtfully, she took a piece and began to mould it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jove came by. Care asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But, when Care wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, Jove forbade this and insisted that it be given his name instead. While Care and Jove were disputing, Earth (Tellus) rose up and demanded that her own name be conferred, as it was her body. They asked Saturn to judge, and he judged as follows:

“You, Jove, since you gave the spirit, in death you get its spirit; you, Earth, because you gave the body, you get its body. Care, since she first made it, shall keep it as long as it lives. And because there is controversy among you about its name, let it be called *homo* since it is made from humus (earth).

This pre-ontological testimony takes on a special significance not only in that it sees “care” as what belongs to human being-there “as long as it lives” but also in that this primacy of “care” emerges in connection with the familiar understanding of man as a composite of body (earth) and spirit. *Cura prima finxit:* the being of this one being has its “origin” in care. *Cura teneat, quandiu viserit:* This one being does not get away from this origin but is held by it, dominated by it, so long as it is “in the world.” Its “being-in-world” has care as its stamp of being. It receives its name (*homo*) not with a view to its being, but in regard to where it comes from (*humus*). Just where this “original” being of the formed creature can be seen: this decision depends on Saturn — “time.”¹

So the determination of man expressed pre-ontologically in this myth has at the outset brought into view the one manner of being dominating its entire *temporal sojourn in the world.*

The history of the ontic concept of *cura* — of how it has taken on significance — allows us to detect still further basic structures of being-there. Burdach² calls attention to the double meaning of the term: *cura* not only signifies “anxious effort” but also “careful attention,” “devotion.” Thus Seneca writes in his last letter (*Epistles*, 124): “Of the four existing natures (tree, animal, man, god) the last two, alone endowed

¹ The following pre-ontological evidence for the existential-ontological interpretation of being-there as care the author came upon in an essay by Konrad Burdach: “Faust und Sorge,” in Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, I (1923), pp. 1 ff. Burdach shows that Goethe got the fable (which comes down to us from *Hyginus* as fable 220) from Herder, and worked on it for Part Two of his *Faust*. Cf. especially pp. 40 ff. — The text cited is that of Franz Buecheler: Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Vol. 41 (1886), pp. 5 ff. The [German] translation is that of Burdach, pp. 41 ff.

² Op. cit., p. 49. Already in the Stoics *µερινα* is a term fixed in its meaning, and in the New Testament the term comes up again — in the Vulgate, as *solicitude*. — The direction in which the foregoing existential analysis of being-there has been looking is one that, for the author, germinated in connection with his attempts to interpret Augustinian (and that means Greek-Christian) anthropology with an eye to the basic fundamentals achieved in the ontology of Aristotle. [Indeed, Heidegger's account of care makes explicit what Plato and Aristotle incessantly "make use of" without making thematic: the need to care for things, precisely in order even to know, let alone master them, governs the analyses of cognition in Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (the evidence supplied by τεχνη, competence in handling things). Heidegger has taught many to read these works phenomenologically — here, by opening them out onto their own foundations, “deconstructing” them.]
with reason, are different in that god is immortal and man is mortal. Of these two, the good of the one (i.e., of god) his own nature perfects, the good of the other (of man) care (cura): *unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis.*

The *perfectio* of man, his becoming what, in his being free for his ownmost possibilities (in projection), he can be: this is “accomplished” by ‘care.’ Yet, equi-primordially, care determines the basic manner in which this being is — according to which it is consigned to the world it takes care of (thrownness). The “double meaning” of *cura* bears on a single basic constitution in its essentially twofold structure — thrown projection.

In contrast to an ontic interpretation, the existential-ontological interpretation is not, say, a mere theoretical-ontic generalization. Such a generalization would simply be saying: every comportment of man is ontically “filled with cares” and guided by a “devotion” to something. The [proper] “generalization” is a priori and ontological: it does not bear on constantly recurring ontic properties but rather on a constitution [of being-there] that in each case already grounds its being. This constitution first makes it ontologically possible that we can address this one being ontically as *cura*. It is with a view to a primordial, i.e. ontological meaning of care that we must conceptualize the existential condition of the possibility of “caring for life” and “devoting oneself.”

On the other hand, the transcendental “generality” of the phenomenon of care, and of all fundamental existentials, does have a broad enough expanse to offer a foothold for every ontic interpretation of being-there (every world-view), whether it understands being-there as “caring for life” (as “having troubles”) or in some contrary manner [as “devoted,” as “carefree,” . . . ].

The ontically obtrusive “vacuity” and “generality” of existential structures have their own ontological determinateness and fullness. Thus the whole of the constitution of being-there itself is, in its unity, not simple; it rather exhibits a structural jointedness coming to expression in the existential concept of care.

Our ontological interpretation has brought the pre-ontological self-

* It is *cura* as “making an effort” that “makes us whole” — as when we *cure* things of their diseases, i.e. make up for their “imperfections.” Division Two considers how it is that being-there is made whole, “per-fected.”
into understanding “world”—in keeping with the manner in which it has its being in collapsing. Even when it is not a question of an ontic experience but rather of an ontological understanding, one’s interpretation of being initially takes its orientation from the being of inner-worldly beings. In doing this, one jumps over the being of those beings initially at hand and proceeds right off to conceptualize beings as an on-hand interconnection of things (as res). [In this way,] being takes on the meaning of reality. The basic determination of being becomes substantiality. In keeping with this transposition of the understanding of being, the ontological understanding of being-there also shifts into the horizon of this concept of being. Just as other beings, being-there too is a being that is on hand as something real. In this way, being in general takes on the meaning of reality. Accordingly, the concept of reality has a peculiar primacy in the [traditional] ontological problematic. This primacy bars the path to an intrinsic existential analysis of being-there—indeed, it even blocks the view of the being of beings as these are first of all at hand in a world. In the end, this primacy forces the problematic of being into misdirected paths. With an eye to reality, other modes of being get determined negatively and privatively.

Thus it is that not only the analysis of being-there, but also the elaboration of the question about the meaning of being in general, must be turned and twisted out of and away from the one-sided orientation guided by being construed as reality. What needs to be demonstrated is this: reality is not only just one kind of being among others, it stands ontologically in a determinate context with being-there, world, and at-hand-ness—a context providing its very foundation. This demonstration requires a foundational elucidation of the problem of reality, its conditions and its limitations.

Under the heading “problem of reality” various questions are jumbled together: 1. whether there could be such a thing as a being supposedly “transcending consciousness”; 2. whether this reality of the

\[\text{§43. Being-there, Worldliness, and Reality} \]

“outside world” could be adequately proved; 3. to what extent this being, if it is real, could be known in its being-in-itself; and 4. what the meaning of this being, reality, could signify. With a view to the question of fundamental ontology, the following elucidation of the problem of reality discusses three matters: (a) reality as a problem of being, and the provability of the “outside world”; (b) reality as an ontological problem; and (c) reality and care.

(a) Reality as a problem of being, and the provability of the “outside world”

Of the questions cited regarding reality, first in order is the ontological one—what [the term] reality even signifies. Yet so long as there was lacking a purely ontological understanding of the problem and the method, this question, whenever it was explicitly asked at all, had to be confounded with the elucidation of the “problem of the external world”; for the analysis of reality is only possible on the basis of an appropriate access to what's real. But starting long ago the manner in which we take hold of what's real was taken to be intuitive cognition. Such cognition “is” [occurs as] a comportment of the soul, of consciousness. Since the character of in-itself and independence belongs to reality, the question about the meaning of reality interconnects with the question about a possible independence of what's real “from consciousness”—or, alternatively, about a possible transcendence, on the part of consciousness, into the “sphere” of the real. The possibility of an adequate ontological analysis of reality depends [therefore] on how far that from which such independence supposedly subsists [viz., soul or consciousness, i.e.] what supposedly gets transcended, is itself clarified in regard to its being. Only then does it become ontologically intelligible even how the transcending has its being. And, finally, the primary manner of access to what's real must be secured by deciding the question whether cognition can take on this function at all.

These investigations—ones taking precedence over any possible ontological question about reality—have been carried out in the foregoing existential analysis. According to that analysis, cognition is a founded mode of access to the real. By its very nature, what's real is only accessible as inner-worldly. Every access to inner-worldly beings is ontologically founded in the basic constitution of being-there—in its being-in-world. This has the more primordial constitution of care (being-ahead-of-itself—being already in a world—as being near inner-
worldly beings).

The question whether there is any world at all, and whether its being can be proved, is, as a question posed by *being-there* (as being-in-world) — and who else could pose it? — senseless. Moreover, such a question is plagued by a double meaning: world as the wherein of being-in and “world” as inner-worldly beings (as the things in which taking-care gets absorbed) are conflated, or not even distinguished at all. Yet, with the *being* of being-there, world is essentially disclosed; and with the disclosure of world, “world” is in each instance already uncovered. Of course inner-worldly beings, precisely these construed as real and merely on hand, can remain under cover. However, anything real can only be uncovered on the basis of a world already disclosed. And only on this same basis can something real still remain *concealed*. One [traditionally] poses the question about the “reality” of the “outside world” without clarifying precedently the *phenomenon of world* as such. Factically, the “problem of the “outside world” takes its orientation from inner-worldly beings (things and objects). In this way, such elucidations steer themselves into a problematic that is almost impossible to disentangle ontologically.

In Kant’s “refutation of idealism” we can see the confusion of questions, the jumbling together of what it intends to prove with what is in fact proved and with what it calls upon to conduct the proof. Kant calls it “a scandal to philosophy, and to human reason in general,” that there is still no cogent proof, dispelling all skepticism, for the “existence of things outside us.” He himself proposes such a proof, one taking the form of justification for the thesis: “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.”

It must first of all be noted that Kant employs the term “existence” to designate that kind of being that the foregoing analysis has called “on-hand-ness.” For Kant, “consciousness of my existence” means consciousness of my being on hand in the Cartesian sense. The term “existence” refers to the on-hand-ness of consciousness as well as the on-hand-ness of things.

The proof for the “existence of things outside me” leans on the thought that change and permanence belong equi-primordially to the essence of time. My being on hand, i.e. the being-on-hand of a manifold of representations given in inner sense, is on-hand change. However, any determinateness of time presupposes something permanently on hand. But this cannot be “in us”—“since it is only through this permanent that my existence in time can itself be determined.” With the empirically posited on-hand change “in me” there is necessarily and empirically co-posted something permanent and on hand “outside me.” This permanence is the condition of the possibility of there being change on hand “in me.” The experience of the being-in-time of representations posits equi-primordially something changing “in me” and something permanent “outside me.”

Of course, the proof is not a causal inference, and is therefore not encumbered with the shortcomings of such an inference. Kant offers, as it were, an “ontological proof” starting with the idea of a temporal being [self-consciousness]. At first it seems as though Kant had given up the Cartesian attempt to posit a subject findable in isolation. But it only seems so. That Kant demands a proof at all for the “existence of things outside me” already shows that he takes the subject, the “in me,” as the foothold for the problematic. The proof itself is then carried through by starting out from the empirically given change “in me.” For only “in me” is the “time” experienced that undergirds the proof. This “time” offers the ground for leaping, by proof, into what’s “outside me.” Kant even emphasizes this: “Problematic idealism, which … merely pleads incapacity to prove, through immediate experience, any existence except our own, is, insofar as it allows of no decisive judgement until sufficient proof has been found, reasonable and in accordance with a thorough and philosophical mode of thought.”

But even if the ontic primacy of the isolated subject and inner experience were abandoned, the Cartesian position would still be kept. What Kant proves (supposing for the moment that his proof and its basis are correct) is that change and permanence go together in the case of beings that are on hand. But this placement of two on-hand beings on

2. *ibid.*, Preface, note [following N. K. Smith’s translation].
3. *ibid.*, B 275 [following N. K. Smith’s translation].
the same level still does not entail that subject and object are on hand together. And even if that were to be proved, what's ontologically most decisive would still remain covered up: the basic constitution of the “subject,” of being-there, as being-in-world. The being-on-hand-together of something physical and something psychical is ontically and ontologically entirely different from the phenomenon of being-in-world.

Kant presupposes the difference and the interconnection of the “in me” and the “outside me.” Factically, he is right do so; but, given what his proof is driving at, it is not right. He has not shown that what, owing to the consideration of time, pertains to the interconnection of on-hand change and permanence also holds for the interconnection of the “in me” and “outside me.” Yet if he had seen the whole of the difference and interconnection between the “inside” and the “outside” (the whole he was presupposing in his proof)—if he had understood ontologically what was presupposed in his presupposition—it would have become impossible to consider the proof of “the existence of things outside me” as yet to be accomplished and necessary.

The “scandal to philosophy” does not consist in there not yet being such a proof, but in the recurrent expectation for and attempt at such proofs. Such expectations, intentions, and demands germinate from an ontologically inadequate assumption of there being something, independently from which and “outside” of which, a “world” is to be proved as on hand. It's not that the proofs are inadequate; rather, it's that the manner in which the being undertaking and craving the proof has its being is under-determined. For this reason the illusion can arise that, with the demonstration of the necessary on-hand connection between two on-hand beings [something permanent and something changing] something can be shown or at least proved about being-there as being-in-world. Any rightly understood being-there defies such proofs because, in its being, it already is what subsequent proofs consider necessary to demonstrate for it.

If one were to conclude, from the impossibility of proofs that things are on hand outside us, that therefore their being-on-hand “must be accepted merely on faith,” the distortion of the problem would not be overcome. There would still be the preconceived idea that, basically and ideally, we should be able to devise a proof. In restricting oneself to a

1. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey’s “Beiträge zur Lösung der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Außenwelt und seinem Recht” (1890), in Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 5, 1, pp. 90 ff. Right at the outset of this treatise Dilthey states the point in all clarity:

For, should there be for us any universally valid truth, our thinking must, in accordance with the method prescribed by Descartes, pave a way from the facts of consciousness toward the actuality outside.

“faith in the reality of the outside world”—even if one expressly accords to this faith its own “justification”—one endorses the same inappropriate approach to the problem. One still agrees, in principle, with the demand for a proof even as one aspires to satisfy the demand along a path other than that of a stringent proof. ¹

Even if one were to claim that the subject had to presuppose that the “outside world” is on hand—and already did presuppose it unconsciously—at issue would still be the constructive positioning of an isolated subject. In this effort, the phenomenon of world would then be just as little accounted for in the effort to demonstrate the interconnection of physical and psychical things considered as on hand. With all such presuppositions, being-there already always comes “too late”—because, inasmuch as it is the one that, as a being, effects any such presupposition (and in no other way is a presupposition possible), it is, in each instance as a being, already in a world. The “a priori” of its essential constitution, the “a priori” manner it has its being in care, is “earlier” than any presupposition and comportment on the part of being-there.

To believe in the reality of the “outside world,” whether justifiably or not, to prove anything about this reality, whether adequately or not, to presuppose this reality, whether explicitly or not,—all such attempts, not having mastered their own basis in full transparency, presuppose at the outset a world-less subject, or at least one unsure of its world, in any case a subject that then basically has to assure itself of its world. Right off, then, being-in-world is aligned with construing, supposing, assuring, and believing—a comportment that is itself, always already, a founded mode of being-in-world.

The “problem of reality” (construed as the question whether an outside world is on hand and whether it is provable) proves itself to be an impossible one—not because it leads in its results to unbearable aporias, but because the very being that is here thematized rejects, as it were, this way of positioning the question. We do not need to prove that

¹ ibid., Preface, xxxix, note [still following N. K. Smith's translation].
and how an “outside world” is on hand, we rather need to show why it is that being-there, as being-in-world, has this drive initially to bury the “outside world” in nothingness “epistemologically” in order then to prove it. The ground of this drive lies in the collapsing of being-there, and in the relocation, motivated by this collapsing, of the primary understanding of being into the being of on-hand-ness.* When in this ontological orientation the question is positioned “critically” [i.e., in the manner of neo-Kantian critical philosophy], it finds a mere “inside” as what is initially and solely on hand with certainty. Subsequent to this shattering of the primordial phenomenon of world, one resorts to this last remainder, the isolated subject, and splices it together with a “world.”

In the present investigation we cannot discuss at length the wide variety of attempts to solve the “problem of reality” that have evolved in the interplay of realism and idealism and the efforts to mediate between them. As certainly as there is in each of them a kernel of genuine questioning, it would be wrong-headed to aim for a tenable solution to the problem by figuring out what is correct about each one. Rather, what is needed is the basic insight that the various epistemological schools go wrong not so much because they are epistemological as because their neglect of an existential analysis of being-there prevents them from attaining the basis for a phenomenally assured problematic. Nor is such a basis to be attained by way of belated phenomenological improvements of the concept of the subject and of consciousness. Such improvements do not guarantee that the inappropriate positioning of the question will not persist.

Along with being-there as being-in-world, inner-worldly beings are in each instance already disclosed. This existential-ontological assertion seems to accord with the thesis of realism that the outside world is on hand as real. Inasmuch as this existential assertion does not deny that inner-worldly beings are on hand, its result agrees — speaking doxographically — with the thesis of realism. But the existential assertion distinguishes itself at its very core from every sort of realism inasmuch as realism considers the reality of the “world” to stand in need of proof, and then also to be provable. The existential assertion precisely denies both. Yet what fully distances the assertion from realism is the latter's ontological misunderstanding: it still tries to clarify reality ontically, by way of real interconnections between real beings [one “physical” and one “psychical”].

Compared with realism, idealism, no matter how contrary and untenable it may be in its result, has a basic primacy — providing it does not misunderstand itself as a “psychological” idealism. When idealism declares that being (or reality) is only “in consciousness” we see coming to expression the understanding that being cannot be clarified by way of beings. However, inasmuch as it remains unclarified what this understanding of being itself means ontologically, how such understanding is possible, and that it belongs to the essential constitution of being-there — so long as all this remains unclarified, idealism fashions its interpretation of reality in a vacuum. That being is not clarifiable by way of beings, and that reality is only possible in an understanding of being — this does not absolve us from raising questions about the being of consciousness, of the res cogitans, itself. An ontological analysis of consciousness itself is prefigured as an unavoidable initial task in any effort to achieve consistency in the thesis of idealism. Only because being is “in consciousness,” and this means that it is understandable in being-there, can being-there also understand and conceptualize such characteristics of being as independence, “in-itself-ness,” and reality. Only on this basis are “independent” beings circumspectly accessible as arising for encounter.

If the term idealism signals in effect an understanding of the thesis...

---

* The “primary understanding of being” is the understanding of at-hand-ness. Yet readers might recall that this “primary understanding” serves as the “window” for the understanding possible in creative work — of beings arising for encounter as neither on hand nor only at hand, but as “subsisting” (p. 333: the manner Heidegger will talk about in his 1936 lectures published as “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in his 1950 talk “The Thing,” and elsewhere). In this paragraph Heidegger is placing much of modern philosophy on the psychoanalytic couch, as it were: Why is it so inclined to shut the window?

[a] Rather than improving the concept of subject, or of consciousness, what is needed in contemplative work is a leap into being-there.

[b] and yet being-there [belongs] to the nature of being as such. [Heidegger here emphasizes the reversal: not only does an understanding of being belong to being-there (one strand of thought running through the work), being-there belongs to the event of being itself. Note, too, that Being and Time itself attempts to clarify being by way of a being; cf. the last annotation on p. 436.]
that being is never clarifiable\textsuperscript{a} by way of beings but is rather for each and every being already what’s “transcendental,” then idealism contains the one and only possibility of a philosophical problematic [i.e., of contemplative work]. On this account, Aristotle was no less an idealist than Kant. If [on the other hand] idealism signifies the reduction of everything that is to a subject or a consciousness—beings distinguishing themselves only in that they remain, in their own being, indeterminate and at most get characterized negatively as “non-thingly”—then this idealism is, in its method, no less naive than the most crudely hewn realism.

It is still possible for one to position the problematic of reality prior to any “standpoint” of orientation—with the thesis, namely, that every subject is what it is only for an object, and vice versa. However, on this formal approach, each member of the correlation, and then also the correlation itself, remains ontologically undetermined. Still, the whole of the correlation does necessarily get thought as “somehow” being—and therefore thought with a view to a determinate idea of being. Of course, if the existential-ontological basis is assured beforehand—with an account highlighting being-in-world—then such a correlation can afterwards be cognized as a formalized, ontologically undifferentiated relation.

Our discussion of the unexpressed presuppositions of mere “epistemological” attempts to solve the problem of reality shows that this problem must be taken back into the fold of the existential analysis of being-there—as an ontological problem.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{a} [what’s at issue here is] the ontological difference.

\textsuperscript{1} Recently, Nicolai Hartmann, following Max Scheler, has based his ontologically oriented epistemology on the thesis that cognition is a “relationship with being.” Cf. his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 2nd (enlarged) edition, 1925. However, both Scheler and Hartmann, for all their differences in their points of phenomenological departure, fail in the same way to recognize that, in its traditional and basic orientation regarding being-there, ontology falls short—and that precisely the “relationship with being” that is enwrapped within cognition (cf. above, pp. 59 ff.) is what forces us to revise, from the bottom up, this ontology—and not just to improve it by way of critique. Underestimating the unexpressed extent of the consequences of an ontologically unclarified approach to the relationship with being, Hartmann finds himself propelled into a “critical realism” that is quite foreign to the level of the problematic he himself has expounded. For Hartmann’s under-standing of ontology, cf. “Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich?” (Festschrift für Paul Natorp, 1924, pp. 124 ff.).
manner in which this "arising" has its being, the meaning of being "within," the way consciousness is in relation to what's real — all this needs to be ontologically determined. That such determination is lacking stems in the end from Dillthey's allowing "life" ("behind" which we can of course never get) to remain ontologically undifferentiated. However, ontological interpretation does not signify getting back ontically to some other being.* That, epistemologically, Dillthey has been refuted, should not prevent us from making fruitful the positive contribution of his analyses, something that these refutations have not understood.

Thus Scheler has recently resumed Dillthey's interpretation of reality.\(^1\) He holds to a "volitional theory of existence." In this context, existence is understood in the Kantian sense as being-on-hand. "The being of objects is only given in their relation to drive and volition." Just as does Dillthey, Scheler not only emphasizes that reality is never primarily given in thought and apprehension, he points out once again that cognizing is itself not a judging, and that knowing something is a "relationship" with its being.

At bottom, what has already been said about the ontological indeterminateness of foundations in Dillthey's work must be said again about Scheler's theory. Moreover, one cannot afterwards slip in an ontological analysis of "life's" foundations to support the theory. Such analysis supports and conditions the analysis of reality, the full explication of offering-resistance, and the phenomenal presuppositions of this latter. Resistance is encountered within an inability-to-proceed, as a frustration of a wanting-to-proceed. With these, however, something is already disclosed that drive and will are going after. The ontic indeterminateness of where it is going should not lead us to overlook it or regard it as nothing. The being-after... that meets resistance, and that alone can "meet" it, is itself already wrapped within a wholeness of being-bound.\(^1\) And the uncoveredness of this wholeness is grounded in the disclosedness of the referential whole of signification. The experience of resistance, i.e. the dis-covering of something offering resistance to our striving, is ontologically only possible on the basis of the disclosedness of world. The offering of resistance is a characteristic of the being of inner-worldly beings. Experiences of resistance factically determine only the extent and the direction of the dis-covering of beings arising for encounter within a world. The summation of such resistances cannot lead to the disclosure of world, it rather presupposes world. In their ontological possibility, "againstness" and "opposition" are borne by a disclosed being-in-world.\(^2\)

Neither does resistance get experienced in either a drive or a will "arising" all by itself. Drive and will will prove to be modifications of care [cf. pp. 194-5]. Only beings having their being in the manner of care can meet up with things offering resistance, these as inner-worldly beings. Accordingly, if reality gets determined from what offers resistance, we must notice two things: first, such determination touches only on one character of reality among others, and, second, a disclosed world is already necessarily presupposed for such offering of resistance. Resistance characterizes the "outside world" construed as inner-worldly beings, never as world. "Consciousness of reality" is itself a manner of being-in-world. Every "problem of the outside world" will necessarily lead us back to this basic existential phenomenon.

Should the cogito sum ever serve as the point of departure for an existential analysis of being-there, there will be need not only for an inversion [of its meaning] but also for a new ontological-phenomenal

\[^{1}\] On pp. 261 f. Heidegger will return to the analysis of "going after possibilities." On p. 195 he analyses addiction as one of its forms.

\[^{2}\] Heidegger's critique of Dillthey and Scheler applies equally well to John Dewey's account in his *Art as Experience* (1934; New York: Putnam, 1958). Experience (life) consists in "interaction of organism and environment"; the complexities of human nature provide extensive "opportunities for resistance and tension" (p. 23): "Nor without resistance from the surroundings would the self become aware of itself" (pp. 59, 282). "The existence of resistance defines the place of intelligence in the production of an object of fine art" (pp. 138, 160, 339). The inability to 'place' resistance within world keeps all these thinkers within the line of thought first proposed by Nietzsche: will to power ("happiness consists in overcoming resistance" — *Antichrist*, §2).

\[^{*}\] This sentence is parenthetical: Heidegger's analysis of being-there intends precisely to display "life" in all its differentiations — all those relevant to broaching the question of being.

\[^{1}\] Cf. "Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung" (a 1925 lecture), notes 24 and 25. — *A note added when correcting the proofs:* Scheler has just now published, in his collection *Wissensformen und Gesellschaft* (1926), a piece that he has long been promising: "Erkenntnis und Arbeit" (pp. 233 ff.); the sixth part of this treatise (p. 455) juxtaposes an extensive exposition of the "volitional theory of existence" with an appreciation and critique of Dillthey's work.
corroboration of its content. Its first assertion will then be: *sum, “am” — taken in the sense of “I am in a world.” As such a being, “I am,” within my possibility of being, toward various comportments (*cogitationes*), these as manners of being near inner-worldly beings. In contrast, Descartes says: *cogitationes* are on hand, wherein there is also an ego on hand as a worldless res cogitans.

(c) Reality and care

As an ontological term, reality bears on inner-worldly beings. If we take it as designating broadly this manner of being, both at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness serve as modes of reality. But if we retain this word in its traditional meaning, it refers to being in the sense of the pure on-hand-ness of things. Yet not every on-hand-ness is that of things. The “nature” that “surrounds” us is indeed an inner-worldly being, but it does not display its being in the way beings at hand do, or in the way beings on hand do (in the manner of “thingliness”). However the being of “nature” is interpreted, all essential modes of inner-worldly beings are ontologically founded in the worldliness of world, and thereby in the phenomenon of being-in-world. From this springs an insight: reality has no primacy within the essential modes of inner-worldly beings, nor can this mode of being characterize, in an ontologically appropriate way, anything like world or being-there.

In the order of ontological considerations of foundations and of possible categorial and existential discernment, *reality is directed back to the phenomenon of care*. That reality [the real-ness of what’s real] finds its ground in the being of being-there: this does not claim that things that are real can only be, as the things they in themselves are, if and so long as being-there ex-sists.

Still, only so long as being-there is, i.e. is the ontic possibility of an understanding of being, “is” there being. When being-there does not exist, then neither “is” there any “independence” nor any “in-itself-ness” [of what arises for encounter]: such qualifications can neither be understood nor fail to be understood. Then, too, inner-worldly beings can neither be uncovered nor lie in concealment. It is then that it cannot be said either that beings are or that they are not. Now, however, i.e. so long as there is some understanding of being, and thereby also an understanding of on-hand-ness, it can be said that beings will henceforth continue to be.

As we have characterized it, the dependence of being (not of beings) on an understanding of being, i.e. the dependence of reality (not of real beings) on care, protects our further analysis of being-there from the uncritical interpretation, always resurgent, that takes the idea of reality as the guideline for interpreting being-there. Yet only by taking our orientation from existentiality interpreted in an ontologically positive manner do we have assurance that we are not assuming as basic some sort of reality, if only in an undifferentiated sense, during the factical course of analyzing “consciousness” or “life.”

That a being having its being in the manner of being-there cannot be apprehended by starting from reality or substantiality: this we have expressed in the thesis that the *substance of man is ex-sistence*. However, the interpretation of existentiality as care, and its contrast with reality, does not mark the end of our existential analysis. They only allow to emerge more sharply the intricacies of the problem in the question of being and its possible modes, and in the question of the meaning of such modifications: only when some understanding of being is do beings become accessible as beings; only when there is a being having its being the way being-there does, is any determinate understanding of being possible.

---

*a today's [not so much our tradition's meaning of the term: the warrior-like tone of *Being and Time* often conflates authentic tradition and current remnants from it; cf. pp. 391-2 on “remnants” in the “today”].

*b From p. 46 onwards (pp. 63, 68, 81 f., 99 f., and 114), Heidegger has waged battle with the (modern) effort to formulate a “thingliness” founding our engagement with beings at hand — or even on hand.

* Heidegger here warns readers of his predecessors’ works, perhaps especially of those by Husserl on “consciousness” and by Dilthey on “life.” He himself, of course, never employs these terms to designate what his own work analyzes. See the first note on p. 241.
§44. Being-there, disclosedness, and truth

Right from the beginning, philosophy has associated truth with being.¹ The first uncovering of the being of beings by Parmenides “identified” being with the intuiting-understanding of being: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἑστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι.¹ In his outline of the history of the uncovering of ἀρχαί,² Aristotle insists that the philosophers before him, led by “matters themselves,” were compelled to pursue the question further: αὐτὸ τὸ πρόσωπο ὀδοσοφήσαν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγαγας ἔτεν.³ He also describes this matter with the words: ἀναγκάζομενος ἀνακαλούθην τοῖς φαινομένοις;⁴ he (Parmenides) was compelled to follow what shows itself in itself. In another passage we read: ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκάζομεν,⁵ they were compelled by “truth” itself to investigate. Aristotle characterizes such investigation as φιλοσοφεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας,⁶ as “philosophizing” about “truth,” and then also as ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας,⁷ as letting things be seen, identifying them in regard to, and within the domain of, “truth.”

¹ φύσις [nature] is in itself already ἀλήθεια [truth] because it κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ [loves to hide]. [Heidegger interprets this aphorism from Heraclitus (fragment 123) in his 1939 piece on Aristotle’s notion of nature, now available in Pathmarks; cf. the last page of the essay: Only what is as unhiding can be as concealing. And therefore the point is not to overcome the κρύπτεσθαι of φύσις [the self-hiding of nature, of being], and to strip her of it. Rather, the task, much more difficult, is to leave to φύσις the κρύπτεσθαι that belongs to her — this very hiding in all its prevalence.

² Heidegger’s later works take on this difficult task of “leaving to being the self-encrypting that belongs to it — and prevails in our own being.” Cf. my annotation on Heidegger’s marginalium on p. 36.]

³ Diels’ fragment 5. [“For it is the same: minding and being.”]

⁴ Metaphysics, Book One [on origins — on where we ourselves can best begin, namely at the beginnings of matters themselves].

⁵ ibid., 984 a 18 ff. [“the matter itself showed them the way and joined in compelling them to go on investigating”].

⁶ ibid., 986 b 31 [“. . . being compelled to follow the phenomena. . . .”].

⁷ ibid., 984 b 10 [“. . . compelled by truth itself . . .”; this is the third reference to “being compelled” — τὸ ἄναπτθη, “necessity”].

Philosophy itself Aristotle defines as ἐπιστήμη τις τῆς ἀληθείας,¹ as a science of “truth.” Yet he also characterizes it as an ἐπιστήμη, ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ἄναπτθη ἢ δύναμις,² as a science contemplating beings just as they are, i.e. with a view to their being.

This talk about “investigating truth,” and about a science of “truth” — what does it mean? In such investigation, does “truth” become a theme in the way it does in epistemology or in theory of judgement? Evidently not, since “truth” means the same as the “matters itself,” “what shows itself.” What then does the expression “truth” mean if it can be employed terminologically as meaning [both] “something that is” and the “being” [of what is]?*¹

If, then, truth rightly stands in a primordial connection with being, the phenomenon of truth comes within the range² of the problematic of fundamental ontology. Must then this phenomenon not already have arisen for encounter within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analysis of being-there? What ontic-ontological connection does “truth” have with being-there and with the ontic determination [on the part of being-there] that we have called “understanding of being”? Might this understanding of being not reveal the reason why being necessarily goes together with truth, and truth with being?

These questions are unavoidable. Because being does indeed “go together” with truth, the phenomenon of truth has all along lurked within our theme, even though not expressly named as such. With a view to

¹ ibid., 993 b 20 [Heidegger adds the τις to the Greek: “a kind of”].

² ibid., Book Four, 1003 a 21 [as a “science” that “contemplates beings as beings” — translators often retain the singular: “being qua being”].

* These paragraphs compact a number of interrelated thoughts regarding the Aristotelian account: (1) genuine philosophical thinking is evoked by “reality” itself (the matter itself, the phenomena, truth); (2) what it investigates may be called either truth or being; and (3) what is called “being” covers both beings and their being. Heidegger’s later works aspire to “deconstruct” each of these, especially to instantiate a thinking that primarily acknowledges its source — and thereby to distinguish the truth of being from the truth of beings. Cf. his What is Called Thinking? (Harper & Row, 1968).

³ not only [does the phenomenon of truth come within the range, it comes] rather into the middle [the center: Heidegger increasingly insists on the “connection” between being and truth — and these two with freedom; cf. his 1930 “On the Essence of Truth” (available in Pathmarks)].
sharpening the problem of being, it is now appropriate to delimit the phenomenon of truth explicitly, and to focus on the problems this phenomenon comprises. The intent is not simply to gather together what has so far been laid out. The investigation embarks on a new approach. a

Our analysis starts with the traditional concept of truth and attempts to lay bare its ontological foundations (a). From these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible.* From this primordial phenomenon we can discern the derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth (b). This investigation makes it clear that the question about the way truth has its being necessarily belongs to the question about the “essence” of truth. This brings with it the elucidation of the ontological

a Here is the rightful place for the leap into being-there, for being in there. [Cf. Heidegger’s marginalium on p. 207: what is needed is “a leap into being-there.” Also Vol. 69 of his Collected Works, pp. 56-7: In the first projection (Being and Time), “being-there” is taken as something “given” and then investigated. Yet being-there only is in an owning-up, i.e. comes fully out only in the essential history that then first begins. Such thinking-ahead cannot afford to lose sight of this owning-up, yet it must also try to obtain a proximate concept of being-there, starting from being itself (from the question of being) and from human being, inasmuch as being-there can only be taken over by humankind. In truth, being-there is never “given”—not even in a projection—unless such a projection takes shape as a thrown one, in the throes of owning-up. Although Being and Time appears to analyze this one being called being-there in order to raise the question of being, willingness to be there already answers the question; cf. ibid., p. 123: Impoverishment into the essential poverty confers, as a gift, the basis of any possible urgent dwelling within being-there—care being only of being-there, and care being from the truth of being.]

* Notice that this procedure illustrates the “destructuring” Heidegger announced already on p. 22:

If the question of being is to attain to a transparency of its own history, there is a need to loosen up our hardened tradition, to dissolve the cover-ups that our tradition has fructified. This task we understand as the destructuring of the inherited body of ancient ontology, one returning us to the primordial experiences . . .

Although Jacques Derrida has subsequently attempted to introduce this project under the title “deconstruction,” his attempts have led his followers in the opposite direction, one discrediting the tradition (more in line with Nietzsche’s genealogical critiques).

(a) The traditional concept of truth, and its ontological foundations

Three theses characterize the traditional construal of the essence of truth and the current opinion regarding its earliest definition: 1. Truth is “located” in assertions (judgements). 2. The essence of truth lies in the “agreement” of a judgement with its object. 3. It was Aristotle, the father of logic, who not only assigned truth to judgement but also named its primordial location, and who also initiated the definition of truth as “agreement.”

There is no intention here of presenting a history of the concept of truth—something only feasible on the basis of a history of ontology. A few indications of familiar facts may serve to introduce the analytical considerations.

Aristotle does say: παθηματα της ψυχης των πραγματων δομοιματα— the “experiences” of the soul, the νοηματα (“representations”), are conformations to things. This assertion, one in no way offered as an explicit definition of the essence of truth, helped bring about the development of the later formulation of the essence of truth as adaequatio intellectus et rei. Thomas Aquinas, who refers to Avicenna for this definition of truth (who in turn had taken it over from the 10th-century Book of Definitions), also employs correspondentia (correspondence) and convenientia (agreement) for adaequatio (corformation). 2

The neo-Kantian epistemology of the 19th century characterized this definition of truth time and again as an expression of a methodologically retarded and naive realism, declaring it incompatible with any kind of

1 On Interpretation, 16 a 1. [“Affects of the soul are similitudes of things”: the singular of “similitudes of” is then translated into “adequation to.” Heidegger cites the text loosely.]

2 Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Question One, Article 1. [English Truth, translated by R. W. Mulligan (Chicago, 1952: Henry Regnery), pp. 3-9. These pages swirl with the intermixture of “being” in the sense of “what’s detected” (so being is the same as truth), “substance” (as the basis of the detection: the being of detected beings) and “thing” (a being recognized for what it is).]
questioning that had passed through Kant’s “Copernican turn.” Such talk
neglects to notice what Brentano already called attention to: that Kant,
too, adheres to this concept of truth—so much so that he does not even
subject it to any discussion: “The question, famed of old, by which
logicians were supposed to be driven into a corner, … is the question:
What is truth? The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement
of knowledge with its object, is assumed as granted.”1

If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its
object, this object must thereby get distinguished from
other objects; for a cognition is false if it does not agree
with the object to which it is being related, even if it does
contain something which may hold for other objects.2

And in the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic Kant says: “For
truth or illusion is not in the object insofar as it is intuited, but in the
judgement about it insofar as it is thought.”3

The characterization of truth as “agreement”— *adaequatio, ὀμοιωσις*—
is of course very general and empty. Yet it must surely have some
sort of justification, seeing that it persists throughout the most varied
interpretations of cognition, ones that this distinctive predicate [viz.
“agreement”] supports. Our questioning now bears on this “relation.”

What is tacitly co-posited in the whole of this relation: *adaequatio*
intellectus et rei? What sort of ontological character does this itself
(what is co-posited) have?

Just what does the term “agreement” mean? The agreement of one
thing with another has the formal character of a relation of one to the
other. Every agreement, therefore also “truth,” is a relation. But not
every relation is one of agreement. A sign points toward what it
designates. Pointing is a relation, but not an agreement, of the sign and
what it designates. However, it is obvious that not every agreement
means what the [traditional] definition of truth has in mind when
speaking of *convenientia*. The number 6 agrees with 16 less 10. The
numbers agree, they are equal in regard to quantity. Equality is *one* kind
of agreement. To this kind belongs some sort of “in regard to.” What

1 Critique of Pure Reason A57, B82 [following N. K. Smith’s translation; of
course, Kant more famously reverses the direction of the agreement: “objects
must conform to our knowledge” (B. xvi)].
2 ibid., A58, B83. [Here I do not follow N. K. Smith’s translation.]
3 ibid., A293, B350. [Following N. K. Smith’s translation.]

is it, in regard to which the relatum in the *adaequatio* agrees? Any
clarification of the “truth-relation” must also consider the peculiarity of
the relata. In regard to what do *intellectus* and *res* agree? Do these offer
us, in accordance with their manner of being and their essential content,
anything at all in regard to which they can agree? If, since the two are
not of the same kind, equality [in the numerical sense] is not possible, are
the two (*intellectus* and *res*) perhaps [only] similar? But cognition is
supposed to “offer” the matter just as it is. “Agreement” has the
relational character of just as. In what manner is this relation, as a
relation between *intellectus* and *res*, possible?—From these questions it
becomes clear that it is not enough, for the clarification of the structure of
truth, simply to presuppose this relational whole. We must rather
reposition our questioning back into the essential context supporting this
whole.*

Is there then need for unfurling the “epistemological” problematic
with a view to the subject-object relation? Or can our analysis confine
itself to interpreting the “immanent consciousness of truth,” and thereby
remain “within the sphere” of the [human] subject? On the generally
accepted view, [only] cognition is true. But cognition is judging. In
judgement we must distinguish between judging as a real psychical
performance and the *ideational* content of the judgement. On the
commonly accepted view, it is this latter that is true. In contrast, the real
psychical performance is either on hand or not. Accordingly, it is this
ideational content that stands in the relation of agreement. This relation
then concerns a connection between an ideational content of judgement
and the real thing as that about which there is judgement. Is the
agreement—in its own manner of being—real or ideational, or neither
one? How are we to understand ontologically this relation between
what’s ideational and what’s on hand as real? Such relation does indeed
subsist—and in factual judging it subsists not only between the content
of judgement and a real object, but also between the ideational content
and a real act of judgement. And in the latter case is the relation not

* The argument in this paragraph leans on the account of reference, sign and
relation in §17. Also, perhaps, on the sensitivity of readers to the “logic of
relations” that had emerged in mathematical logic to override the Aristotelian
logic of predication. Heidegger’s conclusion will be that “relations”
 submodule world.
even more “intimate”?

Or are we not allowed to ask about the ontological meaning of the relation between the real and the ideational (the meaning of ἐθέξις)? This relation supposedly just subsists. But what does subsistence mean — ontologically?

What is it that resists the legitimacy of this question? Is it just a matter of chance that this problem has stagnated for more than two millennia? Does the distortion of the question lie already in the initial approach — in the ontologically unclarified separation of the real and the ideational?

And, regarding “actual” judging of what gets judged, is the separation of the real performance and its ideational content [not] altogether unjustified? Does such separation not sunder the actual event of cognizing and judging into two kinds of being, two “levels” that can never be put back together in a way doing justice to the way cognition has its being? Is psychologism not right in resisting this separation — even if it does not itself either clarify ontologically the manner in which thinking-what-gets-thought has its being, or recognize it as a problem?

When asking about the way adaequatio has its being, we get nowhere by recurring to the distinction between the performance and the content of a judgement. Such recourse only makes it clear that we cannot avoid clarifying the way cognition has its being. The analysis necessary for this clarification must simultaneously attempt to bring into view the phenomenon of truth as what characterizes cognition. When does truth become phenomenally explicit in cognition itself? Precisely when cognizing proves itself as true. What assures cognition its truth is self-proving. Accordingly, the relation of agreement must become visible in the phenomenal context of such proving.

Someone with his back to the wall performs the true assertion: “The picture on the wall is hanging crooked.” This assertion proves itself as the assertor turns around to perceive the picture hanging crooked. What is proved in this proving? What is the meaning of this corroboration of the assertion? Does the assertor perhaps discern an agreement of the “cognition,” or of “what’s cognized,” with the thing on the wall? Yes and no, according to whether we interpret, in a phenomenally appropriate way, the meaning of this expression: “what’s cognized.” To what does the assertor relate at the moment he judges while not perceiving the picture but “only representing” it? Is he relating to “representations”? Definitely not — if we here take representation to mean a psychical process of representing. Neither does he relate to representations taken in the sense of what’s represented, if by this we mean a “picture” of the real thing on the wall. Rather, taken in its ownmost meaning, the assertion “only representing” the picture relates to the real picture on the wall. It is this, and nothing else, that is meant by the assertion. Any interpretation that here inserts anything else supposedly meant by the assertion that only represents [rather than perceives the picture on the wall] falsifies the phenomenal circumstance of the assertion. Asserting something is a being-toward the thing itself. And what gets proved by the [subsequent] perception of the thing? Nothing more or less than that this thing is indeed the being that had been meant in the assertion. What gets confirmed is that the asserting-being-toward what is asserted is a pointing up of the being [here, the picture on the wall]—that it uncovers the being to which it relates. What gets proved is the assertion’s being
as uncovering. All along, the performance of cognizing remains related solely to the being itself [here, the picture on the wall]. It is in regard to this latter that the corroboration plays itself out, so to speak. The being that is meant, this very being, shows itself just as it is in itself, i.e. shows that it is, in its own self-same-ness, just as it gets pointed up, gets uncovered, in the assertion. No representations get compared, neither among themselves nor in relation to the real thing. Confirmation does not involve an agreement of cognizing and object, or one of the psychical and the physical, and neither does it involve an agreement between “contents of consciousness” among themselves. Confirmation involves solely the being-uncovered of the being itself—involves it in the how of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness confirms itself in that what is asserted, namely the being itself [here, the picture on the wall], shows itself as the same. Confirmation means: the being [at issue] shows itself in its self-same-ness.1 Any confirmation proceeds from a self-showing of the being [at issue]. Such is only possible inasmuch as the cognition that comes to asserting and getting confirmed is, by its very ontological meaning, a being-toward the real being itself—a being-toward that uncovers.*

An assertion is true: this means that it uncovers the being [at issue] in its terms. It tells of, it points up, it “makes visible” (αποφανειται) the

1 For the idea of confirmation as “identification,” cf. Husserl’s Logical Investigations, 2nd edition, Vol. II, Part Two, Investigation VI. Regarding “Evidence and Truth,” see §§36-37, pp. 115 ff. The usual presentations of the phenomenological theory of truth limit themselves to what Husserl says in his critical prolegomena (Vol. I), and take note of its connection with Bolzano’s doctrine of propositions. On the other hand, Husserl’s positive phenomenological interpretations, totally different from those of Bolzano’s theory, are pretty much ignored. Within the domain of phenomenological research, E. Lask is the only one who has pursued Husserl’s investigations in a positive manner; his Logik der Philosophie (1911) is just as strongly influenced by Investigation VI as his Lehre vom Urteil (1912) is by those sections on evidence and truth.

* In §33 Heidegger already argued that assertion is a derived mode of the interpretation already structuring being-in-world. His later works may be interpreted as aspiring to liberate language (our reading and writing, speaking and listening) from the primacy of assertion, and therefore from the primacy of the question of truth as understood by academic logic. See the collection On the Way to Language (Harper & Row, 1971).

being in its uncovered-ness. An assertion’s being true (its true-ness) must be understood as its uncovering (its uncovering-ness). Thus truth does not at all have the structure of an agreement between cognizing and object—not in the sense of an assimilation of one being (the [human] subject) to another (the object).

Then again, being-true as being-uncovering is only possible on the basis of being-in-world. This phenomenon—which we have determined to be the basic constitution of being-there—is the foundation of the primordial phenomenon of truth. We must now pursue this phenomenon more penetratingly.

(b) The primordial phenomenon of truth, and the derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth

Being-true (truth) means being-uncovering. But is this not a highly arbitrary definition of truth? With such violent conceptual determinations we might indeed succeed in eliminating the idea of agreement from the concept of truth. Must we not pay for this dubious victory by relegating the “good” old tradition to nothingness? Yet the apparently arbitrary definition contains only the necessary interpretation of what the oldest tradition of ancient philosophy originally surmised—and also, in a pre-phenomenological fashion, understood. The being-true of λόγος as αποφανειται in the manner of αποφανεσθαι: letting a being be seen in its unconcealedness (uncovered-ness), bringing it out from concealment.* The αποφανεια that Aristotle equates (in the passages quoted above) with προφητευσαι and φανερονεια means the “matters themselves”—what shows itself, beings in the how of their uncovered-ness. And is it just coincidence that in one of the fragments of Heracleitus, the oldest doctrinal pieces expressly dealing with λόγος, the phenomenon of truth just proposed shows through, namely as having the meaning of uncovered-ness (unconcealedness)? Those who lack understanding are [here] contrasted with the λόγος and with him who says and understands it. The λόγος is φραζον διακε αξει: it says how beings comport themselves. In contrast, for those who lack understanding, what they are doing remains in concealment; ἐπιλανθανονται,

* Plato and Aristotle often employ the verbal form αποφανεια, which Heidegger then translates as “being-true”—an event rather than either an achievement or a goal.

1 Heracleitus, Fragment 1 in Diels’ Fragments of the Pre-Socratics.
they forget, i.e. what they are doing sinks away from them, back into concealment. Thus, to λόγος belongs unconcealment, ἀληθεία. The translation of this word by “truth,” and then especially the [traditional] theoretical determinations conceptualizing this expression, cover up the meaning of what the Greeks took to be “self-evidently” the pre-philosophical understanding supplying the basis for the terminological employment of ἀληθεία.

Recourse to such evidence must guard against uninhibited word-mysticism; still, in the end it is the business of philosophy to preserve the power of the most elementary words — of those words in which being-there expresses itself — from getting leveled down by the common understanding into a lack of understanding, an unintelligibility serving in its turn as a source of pseudo-problems.

What was earlier exposited about λόγος and ἀληθεία (in a dogmatic interpretation, as it were) has now received its phenomenal justification. The proposed “definition” of truth intends not to dismiss but rather to appropriate the tradition at its source: and this all the more once it has been demonstrated that and how the theory [of truth], given its basis in the primordial phenomenon of truth, had to evolve into the idea of agreement.

The “definition” of truth as uncovered-ness and being-uncovering is, moreover, not a mere clarification of a word. It rather grows out of the analysis of those comportments of being-there that we customarily call “true” in the first place.

Being-true, this as being-uncovering, is a manner in which being-there is.* What makes such uncovering possible must necessarily be called “true” in a still more primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon of truth first gets shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering.

Uncovering is a manner in which being-in-world is. Circumspect taking-care, and even the taking care that looks on lingeringly, uncover inner-worldly beings. These then become what is uncovered. These then are “true” in a secondary sense.* Primarily “true,” i.e. uncovering, is being-there. Truth in the secondary sense does not mean being-uncovering (discovery), but being-uncovered (uncovered-ness).

Yet our earlier analysis of the worldliness of world and of inner-worldly beings showed that the uncovered-ness of inner-worldly beings is grounded in the disclosedness of world. And disclosedness is the way being-there basically is — the way according to which it is there. Disclosedness gets constituted by attunement, understanding, and talk, and it bears equi-primordially on world, being-in, and self. The structure of care (an ahead of itself — already being in a world — as being near inner-worldly beings) harbors in itself a disclosedness of being-there.† Along with and by way of such disclosedness is [there truth in the secondary sense, viz.] uncoveredness: thus only with the disclosedness of being-there do we reach the most primordial phenomenon of truth.

What we earlier pointed out regarding the existential constitution of the there, and regarding the everyday being of the there,¹ born on nothing less than the most primordial phenomenon of truth. Inasmuch as being-there is essentially its disclosedness — inasmuch as it, as disclosed, discloses and uncovers [i.e., opens up circum-worlds and determines what emerges in these worlds] — it is essentially “true.” Being-there is “in

* Readers should bear in mind that “beings” (like Plato’s and Aristotle’s τὰ δημακα) initially become evident in ways logicians describe as predications. Here and elsewhere, Heidegger argues that “predicative” (assertoric) truth depends on a prior uncovering. Aristotle’s Metaphysics (especially Γ, Z, and Θ) contemplates the proper naming of what is prior (of the σοφία grounding the ὤν): the whatness of what’s right here, its material, its intent, its wholeness, its genus, its shape — or its ability (δύναμις) as defined by its in-act-ness (ἔνεργεια).

† The “disclosedness of being-there” becomes ever more thematic in Being and Time: “…being-there is, as temporal, ecstastically open” (p. 386), i.e. is its situation, and in a three-fold manner — including its heritage (“past”), its mission (“future”), and the presence configured from the congruence of these. Heidegger is arguing both for a kind of Socratic notion that truth “begins at home” and against the notion that we can do justice to this “home” as self-enclosed.

¹ Cf. pp. 134 ff. and 166 ff., respectively.
truth.” This assertion has an ontological meaning. It does not mean that being-there is always or even occasionally brought ontically “into full truth,” but rather that disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its existential constitution.

Making use of our earlier insights, we can restate the full existential meaning of the statement “being-there is in truth” with the following determinations:

1. **Disclosedness in general** essentially belongs to the constitution of being-there— to its very being. Disclosedness embraces the whole of its structure of being, a structure becoming explicit in the phenomenon of care. To care belongs not only being-in-world but also being-near inner-worldly beings. With the being of being-there and its disclosedness there is also, and equi-primordially, an uncovered-ness of inner-worldly beings.*

2. **Thrownness** belongs to the constitution of being-there— to its very being — and as an essential ingredient of its disclosedness. In its thrownness being-there is unveiled as mine, and this in a determinate world and near a determinate range of determinate inner-worldly beings. Disclosedness is essentially factual.

3. **Projection** belongs to the constitution of being-there— to its very being: disclosive being-toward its ability-to-be. Being-there can understand itself from its “world” and from others, and it can understand itself from its ownmost ability-to-be. This second possibility means: being-there discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost ability-to-be. † This authentic disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth — shows it in the mode of authenticity. ‡ The most primordial, indeed the most authentic disclosedness in which being-there can be as its ability-to-be, is the truth of ex-sistence. § This disclosedness receives its existential-ontological determinateness only in the context of an analysis of the authenticity of being-there.

4. **Collapsing** belongs to the constitution of being-there— to its very being. Initially and mostly, being-there is lost in its “world.” Understanding, the projection of possible ways of being, has diverted itself into that “world.” Absorption into the one entails the dominance of public interpretedness. In the thrill of re-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, what was once uncovered and disclosed stands in the mode of disguised-ness and covered-ness. Being-toward-beings is not extinguished, but it is uprooted. Beings are not fully concealed, they are indeed uncovered but immediately disguised: they show themselves, but in the mode of seeming — illusion. * It is in this way that what was previously uncovered sinks back again into disguised-ness and concealed-ness. Because it is essentially collapsing, being-there is, by its very constitution, in “untruth.” Here, this term is used ontologically — just as is the expression “collapsing.” In its existential-analytical use, the term is to be kept free of any ontically negative “assessment.” Closed-off-ness and covered-over-ness belong to the facticity of being-there. The full existential-ontological meaning of the statement “being-there is in truth” includes equiprimordially: “being-there is in untruth.” Yet only inasmuch as being-there is dis-closed is it also closed-off; and inasmuch as, along with being-there, inner-worldly beings are in each instance already uncovered, such beings are, as ones possibly arising for encounter in a world, covered-over (concealed) or disguised.

Thus, by its very essence, being-there must expressly appropriate for itself, against illusion and disguise, even what has already been uncovered: it must ever again assure itself of the uncovered-ness. Precisely every new discovery comes about not by starting from complete concealment but by taking its point of departure from uncovered-ness in the mode of illusion. Beings look like . . ., i.e. they are in some way already uncovered even if still disguised.

Truth (uncovered-ness) must always first be wrested from beings. Beings get ripped out of concealment. Any factual uncoveredness is always, as it were, a theft. Is it just coincidence that the Greeks expressed themselves with a privative term (ἀ-ληθεύω) when they talked about truth? Does not a primordial understanding of its own being

* This formulation (“there is also, and equi-primordially . . .”) prepares for the “duality” distinctive of his later works: world and earth, world and thing.
† Here again we must distinguish between being-there and human being: It is not I who disclose myself: being-there discloses itself — and me.
‡ Only when I myself have become authentic does the phenomenon of primordial truth show itself: again, that circularity.
§ That, namely, I must make something of my thrownness — that both the circumstances with which, and the people with whom I work will show themselves fully (in their ability to be) only as I take upon myself the projective condition of being-in-world.

* Already in the Introduction (pp. 29-36) Heidegger discussed the subtleties of self-showing in the mode of seeming (illusion).
become evident in such self-expression on the part of being-there—an understanding, although only pre-ontological, that being-in-untruth is an essential determination of being-in-world?

That the goddess of truth who guides Parmenides places him before both paths, the path of un-covering and the path of covering-up, means nothing less than this: being-there is in each instance already in truth and untruth. The path of un-covering is achieved only in κρινειν λόγω: in dis-tinguishing the two understandingly, and in deciding upon the one.

The existential-ontological condition for both “truth” and “untruth” determining being-in-world lies in the one essential constitution of being-there that we designated as thrown projection. This feature is one constituent of the structure of care.

The existential-ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of truth has shown, first, that truth in its most primordial sense is the disclosedness of being-there, one to which the uncovered-ness of inner-worldly beings belongs, and, secondly, that being-there is equi-primordially in truth and untruth.

These statements can make full sense, within the horizon of the traditional interpretations of the phenomenon of truth, only when it can be shown: 1. that truth, understood as agreement, has its provenance in disclosedness, and this by way of a determinate modification; and 2. that the manner itself in which disclosedness has its being sees to it that its derivative modification is what initially comes into view and guides the theoretical explication of the structure of truth.

[re 1:] Assertion and its structure (the apophantic “as”) are founded in [pre-intellectual] interpretation and its structure (in the hermeneutic “as”) and then too in understanding (the disclosedness of being-there). Truth, though, is [commonly] held to be a distinctive feature of assertion (derivative as it is). On this account, the roots of assertoric truth reach back into the disclosedness provided by understanding. Beyond this indication of the provenance of assertoric truth, the phenomenon of agreement must be expressly brought out in its derivativeness.

Being near inner-worldly beings is [essentially as] uncovering. But talk belongs essentially to the disclosedness of being-there. Being-there speaks itself out; it itself—[i.e., it comes out] as a being-toward beings, a being that is its uncovering of beings. And, as such being-toward beings, it speaks itself out regarding beings, i.e. in assertions. An assertion communicates these beings [i.e. determinations regarding how things are] in the how of their uncoveredness. A being-there receiving this communication brings itself, by this very reception, into an uncovering-being-toward the beings discussed. An assertion spoken out contains in that about which it speaks the uncovered-ness of those beings. This uncovered-ness is preserved in what has been spoken out. What has been spoken becomes, as it were, an at-hand worldly being that can be taken up and spoken again. Owing to this preservation of the uncoveredness, what is at-hand-out-spoken has its own relationship with those beings about which what is out-spoken is an assertion. Uncovered-ness is in each instance an uncovered-ness of . . . . Even when simply reciting what was spoken, being-there enters into a being-toward what is discussed. Yet such recitative being-there is—and considers itself to be—absolved from having to restate primordially the uncovering itself.

Being-there need not bring itself, in “originary” experience, before what is [discussed], and yet it nonetheless remains in a being-toward it, in a correspondence with it. To a very great extent, uncovered-ness gets appropriated not by way of one’s own uncovering but by way of hearsay

---

[1] In his Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (1916), Karl Reinhardt understood and solved, for the first time, the much-treated problem of the connection between the two parts of Parmenides’ didactic poem, even though he does not expressly display the ontological foundations for the connection between ἀλήθεια and δόξα, and its necessity.

[2] These statements will never make full sense within the horizon of the traditional interpretation.
II. Chapter Six: Care as the Being of Being-There

288

Passive examples range from "news" in the media to much of what is called "education" (insofar as it consists of absorbing information rather than learning an art). But then also the arduous learning of what Plato and Aristotle called the "beginnings" or "grounds" of "arts" and "sciences" — for apprentices, i.e. those who have not yet "turned around" to consider head-on what they rely on. Distinctive of Heidegger's display of the derivativeness of assertion is that it does not right off distinguish between the passive and the active versions.

Heidegger paraphrases Kant; cf. the full citation on p. 215 above.

With the spoken-out-ness of an assertion, the uncovered-ness of beings shifts into the manner in which at-hand beings have their being. Since, however, in the assertion a relationship to on-hand things persists as an uncovered-ness of..., uncovered-ness (truth) becomes, in its turn, an on-hand relation between on-hand things (intellectus and res).

The existential phenomenon of uncovered-ness, one founded in the disclosedness of being-there, gets broken apart into an on-hand property still harboring in itself a character of relationship, and as this property it gets broken apart into an on-hand relation.* Truth as disclosedness and as a being-toward beings uncovered has then become truth as agreement between inner-worldly on-hand beings [the assertion and what it is about]. We have then shown the ontological derivativeness of the traditional concept of truth.

[re 2:] However, what comes last in the order of existential-ontological foundational interconnections is held ontically-factually to be what comes first and what lies closest. Once again, though, this factum, its very necessity, is grounded in the way being-there itself has its being. Absorbed in taking care of things, being-there understands itself from what arises for encounter in its world. The uncovered-ness accessory to any uncovering initially becomes available, in an inner-worldly manner, as something spoken out [i.e. as an observable linguistic result]. Yet not only does truth arise as something on hand; the [intellectual] understanding of being itself initially understands every being as something on hand. The closest ontological contemplation of "truth" as it arises initially and ontically understands λόγος (assertion) as λόγος τινος (assertion about..., uncovered-ness of...) — and interprets this phenomenon, as an on-hand being, in regard to its possible on-hand-ness.

And because this on-hand-ness is equated with the meaning of being in general, the question cannot really come alive whether this manner of truth’s being, and its intimately arising structure, are primordial or not. The understanding of being imbedded in being-there, the understanding that initially dominates and that still today is not overcome at its basis and expressly, is what covers up the primordial phenomenon of truth.

Yet it should also not be overlooked that for the Greeks, the very ones who first carefully worked out and brought into dominance this closest understanding of being, the primordial (even if pre-ontological) understanding of truth also remained alive and — at least in Aristotle — even resisted the cover-up lying in their own ontology.†

Aristotle never advocated the thesis that the primordial “location” of truth is judgement. Rather, he claims that λόγος is the way being-there

* Passive examples range from "news" in the media to much of what is called “education” (insofar as it consists of absorbing information rather than learning an art). But then also the arduous learning of what Plato and Aristotle called the "beginnings" or "grounds" of "arts" and "sciences" — for apprentices, i.e. those who have not yet "turned around" to consider head-on what they rely on. Distinctive of Heidegger's display of the derivativeness of assertion is that it does not right off distinguish between the passive and the active versions.

† Heidegger paraphrases Kant; cf. the full citation on p. 215 above.

§44. Being-there, Disclosedness, and Truth

* While relationship implies an intimacy (so that "two-ness" is grounded in oneness, as Plato and Aristotle argue — and as Homer assumes when depicting Achilles as the son of Peleus), relation implies initial difference and only subsequent (possibly only contrived) "union."

† Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Ζ (Book 7) and Metaphysics Θ (Book 9).
has its being, a way that can either un-cover or cover-over. This double possibility is what is distinctive about the being-true of λόγος: λόγος is the comportment that can also cover-up. And because Aristotle never held to the thesis just cited, he never came to the point of “expanding” the concept of truth from λόγος into pure νοεῖν [pure intellectual intuition]. The “truth” of ἀποδήμησις [“sensory perception”] and of seeing “ideas” is [for Aristotle] the primordial uncovering. And only because νοησις [intellection: the seeing of “ideas”] primarily uncovers can λόγος, too, have the function of uncovering — as διάνοιαν [discursive reason].

Not only does the thesis that the intrinsic “location” of truth is judgement wrongly appeal to Aristotle. In its own thrust it also misconstrues the structure of truth. The primary “location” of truth is not assertion, but the reverse: as a mode of appropriating uncoveredness, and as a manner of being-in-world, an assertion is grounded in uncovering — or in the disclosedness of being-there. The most primordial “truth” is the “location” of assertion — and the ontological condition of the possibility of an assertion being true or false (un-covering or covering-up).

Understood in its most primordial sense, truth belongs to the basic constitution of being-there. The term refers to an existential. And this determination already prefigures the answer to the question regarding the manner in which truth has its being, and regarding the meaning of the necessity of presupposing that “there is” truth.

(c) The manner in which truth has its being, and the presupposition of truth

Constituted by disclosedness, being-there is essentially in truth. Disclosedness is an essential manner in which being-there has its being.

“There is” truth to the extent that, and so long as, being-there is.* Beings are only then uncovered when, and only so long disclosed as, being-there somehow is. The laws of Newton, the principle of contradiction, any truth at all — these are true only so long as being-there is. Formerly, when there was no being-there at all, there was no truth, and subsequently, when there will no longer be any being-there at all, there will be none — because then, as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, truth cannot be. Before the laws of Newton were uncovered, they were not “true.” From this it does not follow that they were false, or even that, when ontically no uncovered-ness is any longer possible, they would be false. Just as little does this “restriction” imply any diminishment of the being-true of these “truths.”

Before Newton, his laws were neither true nor false: this cannot mean that the beings pointed out by these laws formerly were not. Through Newton, these laws became true: with them, beings became accessible for being-there — became accessible as they are in themselves. With their uncovered-ness, these beings show themselves precisely as the beings that formerly already were. To uncover in this way is the manner in which “truth” has its being.*

That there are “eternal truths” will only then be adequately proved when one succeeds in demonstrating that for all eternity being-there has been and will be. So long as this proof is lacking, the statement remains a fantastic claim, one not gaining in legitimacy just because philosophers have commonly “believed” in it.

In keeping with its essential manner of being as one taking its measure from being-there, all truth is relative to the being of being-there. Does this relativity mean that all truth is “subjective”? Certainly not — if “subjective” is interpreted to mean “left to the predilection of the subject.” For, by its very meaning, any uncovering removes assertion from “subjective” predilection and brings being-there, as uncovering, before beings themselves. And only because “truth,” as uncovering, is a manner in which being-there has its being, can it be extricated from such predilection. Even the “universal validity” of truth has its roots solely in the ability of being-there to uncover, and to release, beings as they are in themselves. Only in this way can these beings in themselves be binding on every possible assertion, i.e. on our efforts to point them out. That it is ontically only possible “in the subject” and either stands or falls accordingly: Does this in any way violate truth, properly understood?

From the existentially conceptualized manner in which truth has its

* Heidegger occasionally qualifies some remark about being-there with the phrase “so long as it is” (first on p. 145: being-there “is, so long as it is, projecting”). The phrase suggests a “bird’s eye view” otherwise repudiated in Being and Time. See my first annotation on p. 229.

* Heidegger’s argument here anticipates the need to consider more carefully how “past,” “present” and “future” figure most primordially in being-there — the topic of the last three Chapters of Division Two.
being, the meaning of presupposing truth also becomes intelligible. Why must we presuppose that there is truth? What does “presuppose” mean? To what does the “must” and the “we” refer? What does this involve, that “there is truth”? Truth “we” presuppose because “we” are “in truth”—being as we are in the manner of being-there. We presuppose it not as something “outside” or “beyond” us, something to which we also, among other “values,” comport ourselves. It is not we who presuppose “truth”—it is rather truth that makes it ontologically possible that we can be in a way allowing us to “presuppose” anything at all. Truth first makes possible anything like presupposition.

What does “presupposing” involve? Understanding something as the basis of the being of another being. Any such understanding of beings in their interconnected being is only possible on the basis of the disclosedness, i.e. the being-uncovered of being-there. To presuppose “truth” then means to understand it as something for the sake of which being-there is. Yet being-there—by its very constitution as care—is in each instance already ahead of itself. It is a being for whom, in its being, its ownmost ability-to-be is at issue. To the being and ability-to-be of being-there as being-in-world, disclosedness and uncovering essentially belong. What’s at issue for being-there is its ability-to-be-in-world, and therefore also its circumspectly uncovering-taking-care of inner-worldly beings. In the essential constitution of being-there as care, in being-ahead-of-itself, lies the most primordial “presupposition” [prior positing]. Because this positing-itself-ahead belongs to the being of being-there, “we” too “must” pre-sup-pose “ourselves”—we ourselves being determined by way of “our” disclosedness. This “pre-sup-posing” embedded in the being of being-there does not bear on beings not taking their measure from being-there, ones outside being-there; it bears solely on being-there itself. The truth getting presupposed—or the “there is,” with which the being of truth might be determined—has its being, or its meaning, in the manner being-there does. Presupposing truth is something we must “do” because such presupposition is already “done”

in the being of the “we.”

We must presuppose truth; as disclosedness of being-there, truth must be—just as being-there itself must, as instantially mine, be, and be mine. All this belongs to the essential thrownness of being-there into its world. Has being-there ever, as itself, freely decided—and will it ever be able to decide—whether or not it comes to “be there”? Considered “all by itself,” it is impossible to discern why beings have to be uncovered, why truth and being-there must be. The usual refutation of skepticism (of the denial of being, or of cognizability of “truth”) gets stuck halfway. In its formal argumentation, it only shows that truth is presupposed when judgements are made. Such refutation points out that “truth” belongs to assertion—that, according to its meaning, to point something up is to uncover it. All the while, it remains unexplained why this must be so—wherein the ontological basis for this necessary interconnection of assertion and truth lies. Thus, too, the manner in which truth has its being, and the meaning of the presupposing and of its ontological foundation in being-there itself, remains entirely obscure.

Moreover, such refutation fails to recognize that, even when nobody is judging, truth is already being presupposed—inasmuch as being-there at all is.

A skeptic cannot be refuted, anymore than the being of truth can be “proved.” If he factically is in the mode of negating truth, he does not even need to be refuted. Insofar as he is, and has understood himself in his being, he has, in his suicidal despair, extinguished his being-there, and therewith also truth.* Truth does not allow of being proved in its necessity—for the reason that being-there itself cannot, for itself, be subjected to proof. Just as it is not established that there are “eternal truths,” so it is not established that there has ever been a “real” skeptic—something in which the refutations of skepticism at bottom believe, despite their undertaking. Or perhaps skeptics are more frequent than the innocuous attempts to outsmart “skepticism” with formal-dialectical

* Following Augustine and Kierkegaard, Heidegger addresses skepticism not (as Plato and Aristotle did) as an opposition to the possibility of contemplative life, but as a “sickness unto death”—as the possibility of refusing to “be there.” Perhaps such refusal illustrates the alternative lurking in such phrases as “so long as being-there ex-sists.” See my annotation on p. 226.
Thus the question about the being of truth and the necessity of presupposing it — then, too, the question about the essence of cognition — has generally been raised by positing an “ideal subject.” The explicit or tacit motive for this lies in the requirement (correct, but still in need of an ontological grounding) that philosophy has for its theme what’s a priori and not “empirical fact” as such. But does the positing of an “ideal subject” satisfy this requirement? Is not such a subject one fantastically idealized? Does not the concept of such a subject precisely miss what’s a priori regarding the “factual” subject, i.e. being-there? Does it not belong to what’s a priori about the factual subject, i.e. to the facticity of being-there, that it is determined to be equi-primordially in truth and untruth?‡

Far from comprising what’s a priori regarding “real” subjectivity, ideas about a “pure I” and about “consciousness in general” leap over the ontological character of facticity and the ontological character of the essential constitution of being there — or they don’t see them at all. Rejecting “consciousness in general” does not mean negating what’s a priori — any more than positing an idealized subject guarantees a concrete grounding in what’s a priori regarding being-there.

The insistence on “eternal truths,” and then also the blending of phenomenally grounded “ideality” with an idealized absolute subject, belong among the remnants of Christian theology within the philosophic problematic — remnants that are far from having been radically extirpated.

The being of truth stands in primordial connection with being-there. And only because being-there is [what, how, where it is], as constituted

by disclosedness (and that means by understanding), can anything like being be understood at all — and is a [philosophical] understanding of being possible.

Only insofar as truth is, “is there” being — not beings. And truth is only to the extent that, and so long as, being-there is. Being and truth “are” equi-primordially. What this means — that being “is” (where being is to be carefully distinguished from beings) — can only be asked concretely after we have clarified the meaning of being and the scope of our [philosophical] understanding of being. Only then will we also be able to analyze primordially what belongs to the concept of a science of being as such — its possibilities and its variations. And, by demarcating this research and its truth, we can ontologically determine the research taking the form of uncovering beings — and determine its truth.*

We have still not answered the question about the meaning of being. What has our fundamental analysis of being-there contributed to preparing for an elaboration of this question? By laying bare the phenomenon of care, it has clarified the essential constitution of the one being to whose being something like an understanding of being belongs. Together with this clarification, the being of being-there was also distinguished from some modes of being (at-hand-ness, on-hand-ness, reality) that characterize beings not taking their measure from being-there. Understanding itself was elucidated — whereby we also safeguarded the methodological transparency of our own understanding-interpretive procedure of interpreting being.

If with [our delineation of] care we have supposedly obtained the primordial constitution of being-there, its very being, then we must be able, on this basis, to conceptualize the understanding of being lying in care, i.e. to delimit the meaning of being. But is the most primordial

* That is, those trying to refute skepticism in the abstract betray their own doubts. Yet it is important to note that Aristotle’s account in Metaphysics Γ does not directly aspire to refute skepticism: it rather offers students game-plans for responding to skeptical challenges in public and private discussions — what we might call “tongue-in-cheek” responses, except that Athenian discussions at the time had an “athletic” quality we today have difficulty appreciating.

‡ Heidegger is here warming to the thought that philosophy is essentially situational (rather than a form of life relieving us of our facticity). The philosopher, too, is then “equi-primordially in truth and untruth”: a thought that the penultimate Chapter of Being and Time will pursue under the rubric of historicity.

* This paragraph is responding to Aristotle’s call for an ἐπιστηµή contemplating τὸ ὅν as such (as in the opening sentence of his Metaphysics Γ: cf. Heidegger’s comments on p. 213). Or to any effort to eke out the possibility of philosophy in contradistinction to other intellectual endeavors to determine how beings are. Although Aristotle does distinguish between being and beings (ἡ οὐσία and τὸ ὅν: the “substance” undergirding “determinates” regarding it), Heidegger argues throughout his works that the distinction collapses (pending in Aristotle, increasingly in the course of western philosophy) into an aspiration to determine what counts “most” as ὅν — with the result that the question of being gets buried by its historical progeny.
It is one thing to detect contemplatively a range of *a priori* structures of being-there. It is another thing to consider contemplatively how this range declares itself prior to — and for — our own detection. Division Two (most dramatically, the first two Chapters) considers modes of such self-declaration. One of Heidegger’s “signature” contentions is that philosophical work is “grounded” in this sense: any detections we truly call our own stem from taking upon ourselves, as our own, what declares itself to us as its own, and, when taken as our own in acknowledgement of this grounding, renders us as its own. Yet, since philosophy has traditionally aspired to detect “how things basically are” *without* concretely acknowledging this grounding (and for this reason has, in academia, been surpassed by its progeny), Heidegger will eventually suggest that what is now needed is not more philosophy but a form of rigorous thinking that consists precisely in its acknowledgement of its own unassured groundedness.
Division Two
Being-there and Temporality

[Prelude]
§45. The outcome of the preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there and the task of a primordial existential interpretation of this being

Chapter One
The Possible Being-whole of Being-there and Being-toward-death

§46. The seeming impossibility of ontologically grasping and determining being-there as whole
§47. Experiencing the death of others, and the possibility of grasping being-there as whole
§48. Remainder, end, and wholeness
§49. Distinguishing the existential analysis of death from other possible interpretations of the phenomenon
§50. Prefiguration of the existential-ontological structure of death
§51. Being-toward-death and the everydayness of being-there
§52. Everyday being-toward-the-end and the full existential concept of death
§53. Existential projection of an authentic being-toward-death

---

$1$ Cf. §9, pp. 41 ff.

---

$^{a}$ but, by this [elaboration of the basic question], “onto-logy” also gets transformed (cf. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Section 4). [In his later works, Heidegger frequently insists that Being and Time intends not to “contribute” to the discipline called ontology, but rather to “appropriate” its topic. E.g., some notes from 1938/39:

Initially it appears as though Being and Time were only a kind of “epistemology” of “ontology” (How is ontology at all possible?); Being and Time would then be a supplement to metaphysics. . . . In truth, there is here another beginning — entirely other, one beginning from the teeming of being. . . . Indeed, Being and Time nowhere corresponds to what one rightly expects from a proper ontology — that it just ooze with oblivion of being. (Collected Works, Vol. 67: “Metaphysics and Nihilism,” p. 125)
horizon in which anything like being in general becomes intelligible: this amounts to clarifying the possibility of the understanding of being that itself belongs to the constitution of the one being we call being-there.¹ However, such understanding of being only lets itself be clarified radically — as an essential factor in the way being-there has its being — if and when this one being to whose being such an understanding belongs is interpreted primordially in regard to its being — how it itself is.

Are we entitled to claim for our ontological characterization of being-there as care that it offers a primordial interpretation of this one being? In regard to what measure might an existential analysis of being-there be assessed for its primordiality or lack thereof? And what does it even mean to speak of the primordiality of an ontological interpretation?

Ontological investigation is one possible version of the interpretation already characterized as an elaborating and appropriating of the understanding [already “at work” in being-in-world].² Every interpretation unfolds in its pre-having, its pre-seeing, and its pre-seeing. Should it become, as interpretation, the explicit task of research, the whole of these “pre-suppositions” — a whole that we call the hermeneutical situation — stands in need of a precedental clarification (and assurance) from and in a basic experience of the “object” to be disclosed. Ontological interpretation, one intending to exhibit some being in regard to its own essential constitution, is obliged to bring (by way of a primary phenomenal characteristic) its thematized being into a pre-having. It is against this pre-having that all subsequent steps of the analysis must measure themselves. Yet these also stand in need of guidance by way of a possible pre-seeing of the manner in which the being under consideration has its being. Then pre-having and pre-seeing also prefigure the conceptuality (pre-ceiving) into which all the structures of being [here, the being of being-there] are to be brought.

But a primordial ontological interpretation requires not only a hermeneutical situation assured in its conformity with phenomena. It also requires explicit assurance that it has brought the whole of the thematized being into its pre-having. Similarly, it is not enough to offer a first prefiguration of the being of this one being — even if it is phenomenally grounded. The pre-seeing directed to the being of this one being must rather bear on its being by bearing on the unity of the structural factors belonging to it and possible for it. Only then can the question about the meaning of the unity of the essential wholeness of this one being be posed and answered with phenomenal assurance.

Has the existential analysis of being-there, as so far completed, grown out of such a hermeneutical situation — so that, by it, the primordiality required for fundamental ontology is guaranteed? Can we, by starting out from the result achieved (the being of being-there as care), move on to the question about the primordial unity of this structural whole?

How do matters stand with the pre-seeing that has until now been guiding our ontological procedure? The idea of ex-sistence we determined as an understanding-ability-to-be for which its very being is at issue. As in each case mine, however, ability-to-be is free for authenticity or inauthenticity, or a modal indifference in regard to these two.¹ Our interpretation so far, concentrating on average everydayness, has limited itself to the analysis of ex-sisting as either undifferentiated or inauthentic. To be sure, already on this path we were also able, indeed obliged, to arrive at some concrete determination of the existentiality of ex-sistence. Nevertheless, our ontological characterization of the constitution of ex-sistence has remained defective in one essential way. Ex-sistence entails ability-to-be — also its authentic mode. So long as the existential structure of authentic ability-to-be is not taken up into the idea of ex-sistence, the pre-seeing that guides our existential interpretation falls short of [the required] primordiality.

And how do matters stand with the pre-having so far comprising our hermeneutical situation? When, and how, has our existential analysis provided assurance that, by concentrating on everydayness, it has forced

---

¹ Cf. §6, pp. 19 ff.; §21, pp. 95 ff.; §43, p. 21. [Georg Picht records Heidegger’s subsequent reservations about the metaphor of “horizon”:

In my own thinking I have proceeded from the question with which Heidegger closes Being and Time: “Does time make itself manifest as the horizon of being?” The last philosophical conversation I had with him, in 1952, reached the point at which he remarked: “The word ‘horizon’ I have since forbidden myself to use.” When I asked him why, I experienced for the first time his inability to formulate what he was thinking.


² Cf. §32, pp. 148 ff.

---

²³²
the whole of being-there — this one being from its “beginning” to its “end” — into phenomenological view, a view supplying the theme [of the investigation]? To be sure, we claimed that care was the wholeness of the structural whole of the constitution of being-there. But doesn't the very approach our interpretation is taking already require us to renounce the possibility of bringing being-there into view as a whole? After all, everydayness is precisely the being [of being-there] “between” birth and death. And if ex-sistence determines the being of being-there — if its essence gets co-constituted by ability-to-be — then being-there must, so long as it ex-sists, still not be something: must, in each case, still be able to be something. A being whose essence is constituted by ex-sistence essentially resists the possibility of our apprehending it as a whole being. Not only has the hermeneutical situation until now not assured itself of being in “possession” of this whole being; it is becoming questionable whether such “possession” is attainable at all, and whether any primordial ontological interpretation of being-there is not destined to founder — to founder on the very manner in which the thematized being has its being.

One thing has become unmistakable: the foregoing existential analysis of being-there cannot make any claim to primordiality. All along, only the inauthentic being of being-there entered into our pre-having, and this as not whole. Should the interpretation of the being of being-there become primordial as the foundation for the elaboration of the basic ontological question, it will first have to bring to light existentially the being of being-there in its possible authenticity and wholeness.

In this way, the task then arises of bringing being-there as whole into our pre-having. However, this means: first of all just to unfurl the question about how this one being can be whole. So long as being-there is, it still includes, in each instance, something remaining that it can and will be. And one thing that remains is the “end.” Death is the “end” of being-in-world. Belonging to ability-to-be, i.e. to ex-sistence, this end restricts and determines the wholeness in each instance possible for being-there. However, the being-at-an-end of being-there in death, and therewith the being-whole of being-there, can get drawn into the

§45. The Outcome so far and the Task to come

thought of in keeping with the essence of being-there. [Death can also be construed categorically, as in forensic medicine and inauthentic ex-sistence.]

[b] [bein-g-toward-death can be thought of as the] being of non-being. [Plato’s Sophist also raises the question of the “being of non-being”; but it looks to the “mortality” of what we find (instances in nature as most prominently experienced in τεχνη) rather than to the mortality in which we (may) find ourselves.]

* It may seem redundant to speak of a contemplative interpretation as intrinsically existential. Why the adverb? Can an interpretation be existential without unfolding “from the inside” — here, from within the phenomena of death and conscience? Perhaps the analyses of Division One still allow readers to distance themselves from the phenomena; in any case, those of Division Two, especially those bearing on death and conscience, make no sense unless we step into the phenomena themselves — speak out of them rather than just about them, i.e. out of being seized by them.

1 Cf. §41, pp. 191 ff.

a also: its already-being. [Heidegger emphasizes that the essence of being-there is constituted by both not-yet-being and already-being.]

b “being”-at-an-end. [Heidegger emphasizes that the “being” here is not the one at issue in the present analysis.]

2 thought of in keeping with the essence of being-there. [Death can also be construed categorically, as in forensic medicine and inauthentic ex-sistence.]
meaning of the being of being-there.

Yet the primordial ontological basis of the existentiality of being-there is temporality. The articulated structural wholeness of the being of being-there as care first becomes intelligible from this temporality. The interpretation of the meaning of the being of being-there cannot stop with showing this. The existential-temporal analysis of this one being stands in need of concrete confirmation. We must retroactively free up those ontological structures previously obtained. Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality. Then, too, this repetition of the preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there allows the phenomenon of temporality to become more transparent. Whereupon it becomes intelligible just why being-there is and can be historical at the very basis of its being — and, as an historical being, is capable of cultivating historiography.

If temporality constitutes the primordial meaning of being-there (the way it has its being), then (given that, by its very being, the being of this one being is at issue for it) care needs “time” and hence takes “time” into account. The temporality of being-there constitutes “time-reckoning.” The “time” that we experience in the computation of time is the foremost phenomenal aspect of temporality. It is from temporality so experienced that the everyday and ordinary understanding of time grows. And this understanding evolves into our traditional concept of time.

The illumination of the origin of the “time” “in which” inner-worldly beings arise for encounter — of time as inner-timely-ness — makes manifest an essential possibility of temporality: a possibility of fructification. We thereby prepare our understanding for a still more primordial fructification of temporality. In this fructification is grounded the understanding of being that is constitutive for the being of being-there. The projection of a meaning of being in general can take on final shape within the horizon of time.

* Heidegger first introduced the metaphor of “fructifying” on p. 22, as annotated. Not until Chapter Three of Division Two does the metaphor itself “bear fruit.”

§46. The Seeming Impossibility of Wholeness

Thus the investigation included in this Division traverses the following stages: The possible being-whole of being-there and being-toward-death (Chapter One); the attestation in being-there of an authentic ability-to-be, and resoluteness (Chapter Two); the authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there, and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (Chapter Three); temporality and everydayness (Chapter Four); temporality and historicity (Chapter Five); temporality and inner-timely-ness as the origin of the ordinary concept of time (Chapter Six).

Chapter One

The Possible Being-whole of Being-there and Being-toward-death

§46. The seeming impossibility of ontologically grasping and determining being-there as whole

The inadequacy of the hermeneutical situation from which the foregoing analysis has sprung must be overcome. With regard to the pre-having of the whole of being-there (a pre-having that must necessarily be obtained), we must ask whether this being, as ex-sisting, can become accessible at all in its being-whole. There seem to be important reasons that speak against the possibility of the required givenness, reasons that lie in the essential constitution of being-there itself.

Any [supposed] possible being-whole of this being — viewed, that is, from the ontological meaning of care itself — manifestly contradicts care, which forms the wholeness of the structural whole of being-there. After all, the primary factor of care, “being ahead of itself,” means: in each instance, being-there ex-sists for the sake of itself. “As long as it is,” up until its end, it is related to its ability-to-be. Even when, still existing, it has nothing further “ahead of it,” and has “settled its accounts,” its being is still determined by “being ahead of itself.” Hopelessness, for example, does not tear being-there away from its possibilities, it is rather
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

This neologism, "holism," Heidegger first employs here, and then only through p. 240. In a note on p. 244, he comments on the Greek ολον. Cf. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (1024 a 1): any quantity has a beginning, middle, and an end, and therefore an all (παν); but if it makes no difference "what is where in it," it is only an all, whereas if it does matter the quantity becomes a whole (ολον); e.g., liquids are just alls, whereas things having a nature remaining the same through change (e.g. bees-wax, a jacket) are wholes in addition to being alls. — Heidegger appropriates this traditional distinction, where it pertains to φυσις (things in nature), into the contemplation of being-there. Un-whole-ness signifies that there is a remainder essential to being-able-to-be.

And as soon as being-there “ex-sists” in such a way that there is absolutely nothing more remaining for it, it has thereby already become a no-longer-being-there. Eliminating the remainder of its being entails annihilating its being. As long as being-there is as a being, it has never attained its “holism.”* But if it does, this gain straightaway becomes the loss of being-in-the-world. It can then never again be experienced as a being.

The reason for the impossibility of experiencing being-there ontically as an ex-sisting whole, and then too of defining it ontologically in its wholeness, does not lie in any imperfection of our cognitive faculties. The hindrance lies on the side of the being of this being. What cannot ever be in a manner that allows an experience of being-there to aspire to grasp it: this eludes, for that very reason, all experience-ability. But is it not then a hopeless undertaking to try to discern the ontological wholeness of being-there, the wholeness of its being?†

As an essential structural factor of care, “being ahead of itself” cannot be denied. But is what we concluded from this then sound? Have we not been arguing in a merely formal way that it is impossible to grasp the whole of being-there? At bottom, did we not even inadvertently approach being-there as an on-hand being, beyond which something not yet on hand constantly hovers? Did our argumentation grasp not-yet-being and the “ahead-of-itself” in an intrinsically existential sense? Did we talk about “end” and “wholeness” in a way phenomenally appropriate to being-there? Did the expression “death” have a biological or an existential-ontological meaning — or did it have any meaning that was sufficiently and securely delimited at all? And have we actually exhausted all the possibilities of making being-there accessible in its holism?

These questions demand response before the problem of the wholeness of being-there can be dismissed as null and void. The question of the wholeness of being-there — the existentiell question about a possible ability-to-be-whole, as well as the existential question about the essential constitution of “end” and “wholeness” — contains the task of analyzing positively phenomena of ex-sistence we have until now set aside. At the center of these considerations stands the task of characterizing ontologically the being-at-an-end of being-there and of obtaining an existential concept of death.

The investigation into these topics is structured as follows: experiencing the death of others, and the possibility of grasping being-there as whole (§47); remainder, end, and wholeness (§48); distinguishing the existential analysis of death from other possible interpretations of this phenomenon (§49); prefiguration of the existential and ontological structure of death (§50); being-toward-death and the everydayness of being-there (§51); everyday being-toward-death and the full existential concept of death (§52); existential projection of an authentic being-toward-death (§53).

§47. Experiencing the Death of Others

For being-there, the attainment of its holism in death is also the loss of the being of its there. The transition to no-longer-being-there removes being-there from the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. Yet, while such experience may be impossible for any instance of being-there in relation to itself, the death of others is all the more piercing. In this way, a coming-to-the-end

---

* This neologism, “holism,” Heidegger first employs here, and then only through p. 240. In a note on p. 244, he comments on the Greek ολον. Cf. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (1024 a 1): any quantity has a beginning, middle, and an end, and therefore an all (παν); but if it makes no difference “what is where in it,” it is only an all, whereas if it does matter the quantity becomes a whole (ολον); e.g., liquids are just alls, whereas things having a nature remaining the same through change (e.g. bees-wax, a jacket) are wholes in addition to being alls. — Heidegger appropriates this traditional distinction, where it pertains to φυσις (things in nature), into the contemplation of being-there.

† The third-person formulation is misleading: the question is whether and how I myself can discern (or apprehend or come face to face with) the wholeness of my own being-there.
of being-there becomes “objectively” accessible. Being-there can [it seems] have an experience of death, all the more because it is essentially being-with-others. This “objective” givenness of death must then also make it possible for us to analyze ontologically the wholeness of being-there.

This direction (suggested by the manner being-there has its being, i.e. as being-with-one-another)—namely, taking the having-come-to-an-end of the being-there of others as a replacement on which we can concentrate in our analysis of the wholeness of being-there—does this direction lead to the goal we have set for ourselves?

Even the being-there of others is, when it reaches its holism in death, a no-longer-being-there in this one sense: it is no longer in its world. Does dying mean going-out-of-world, losing being-in-world? The no-longer-being-in-world of one who has died is (understood at the extreme) nonetheless still a way of being, namely the still-being-on-hand of a corporeal thing now encountered. Beholding the dying of others, we can experience a remarkable phenomenon of being, a phenomenon determinable as a change-over of a being from having its being in the manner being-there (or life) does into a no-longer-being-there. The end of this being qua being-there is the beginning of it as an on-hand being.

However, this interpretation of the change-over from being-there to being-only-on-hand misses the full phenomenon: the being that remains is not a simple corporeal thing. Even the on-hand corpse is, theoretically viewed, still a possible object of pathological anatomy, a study whose drive toward understanding still receives its orientation from the idea of life. What is now only on hand is “more” than a lifeless material thing. It occasions an encounter with something un-alive, something that has lost its life.

Yet even this characterization of what still lies there [a corpse] does not exhaust the full phenomenon in its bearing on being-there.

The one who has “passed away” — the one who has not only died but has also been torn away from those “left behind” — is [it seems] the object of “taking-care”: as in the funeral, the interment, and subsequent attention to the grave. And this again happens because the one who has passed away is, in his manner of being, “more” than an inner-worldly at-hand instrument to be taken care of. Dwelling with him in mourning and commemoration, those left behind are with him—in a mode of respectful caring-for. Thus our essential relation to the dead cannot be rightly construed as being with something at hand in the mode of taking-care.

In such being with the dead, the one who has passed away is himself no longer factically “there.” However, being-with always means being-together within the same world. The one who has passed away has left our “world,” left it behind. On the basis of it [i.e., of the shared world], those left behind can still be with him.*

The more appropriately we phenomenally apprehend the no-longer-being-there of one who has passed away, the more clearly it becomes evident that this being-with-the-dead does not at all allow us to experience the authentic having-come-to-an-end of the one who has passed away. To be sure, death here reveals itself as a loss, but more as one that the survivors experience. In suffering the loss, we do not gain access to the loss of being “suffered” by the one who dies. We do not experience the dying of others, not in any intrinsic sense; at most, we are just “there at the time.”

And even if it were possible and feasible to clarify the dying of others “psychologically” from the standpoint of just being there at the time, we would not at all apprehend the manner of being under investigation, namely as coming-to-an-end. The question bears on the ontological meaning of the dying of the one who dies, on this as an essential possibility of its being, and not on the manner the one who has passed away is there-with and still-there with those who have stayed behind. The effort to take the experience of death in others as the theme in reference to which we might analyze the end of being-there and its wholeness can neither ontically nor ontologically deliver what it claims to deliver.

Above all, though, the reference to the dying of others in hopes that it can serve as a replacement on which we could concentrate our ontological analysis of how being-there gets rounded out and made whole — this reference rests on a presupposition that can be shown to misunderstand completely the manner in which being-there has its being. The presupposition consists in the opinion that being-there could be replaced randomly, one for another, so that what cannot be experienced in one’s own being-there can become accessible by way of another. But

---

* The argument in this paragraph—as so many others now—depends heavily on acknowledging the primacy of world in Heidegger’s sense over “world” in the easier sense (a collection of things at hand and on hand).
is this presupposition really so groundless?

To the essential possibilities of being-with-one-another there doubtless does belong the substitutability of one being-there by another. In the everydayness of taking-care, there is manifold and constant use made of such substitutability. In the range of the "circum-world" that is first of all taken care of, every going-to... and every fetching-of... allows of substitution. The broad manifold of manners of being-in-world in which substitution is possible extends not only to the well-worn modes of public being-with-one-another; it also includes possibilities of taking-care that are restricted in their range, possibilities defined by profession, social status, and age. Yet, by its very meaning, such substitution takes place "in" and "with" something, i.e. in the taking care of something. Still, everyday being-there understands itself initially and mostly from what it customarily takes care of. "One is" what one is doing. In regard to this its being—its everyday absorption with one another in a "world" taken care of—substitutability is not only possible, it even belongs to being-with-one-another as one of its constituents. Here, any one being-there not only can but must, within certain limits, "be" the next.

Yet, such possibility of substitution completely fails when it comes to substituting for the essential possibility that constitutes the coming-to-an-end of being-there and, as such, gives to being-there its holism. No one can take away from another his dying. Someone can indeed "go to his death in place of another." But that always means: sacrificing oneself for another in a determinate affair. Such dying for... can never mean death has in the least been taken away from the other. Dying is something each being-there must, in each instance, take upon itself. By its nature, death is, insofar as it "is," in each instance mine. Indeed, death signifies one peculiar possibility of being in which the being of being-there is distinctively at issue for each instance. In the phenomenon of dying, it becomes evident that death is constituted ontologically by instantial mineness and ex-sistence. Dying is not something that just happens, it is a phenomenon that must be understood existentially, and in a pre-eminent way that we will have to delimit more carefully.

So if "coming to an end" constitutes, as dying, the wholeness of being-there, the being of this holism must itself get conceptualized as an existential phenomenon of being-there as in each case one's own. In this "ending," in the being-whole of being-there constituted by this ending, there is essentially no substitution. This existential condition gets misunderstood by any effort suggesting that we circumvent the problem by taking as our theme the dying of others, in place of one's own, for the analysis of wholeness.

So, once again, the attempt has failed to make the being-whole of being-there accessible in a phenomenally appropriate manner. But the result of our considerations does not remain negative. They culminated in an orientation (even though a rough one) toward the phenomenon. Death has been seen as an existential phenomenon. This forces our investigation into a purely existential orientation toward being-there that is in each case one's own. For our analysis of death as dying there is only one possibility: that we bring this phenomenon into a purely existential concept—either this or renounce all ontological understanding of it.

Furthermore, it became evident during our characterization of the change-over from being-there to no-longer-being-there (this as no-longer-being-in-world) that the going-out-of-world of being-there (this as dying) must be distinguished from any going-out-of-world on the part of what only lives. Terminologically, the ending of anything [simply] alive we call perishing. This distinction can only become visible as we mark off the ending integral to being-there from the end of life. And of course dying can be construed physiological-biologically. Yet [even] the medical concept of "exitus" does not coincide with that of perishing.

From the foregoing discussion of the ontological possibility of apprehending death it also becomes clear that substructures of beings...
having their being in other ways (on-hand-ness and living) intrude themselves unawares and threaten to confuse the interpretation of the phenomenon—indeed, precisely how this phenomenon first makes itself appropriately available to us.* We can only counteract this by searching out, for our subsequent analysis, an adequate ontological determinateness of such constitutive phenomena as end and wholeness.

§48. Remainder, end and wholeness

In the context of our investigation, we can characterize end and wholeness only in a provisional fashion. Any adequate completion of the characterization requires not only an exhibition of the formal structure of end in general and wholeness in general. It also stands in need of an exfoliation of their possible structural variations—variations [of end and wholeness] that are regional, i.e. de-formalized and in each instance related to determinate beings having their own “content” and getting determined on the basis of their being. And this task in turn presupposes a sufficiently univocal and positive interpretation of those manners of being requiring a regional partition of the totality of beings. But any understanding of these manners of being requires a clarified idea of being in general. We can fail to complete the analysis of end and wholeness appropriately not only owing to the broad sweep of the theme, but also owing to the fundamental difficulty that, to come up to the task, we must presuppose, as already found and familiar, precisely what our investigation is searching out (the meaning of being in general).

The following considerations are chiefly interested in the “variations” on end and wholeness—themes that, as ontological determinations of being-there, will guide us into a primordial interpretation of this one being. In constant regard to the existential constitution of being-there already exhibited, we must try to decide the extent to which the initially intruding concepts of end and wholeness fail to fit being-there, no matter how categorially indeterminate [i.e., unrestricted] these concepts are. The repulsion of such concepts must be further reshaped into a positive impulsion into the region specific to these concepts. In this way we will strengthen an understanding of end and wholeness as existentials throughout their variation—which guarantees the possibility of an ontological interpretation of death.*

If now the analysis of end and wholeness of being-there takes such a broad orientation, this still does not mean that the existential concepts of end and wholeness could be obtained in a deductive manner. On the contrary, we must extract from being-there itself the existential meaning of its coming-to-an-end, and show how such “ending” can constitute a being-whole of the one being that ex-sists.

We may formulate in three theses what we have so far elucidated: 1. To being-there belongs, so long as it is, a not-yet that it will be—something constantly remaining. 2. The coming-to-its-end of any one being that is not-yet-at-an-end (the elimination, at the root of its being, of the remainder) has the character of a no-longer-being-there. 3. Its coming-to-an-end contains in itself a mode of being that, for any one instance of being-there, permits no substitution at all.

[re 1:] Being-there is inexorably permeated by a constant “un-wholeness,” one that finds its end with death. But may we interpret this phenomenal condition—that this not-yet belongs to being-there so long as it is—as there being something remaining? In regard to which being are we talking about a remainder? The expression refers to what indeed “belongs” to a being, but happens to be missing. Understood as something missing, a remainder makes sense within a belonging relationship. For example, the rest of a debt remains: it is yet to be received. What here remains is something that is not at one’s disposal. Having the “debt” removed, i.e. eliminating the remaining amount, means receiving the remainder as it subsequently “comes in,” whereupon the not-yet gets filled up, as it were, until the sum that was owed is “all of a piece.” There being a remainder thus means: not-yet-being-of-one-piece of what does belong together. Herein lies, ontologically, an un-at-hand-ness of pieces to be brought together—pieces that have the same manner of being as do those already at hand, and in turn do not modify their manner of being as the remaining pieces come in. The un-togetherness gets eradicated by a compulsory piecing-together. Any being for which something is remaining has its being in the manner of something at hand. Such togetherness, and the un-togetherness founded upon it, we

* In this sentence we find the only occurrence of “substructure,” here applicable to inner-worldly beings. Distinctive of Heidegger’s work is that “structure” applies solely to the being-in-world of being-there; thus, no doubt, the thought that any others must be “sub-”structures.

* One major concern of Being and Time is to distinguish the contemplation of “regions” of being (especially at-hand and on-hand beings) from the contemplation of being-there itself.
characterize as a *sum*.

This un-togetherness belonging to any such mode of togetherness — something missing in the sense of remaining — can in no way determine ontologically the not-yet that belongs to being-there as possible death. This one being does not have its being at all in the manner of an inner-worldly at-hand being. The togetherness of this one being (as which being-there is “running its course” until “its course” is over) does not get constituted by piecing together (as it is “coursing along”) items already somehow and somewhere at hand on their own. Being-there does not first come together when its not-yet has been filled up; the opposite is the case: at that point it *is* no longer. Being-there ex-sists, in each instance and always, precisely in such a manner that its not-yet *belongs* to it. — But aren’t there beings that are the way they are and to which a not-yet can belong without these beings having to have their being in the way being-there does?

We can say, for example, that the last quarter of the moon is still remaining for it to become full. The not-yet is diminishing as the shadow covering it is disappearing. Yet the moon is here always already on hand as a whole. — Apart from the fact that even as full the moon is never apprehensible as *whole*, the not-yet here does not at all signify a not-yet-being-together of parts belonging to one another; it concerns only our apprehension of it in perception. In utter contrast, the not-yet belonging to being-there remains not only provisionally and occasionally inaccessible for one's own experience as well as the experience of others; it *is* not yet “actual” at all. The problem [we are considering] does not concern the apprehension of the not-yet essential to being-there, it concerns its possible being — or non-being. Being-there must, as itself, *become* what it is not yet, i.e. *be* it. — In order, then, to be able to determine, by comparison, the *being of the not-yet*, as this being pertains to being-there, we must [next] consider beings to whose being becoming belongs.

For instance, an unripe fruit approaches its ripeness. As the fruit ripens, that which it is not yet does not get added onto it as something not-yet-on-hand. It ripens of its own accord, and this on-its-own-accord characterizes its being as a fruit. If this being were not to ripen *on its own*, nothing we could ever dream up to add to it could ever disperse the unripeness of the fruit. The not-yet of unripeness does not refer to something other and outside of it, something that could stand over against the fruit, on hand about and with it. The not-yet refers to the fruit itself in the specific manner it has its being. The sum that is not yet complete is, as something at hand, “indifferent” to the rest that is missing. Strictly speaking, it can be neither not-indifferent nor indifferent. However, the ripening fruit is not only not indifferent to its unripeness (considered as the opposite of itself); as ripening, it *is* its unripeness. The not-yet [of a fruit] is already included in its own being, and not as an incidental feature but rather as one of its constituents. Just so, being-there *is*, so long as it is, *in each instance its not-yet*.1

What makes being-there “un-whole,” its constant ahead-of-itself, is neither what remains for a summative togetherness, nor even a not-yet-having-become-accessible; it is a not-yet that each being-there has to be — as the being it is. Still, though, the comparison with the unripeness of a fruit shows, for all the similarity, some essential differences. Taking note of these differences, we can see how indeterminate our talk about end and ending has so far been.

Even though, as a manner in which the not-yet (of unripeness) has its being, ripening, the specific being of fruit, formally agrees with being-there — in that the one as the other *is*, in each instance, its not-yet (in some meaning yet to be delimited) — this still does not mean that ripeness as an “end” and death as an “end” coincide with one another in regard to their ontological structure of ending. When ripe, the fruit is *completed*. But is death, at which being-there arrives, a completion in this sense? To be sure, with its death being-there has “completed its course.” Has it thereby necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities as well? Does death not precisely deprive it of these possibilities? Even an “incomplete” being comes to an end. On the other hand, far from needing to wait for death to reach its ripeness, being-there can, prior to its death, easily have already passed beyond its ripeness. It mostly ends in incompleteness, or [as] fallen apart and worn out.

Ending does not necessarily entail completing itself. The question

---

1 The difference between a whole and a sum, *δόλον* and *πάν*, *totum* and *compositum*, has been familiar since Plato and Aristotle. Of course, this does not mean that the categorial variations already included in this distinction have yet been systematically understood and conceptualized. For the start of an explanatory analysis of the structures in question, cf. E. Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Vol. II, the third investigation: “The Doctrine of Wholes and Parts.” [See annotation on p. 236.]
becomes more urgent in just what sense we must conceptualize death as an ending of being-there.

[re 2:] Ending means, first of all, ceasing, and this in turn in an ontologically variable sense. Rain ceases: it is no longer on hand. A path ceases: this ending does not entail that the path disappears; rather, ceasing here determines something about the path as it is on hand. Accordingly, then, ending in the sense of ceasing can mean either passing out of on-hand-ness or precisely being on hand with its end. This second kind of ending can, in turn, either determine something on hand as unfinished (a path under construction can break off) or constitute the “finishedness” of something on hand (with a final brush-stroke the painting is finished).

Still, the ending that consists in being finished does not include completion. In contrast, however, whatever is to be completed must attain to the finishedness possible for it. Completion is a founded mode of “finishedness.” This latter is itself only possible as a determination of something on hand or at hand.

Even ending in the sense of disappearing takes on modified forms, all according to the manner in which the being has its being. The bread is at an end, i.e. consumed, no longer available as something at hand [this is different from the shadow of the moon disappearing and a path in the woods disappearing].

Death cannot, as the end of being-there, appropriately be characterized by any of these modes of ending. If we were to understand dying as being-at-an-end (this construed as an ending of the sort we have been discussing), being-there would be posited as something either on hand or at hand. In its death, being-there is neither completed, nor has it simply disappeared or been finished, nor is it entirely available as something at hand.

[re 3:] Just as being-there, so long as it is, already is constantly its not-yet, so too it is always its end. The ending pertinent to its death does not signify any being-at-an-end of being-there: it rather signifies a being toward its end of this one being. Death is a way of being, a way that takes being-there over as soon as it is. “As soon as a human being is born, just so soon is it old enough to die.”¹

Ending as being-toward-the-end must be clarified ontologically from the manner in which being-there has its being. Then, too, presumably the possibility of an ex-sisting being of the not-yet, one coming “before” the “end,” first becomes intelligible on the basis of an existential determination of ending. An existential clarification of being-toward-the-end also first provides the basis adequate for delimiting the possible meaning of talk about a wholeness of being-there—assuming that death as “the end” can ever constitute this wholeness.

The attempt to arrive at an understanding of the wholeness essential to being-there by starting with clarifying the not-yet, and then characterizing coming-to-an-end, did not lead to its own goal. It only pointed out negatively that the not-yet that each being-there is resists being interpreted as a remainder. The end toward which being-there existentially is: this get is inappropriately determined when taken as being-at-an-end. Then, too, our consideration intended to make clear that we must reverse its direction: a positive characterization of the phenomena in question (not-yet-being, ending, wholeness) can only succeed if we take our orientation univocally from the essential constitution of being-there. Yet such univocality does get negatively assured against deviations if we gain insight into the way those structures of end and wholeness—that those that run ontologically counter to being-there—belong to one another regionally.

The positive existential-analytical interpretation of death, and of its character as an end, is to be worked out by following the guideline we earlier obtained regarding the basic constitution of being-there—the phenomenon of care.

§49. Distinguishing the existential analysis of death from other possible interpretations of the phenomenon

The univocality of our ontological interpretation² of death depends on our

¹ Der Ackermann aus Böhmen, edited by A. Bernt and K. Burdach (in Vom Mittelalter zur Reformation. Forschung zur Geschichte der deutschen Bildung, 1917, Vol. III, Part 1, Chap. 20, p. 46). [The original stems from Luther and could also be translated: “As soon as a human being comes alive it is old enough to die.”]
² i.e., [the interpretation at issue here is] fundamental-ontological.
first assuring that we are explicitly aware of what the interpretation is not asking about, and of what information or instruction one cannot rightly expect from it.

[1] In its broadest meaning, death is a phenomenon of life. Life has to be understood as a manner of being to which a being-in-world belongs. We can focus on this manner ontologically only in a privative orientation toward being-there. Even being-there can be examined as purely living. For questions posed in a biological and physiological way, being-there then slips into the realm of being familiar to us as the world [i.e., region] of animals and plants. In this field, investigators can obtain, by way of ontic ascertainment, data, and statistics about the longevity of plants, animals, and people. They can come to know how longevity, reproduction, and growth interconnected with one another. They can do research on the various “sorts” of death, its causes, the “arrangements” and manners in which death comes about.

At the bottom of this biological-ontic research into death lies an ontological problematic. We still have to ask how the ontological nature of death gets determined from the ontological nature of life. In some way or another, an ontic investigation of death has always already decided this question; in it, more or less clarified pre-ceilings of life and death are at work. These pre-ceilings stand in need of a prefiguration by way of an ontology of being-there. Within the ontology of being-there that is superordinate to any ontology of life, the existential analysis of death is subordinate to a characterization of the basic constitution of being-there. The ending of things alive we called perishing. Now, qua a living being, being-there also “has” its physiological death; however, such death is not ontically isolated: it is co-determined by the way being-there primordially has its being. Then, too, being-there can end without authentically dying — while, qua being-there, it does not simply perish. Thus we designate the intermediate phenomenon as deceasing. In contrast, dying may serve as the term for the manner of being in which being-there is toward its death. Accordingly, we can say: being-there never perishes. And also: being-there can decease only so long as it is dying. Medical-biological investigation into deceasing might well lead to results that can also be ontologically significant once the basic orientation for an existential interpretation of death has been made secure. Or must not illness and death be conceptualized primarily as existential phenomena — even in medicine?

The existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biology or ontology of life. But then too, it first founds any biographical-historical or ethnological-psychological investigation of death. As a characterization of the conditions and manners in which deceasing is “experienced,” a “typology” of “dying” presupposes the concept of death. Moreover, a psychology of “dying” offers information more about the “living” of the one “dying” than about the dying itself. All this simply reflects the fact that being-there does not first of all die, let alone authentically die, by and in experiencing its factual decease. Likewise, the ways primitive peoples construe death (their comportments toward death [evident] in magic and ceremony) bring to light primarily an understanding of being-there; and the interpretation of this understanding already stands in need of an existential analysis — and of a corresponding concept of death.

[2] Then, too, an ontological analysis of being-toward-the-end does not in advance take any existential stand toward death. If we determine death as the “end” of being-there, i.e. of being-in-world, we make no ontic decision regarding whether “after death” another, whether higher or lower being, is possible — whether being-there “lives on” or even, “outlasting” itself, is “immortal.” About the “hereafter” and its possibility we offer no ontic decisions — any more than about “this world,” as though proposing “edifying” norms and rules for comporting oneself toward death. Yet the analysis of death does pertain purely to “this world” insofar as it interprets the phenomenon solely as it intrudes into each being-there as one possibility of its being. Only once death has been conceptualized in its full ontological nature does it make any sure methodological sense for us even to ask what might be after death. We leave undecided here whether such a question has the status of a possible theoretical question. Our “this-world” ontological interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical speculation regarding the “hereafter.”

[3] Finally, whatever comes under the rubric of a “metaphysics of death” lies outside the range of an existential analysis of death. Questions about how and when “death came into the world,” what death as an evil and a suffering can and should “mean” in the totality of beings,
necessarily presuppose not only an understanding of the essential character of death but also an ontology of the totality of beings in general, and especially an ontological clarification of evil and negativity.

Methodologically, the existential analysis of death is superordinate to the questions posed by any biology, psychology, theodicy, or theology of death. Taken ontically, their results display the peculiar formality and vacuity of every [traditional*] ontological characterization. However, this should not blind us to the rich and complicated structure of the phenomenon. If already being-there never becomes accessible at all as an on-hand being, and this because being-possible belongs to the manner it has its being (and in a way especially its own), we can even less expect to be able to detect right off the ontological structure of death—assuming death to be a pre-eminent possibility of being-there.

On the other hand, the analysis cannot cling to an idea of death thought up by chance and at random. Only a precedental ontological characterization of the essential manner in which the “end” intrudes into the average everydayness of being-there can restrain such arbitrariness. This characterization requires that we make fully present the structures of everydayness that we earlier exhibited. That existentiell possibilities of being-toward-death also resonate within an existential analysis of death: this lies in the nature of any ontological investigation. Thus existentiell neutrality must all the more explicitly accompany our existential determination of concepts — and this especially in relation to death, where possibility gets most sharply revealed as characteristic of being-there. The existential problematic aims solely at exhibiting the ontological structure of being-toward-death.¹

* That is, these ontologies stand in need of an existential-fundamental ontology.

¹ The anthropology developed in Christian theology — from Paul to Calvin’s meditatio futurae vitae — has always viewed death together with its interpretation of “life.” Wilhelm Dilthey, whose real philosophical intentions aimed at an ontology of “life,” could not fail to recognize its connection with death: “And finally, [Goethe pondered] the relation which most deeply and universally defines the feeling of our being-there — the feeling of life toward death; for the limitation of our existence by death is always decisive for our understanding and appreciation of life.” Poetry and Experience (Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 275.

Recently, Georg Simmel has also explicitly related the phenomenon of death

§50. Prefiguration of the Structure of Death

Our considerations of remainder, end, and wholeness resulted in the necessity of interpreting the phenomenon of death as a being-toward-death, and to do this from the basic constitution of being-there. Only in this way can it become clear just how much a being-whole is possible in being-there itself, one constituted by being-toward-its-end and in keeping with its essential structure. Care has been made visible as the basic constitution of being-there. The ontological meaning of this expression is exfoliated in its “definition”: being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-(world), and this as being-near (inner-worldly) beings arising for encounter.¹ Herein are expressed the fundamental characteristics of the being of being-there: in the ahead-of-itself, ex-sistence; in the already-being-in…, facticity; in being-near…, collapsing. Assuming death belongs, in some pre-eminent sense, to the being of being-there, it (or rather being-toward-its-end) must be determinable from these characteristics.

We must first all make clear, in a prefigurative way, how ex-

¹ For the present inquiry, compare especially Karl Jaspers’ Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 3rd edition, 1925, p. 299 ff. and especially 259-70. Jaspers understands death by following the guidelines of the phenomenon of the “boundary situation” developed by him, whose fundamental significance lies beyond any typology of “attitudes” and “world-views.” [On pp. 308 & 349, Heidegger borrows this term, “boundary situation,” to describe being-toward-death; see Heidegger’s acknowledgement of Jaspers’ work in the note on p. 301.]

Rudolf Unger took up Dilthey’s suggestions in his work Herder, Novalis und Kleist: Studien über die Entwicklung des Todesproblems im Denken und Dichten vom Sturm und Drang zur Romantik, Frankfurt am Main, 1922. Unger offers an important meditation on Dilthey’s questions in his lecture: “Literaturgeschichte als Problemsgeschichte: Zur Frage geisteshistorischer Synthese, mit besonderer Beziehung auf W. Dilthey” (1924, reprinted in Gesammelte Studien, 1929, Vol. 1, pp. 137-170). Unger sees clearly the significance of phenomenological investigation for a more radical foundation for the “problems of life” (pp. 17 ff.).

¹ Cf. §41, p. 192. [Heidegger varies the punctuation slightly.]
Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

[re ex-sistence:] We have rejected as inappropriate one interpretation of the not-yet (including then also the most extreme not-yet) embedded in the end of being-there, the one construing it as a remainder; for it implied an ontological distortion of being-there into an on-hand being. Existentially, being-at-an-end means: being-toward-its-end. The most extreme not-yet has the character of something **toward which** being-there **comports itself.** The end looms **before** being-there. Death is not something not yet on hand, not a final point approached ever closer. * Rather, it **looms** for being-there.

However, many things loom for being-there as being-in-world. The character of looming does not by itself distinguish death. On the contrary: even this interpretation might suggest that we could understand death as a looming event to be encountered within one’s circums-world. For instance, a storm can loom, as can renovations on a house, the arrival of a friend — beings on hand, at hand, or there-along-with. Death in its looming does not have this sort of being.

Also, for example, a voyage can loom for being-there, as can a dispute with others, or an abnegation of something that being-there itself can be: [these three touch upon] one’s own possibilities of being as these are rooted in one’s being-with-others.

Death is a possibility of being that [in contrast to the examples so far given] each being-there must take upon itself. In the case of death, being-there itself looms in its **ownmost** ability-to-be. In this possibility what is at issue for being-there is purely and simply its being-in-world. Its death is the possibility of no longer being able to be there. If and when being-there looms as this possibility of itself, it is **entirely** referred to its ownmost ability-to-be.† Within it, looming before itself in this way, all relations to other being-there are loosened. This ownmost, non-relational possibility is also the most extreme. The possibility of death is one that being-there, for all its ability-to-be, cannot get around. Death

is the possibility of the impossibility of being there at all. Thus death reveals itself as the **ownmost possibility, one that is non-relational and unskirtable.** As such a possibility, death is a **pre-eminent** looming. The existential possibility of this looming is grounded in being-there itself: that it is essentially disclosed to itself, and this in the manner of being-ahead-of-itself. This structural factor of care receives its most primordial concretion in being-toward-death. Being-toward-its-end becomes phenomenally clearer as a being toward the pre-eminent possibility of being-there as we have characterized it.*

[re facticity:] Being-there does not get its ownmost, non-relational, unskirtable possibility just eventually and occasionally, in the course of its being. Rather, whenever being-there ex-sists it has long since been **thrown** into this possibility. That it is entrusted to death, that death thus belongs to being-in-world: of this, being-there initially and mostly has no explicit, let alone theoretical knowledge. Its thrownness into death reveals itself more primordially, and more urgently, in the attunement of dread.† Dread of death is dread “in the face of” one’s ownmost, non-relational and unskirtable ability-to-be. The in-the-face-of-which of dread is being-in-world itself. The for-the-sake-of-which of this dread is the ability-to-be of being-there pure and simple. Dread of death is not to be conflated with fear of deceasing. Dread is no “weak” mood, arising by chance and at random, on the part of an individual; rather, it is, as a basic attunement of being-there, the disclosedness of being-there: that it ex-

* A metaphor drawn from the modern mathematical concern for convergent series; for instance, any finite calculation of π always falls short of the π imagined to be complete.

† On being referred (and referredness), see p. 84. Notice, too, that Heidegger alters the formulation: “death looms” becomes “being-there looms in (the prospect of) death”; again, one longs for a middle voice.

§50. Prefiguration of the Structure of Death

1 Two terms in this key paragraph deserve extra attention. First, “all relations to other being-there are loosened”: ordinarily, being-there is tied into some cooperative enterprise, one that is in turn tied up with various surrounding enterprises, with the result that possibilities (e.g., of travel and wrangling) hang over multiply focussed situations; the “untying” (λυσις: left undefined in the classical account of tragedy) individuates without isolating: it is precisely the community (πολις) that now looms — the one engulfing us, and no other, and in this sense it is “non-relational.” — Secondly, “being-there cannot skirt the possibility of death”: ordinarily, we can rightly envision ways of avoiding possibilities that loom — we either move off in another direction, or we get someone else to take care of them; however, in the case of death, since it pertains not to something arising within being-there, but rather to being-there as a whole, and as such, there is no “skirting it” in either of these senses — we can only shut our eyes to it (the clearest case of fleeing) or take it upon ourselves.

† Cf. §40, pp. 184 ff.
But care prevails ["happens"] from the truth of being. And makes more precise how it differs from simply disappearing, then too from merely perishings as well as from "experiencing" a deceasing.

[re collapsing:] Being-toward-the-end does not first arise by way of, and as, an attitude that just breaks in. It rather belongs essentially to the thrownness of being-there, a thrownness that reveals itself in attunement (mood) in one way or another. The "knowledge" (or lack thereof) about one's ownmost being-toward-the-end — however it factically prevails in each instance of being-there — only expresses the existentiell possibility of holding oneself in various ways within this being. That, factically, many people initially and mostly know nothing of death — this cannot be invoked as evidence that being-toward-death does not "universally" belong to being-there; it is rather only evidence that being-there initially and mostly conceals its ownmost being-toward-death in fleeing from it. Factically, being-there is dying so long as it ex-sists, but does so initially and mostly in the manner of collapsing. For factical ex-sisting is not just indifferently a thrown ability-to-be-in-world but is also, always already, absorbed in the "world" it is taking care of. It is in this collapsing being-near… that flight from uncanniness announces itself — flight, we can now say, in the face of one's ownmost being-toward-death. — Existence, facticity, collapsing: these characterize being-toward-death and are, accordingly, constitutive for the existential concept of death. In regard to its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care.

If, though, being-toward-death belongs primordially and essentially to the being of being-there, then it must be able to display itself (even though initially in an inauthentic mode) in everydayness. And even if being-toward-the-end should then offer the existential possibility for an existentiell being-whole of being-there, we will then have phenomenical confirmation of our thesis — that care is the ontological term for the wholeness of the structural whole of being-there. However, our prefiguration of the connection between being-toward-death and care does not suffice for a complete phenomenal justification of this statement. This connection must above all become visible in the most intimate concretion of being-there — in its everydayness.

§51. Being-toward-death and Everydayness

We shall exhibit everyday average being-toward-death by taking our orientation from the structures of everydayness that we earlier obtained.* In being-toward-death, being-there comport itself toward itself as a pre-eminent ability-to-be. Yet the self of everydayness is the one-self that gets constituted in the public interpretedness expressing itself in re-talk. Such re-talk must then make manifest in what way everyday being-there interprets, for itself, its being-toward-death. The foundation of any interpretation is in each instance formed by an understanding that is also attuned, i.e. in a mood. Thus we must ask: How has the attuned understanding that lurks within the re-talk of the one [already] disclosed being-toward-death? How does the one, in its understanding, comport itself toward the ownmost, non-relational, unskirtable possibility of being-there? What attunement discloses to the one our entrustedness to death, and in which manner?

The public sphere of everyday being-with-one-another "recognizes" death as something that constantly just happens — as "a case of death." Someone nearby or faraway "dies." Strangers "die" each day and each hour. "Death" arises as a familiar event just happening in the world. As such, it remains inconspicuous in the manner characteristic of things arising everyday.¹ For this event, too, the one has already secured an interpretation. Talk about it — pronounced, but then also mostly subdued, and "in flight" — amounts to saying: One will also die someday, but right now one is not affected.

The analysis of "one dies" reveals unambiguously the manner in which everyday being-toward-death has its being. In such talk, death gets understood as an indeterminate Something that must indeed enter upon the scene from somewhere, but is momentarily not yet on hand for oneself, and therefore not threatening. The "one dies" spreads the opinion that death does, after a fashion, come upon the one. The public interpretation of being-there says, "One dies" — so that everyone else,

* Heidegger's incessant recurrence to the "everyday average" might be understood as fulfilling Parmenides' instruction that we learn "the viewings of mortals (βροτων δοξαι), in which there is no true conviction (πιστις)" (Fragments 1 & 8). Yet Heidegger instructs us to see, in the everyday, not uninformed absence but rather essential adumbrations of authentic being and true conviction (p. 256).

¹ Cf. §16, pp. 72 ff. [Heidegger's account of conspicuousness.]
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

including oneself, can be convinced that “It is not I, not exactly”—since this one is the no-one. “Dying” gets levelled down to something that just happens, something that does affect being-there but does not really belong to anyone. If ever ambiguity permeates re-talk, it does so in the case of talk about death. Dying, which by its nature is mine, with no substitution possible, gets distorted into a publicly occurring event affecting the one. The talk characterized in this way speaks of death as a “case” that constantly comes up. It talks as though death were already “something actual” and veils its character of possibility and thereby also its attendant features of non-relationality and unshirkability. With such ambiguity being-there puts itself into a position of losing itself in the one—of losing its pre-eminent ability-to-be, an ability belonging to its very own self. The one agrees, and intensifies the temptation to conceal from oneself one’s ownmost being-toward-death.¹

This evasion in the face of death, this concealment, dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in being-with-one-another, those who are precisely “closest” to the one “dying” will even persuade him he will escape death and very soon return to the tranquilized everydayness of the world he takes care of. Such “caring-for” even thinks it is thereby “comforting” the one who is “dying.” It wants to bring him back into being-there by helping him to veil altogether his ownmost, non-relational possibility. In this fashion, the one takes care that there will be a constant tranquilization regarding death. But, at bottom, this tranquilization holds not only for the one “dying” but just as much for those doing the “comforting.” And, moreover, even in the case of deceasing, the public sphere should not be disturbed or unsettled in the carefreeness it has so carefully cultivated for itself. After all, one not infrequently does see, in the dying of others, a social inconvenience, if not tactlessness, against which the public sphere should be protected.²

Yet, as it promotes this tranquilization driving being-there away from its death, the one also puts itself in the right and makes itself respectable—namely, by tacitly regulating the manner in which one has to comport oneself toward death. Already the “thought of death” is publicly deemed to be cowardly fear, insecurity of being-there, and somber flight from the world. The one does not allow for the courage of dread to arise in the

face of death. The dominance of the one’s public interpretedness has also already decided upon the attunement that is to determine one’s stance in regard to death. While dread in the face of death brings being-there to face itself as entrusted to its unshirkable possibility, the one takes care to turn this dread into a fear in the face of an upcoming event. Moreover, dread, now made ambiguous as fear, is branded as a weakness that no self-assured being-there would ever admit to having. According to the silent decree of the one, what’s “proper” is indifferent tranquility in face of the “fact” that one dies. The cultivation of such “superior” indifference alienates being-there from its ownmost, non-relational ability-to-be.

But temptation, tranquilization, and alienation characterize the manner collapsing has its being. As collapsing, everyday being-toward-death is a constant flight from it. Being-toward-death [here] has the modality of evading it—an evading that distorts it, understands it inauthentically, veils it. That in each instance one’s own being-there is factically always already dying, i.e. is in a being-toward-the-end: this factum it conceals from itself by refashioning death into the death of others, something happening everyday. That it is the death of others: this assures us all the more clearly that “one” is oneself still “among the living.” Yet, in its collapsing flight from death, the everydayness of being-there testifies that precisely the one is already determined as a being-toward-death—even when it is not expressly moving within any “thought of death.” This ownmost, non-relational and unshirkable ability-to-be is constantly at issue for being-there—even in its average everydayness, and even if only in the mode of unperturbed indifference in opposition to the most extreme possibility of its ex-sistence.

Yet our exhibition of everyday being-toward-death also provides direction for an attempt to secure a complete existential concept of being-toward-the-end—namely, by interpreting collapsing being-toward-death more penetratingly as an evasion in the face of it. Having made visible, in a phenomenally adequate way, that in the face of which one flees, we must be able to project phenomenologically how being-there itself, as it is evading death, understands it.¹

¹ Regarding this methodological possibility, see what was said during the analysis of dread—§40, p. 184. [“And it is precisely here—within flight’s in-the-face-of—which that being-there “catches up” with being-there. Only inasmuch as being-there is ontologically, by its very nature, brought before

¹ Cf. §38, pp. 177 ff. [Heidegger’s account of temptation and the like.]

² In his story “The Death of Ivan Ilyitch,” Leo Tolstoi has portrayed the phenomenon of disruption and breakdown of this “one dies.”
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

§52. Everyday being-toward-the-end and the full existential concept of death

In its existential prefiguration, we have determined being-toward-death as being toward one’s ownmost, non-relational and unshirkable ability-to-be. Existing being toward this possibility brings one before the impossibility, pure and simple, of ex-sistence. Beyond this seemingly empty characterization of being-toward-death, we allowed it to reveal itself concretely in the mode of everydayness. In keeping with the drive to collapse essential to everydayness, being-toward-death proved to be an evasion in the face of it, one concealing it. While that investigation moved from the formal prefiguration of the ontological structure of death to the concrete analysis of everyday being-toward-death, we now reverse the direction and, by pursuing further our interpretation of everyday being-toward-the-end, obtain the full existential concept of death.

Our explication of everyday being-toward-death kept to the re-talk of the one: one does someday die, but not for a while. We have so far interpreted only the “one dies.” In the “someday, but not for a while” everydayness admits something like a certainty of death. No one doubts that one dies. But this “not doubting” need not already include that being-certain which corresponds to the intrusion, into being-there, of death in the sense of the pre-eminent possibility we have characterized. Everydayness remains obdurate in this ambiguous admission regarding the “certainty” of death — in order to weaken it (while concealing its dying even more), and to alleviate its own thrownness into death.

According to its very meaning, evasion in the face of, the concealing of death is not capable of being “certain” of death — not authentically — yet it is “certain.” What then is this “certainty of death” all about?

To be certain of a being means to hold it, as true, to be true. Yet truth signifies uncoveredness of the being. And every uncoveredness is grounded ontologically in the most primordial truth, the disclosedness of being-there. As disclosed-disclosing [of itself], and as uncovering beings, being-there is essentially “in truth.” Certainty is then grounded in truth, or belongs equi-primordially to truth. The other significance, derived from ... a being [i.e., a determination] of which being-there is certain is also called “certain,” but in a derived sense.

One mode of certainty is conviction. Here, being-there finds its being-toward-the-matter, its understanding of it, determined solely by way of the testimony issuing from the matter itself that is uncovered (true). As a holding-oneself-in-truth, holding something to be true is adequate if and when it is grounded in the being that is itself uncovered — and, as a being-toward-the-uncovered-being, has become transparent to itself in regard to its appropriateness to the being uncovered. This sort of relation is lacking in arbitrary inventions as well as in mere “views” about a being.*

The adequacy of [each instance of] holding something to be true is measured by the truth-claim appropriate to it. This truth-claim receives its justification from the manner in which the being to be disclosed and the direction of the disclosing each have their being. The kind of truth, and therewith the certainty, varies as the being itself does, in keeping with the leading drive and range of the disclosing. Our current consideration focuses on an analysis of being-certain in regard to death, a being-certain that in the end offers a pre-eminent certainty of being-there.

Everyday being-there mostly conceals the ownmost, non-relational and unshirkable possibility of its being. This factual drive to concealment confirms our thesis that, as factual, being-there is in “untruth.” Accordingly, the certainty that pertains to such concealing of being-toward-death must be a holding-for-true that fails to fit; it will not be, say, an uncertainty in the sense of doubting. The un-fitting certainty keeps that of which it is certain in concealment. Whenever “one” understands death as an event arising for encounter within one’s circum-world, the certainty relating to it does not bear on being-toward-the-end.

One says: it is certain that death will come. One says this, and one fails to see that, in order to be able to be certain of death, being-there itself by way of the disclosedness belonging to it, can it flee in the face of it.”

---

1 Cf. §44, pp. 212 ff., especially pp. 219 ff. [Again in these paragraphs, a being means first of all a determination of something.]

2 Cf. §44 (b), p. 222.

* Compare with Nietzsche who, in his Antichrist (§39), assumes that “holding-for-true” is a “state of consciousness” supplanting holding-oneself-in-truth.
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

must, as an individual instance, be certain of its ownmost non-relational ability-to-be. One says death is certain, and thereby implants into being-there the illusion that it itself is certain of its death. And how does this everyday being-certain get its justification? Manifestly not by being talked into it. After all, one experiences daily the “dying” of others. Death is an undeniable “fact of experience.”

The way everyday being-toward-death understands its justified certainty is betrayed precisely when it tries to “think” about death critically and carefully, i.e. fittingly after all. So far as one knows, everyone “dies.” Death is for everyone probable in the highest degree — yet it is not “unconditionally” certain. Strictly, death may be granted “only” empirical certainty. Such certainty falls short of the highest, the apodictic certainty we achieve in some fields of theoretical cognition.

In regard to this “critical” assessment of the certainty of death, the looming of death, it becomes manifest once again just how characteristically everydayness misunderstands the way being-there has its being, along with its affiliated being-toward-death. That deceasing, as an event just happening, is “only” empirically certain: this decides nothing about the certainty of death. The deaths of others may provide the factual occasion for being-there to pay attention to death. But, so long as it remains with that empirical certainty, being-there is never capable of becoming certain of death as it “is” in itself. Even though being-there seems to “talk,” in the public sphere of the one, only about this “empirical” certainty of death, at bottom it neither exclusively nor even primarily bases itself on the deaths of others happening all around. Evading its death, everyday being-toward-the-end is certain, too — in a way other than it would like to believe in purely theoretical reflection. This “other way” everydayness mostly veils from itself. It does not dare to become transparent to itself in this matter.* With the everyday attunement we characterized [on p. 254] as superiority in the face of the certain “fact” of death — a superiority “anxietyously” concerned, yet seemingly not so at all — everydayness admits to a certainty “higher” than the empirical one. One knows about one’s certain death, and yet “is” not authentically certain of it. In its collapsing, the everydayness of being-there recognizes the certainty of death — and evades being certain about it. But then this evasion offers phenomenal testimony — stemming as this testimony does from that in the face of which the evasion takes place — that death must be conceptualized as an ownmost, non-relational, unskirtable and certain possibility.

One says: Death will come, but not for a while. With this “but…” the one deprives death of its certainty. The “not for a while” is no mere negative assertion; it’s a self-interpretation of the one in which the one refers itself to what being-there first of all still has access to and can take care of. Everydayness insists on the urgency of taking care of things and relinquishing the fetters of weary and “useless thinking about death.” Death gets postponed to a “some other time,” appealing to be sure to some supposedly “general view.” In this way the one conceals what’s special about the certainty of death — that it is possible at every moment. The indeterminateness of the when of death goes with the certainty of death. Everyday being-toward-death avoids this indeterminacy by conferring determinateness upon it. Yet such determining [saying “some other time”] cannot mean calculating when deceasing will set in. Being-there flees in the face of such determinateness. Everyday taking-care determines for itself the indeterminateness of certain death in this way: it pastes it over with evident urgencies and possibilities arising most immediately in everyday dealings.

Yet concealing the indeterminateness conceals the certainty as well. In this way death’s ownmost character as possibility gets veiled over — that it is certain and yet undetermined, i.e. possible at every moment.

Complete interpretation of the everyday talk of the one regarding death and its manner of intruding upon being-there has led us to the characteristics of certainty and indeterminateness. We can now delimit the full existential-ontological concept of death in the following set of determinations: As the end of being-there, death is the ownmost, non-relational, certain and, as such, indeterminate, unskirtable possibility of being-there. As an end of being-there, death is in the being of this being toward its end.*

* Heidegger often employs “is…,” which otherwise serves as a “mere copula,” in a sense suggesting “emerges in the form of…,” “comes to light as…,” or “has its being in….” So perhaps: “…death has its being in the being of being-there toward its end.”

* Recall the definition of transparency on p. 146: self-knowledge consists of a transparency to being near a world and being with others in the world. The metaphor is developed by Kierkegaard in Purity of Heart (New York, 1938, 1956), pp. 176-7 and 183: “…so that his life can win the transparency that is the condition for being able to put the question to himself…. ."
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

Our delimitation of the existential structure of being-toward-the-end stands in the service of elaborating a manner in which being-there has its being such that it can, as being-there, be whole. That in each instance everyday being-there is, already, toward its end, i.e. constantly struggles with its death, even though “fleeingly”: this shows that this end, rounding out and determining its being-whole, is not something being-there first comes to when it finally deceases. Into being-there (understood now as being toward its death) the most extreme not-yet of itself (which lies before all other not-yets) has already installed itself. Thus, interpreting the not-yet as a remainder (an interpretation that is, moreover, ontologically inappropriate), we are not justified in formally inferring from the not-yet of being-there its un-wholeness. The phenomenon of the not-yet, extracted from the ahead-of-itself of being-there, is so far from offering proof against a possible ex-sistent being-whole (no more than does the structure of care in general) that this ahead-of-itself first makes such being-toward-the-end possible. We correctly formulate the problem of the possible being-whole of the being each of us is [only] when care, the basic constitution of being-there, “is linked together” with death, the most extreme possibility of being-there.

Meanwhile, it remains questionable whether we have already worked this problem out adequately. Being-toward-death is grounded in care. As thrown being-in-world, being-there is in each instance already entrusted to death. As being toward its death, it is factically, indeed constantly dying — so long as it has not come to its decease. Being-there factically dies: this also means it has always already decided, one way or another, how to comport itself in its being-toward-death. The evasion in the face of death characterizing everyday collapsing is an inauthentic being-toward-death. Inauthenticity has a possible authenticity at its core. Inauthenticity characterizes an essential manner in which being-there can mis-position itself, and also has mostly done so already — and yet need not necessarily and constantly do so. Because being-there ex-sists, its how gets determined in each instance from out of a possibility that it itself is and that it understands.

Can being-there authentically understand its ownmost, non-relational and unskirtable, certain and as such indeterminate possibility? That is, can it hold itself in an authentic being-toward-its-end? So long as this authentic being-toward-death is not exhibited and ontologically determined, our existential interpretation of being-toward-the-end lacks something essential.

Authentic being-toward-death signifies an existentiell possibility of being-there. This ontic ability-to-be must then be ontologically possible. What are the existential conditions of this possibility? How might this possibility itself become accessible?

§53. Authentic Being-toward-death

Factually, being-there holds itself initially and mostly in an inauthentic being-toward-death. How might we characterize “objectively” the ontological possibility of an authentic being-toward-death—if, in the end, either being-there never comports itself authentically toward its end or, by its very meaning, such authentic being has to remain concealed from others? Is the projection of the existential possibility of such a questionable existentiell ability-to-be not a fantastic undertaking? What is needed, so that such a projection can get away from being a merely fictional, an arbitrary construction? Does being-there itself offer any directives for this projection? Can we extract from being-there itself any grounds for its phenomenal justification? Can the ontological task we are now taking upon ourselves obtain from our foregoing analysis of being-there any prefigurations allowing us to steer its pre-having onto a sure path?

We have gotten a sharp focus onto the full existential concept of death, and thereby also onto that to which an authentic being-toward-the-end is to comport itself. Moreover, we have characterized inauthentic being-toward-death and thereby prefigured, prohibitively, how authentic being-toward-death cannot be. With these positive and prohibitive directives we must be able to project the existential formation of an authentic being-toward-death.

Being-there gets constituted by disclosure, i.e. by an attuned understanding. An authentic being-toward-death will then not evade its ownmost and non-relational possibility, not conceal this possibility in such flight, and not reinterpret it for the intelligibility of the one. The existential projection of an authentic being-toward-death must therefore display the factors of such being-toward — those factors constituting it as

---

1 The inauthenticity of being-there was treated in §9, pp. 42 ff. [formal statement], in §27, p. 130 [authentic being-a-self is an existentiell modification of the one as itself an essential existential], and especially in §38, pp. 175 ff.
The first task is to characterize being-toward-death as a being toward one possibility that is pre-eminent for being-there. Being toward a possibility, i.e. to something possible, might mean: going after it, taking care that it be actualized. In the field of at-hand and on-hand beings such possibilities arise constantly: things to be achieved, mastered, gone through, and the like. Taking-care going-after something possible intends to annihilate the possibility of what is possible — by assimilating it. Still, the taking-care actualizing of an at-hand instrument (producing it, preparing it, altering it, etc.) is always only relative, since anything actualized also, even precisely, has the essential character of being-bound-up-with. Although actualized, it remains, as something actual, something possible for...: it is characterized by an in-order-to. The present analysis simply aims to make clear how heedful going-after comport itself toward the possible: not in thematic-theoretical contemplation of the possible as possible, even less with a view to its possibility as such, but in a way that going-after-something circumspectly looks away from the possible — and toward what it is possible for.

Manifestly, the being-toward-death at issue in our investigation cannot have the character of heedfully going after its actualization. For one thing, as something possible, death is not anything possibly at hand or on hand. For another, though, taking care to actualize this one thing possible would have to mean bringing on decease. But being-there would thereby deprive itself of the basis for an ex-sisting being-toward-death.

If, then, being-toward-death does not mean an “actualization” of it, neither can it mean this: lingering over the end in its possibility. One such comportment would consist of “thinking about death.” Such comportment ponders the possibility: when and how it might get actualized. To be sure, such brooding on death does not entirely rob death of its character of possibility; it still broods over death as something coming; yet it weakens death by its calculative desire to get the upper-hand over it — it wants death (as something possible) to show its possibility as little as possible. In being-toward-death, though, the possibility has to be understood, in unweakened form, as possibility, has to be unfolded as possibility, and has to be endured, in comportment, as possibility.*

However, it is in expecting that being-there [usually] comports itself toward something possible, while retaining its possibility. For there to be any suspense regarding it, something possible must be able — in its “perhaps so, perhaps not, but then again surely” — to arise for encounter unhindered and unimpaired. But then, with the phenomenon of expecting, does our analysis not come upon the same manner of relating to the possible that we already characterized in regard to heedfully going after something? Every expecting understands what's possible for it, “has” it, in reference to whether and when and how it can become actually on hand. Expecting consists not in merely happening to look away from the possible toward its possible actualization, but rather (and essentially) in waiting for this actualization. In expecting, too, there lies a leaping away from the possible and digging into the actual — into whatever it is that is expected. In expectation, the possible gets drawn into the actual: it starts with the actual and comes back to it.

But in the case of being-toward-death, being toward possibility is to comport itself to death in a way so that death unveils itself in and for its being as possibility. Such being toward possibility we shall call readiness for possibility [as distinct from going after, pondering, or expecting something possible].† But does there not lurk in this comportment an effort to bring something possible near? And with this nearness of the possible does there not rise into view its actualization? The bringing-near [at issue in readiness for possibility] does not incline toward heedfully making something available as actual; rather, in our coming near to things understandingly the possibility essential to what is possible becomes

---

* Cf. Spinoza’s Ethics, Part IV, Prop. 67: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his meditation is meditation not upon death but upon life” — not a brooding but rather an opening upon the moment (see below, p. 338).
† Heidegger will soon expand upon the significance of “readying for possibility”: besides cutting through the illusions “naturally” engendered by our engagements in a world, the “sense of mortality” allows each situation to become a “window of possibility” — a clearing in which “things themselves” (at-hand beings as well as fellow beings) can emerge and withdraw “on their own,” i.e. in which possibility is freed from actuality-defined visions of what is possible (cf. especially p. 298 ff.). Such liberation conditions the possibility of reading and writing works such as Being and Time: such “activities” are pro-visional (see the annotation on p. 1).
“greater.” The closest nearness engendered by being-toward-death as possibility is as far as can be from anything actual. The more unveiledly this possibility is understood, the more purely understanding pushes ahead into possibility as [including] the possibility of the impossibility of any ex-sistence at all. As possibility, death offers nothing to being-there that could be “actualized,” and nothing that it could itself be as actual. Death is the possibility of the impossibility of any sort of comportment toward . . ., of any ex-sisting. In our readying for this possibility, possibility becomes “ever greater,” i.e. it unveiled itself as one having no measure at all, no more or less — as one signifying the measureless impossibility of ex-sistence. By its very nature, this possibility provides no grounds for waiting suspensefully for anything, for “depicting” anything possibly actual, whereupon one could forget the possibility. As readying for possibility, being-toward-death first makes possible this possibility, sets it free as possibility.∗

Being-toward-death is readying for an ability-to-be essential to that

§53. Authentic Being-toward-death

one being whose manner is to be precisely in readying. Being-there gets disclosed to itself—in its most extreme possibility—in the unveiling of this ability to be, an unveiling integral to readying. To get projected onto the ownmost ability-to-be then means: to be able to understand oneself in the being of the being unveiled in this way — to ex-sist. Readying proves to be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost most extreme ability-to-be, i.e. the possibility of authentic ex-sistence. The ontological constitution of this authentic ex-sistence we must now make visible by exhibiting the concrete structure of readying for death. How can we delimit phenomenally this structure? Manifestly, by determining those characteristics of readying disclosure that must belong to it so that it can become a pure understanding of one’s ownmost, non-relational, unshirkable, certain and, as such, indeterminate possibility. Throughout, it must be remembered that understanding does not primarily entail gazing at a meaning — it rather entails understanding oneself in the ability-to-be unveiled in projection.1

[1] Death is the ownmost possibility of being-there. Being toward this possibility discloses to being-there its ownmost ability to be, the one in which the being of being-there is purely and simply at issue. In this ability-to-be it can become manifest to being-there that, in this pre-eminent possibility of itself, it remains ripped out of the one — i.e., that, in its readying, it already can rip itself out of the one. But then the understanding of this “ability” first unveils the factual lostness in the everydayness of the one-self.

[2] The ownmost possibility is non-relational. Readying allows being-there to understand that it alone, and on its own accord, has to take upon itself the ability-to-be in which its ownmost being is purely and simply at issue. Death is not indifferently “appended” to one’s own being-there; rather, it claims one’s being-there as individual. The non-relationality of death, understood in readying, individuates being-there onto itself. This individuation is one manner in which the “there” gets disclosed for ex-sistence. It makes manifest that no being near things taken care of, and no being with others, is of any avail when its own ability-to-be is at issue. Being-there can only then be authentically its self when it makes itself possible for it — on its own accord. However,

∗ Heidegger’s account of mortality in this paragraph (and on the next few pages) will read much differently according to whether we define the word “possibility” to the one possibility of death “at any moment”— or allow it to extend over the clearing and what emerges and withdraws in the disclosure of this clearing. In his later works, Heidegger emphasizes the broader reading. Cf. his 1949 Introduction to “What is Metaphysics”:

What is meant by “ex-sistence” in the context of a thinking that is prompted by, and directed toward, the truth of being, for it is only together that they constitute the full nature of ex-sistence (dwelling, what “builds”). (The braces indicate Heidegger’s later marginalia.) Also On Time and Being (Harper & Row, 1972), p. 44 (notes from a seminar in 1962):

Today, everything depends on seeing in the attempts of Being and Time the theme and the motive indicating the question of being and determined by this question. Otherwise one all too easily falls into seeing its investigations as self-contained treatises that can then be dismissed as inadequate. Thus, for example, the question of death gets pursued [in Being and Time] only within the confines of, and from the motives evident in, its intention to elaborate the temporality of being-there.

1 Cf. §31, pp. 142 ff. [Cf. Kierkegaard’s Concept of Dread: “It is one thing to understand what is said, it is quite another to understand oneself in what is said” (Chapter IV, §2, ii.)]
that taking-care and caring-for are of no avail: this does not signify that these manners of being-there are cut loose from authentic being-a-self. As essential structures of the constitution of being-there, these also belong to the condition of the possibility of its ex-sisting at all. Being-there is authentically itself only inasmuch as it projects itself—as taking care of what is near to it and caring for those with whom it is—primarily onto its ownmost ability-to-be and not onto the possibility of the one-self. Readying for its non-relational possibility forces the being that is readying into the possibility of taking upon itself, on its own accord, its ownmost being.

[3] The ownmost, non-relational possibility is unskirtable. Being toward this possibility allows being-there to understand that what looms before it as the most extreme possibility of ex-sistence is that it give itself up. Yet readying does not evade the unshirkability, as does inauthentic being-toward-death; rather, it holds itself free for it. Becoming free, in readying, for one's own death liberates one from one's lostness in the possibilities pressing incidentally upon one—in such a way that those factual possibilities lying before the unshirkable possibility can now be understood and chosen.* Readying discloses to ex-sistence the giving up of itself as its most extreme possibility, and in this way shatters any stiffening into the ex-sistence that happens to have been achieved. In readying, being-there guards itself against falling behind itself and its already-understood ability-to-be, and against “becoming too old for its victories” (Nietzsche†). Free for its ownmost and understood possibility

* On p. 259 the imagery of “lying before” is reversed: “Into being-there [as being-toward-death] the most extreme not-yet of itself (which lies before all other not-yets) has already installed itself.”

† From Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part One, “On Free Death”; cf. also the analysis of the “aging philosopher” (Daybreak, §542); e.g.:

When, in earlier years, he compared himself with other, older thinkers, it was to measure seriously his weakness against their strength, and to grow colder and freer toward himself: now he does it only to intoxicate himself in his own delusions. In earlier years, he thought with confidence of the thinkers yet to come, indeed he joyfully saw himself extinguished by their more powerful light: now it torments him that he cannot be the last thinker.

However, while Nietzsche attributes such misconstruals to a “physiological phenomenon” (weariness of old age), Heidegger attributes it to an “existential phenomenon” (flight from death).

§53. Authentic Being-toward-death

(one determined from its end, i.e. understood as finite), being-there averts the danger of misconstruing, from its finite understanding of ex-sistence, the possibilities of ex-sistence embodied in others, possibilities that go beyond its own (or even falsely interpreting their possibilities to fit its own)—so that it can tend to its ownmost factual ex-sistence. Yet, as a non-relational possibility, death only individuates in the course of allowing this possibility, as unshirkable, to make being-there, as being-with, capable of having understanding for the ability-to-be of others. Because readying for the unshirkable possibility co-discloses all the possibilities lying before it, there lies in it the possibility of an existentiell assumption of the whole of being-there, i.e. the possibility of ex-sisting as a whole ability-to-be.

[4] The ownmost, non-relational and unskirtable possibility is certain. The manner of one's being certain of this possibility gets determined from the truth corresponding to it (disclosure of being-there itself, rather than un-coveredness of items encountered). But the certain possibility of death only discloses being-there inasmuch as being-there, in readying for it, makes possible, for itself, this possibility as its ownmost ability-to-be.* Disclosedness of possibility is grounded in readying-making-possible. Holding oneself within this truth, i.e. being certain of what is disclosed, now really demands readying. Certainty regarding death cannot be computed from data regarding deaths. It does not hold itself at all within any truth regarding on-hand beings: with a view to their uncoveredness, such beings arise most purely for encounter as we allow them to do so by only looking on at them. If it is to achieve pure matter-of-factness, i.e. the indifference of apodictic evidence, being-there must first of all lose itself in factual circumstances—as can be one's task, and a possibility of care. If, in regard to death, being-certain does not have this character, this does not mean it is of a lower grade; it rather means that being-certain of death belongs not at all to the graded order of evidence regarding on-hand beings.

Holding-death-to-be-true-for-me—death is in each instance only my own—shows another kind [of being-certain], and is more primordial than

* Here, as often elsewhere, the formulation reflects the effort to leave unsettled the question of agency: who or what “makes things happen.” While the formulations in Being and Time lean toward ourselves as agents (in battle with the one), those of Heidegger’s later works lean toward the event itself as “agent” (grounding any agency we might enjoy).
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

§53. Authentic Being-toward-death

any certainty pertaining either to beings arising for encounter within a world or to formal objects [arising, e.g., in Husserlian “intuition” and in mathematical work]. For it is of being-in-world that holding-death-to-be-true is certain. As such, it not only demands one determinate comportment of being-there, it does so by laying claim to being-there in the full authenticity of its existence. Only in readying can being-there make sure of its ownmost being in its unspeakable wholeness. For this reason, the evidence provided by the immediate givenness of experiences, of the I and of consciousness, must necessarily lag behind the certainty embedded within readying. And not because the manner in which such immediate givenness is apprehended is not rigorous, but rather because this manner is, at its very basis, incapable of holding as true (disclosed) what it basically claims to “have there”: the being-there that I myself am and, as an ability-to-be, can only be in readying.

[5] The ownmost, non-relational, unspeakable and certain possibility is, in regard to certainty, undetermined. How does readying disclose this character of the pre-eminently possible of being-there? How does understanding, as readying, project itself onto a certain ability-to-be that is constantly possible projected in such a way that it remains constantly undetermined when the pure and simple impossibility of its ex-sistence becomes possible? Readying for its indeterminately certain death, being-there opens itself up to a threat, one that springs from its own there and is constant. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this threat. It is so little able to dim down the threat that it must rather build up the indeterminateness of the certainty. How is the intrinsic disclosing of this constant threat existentially possible?

All understanding is attuned understanding. It is mood that brings being-there before the thrownness of its “that it is there.” Yet the attunement that is capable of holding open the constant and pure threat to itself, the threat surging up out of the ownmost and individuated being of being-there: this attunement is dread. In dread, being-there finds itself in the face of the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence. Dread dreads for the ability-to-be of the one being so destined, and in this way discloses its most extreme possibility. Because readying purely and simply individuates being-there, and in this individuation lets being-there become certain of the wholeness of its ability-to-be, the basic attunement of dread belongs to this self-understanding of being-there at its very basis. Being-toward-death is essentially dread. An unmistakable, though “only” indirect attestation for this is offered by one version of being-toward-death that we [earlier] characterized: when it turns dread into cowardly fear and [then], with the overcoming of the fear, proclaims cowardice in the face of dread.

Our characterization of existentially projected authentic being-toward-death we may summarize as follows: Readying unveils to being-there its lostness in the one-self and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself—not primarily propped up by taking-care caring-for, but rather on its own and in passionate and factical freedom toward death, released from the illusions of the one, certain of itself and dreading for itself.

All the relations embedded within being-toward-death, and bearing on the full content of the most extreme possibility of being-there as we have characterized it, are here gathered together to unveil, unfold, and hold fast the readying they constitute — readying as the making-possible of this possibility. Our existentially projected delimitation of readying

---

1 Cf. §62, pp. 305 ff. [Heidegger here anticipates: resoluteness is the one determinate comportment concomitant with being certain of death.]
2 Cf. §29, pp. 134 ff.
3 Cf. §40, pp. 184 ff.
4 yet this does not mean [being-toward-death is] only dread — and surely not dread as mere emotion.
5 This indirect attestation that “being-toward-death is essentially dread” refers back to p. 254: “… the one takes care to turn this dread into a fear in the face of an upcoming event” — so that, once the “upcoming event” has passed by, or been mastered, one looks back on the fear as having been uncalled for, and cowardly. There would then be no such thing as genuine courage.
6 Note the formulation: not propped up by the obvious forms of caring for others while taking care of things. The question is how, and when, caring-for and taking-care can open out onto the possibilities, the ability-to-be of the people and the things we encounter. Cf. the passing remarks at the bottom of p. 263 and the middle of p. 264, and the emphatic statement on pp. 297-8.
7 Heidegger’s account of “freedom toward death” can be read as accounting for the possibility of “deliverance from death” (as in Psalm 116 and I Cor. 25:26). It can also be read as “competing” with the account of courage in Plato’s Republic (412d ff. and 429c): guardians must care for the city (πολις: read “situation”), but this care (κηδος) is based on love (φιλια), and love means identifying one’s own “going well” or “going badly” with that of what one is caring for; so courage is then a form of preservation (σωτηρια) — of opinion
II. Chapter One: Wholeness and Death

has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell authentic being-toward-death. With this there then arises the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there — but this as only an ontological possibility. To be sure, the existential projection of readying has held to the structures of being-there we earlier worked out, and has, as it were, allowed being-there itself to project itself onto this possibility, instead of holding up to it an ideal “content” of ex-sistence, and forcing this ideal off onto it “from outside.” And yet this existentially “possible” being-toward-death remains existentiellly a fantastic imposition. The ontological possibility of an authentic ability-to-be-whole on the part of being-there means nothing so long as the corresponding ontical ability-to-be has not displayed itself from being-there itself. Does being-there ever throw itself factically into such being-toward-death? Does being-there even demand, from out of the ground of its ownmost being, an authentic ability-to-be, one determined by readying?

Before answering these questions we must inquire to what extent at all, and in what manner, being-there testifies, from out of its ownmost ability-to-be, to a possible authenticity of its ex-sistence — and in such a way that the testimony not only evinces authenticity as existentiellly possible but also demands authenticity from it.

The hovering question about an authentic being-whole of being-there, and about its existential constitution, will only then be set onto stable phenomenal ground when it can adhere to a possible authenticity of its being that being-there itself attests. Once we have succeeded in detecting phenomenologically such an attestation (along with what it attests), then the problem once again raises its head: whether readying for death, hitherto only projected in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with the attested authentic ability-to-be.

regarding what is truly terrifying (δοξα περι των δεινων), i.e. dissolution of the soul-together-with-the-city. Yet Plato slides over a number of interrelated questions: How does such “love” evolve — so that one can become a guardian of the city? And What is the provenance of this “opinion” — if not just a borrowed doctrine? And is it “opinion” that must be preserved?
Chapter Two
Attestation in Being-there of an Authentic Ability-to-be, and Resoluteness

§54. The problem of the attestation of an authentic existentiell possibility
We are looking for an authentic ability-to-be of being-there that is attested by being-there itself in its existentiell possibility. First of all, we have to find this attestation itself.\(^1\) If it is to “allow” being-there to understand itself in its possible authentic existence, it will have its roots in the being of being-there. The phenomenal display of such an attestation thus contains the evidence of its origin from the essential constitution of being-there.

The attestation is to allow being-there to understand an authentic ability-to-be-itself. With the expression “self,” we answered the question of the who of being-there.\(^1\) The selfhood of being-there was determined formally as a way of ex-sisting, i.e. not as an on-hand being. I myself am not, mostly, the who of being-there; rather, the one-self is. Authentic being-itself manifests itself as an existentiell modification of the one that we must delimit existentially.\(^2\) What does this modification imply, and what are the ontological conditions of its possibility?

With the lostness in the one, the nearest, factual ability-to-be of being-there has in each case already been decided upon—the tasks, rules, standards, the urgency and scope of being-in-world, taking care of things and caring for others. The one has already taken the apprehension of these possibilities-of-being away from being-there. The one even conceals the way it has silently disburdened being-there of the explicit choice of these possibilities. It remains undetermined who is “really” choosing. So being-there is taken along by the no-one, without choice, and thus gets caught up in inauthenticity. This can be reversed only as being-there gets explicitly brought back to itself from its lostness in the one. But this being-brought-back must have that sort of being by the

\[\text{[distinguish:] (1) What, as such, does the attesting and (2) what is attested in the attesting.}\]

---

\(^1\) Cf. §25, pp. 144 ff.
\(^2\) Cf. §27, pp. 126 ff., and especially p. 130.
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

346  

neglect of which being-there has lost itself in inauthenticity. When being-there thus gets brought back from the one, the one-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic being-itself. This must be accomplished by making up for not choosing. But making up for not choosing signifies choosing to make this choice—deciding, from its very own self, for an ability-to-be. In choosing to make this choice, being-there makes possible, for the first time, its authentic ability-to-be.\(^a\)

But because being-there is lost in the “one,” it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be “shown” to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, being-there is already an ability-to-be-itself, but it needs to have this ability attested.

In the following interpretation, we shall claim that this ability is attested by what, in the everyday interpretation of itself, being-there is familiar with as the “voice of conscience.”\(^b\) That the “fact” of conscience has been disputed, that its function as a higher court for the ex-sistence of being-there has been variously assessed, and “what it says” has been interpreted in manifold ways—all this might mislead us into dismissing the phenomenon of conscience if we were not that the very “dubiousness” of the factum, or of its interpretation, precisely proves that here a primordial phenomenon of being-there lies before us. In the following analysis, conscience will be placed into a thematic pre-having and will be investigated in a purely existential manner, with fundamental ontology as the aim.

We shall first trace conscience back to its existential foundations and structures, and make it visible as a phenomenon of being-there, holding fast to what we have hitherto arrived at as that being’s essential constitution. The ontological analysis of conscience we are thereby initiating is prior to any psychological description and classification of experiences of conscience, just as it lies outside any biological “explanation,” i.e. dissolution of this phenomenon. But it is no less distant from a theological exegesis of conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God’s ex-sistence or of an “immediate” consciousness of God.

\(^a\) A happening of being—philosophy, freedom.

\(^b\) These observations, and those which follow, were communicated as theses during a lecture in Marburg on the concept of time (July 1924).

Still, in our restricted investigation into conscience, we must neither exaggerate its importance nor make distorted claims about it, thereby diminishing it. As a phenomenon of being-there, conscience is not a fact that occurs and is occasionally on hand. It “is” only in the manner being-there is, and makes itself known as a factum only in factual ex-sistence. The demand for an “inductive empirical proof” of the “factuality” of conscience, and of the legitimacy of its “voice,” is based on an ontological distortion of the phenomenon. But this distortion is also shared by every aloof critique of conscience that considers it as something occurring only now and then rather than as a “universally established and ascertainable fact.” The factum of conscience cannot be coupled with such proofs and counter-proofs at all. This is not a deficiency, but a sign that it differs ontologically from beings on hand in the circum-world.

Conscience offers “something” to understand, it discloses. From this formal characteristic arises the directive to take this phenomenon back into the disclosedness of being-there. This fundamental constitution of the being that we ourselves in each case are constituted by attunement, understanding, collapsing, and talk. A more penetrating analysis of conscience reveals it as a call. Calling is a mode of talk. The call of conscience has the character of summoning being-there to its ownmost ability-to-be-itself—by summoning it to its ownmost being-guilty.

This existential interpretation necessarily departs from everyday, ontic intelligibility, although it exposes the ontological foundations of what the ordinary interpretation of conscience has always understood within certain limits and has conceptualized as a “theory” of conscience. Thus our existential interpretation needs to be confirmed by a critique of the ordinary interpretation of conscience. When this phenomenon has been exhibited, we can bring out to what extent it bears witness to an authentic ability-to-be of being-there. To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Understanding the summons reveals itself as wanting-to-have-conscience. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing of the choice of being-itself that we are looking for and that we call resoluteness in accordance with its existential structure.

Thus we have the divisions of the analysis of this chapter: the existential-ontological foundations of conscience (§55); the character of conscience as a call (§56); conscience as the call of care (§57);
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

understanding the summons, and guilt (§58); the existential interpretation of conscience and the ordinary interpretation of conscience (§59); the existential structure of the authentic ability-to-be attested in conscience (§60).

§55. The existential-ontological foundations\(^a\) of conscience

The analysis\(^b\) of conscience will start out with an undifferentiated feature of this phenomenon: it somehow offers one something to understand. Conscience discloses, and thus belongs to the scope of the existential phenomena constituting the being of the there as disclosedness.\(^1\) We have analyzed the most general structures of attunement, understanding, talk, and collapsing. If we put conscience in this phenomenal context, it is not a matter of a schematic application of the structures already gained to a particular “case” of the disclosure of being-there. Rather, our interpretation of conscience will not only continue the earlier analysis of the disclosedness of the there, it will grasp it more primordially with regard to the authentic being of being-there.

Through disclosedness, the being that we call being-there has the possibility of being its there. It is there for itself, together with its world, initially and mostly in such a way that it has disclosed its ability-to-be in terms of the “world” taken care of. The ability-to-be, as which being-there ex-sists, has in each instance already abandoned itself to determinate possibilities. And this because it is thrown being, its thrownness becoming disclosed more or less clearly and penetratively in its being attuned. Understanding belongs equi-primordially to attunement (mood). In this way being-there “knows”\(^c\) where it stands, since it has projected itself upon possibilities of itself—or, absorbed in the one, has let itself be given such possibilities as are prescribed by its public interpretedness. Yet this prescription is existentially possible [only] because being-there

---

\(a\) horizon. [Are we to get at a foundation, or into a vista? Or does either one of these metaphors do justice to the thinking at issue in Heidegger’s work? About Heidegger’s doubts regarding “horizon,” cf. my annotation on p. 39.]

\(b\) Many things necessarily intertwine here: (1) the call of “conscience”; (2) being called upon; (3) the experience of being called; (4) the usual, traditional interpretation; (5) how to come to terms with it.

\(1\) Cf. §§28 ff., pp. 130 ff.

\(c\) it thinks it knows it [thus the “scare quotes”].

---

§55. The Foundations of Conscience

349

as understanding being-with can listen\(^a\) to others. Losing itself in the public sphere of the one and its re-talk, in listening to the one-self, it fails to hear its own self. If being-there is to be brought back, and by itself, from this lostness of failing to hear itself, it must first be able to find itself, the very self that has failed to hear itself and continues to do so in listening to the one. This listening must be arrested, i.e. the possibility of a hearing that interrupts such listening must be given by being-there itself. The possibility of such a breach lies in being directly summoned. The call ruptures, within being-there, the listening to the one that fails to hear itself—when [namely] the call, in keeping with its character as a call, awakens a hearing that, in relation to the lost hearing, has a character in every way opposite. If this lost hearing is numbed by the “noise” of the manifold ambiguity of everyday “new” re-talk, the call must call silently, unambiguously, with no foothold for curiosity. What, calling in this manner, offers something to understand is: conscience.

We take this calling as a mode of talk. Talk articulates intelligibility. What is characteristic about conscience as a call is by no means only an “image,” like the Kantian representation of conscience as a court of justice. We must not forget that vocal utterance is not essential to talk, and thus not to the call either. Every speaking out and “calling out” already presupposes talk.\(^1\) If the everyday interpretation knows about a “voice” of conscience, it thinks not so much about an utterance, which can factically never be found,\(^b\) but rather it understands “voice” as offering-something-to-understand. In the call’s intent of disclosure lies the element of a jolt, a marked shake-up.\(^c\) The call calls from afar to afar. It reaches whoever wants to be brought back.\(^d\)

But, with this characterization of conscience, only the phenomenal horizon for the analysis of its existential structure has been outlined. We are not comparing this phenomenon to a call, but we are understanding it as talk, as rooted in the disclosedness constitutive for being-there. Our reflection avoids from the very beginning the path which initially offers itself for an interpretation of conscience: the path tracing conscience

---

\(a\) Whence this listening and ability to listen? Sensuous listening with the ears [is to be considered] as a thrown mode of taking things in.

\(1\) Cf. §34, pp. 160 ff.

\(b\) an utterance we don’t “hear” with the senses.

\(c\) but also something enduring.

\(d\) one who has distanced himself from his own self.
back to a faculty of the soul, to understanding, to will or feeling, or explaining it as the product of a mixture of these. In view of a phenomenon such as conscience, it becomes obvious what makes a free-floating framework of classified faculties of the soul, or of personal acts, ontologically and anthropologically inadequate.¹

§56. The character of conscience as a call
To talk belongs what is addressed in it. Talk elucidates something, and this within a determinate perspective. From what is thus addressed, talk draws whatever it is saying: it draws what is said, as such, from what is addressed. In talk as communication this becomes accessible to the being-there-with of others, mostly by way of utterance in language.*

What is it that is addressed, i.e. summoned, in the call of conscience? Evidently, being-there itself. This answer is just as incontestable as it is indeterminate. If the call had such a vague goal, it would still be an occasion for being-there to pay heed to itself. But to being-there essentially belongs this: with the disclosedness of its world it is disclosed to itself, so that it understands always already itself. The call reaches being-there in this always-already-understanding-itself in everyday, average taking care of things. The call reaches the one-self embedded in being with others and in taking care of things.

And to what is the one-self summoned? To its own self. Not to what being-there is taken to be, can do, and takes care of in public being-with-one-another, not even to what it has grasped, what it has pledged itself to, what it has let itself be involved with. The being-there that is understood in a worldly way as being for others and for itself; this being-there gets passed over in this summons. The call to the self takes not the slightest notice of all this. Because only the self of the one-self is summoned and made to hear, the one implodes into itself. That the call passes over both the one and the public interpretedness of being-there by no means signifies that the call has not also reached the one. Precisely in passing over the one, the call pushes the one, ever adamant for public recognition, into insignificance. But, robbed of its refuge and hiding-place, summoned out of these, the self is brought to itself by the call.

The one-self is summoned to the self. However, this is not the self that can become an “object” for itself, on which it can pass judgment—not the self that unrestrainedly dismembers its “inner life” with excited curiosity, and not the self that stares “analytically” at states of the soul and their backgrounds.* The summons of the self in the one-self does not force it inwards upon itself so that it can close... The call leaps beyond all this and disperses it, so as to summon solely the self—which is also nothing else than being-in-world.

But how are we to determine what is said in this talk? What does conscience call out to the one summoned? Strictly speaking—nothing. The call does not propose anything, does not give any information about

---

¹ Besides the interpretations of conscience given by Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, we should note M. Kähler’s: Das Gewissen (1878), and the article by the same author in the Realenzyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche. Furthermore, A. Rischl’s: Über das Gewissen (1876), reprinted in Gesammelte Aufsätze, New Series (1896), pp. 177 ff. Finally, see the monograph just published of H. G. Stoker, Das Gewissen, in Schriften zur Philosophie und Soziologie, edited by Max Scheler, vol. 2, 1925. This last investigation is broadly conceived; it clarifies a manifold richness of phenomena of conscience, characterizes critically the various possible ways of treating the phenomenon, and notes further literature (which is incomplete regarding the history of the concept of conscience). Stoker’s monograph differs from our existential interpretation already in its starting point and therefore also in its conclusions, despite many points of agreement. Stoker underestimates from the beginning the hermeneutical conditions for a “description” of the “objectively real conscience” (p. 3). Hand in hand with this goes the muddling of the borderline lines between phenomenology and theology — to the detriment of both. With regard to the anthropological foundations of the investigation which Scheler’s personalism endorses, see the present treatise, §10 (pp. 47 ff.). Still, Stoker’s monograph signifies considerable progress as compared with the traditional interpretations of conscience, but more by the comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon and its ramifications than by any display of its ontological roots.

* The distinction between what is addressed and what is said has puzzled logicians from the beginning. See my annotation on p. 162, where Heidegger distinguishes what talk is about, what talk addresses, and the talking itself.

* Heidegger’s account of selfhood does intermittent battle with the theories of introspection tempting us either to “dismember” ourselves heatedly or to “analyze” ourselves coolly. On p. 178 these tendencies are presented as examples of collapsing.
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

events of the world, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it strive to open a “conversation with itself” in the self which has been summoned. “Nothing” is called to the self summoned, but it is summoned to itself, i.e. to its ownmost ability-to-be. In accordance with its drive as a call, the call does not summon the summoned self to a “trial hearing”; rather, as a summons to the ownmost ability-to-be-itself, the summons calls being-there forth (ahead) to its ownmost possibilities.

The call does without any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet it is not at all obscure and indeterminate. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode of silence. Thus it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces being-there, thus summoned and called upon, into the reticence of itself. That what is called in the call lacks a formulation in words does not shunt this phenomenon into the indeterminateness of a mysterious voice, but only indicates that the understanding of “what is called” may not cling to the expectation of a communication, or anything of the sort.

What the call discloses is nevertheless unequivocal, even if it gets interpreted differently in each individual being-there, in accordance with its possibilities of understanding. Whereas the content of the call is seemingly indeterminate, the direction it takes is a sure one and cannot be overlooked. The call does not entail a groping search for the one summoned, nor a sign showing whether it is he who is meant or not. “Deceptions” occur in conscience not by an oversight of the call (a mis-calling) but only because the call is heard in such a way that, instead of being understood authentically, it is drawn by the one-self into a debate with itself, and is distorted in its disclosive intent.

We must bear firmly in mind this: the call we designate as conscience is a summons to the one-self in its self; as this summons, the summons is the call of the self to its ability-to-be-itself, and thus a calling forth of being-there into its possibilities.

Yet we shall not obtain an ontologically adequate interpretation of conscience until we can clarify not only who is called by the call, but who calls, how the one who is summoned is related to the caller, and how this “relation” is to be grasped ontologically in its interrelated being.

§57. Conscience as the Call of Care

Conscience calls the self of being-there forth out of its lostness in the one. The summoned self remains indeterminate and empty in its what. The call passes over what being-there initially and mostly understands itself to be — as this is interpreted from what being-there takes care of. And yet the self is unequivocally and unmistakably reached. Not only is the call meant for the one who is summoned “without regard to his person”; the caller, too, remains strikingly indeterminate. It not only refuses to answer questions about name, status, origin, and repute, but also, without at all disguising itself in the call, leaves not the slightest possibility of making the call safely familiar for any understanding of being-there with a “worldly” orientation. The caller of the call — and this belongs to its phenomenal character — distances itself absolutely from any kind of familiarity. It goes against its manner of being to be drawn into any examination or discussion. The peculiar indeterminateness and undeterminability of the caller are not nothing, but a positive characteristic. It lets us know that the caller expends itself entirely in the summoning to . . . , that it wants to be heard only as such, and not to be chattered about any further. But is it then not suitable to the phenomenon to leave unasked the question of who the caller is? For existential analysis of the facticity of calling and the existentiality of hearing.

But is it at all necessary to keep raising explicitly the question who is calling? Is this not answered for being-there just as unequivocally as the question of who the call summons? In conscience, being-there calls itself. This understanding of the caller may be more or less awake in factically hearing the call. However, ontologically it is not at all enough to answer that being-there is simultaneously the caller and the summoned. Is not being-there differently “there” as summoned than it is as calling? Is it perhaps one's ownmost ability-to-be that takes the role of the caller?

The call is precisely something that we ourselves neither plan nor prepare nor willingly effect. “It” calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call doubtlessly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The calls come from me and yet upon me.

These phenomenal findings are not to be explained away. Yet they have also been taken as the point of departure for interpreting the voice of conscience as an alien power entering being-there. Continuing in this
direction of interpretation, one supplies an owner for the power thus localized, or else one takes that power as a person making himself known (God). Conversely, one tries to reject this interpretation of the caller as the expression of an alien power, and then to explain conscience away “biologically.” Both interpretations hastily leap over the phenomenal findings. Such procedures are made easier by the unspoken, but ontologically guiding [and mis-guiding] dogmatic thesis: what is (i.e., anything so factual as the call) must be on hand; what cannot be demonstrated as on hand just is not at all.

As opposed to this methodological hastiness, we must hold on firmly not only to the phenomenal findings in general — that the call, coming from me and upon me, reaches me — but also to the ontological intimation contained in them: that this phenomenon is a phenomenon of being-there. The existential constitution of this being offers the sole guideline for the interpretation of the way the “it” that calls is.

Does our previous analysis of the essential constitution of being-there show a way of making ontologically intelligible the manner the caller is, and thereby also the manner the calling is? That the call is not explicitly brought about by me, that rather “it” calls, does not justify looking for the caller in a being not taking its measure from being-there. Being-there, after all, in each case ex-sists factically. It is not a free-floating self-projection, but is rather determined by thrownness as the factum of the being that it is — just as it has in each case already been entrusted to ex-sistence, and remains so constantly. But the facticity of being-there is essentially distinguished from the factuality of something on hand. Ex-sitting being-there does not encounter itself as something on hand within the world. But neither is thrownness attached to being-there as an inaccessible characteristic that is of no importance to its ex-sistence. As thrown, being-there has been thrown into ex-sistence. It exists as a being that has to be as it is and as it can be.

That it factically is, might be concealed with regard to its why, but the “that” itself is disclosed to being-there. The thrownness of this being belongs to the disclosedness of the “there,” and reveals itself constantly in some given attunement. Attunement brings being-there, more or less explicitly and authentically, before its “that it is, and has to be as the being it is, i.e. as the being it can be.” But mostly, mood closes off thrownness. Being-there flees from thrownness to the alleviation that comes with the supposed freedom of the one-self. We characterized this flight as the flight from the uncanniness that fundamentally determines individualized being-in-world. Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the fundamental attunement of dread. And, as the most elemental disclosedness of thrown being-there, uncanniness brings its being-in-world up to the nothingness of the world in the face of which it is anxious about its ownmost ability-to-be. What if being-there, finding itself attuned to the ground of its own uncanniness, were the caller of the call of conscience?

Nothing speaks against this, but all the phenomena we have exhibited as characterizing the caller and its calling speak for it.

In its who, the caller is determinable by nothing “worldly.” The caller is being-there in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-world, as not-at-home, the naked “that” in the nothingness of the world. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday one-self, something like an alien voice. What could be more alien to the one, lost in the manifold “world” cared for, than the self individualized to itself, in uncanniness, and thrown into nothingness? “Something” calls, and yet it offers preoccupied and curious ears nothing to hear that could be passed along and publicly addressed. But what could being-there ever report from the uncanniness of its thrown being? What else remains for it than its own ability-to-be, revealed in dread? How else could it call than by summoning to this ability-to-be, that which is solely at issue for it?

The call does not report any particulars; it also calls without any utterance. The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. And it does this only because, in calling the one summoned, it does not call him into the public re-talk of the one, but calls him back from that to the reticence of his ex-sistent ability-to-be. The caller reaches the one summoned with a cold and uncanny but not at all self-evident assurance. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance, if not in this: that being-there, individualized to itself in its uncanniness, is straightaway prevented from mistaking another for itself? What is it that so radically takes away from being-there the possibility of misunderstanding itself, of missing itself by taking its bearings from somewhere else, if not the forlornness of being entrusted to itself?

Uncanniness is the way being-in-world is, from the ground up — even though it is covered over in everydayness. As conscience, being-there itself calls from the ground of this being. The “it calls me” is the pre-eminent talk of being-there. This call, attuned by dread, first makes

§57. Conscience as the Call of Care
possible for being-there its projection of itself upon its ownmost ability-to-be. The call of conscience, existentially understood, first makes known what was earlier simply asserted: uncanniness pursues being-there and threatens its self-forgotten lostness.

The statement that being-there is at once both the caller and the one summoned has now lost its formal emptiness and its self-evidence. Conscience reveals itself as the call of care: the caller is being-there, dreading in thrownness (in its already-being-in . . . ) for its ability-to-be. The one summoned is precisely this being-there, called forth to its ownmost ability-to-be (ahead-of-itself . . . ). And, by the summons, being-there is called out of collapsing into the one (already-being-near the world-taken-care-of). The call of conscience, i.e. conscience itself, has its onto-logical possibility in this: at the ground of its being, being-there is care.

Thus we need not resort to powers not taking their measure from being-there, especially since such recourse, far from clarifying the uncanniness of the call, actually annihilates it. In the end, does not the reason for the far-fetched “explanations” of conscience lie in one’s having cut the examination too short when focusing on phenomenal findings regarding the call, and having tacitly presupposed being-there in some incidental ontological determination or indetermination? Why should we look to alien powers for information before we have made sure that in starting our analysis we have not given too low an assessment of the being of being-there, i.e. considered being-there as a harmless subject arising and endowed with personal consciousness?

And yet there seems to lie, in the interpretation of the caller as a power — a “no-one,” viewed in terms of the world — an impartial

§57. Conscience as the Call of Care

acknowledgement of something “objectively available.” But, closely considered, this interpretation is only a flight from conscience, a way out for being-there, whereby it slips away from the thin wall that, as it were, separates the one from the uncanniness of its being. This interpretation of conscience pretends to acknowledge the call as being a “universally” binding voice that “does not speak just subjectively.” Even more, this “universal” conscience gets exalted to a “world conscience” that, in regard to its phenomenal character, is an “it” and a “no-one” — and is thus indeed still [construed as] what speaks, in the individual “subject,” as this undetermined something.

But this “public conscience” — what is it other than the voice of the one? Being-there can only invent the dubious idea of a “world conscience” because at bottom conscience is essentially in each case mine, not only in the sense that it is always one’s ownmost ability-to-be that is summoned, but because the call comes from the being that I myself happen to be.

With our present interpretation of the caller, which vigilantly follows the phenomenal character of the calling, the “power” of conscience is not diminished and rendered “merely subjective.” On the contrary: with it, the inexorability and unequivocality of the call first becomes free. The “objectivity” of the summons first gets justified when the interpretation leaves it its “subjectivity”— a “subjectivity” which, of course, denies the one-self its dominance.

Still, one will counter this interpretation of conscience as the call of care with the question: Can any interpretation of conscience stand up if it removes itself so far from “normal experience”? How can conscience as that which summons us to our ownmost ability-to-be function, inasmuch as it initially and mostly only reproves and warns? Does conscience speak in such an indeterminately empty way about our ownmost ability-to-be — or not rather determinately and concretely in relation to failures and omissions already committed, or lurking in our plans? Does the alleged summons stem from a “bad” conscience or a “good” one? Does conscience present anything positive at all — does it not rather function only critically?

Such concerns are incontestably justified. We can demand from any interpretation of conscience that “one” should recognize in it the phenomenon in question, as it is experienced daily. But to meet this demand does not mean that the ordinary, ontic understanding of
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

Conscience must be recognized as the first authority for an ontological interpretation. But, on the other hand, those concerns are premature so long as the analysis of conscience to which they pertain has not reached its goal. Up to now we have tried solely to trace conscience as a phenomenon of being-there back to the ontological constitution of being-there. This has served as preparation for the task of making conscience intelligible as an attestation of its ownmost ability-to-be—one lurking already in being-there itself.

And we can fully determine what conscience attests only when we have delimited with sufficient clarity what characteristic that hearing must have which intrinsically corresponds to the calling. The authentic understanding “following” the call is not an addition annexed to the phenomenon of conscience, an event that might occur but then again might not. The complete experience of conscience only strikes home from understanding the summons, in unison with it. If the caller and the one summoned are themselves at once one’s own being-there, a determinate manner of being-there lies in any failure to hear the call. For this will be to mishear oneself. Viewed existentially, a free-floating call from which “nothing ensues” is an impossible fiction. “That nothing ensues” means something positive with regard to being-there.

Thus only an analysis of the summons can lead to an explicit discussion of what the call offers us to understand. But only with our foregoing, general ontological characterization of conscience is the possibility given to comprehend existentially conscience’s call of “guilty.” All interpretations and experiences of conscience agree that the “voice” of conscience somehow speaks of “guilt.”

§58. Understanding the Summons: Guilt

In order to grasp phenomenally what is heard in understanding the summons, we must focus on this summons freshly. Summoning the oneself means calling forth the authentic self to its ability-to-be—and this as being-there, i.e. as being-in-world taking care of things and being with others. For this reason, so long as it understands itself correctly in its methodological possibilities and tasks, our existential interpretation of that to which the call calls forth cannot intend to delimit any concrete individual possibility of ex-sistence. What we can establish, and what we seek to establish, is not what is called out existentially to each particular being-there, but what belongs to the existential condition of the possibility of any factual-existentiell ability-to-be.

Whenever the call is understood in an existentiell hearing, the understanding is more authentic the more unconditionally being-there hears and understands its being summoned, and the less what “one” says (what passes for “right” and “proper”) perverts the meaning of the call. What lies essentially in the authenticity of understanding the summons? What is it, essentially, that is offered to one, in any instance of the call, for understanding—even if it is not always factically understood?

We have already decided this question in our claim that the call “says” nothing which could be talked about, it does not give any information about the way matters stand. The call directs being-there forward—toward its ability-to-be—and does this as a call from uncanniness. The caller is indeed indeterminate—yet the wherefrom out of which it calls is not indifferent for the calling. This wherefrom—the uncanniness of thrown individuation—is co-called in the calling, i.e. is disclosed along with it. The wherefrom of the calling, in its calling forth to..., is that to which it is called back. The call does not allow us to understand an ideal, universal ability-to-be; it discloses the ability-to-be that happens to be there, but now as individualized and as of the being-there that happens to be. The disclosive character of the call can only be completely determined once we understand it as a calling back that calls forth. Only if we are oriented toward the call thus understood may we ask what it allows one to understand.

But is the question of what the call says not answered more easily and certainly by the “simple” reference to what we generally hear or fail to hear in any experience of conscience: that the call addresses being-there as “guilty”—or, as in the warning conscience, refers to a possible “guilt”—or, as a “good” conscience, confirms that one is “conscious of no guilt”? If only this “guilty” that is experienced “universally” were not determined, in experiences and interpretations of conscience, in such completely different ways! And even if the meaning of this “guilty” could be grasped in general agreement, the existential concept of this being-guilty would still be obscure. However, when being-there addresses itself as guilty, where should its idea of guilt be drawn from if not from the interpretation of its own being? But the question arises again: Who says how we are guilty and what guilt means? The idea of guilt should not be arbitrarily thought up and forced upon being-there. But if an understanding of the essence of guilt is
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

possible at all, this possibility must already be prefigured in being-there. How are we to find the trace that can lead to revealing this phenomenon? All ontological investigations into phenomena such as guilt, conscience, and death must have their foothold in what the everyday interpretation of being-there “says” about them. Yet the collapsing manner of its being also assures that the way being-there gets interpreted is mostly inauthentically “oriented” and does not get at the “essence,” since the primordially appropriate ontological mode of questioning remains alien to it. Yet whenever we see something wrongly, a directive as to the primordial “idea” of the phenomenon is also revealed. But where do we get our criterion for the primordial existential meaning of “guilty”? From this “guilty” turning up as a predicate of the “I am”?

* Does what is understood as “guilt” in inauthentic interpretation possibly lie in the being of being-there as such, in such a way that being-there, just by ex-sisting as it happens to ex-sist, is also and already guilty?

Thus, by invoking the “guilty” which everyone agrees to hearing, we have not yet answered the question of the existential meaning of what is called in the call. This must first be properly conceptualized if we are to make intelligible what the call of “guilty” means, and why and how it gets distorted in its significance by the everyday interpretation.

Everyday intelligibility initially takes “being guilty” in the sense of “owing something,” “having something on account.” One is supposed to return, to another, something to which the latter has a claim. This “being guilty” as “having debts” is a way of being-with-others in the field of taking care of things — as when providing them with something or teaching them something. Further modes of taking care of things are: depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking, robbing — i.e., in some way not satisfying the claims that others have made as to their possessions. This kind of being guilty is related to things that can be taken care of.

Then too, being guilty has the further significance of “being responsible for,” i.e. being the cause or author of something, or “being the occasion” for something. This “being responsible” for something has the sense of “being guilty” without owing or coming to owe anything to anyone. Conversely, one can owe something to another without oneself having caused the debt. Another person can “incur debts” to others “for me.”

These ordinary significations of being guilty as “having debts to . . .” and “being responsible for . . .” can occur together and determine a comportment that we call “making oneself guilty,” i.e. violating some law by being responsible [i.e., at fault] for having incurred debts, and thereby making oneself punishable. However, the requirement one fails to satisfy need not necessarily be related to possessions, it can regulate public being-with-one-another in general. Yet such determinate “making oneself guilty” by violating a law can just as well have the character of “becoming responsible to others” — this occurring not by violating a law as such, but by my having the responsibility for the other’s becoming jeopardized in his ex-sistence, led astray, or even destroyed. Such becoming responsible to others is possible without violating “public” law. The formal concept of being guilty in this sense (having become responsible to others) can be defined as follows: being the ground [i.e., the reason] for a lack in the being-there of another, in such a way that this being-the-ground itself is determined as “lacking” in terms of its own intent. This lacking-ness is a non-satisfaction of some demand permeating one’s ex-sisting being-with-others.

It remains undecided how such demands arise and in what way their character, as demands and laws, is to be conceived on the basis of this origin. In any case, being guilty in this latter sense of violating a “moral requirement” is a way of being that belongs to being-there. Of course, that is also true of being guilty as “making oneself punishable,” as “having debts,” and of any “being responsible for . . . .” These, too, are comportments of being-there. Very little is said by accounting for “burdened with moral guilt” as a “quality” of being-there. On the contrary, such an account only makes it evident that this characterization does not allow us to distinguish ontologically between its “determination” of how being-there is and the comportments just listed. The concept of moral guilt has been so little clarified ontologically that interpretations of the phenomenon have been able to become dominant, and to remain so, which bring into the concept of it not only the idea of deserving punishment but even the idea of having [particular] debts to others — or which derive the concept from these ideas. But in this way the “guilty” is again forced into the realm of taking-care, this construed as calculating and settling claims.

§58. Understanding the Summons: Guilt

I have inserted the question-mark: the sentence is uttered by an imagined opponent. Heidegger goes on to argue that “predications” of guilt are possible only because being-there is essentially (not predicatively) guilty.
The clarification of the phenomenon of guilt—a phenomenon not necessarily related to “having debts” or to breaking the law—can succeed only if we first enquire penetratingly into the being-guilty of being-there, i.e. if we conceptualize the idea of “guilty” from the way in which being-there has its being.

For this purpose, the idea of “guilty” must be formalized to the extent that we can free ourselves from the ordinary phenomena of guilt, those arising from the being-with-others in taking care of things. The idea of guilt must not only be removed from the realm of calculative taking care of things, but must also be separated from any relationship to obligation and law, failure to comply with which burdens someone with guilt. For here, too, guilt is still necessarily determined as lack, as absence of something which should and can be [present]. But absence means not being on hand. A lack, as the not-being-on-hand of what ought to be, is a determination of on-hand being. In this sense nothing can be essentially lacking in ex-sistence, not because it is complete, but because the character of its being is distinct from every kind of on-hand-ness.

Still, the character of the not lurks within the idea of “guilty.” If the “guilty” is to determine ex-sistence, the ontological problem then arises of clarifying existentially the not-character of this not. Furthermore, there belongs to the idea of “guilty” something expressed in the concept of guilt undifferentiatedly as “being responsible for”: being-the-ground for . . . Thus we may determine the formal existential idea of “guilty” as: being-the-ground for a [manner of] being determined by a not—i.e. being-the-ground of a nothingness.* If the idea of the not lurking in the existentially understood concept of “guilt” excludes relatedness to on-hand beings, possible or exacted, if again being-there is altogether incomensurable with anything on hand (or commonly accepted) that it itself is not, or that is not in the way being-there is, i.e. does not ex-sist: so too we must exclude the possibility of considering (in reference to such being-the-ground) as itself “deficient” the being that grounds the lack. If a lack, such as a failure to fulfill some demand, has been “caused” in a way ascribable to being-there, we cannot simply calculate back to some deficiency in the “cause.” Being-the-ground for . . . need not have the same not-character as does the privation grounded in it and arising from it. The ground need not acquire a nothingness of its own from what is grounded in it. But this means that being-guilty does not result from an indebtedness, but the other way around: indebtedness is possible only “on the ground” of a primordial being-guilty.* Can we show this in the being of being-there? And how is it existentially possible at all?

The being of being-there is care. It includes in itself facticity (thrownness), ex-sistence (projection) and collapsing. Being-there is as thrown: it is brought into its there not of its own accord. It is as an ability-to-be which belongs to itself: and yet it has not been given itself as its own. Ex-sisting, being-there never gets back behind its thrownness—so that it could itself expressly release this “that-it-is and has-to-be” from its own being a self and lead it [directly] into the there. Yet thrownness does not lie behind it as an event that factually came about, something that happened to it and then fell off it. Rather, as long as it is, being-there is constantly its “that” as care. As this being, entrusted to which it can ex-sist uniquely as the being that it is and that can ex-sist, being-there is ex-sistingly the ground of its ability-to-be. Although it has not laid the ground itself, it bears the weight of it, which mood reveals to it as a burden.

And how is being-there this thrown ground? Only by projecting itself upon the possibilities into which it is thrown. The self, which as such has to lay the ground of itself, can never gain power over that ground, and yet it has to take over being the ground in ex-sisting. Being its own thrown ground is the ability-to-be that is at issue for care.

Being the ground, i.e. ex-sisting as thrown, being-there constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never ex-sistent before its ground, but only from it and as it. Thus being-the-ground means never to gain power

---

* This formulation anticipates a thought developed both throughout Being and Time and in Heidegger's later works: being-there is the "place" at which beings arise for encounter—but this in a way suggesting something both about us (we must learn to be the there) and about the being of those beings (they withdraw as well as emerge: the "not" belongs to their being). Already on p. 14, Heidegger endorses Aristotle's "the soul is in a way all beings." In the same context, Aristotle endorses the then-current saying that "the soul is the place of forms—not the whole soul but only the thinking soul, and not in its completion but in its ability-to-be" (429a27). Cf. p. 319 regarding Kant.

* The analyses of the “not-yet” in §48 foreshadow this thought, which undergirds Nietzsche’s critique of ontic guilt (e.g., in his Will to Power, §765).
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

§58. Understanding the Summons: Guilt

over one’s ownmost being—from the ground up. This not belongs to the existential meaning of thrownness. Being the ground, it itself is a nothingness of itself. Nothingness by no means signifies not being on hand or not subsisting, but means a not that constitutes this being of being-there, its thrownness. The not-character of this not is determined existentially: being its self, being-there is the thrown being as its self. Being-there is released to itself, from its ground, in order to be as this ground—it does not effect this release. Being-there is itself the ground of its being not because the ground first springs from its own projection; but, by being its self, it is the being of its ground. The ground is always ground only for a being whose being has to take over being-the-ground.

Being-there is its ground ex-sistingly, i.e. in such a way that it understands itself in terms of possibilities and, understanding itself accordingly, is as thrown being. But here included is this: as an ability-to-be, it always stands in one possibility or another; it is constantly not other possibilities; it has relinquished them in its existentiell projection. As thrown, the projection is not only determined by the nothingness of being-the-ground; it is itself, as projection, essentially null. Again, this determination by no means signifies the ontic property of being “unsuccessful” or “unworthy”; it is rather an existential constituent of the essential structure of projecting. This nothingness belongs to the being-free, of being-there, for its existentiell possibilities. But freedom is only in the choice of one possibility, i.e. in bearing its not-having-chosen and not-being-able-also-to-choose the others.

In the structure of thrownness, as well as in that of projection, there essentially lies a nothingness. And this structure of nothingness is the ground for the possibility of the nothingness of inauthentic being-there in the collapsing that in any instance it already is factically. Care itself is in its essence thoroughly permeated with nothingness. Accordingly, care—as the being of being-there—means, as thrown projection: being the (null) ground of a nothingness. And that signifies: being-there as such is guilty, if our formal existential determination of guilt as being-the-ground of a nothingness hits the mark.*

Existential nothingness by no means has the character of a privation, of a lack as compared with an ideal set up but not attained in being-there; rather, as projection, the being of this being is already null before anything it can project and even attain. Thus this nothingness does not just occur occasionally in being-there, attached to it as a dark quality that it could get rid of if it made sufficient progress.

Still, the ontological meaning of the not-ness of this existential nothingness remains obscure. But that is true also of the ontological essence of the not in general. To be sure, ontology and logic have made much of the not, and thereby at times made its possibilities visible, without revealing the not itself ontologically. Ontology found the not and used it. But is it then so self-evident that every not means a negation in the sense of a lack? Is its positivity exhausted by its constituting the ”transition” [to a filling]? Why does every dialectic take refuge in negation, without itself grounding it dialectically, without even being able to locate it as a problem? Has anyone ever made the ontological origin of not-ness a problem at all—or, prior to that, even looked for the conditions on the basis of which the problem of the not and its not-ness, and the possibility of this not-ness, could be raised? And where else could they ever be found than in a thematic clarification of the meaning of being in general?

The concepts of privation and lack (hardly transparent in themselves) are not sufficient for the ontological interpretation of the phenomenon of guilt—even though, if we take them formally enough, we can put them to considerable use. Least of all can we get nearer to the existential phenomenon of guilt by taking our orientation from the idea of evil, the malum as privatio boni. Then too, the bonum and the privatio have the same ontological provenance in the ontology of on-hand beings as does the idea of “value” drawn from this ontology.

Beings whose being is care not only can burden themselves with factual guilt, they are guilty in the ground of their being. This being-guilty first locates the ontological condition allowing being-there to become guilty in factically ex-sisting. This essential being-guilty is, equiprimordially, the existential condition for the possibility of the “morally” good and evil, i.e. for morality in general and its possible factual formations. Primordial being-guilty cannot be determined by morality because morality already presupposes it.

But what experience speaks for this primordial being-guilty of being-there? However, let us not forget the counter-question: “Is” guilt “there” only when a consciousness of guilt is awakened, or does not the most

---

* Heidegger is here dialoguing with Augustine's Confessions — in the effort to show how the ground of “guilt” (viz. nothingness) lies in being-there itself.
primordial being-guilty evince itself precisely in the “slumbering” of guilt? That this primordial being-guilty initially and mostly remains undisclosed and is kept closed off by the collapsing being of being-there: precisely this reveals the nothingness. Being guilty is more primordial than any knowing about it. And only because being-there is guilty in the ground of its being and, as thrown and collapsing, closes itself off from itself, is conscience possible — assuming the call basically lets us understand this being-guilty.

The call is the call of care. Being-guilty constitutes the being that we call care. In uncanniness, being-there stands primordially together with itself. Uncanniness brings being-there face to face with its undisguised nothingness, a nothingness that belongs to the possibility of its ownmost ability-to-be. Since its being as care is at issue for itself, being-there calls (out of the uncanniness) to itself as the one (as factically collapsed), calling it forth to its ability-to-be. The summons calls back by calling forth: forth to the possibility of taking over ex-sistingly the thrown being that it is, back to thrownness in order to understand it as the null ground that it has to take up into ex-sistence. The calling back in which conscience calls forth lets being-there understand that being-there itself — as the null ground of its null projection, standing in the possibility of its being — must bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the one, i.e. that it is guilty.

So what being-there lets itself understand seems after all to be something one can notice about oneself. And the hearing corresponding to that call seems to be a taking notice of the factum “guilty.” And if the call is indeed to have the character of a summons, does not this interpretation of conscience lead to a complete distortion of its function? Summoning to being-guilty, does that not mean summoning to evil? Even the most violent interpretation would not wish to impose upon conscience such a meaning for the call. The intelligibility of the one knows only what is sufficient or insufficient with respect to handy rules and public standards. It regulates infractions of them and seeks compromises. The one has sunk away from its ownmost being-guilty so as to address mistakes all the more vociferously. But in the summons, the one-self is summoned to the ownmost being-guilty of the self. Understanding the call is choosing — but not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is to have conscience as being free for one’s ownmost being-guilty. Understanding the summons means: wanting-to-have-conscience. This does not mean wanting to have a “good conscience,” nor does need not first burden itself with “guilt” through failures or omissions; it must only be authentically the “guilty” that it is.

Then the correct hearing of the summons is tantamount to understanding oneself in one’s ownmost ability-to-be, i.e. in projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic ability to become guilty. When being-there understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its becoming free for the call: its preparedness for the ability-to-become-summoned. Understanding the call, being-there is bonded to its ownmost possibility of ex-sistence.

With this choice, being-there makes possible its ownmost being-guilty — something that remains closed off from the one-self. The intelligibility of the one knows only what is sufficient or insufficient with respect to handy rules and public standards. It regulates infractions of them and seeks compromises. The one has sunk away from its ownmost being-guilty so as to address mistakes all the more vociferously. But in the summons, the one-self is summoned to the ownmost being-guilty of the self. Understanding the call is choosing — but not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is to have conscience as being free for one’s ownmost being-guilty. Understanding the summons means: wanting-to-have-conscience.

This does not mean wanting to have a “good conscience,” nor does

* Already on p. 163 Heidegger interrelated listening to others (a kind of obedience) and bonding with them. Here, now, the bonding is reflexive. Traditionally the term describes the condition of serfdom, colloquially now any strong condition of dependence. Cf. Oswald Spengler’s account of bonding in his Decline of the West, Vol. II, Chapter 4, “The Problem of the Estates,” §5, e.g.: “the peasant gets relieved of the pressure of bonding [to the soil] but then gets subjected to the power of money” (Der Untergang des Abendlandes [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1923, 1998], pp. 990-1004).

† On p. 7 Heidegger remarked that even raising the question of being requires that we learn to choose the right “exemplary being” for phenomenological consideration; and on p. 268 he argues that the one “conceals the way it has silently disburdened being-there of the explicit choice of its possibilities.” On these present pages he is exposing the conditions of the possibility of explicit choice — a kind of bonding — and therefore also of phenomenology.

‡ Heidegger here begins to interpret volition (willing, wanting) as most primordially directed to the situation as already taken shape (the “past”) rather than to the enactment of envisioned situations (the “future”).
it mean willfully cultivating the “call”; it means solely the preparedness to be summoned. Wanting-to-have-conscience is just as removed from searching out one’s factual indebtedness as from the intent to free oneself from guilt in its essential sense.

Wanting to have conscience is rather the most primordial existentiell presupposition for the possibility of becoming factically guilty. Understanding the call, being-there lets its ownmost self take action from within its chosen ability-to-be. Only in this way can it be responsible. But factically every action is necessarily “conscienceless” — not only because it does not avoid factual moral indebtedness, but because, on the basis of the null ground of its null projection, it has in each instance already become indebted to others in its being-with-them.* Thus wanting-to-have-conscience takes over the essential consciencelessness within which alone there is the existentiell possibility of being “good.”

Although the call does not give us any information, it is not only critical, but also positive: it discloses the most primordial ability-to-be of being-there as being-guilty. Thus, conscience reveals itself as an attestation belonging to the being of being-there — one in which it calls being-there forth to its ownmost ability-to-be. Can the authentic ability-to-be thus attested be determined existentially in a more concrete way? — But a precedental question arises. We have shown an ability-to-be that is attested in being-there itself, but can we claim sufficient evidential weight for the way we have shown this so long as the strangeness of our interpretation does not subside — the [apparently] one-sided interpretation of conscience tracing it back to the constitution of being-there while hastily passing over all the findings familiar to the ordinary interpretation of conscience? Is the phenomenon of conscience still recognizable at all, as it “really” is, in our interpretation? Have we not been all too sure of ourselves in the ingenuousness with which we deduced an idea of conscience from the essential constitution of being-there?

* Heidegger is here accounting phenomenologically for Goethe’s well-known maxim: “He who acts is always conscienceless; only he who looks on has a conscience.” Goethes Werke (Hamburg: C. Wegner, 1955, 1998), Band XII, p. 399. Heidegger may also be subtilizing the account in Spengler’s Decline of the West, Vol. II, Chapter 4, “Philosophy of Politics;” §16, e.g. “Doing the right thing without ‘knowing’ it — the sure hand that imperceptibly tightens or loosens the reins — this is a talent opposite to that of the theoretical man.” In its guise as before- or after-the-fact knowing, conscience gets in the way.

The last step in our interpretation of conscience will be the existential delimitation of the authentic ability-to-be that conscience attests. If we are to assure ourselves of an access that will make such a step possible even for the ordinary understanding of conscience, we need explicit evidence for the connection between the results of the ontological analysis and the everyday experiences of conscience.

§59. The Existential interpretation of conscience and its ordinary interpretation
Conscience is the call of care issuing from the uncanniness of being-in-world, a call summoning being-there to its ownmost ability-to-be-guilty. We showed that wanting-to-have-conscience corresponds to understanding the summons. These two characterizations are not immediately harmonious with the ordinary interpretation of conscience. Indeed, they seem to be in direct conflict with it. We call this interpretation of conscience ordinary because in characterizing this phenomenon and describing its “function” it keeps to what the one knows as conscience, how one follows it or fails to follow it.*

But must the ontological interpretation be in harmony with the ordinary interpretation at all? Should not the latter be, in principle, ontologically suspect? If being-there initially and mostly understands itself in terms of what it takes care of, and if it interprets all its comportments as taking care of things, then won’t being-there, collapsing and covering over, interpret, according to its own manner of being, the way the call seeks to bring it back from its lostness in the cares of the one? Everydayness [interprets, i.e.] takes being-there as something at hand that is to be taken care of, i.e. governed and settled. “Life” is a “business,” whether or not it covers its costs.

So, regarding the ordinary manner in which being-there is itself, there is no guarantee that the interpretation of conscience arising from it, or the theories of conscience taking their orientation from it, have attained the appropriate ontological horizon for its interpretation. Nevertheless, even the ordinary experience of conscience must somehow get at the phenomenon — pre-ontologically. Two things follow from this: On the one hand, the everyday interpretation of conscience cannot be valid as the ultimate criterion for the “objectivity” of an ontological analysis. On

* Note the “definition” of the term “ordinary”: what “the one” knows.
the other hand, such an analysis has no right to elevate itself above the everyday understanding of conscience and pass over the anthropological, psychological, and theological theories of conscience based on it. If the existential analysis has exposed the phenomenon of conscience in its ontological rootedness, the ordinary interpretations must be intelligible precisely in terms of that analysis—not least where they miss the phenomenon and why they cover it over. However, since in the context of problems of this treatise the analysis of conscience serves only the ontological question of foundations, the characterization of the connection between the existential and ordinary interpretations of conscience will have to be content with an indication of the essential problems.

The ordinary interpretation of conscience objects in four ways to our interpretation of conscience as the summons of care to being-guilty. First, conscience has an essentially critical function. Second, conscience always speaks relative to a definite deed that has been done or wished for. Third, in actual experience the “voice” is never related so radically to the being of being-there. Fourth, our interpretation does not account for the basic forms of the phenomenon—for the “nagging” or “good,” the “reproving” or “warning” conscience.

Let us begin our discussion with the fourth reservation. In all interpretations of conscience, it is the “nagging” or “bad” conscience that has priority. Conscience is primarily a “nagging.” This nagging declares that in every experience of conscience something like a “guilty” gets experienced first. But how is this declaration of being evil understood in the idea of bad conscience? The “experience” of conscience turns up after the deed has been done or left undone. The voice follows after the transgression and points back to the event through which being-there has burdened itself with guilt. If conscience declares a “being guilty,” this cannot occur as a summons to . . ., but as a pointing that reminds us of the guilt incurred.

But, after all, does the “fact” that the voice comes later prevent the call from being basically a calling forth? That the voice is comprehended as a stirring of conscience that follows after: this is not yet evidence for a primordial understanding of the phenomenon of conscience. What if the factual indebtedness were only the occasion for the factual calling of conscience? What if the interpretation we described of “nagging” conscience became stuck halfway? That it indeed has can be seen from the ontological pre-having into which the phenomenon has been brought by this interpretation. The voice is something that turns up, it has its place in the series of on-hand experiences, and it follows after the experience of the deed. But neither the call nor the past deed nor the guilt assumed are events having the character of an on-hand being that runs its course. The call has the manner of being that care has. In the call, being-there “is” as beyond itself, but in such a way that it is simultaneously directed back into its thrownness. Only by assuming at the outset that being-there is an interconnected series of successive experiences is it possible to take the voice as something coming afterwards, something later that thus necessarily refers back. The voice does call back, but it calls back past the deed that took place and into thrown being-guilty, which is “earlier” than any indebtedness. But the call back simultaneously calls forth a being-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one’s own ex-sistence, in such a way that authentic, existentiell being-guilty precisely “comes after” the call, and not the other way around. Basically, bad conscience is so far from reproving and pointing back that it rather points forward by calling back into thrownness. The order of succession in which experiences run their course does not provide the phenomenal structure of ex-sisting.

If characterizing “bad” conscience does not get at the primordial phenomenon, still less can characterizing “good” conscience, whether one takes it as an independent form of conscience or as one essentially founded upon “bad” conscience. As the “bad” conscience declares a “being evil,” so “good” conscience would have to declare the “being good” of being-there. One can easily see that conscience, at one time the “effluence of the divine power,” now becomes the slave of Pharaism. It is supposed to let people say of themselves: “I am good.” Who can say this—and who would be less willing to affirm it than those who are good? But from this impossible consequence of the idea of good conscience it becomes all the more glaringly apparent that conscience calls for being-guilty.

To escape this consequence, one has interpreted “good” conscience as a privation of the “bad” one, and defined it as an “experienced lack of bad conscience.”1 Accordingly it would be an experience of the call not turning up, i.e. of having nothing to reproach myself with. But how is

---

this “lack” “experienced”? The supposed experience is not at all the experience of a call, but a self-assurance that a deed attributed to being-there was not committed by it and that being-there is therefore innocent. Becoming certain of not having done something does not have the character of a phenomenon of conscience at all. On the contrary, this certainty can rather signify a forgetting of conscience, i.e. an opting out of the possibility of being able to be summoned. Such “certainty” includes within itself a tranquilizing suppression of wanting-to-have-conscience, i.e. the suppression of understanding one’s ownmost and constant being-guilty. A “good” conscience is neither an independent nor a founded form of conscience; that is, it is not a phenomenon of conscience at all.

Inasmuch as the talk of a “good” conscience springs from the experience of conscience in everyday being-there, the latter, for all its talk, only shows that, even when it speaks of “bad” conscience, it does not get at the phenomenon. For factically the idea of “bad” conscience takes its orientation from that of the “good” conscience. The everyday interpretation keeps to the dimension of the calculating and settling of “guilt” and “innocence” arising in taking-care. It is within this horizon that the voice of conscience is “experienced.”

In characterizing the source of the ideas of a “bad” and a “good” conscience, we have also already decided as to the distinction between a conscience that points ahead and warns, and one that points back and reproves. To be sure, the idea of the warning conscience comes nearest to the phenomenon of summoning to . . . . It shares with the latter the character of pointing ahead. But this agreement is still only an illusion. The experience of a warning conscience again sees the voice only oriented toward the willed deed from which it wants to deter us. As the suppression of what is wanted, the warning is thus possible only because the “warning”-call aims at the ability-to-be of being-there, namely, at its understanding of itself within the being-guilty that smashes “what is wanted.” The warning conscience has the function of assuring, for a moment, a condition free from indebtedness. The experience of a “warning” conscience sees the intention of its call only to the extent that it remains accessible to the intelligibility of the one.

The third reservation appeals to the fact that the everyday experience of conscience is not familiar with anything like being summoned to be guilty. This we must admit. But does the everyday experience of conscience then guarantee that the complete possible content of the call of the voice of conscience is heard in it? Does it follow from this that the theories of conscience based on the ordinary experience of it have secured for themselves the appropriate ontological horizon for the analysis of the phenomenon? Does not rather an essential manner in which being-there is, namely collapsing, show that this being initially and mostly understands itself ontically from within the horizon of taking care of things, but ontologically determines the being [of being-there] in the sense of on-hand-ness? But out of this grows a twofold covering-over of the phenomenon: [1] Theory sees a series of experiences or “psychic processes” that, mostly, are wholly indeterminate in the manner of their being. [2] Experience encounters conscience as a judge and an admonisher with whom being-there deals in a calculating way.

That Kant takes the image of a “court of justice” as the idea guiding his interpretation of conscience is not a matter of chance, but was suggested by the idea of moral law — although his concept of morality was far removed from utilitarianism and eudaemonism. Every theory of value, whether formally or materially conceived, also has a “metaphysics of morals,” i.e. an ontology of being-there and of ex-sistence, as its unspoken ontological presupposition. Being-there is conceived as a being to be taken care of, and this caring has the meaning of “actualizing values” or satisfying norms.*

The appeal to the scope of what the everyday experience of conscience knows as the sole authority for interpreting it cannot be justified unless it has stopped to consider whether in it conscience can become authentically accessible at all.

Thus the further [the second] objection loses its force — that the existential interpretation forgets that in each case the call of conscience is related to a determinate deed, “actualized” or willed. Again, it cannot be denied that the call is frequently experienced as having such an intent. Still, the question remains whether this experience of the call lets it fully “call out.” The commonly intelligible interpretation might believe that it holds to the “facts,” and yet in the end it has, by this intelligibility, restricted the call’s scope of disclosure. As little as a “good” conscience can be placed in the service of a “Pharisaism,” so just as little may the function of the “bad” conscience be reduced to pointing out indebted-

---

* Note that “being-there” here means “the context in which one finds oneself” (as on p. 289: “Everydayness takes being-there as something at hand . . .”).
nesses that are on hand, or to repressing possible ones. As if being-there were a “household” whose debts only needed to be settled in an orderly way so that the self can stand “along side” the course of these experienced debts as an uninvolved spectator.

But if what is primary in the call is not a relation to factically “on hand” guilt or culpable deeds factically willed, and if for this reason the “reproving” and “warning” conscience does not express primordial functions of the call, then the ground is also taken out from under the feet of the first reservation: that the existential interpretation fails to recognize the “essentially” critical accomplishment of conscience. This reservation, too, springs from a view of the phenomenon which is, within certain limits, genuine. For, indeed, in the content of the call, nothing can be shown that the voice “positively” commends and commands. But how is this positivity, missing from conscience, to be understood? Does it follow from this missing positivity that conscience has a “negative” character?

We miss “positive” content in what is called because we expect information, useful for the case at hand, about safe, available and calculable possibilities of “action.” This expectation is grounded in the horizon of interpretation appropriate to the commonly intelligible way of taking care of things, which forces the ex-sistence of being-there to be subsumed under the idea of a regulable course of business. Conscience disappoints such expectations—which in part implicitly underlie also the demands of a material ethics of value as opposed to a “merely” formal one [as in Scheler’s work]. “Practical” directions of this sort are not given by the call of conscience for the sole reason that it summons being-there to ex-sistence, to its ownmost ability-to-be-itself. With those expected maxims for settling accounts, conscience would deny to ex-sistence nothing less than the possibility of acting. Because conscience evidently cannot be “positive” in this way, neither does it function in the same way “except negatively.” The call discloses nothing that could be positive or negative as something to be taken care of, and this because it bears on an ontologically completely different being: on ex-sistence. In contrast, the correctly understood call offers the “most positive thing of all” in the existential sense—the ownmost possibility that being-there can divulge to itself: a call back that calls forth into the pertinently factual ability-to-be-itself. To hear the call authentically means to bring oneself to factual action. But only by exposing the existential structure implied in our understanding of the summons authentically heard, shall we attain a completely adequate interpretation of what is called in the call.

The task has been to show how the phenomena—those alone familiar to the ordinary interpretation of conscience—point back to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience when they are understood in an ontologically appropriate way; then too, to show that the ordinary interpretation springs from the limited competence of the collapsing self-interpretation of being-there, and—since collapsing belongs to care itself—that this interpretation, for all its self-evident-ness, is not at all accidental [but rather an essential feature of being-there].

The ontological critique of the ordinary interpretation of conscience might be subject to the misunderstanding that, by showing the lack of existential primordiality of the everyday experience of conscience, we wanted to pass judgment upon the existentiell “moral quality” of any being-there residing within such experience. Just as ex-sistence is not necessarily and directly jeopardized by an ontologically insufficient understanding of conscience, so neither is the existentiell understanding of the call guaranteed by an existentially adequate interpretation of conscience. Seriousness is no less possible in the ordinary experience of conscience than is lack of seriousness in a more primordial understanding of conscience. Still, so long as our ontological conceptualizing is not cut off from ontic experience, the existentially more primordial interpretation also discloses the possibilities of a more primordial existentiell understanding.*

§60. The existential structure of the authentic ability-to-be attested in conscience

The existential interpretation of conscience intends to exhibit an attestation coming into being in being-there itself, an attestation of its ownmost ability-to-be. The manner in which conscience attests is not that of an indifferent announcement, but that of a summons calling forth to being-guilty. What is thus attested gets “apprehended” in the hearing

* Philosophy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of authenticity. Yet notice the delicate relationship between phenomenology and experience: perhaps one must distinguish between “keeping in touch” with what concretely happens (with “experience” taken in one sense—that of Dilthey and Scheler) and “regaining” it (the sense at issue in Being and Time).
which undistortedly understands the call in the sense it itself intends. Understanding the summons, as a mode of being of being-there, first provides the phenomenal content of what is attested in the call of conscience. We characterized authentically understanding the call as wanting-to-have-conscience [p. 288]. Letting one’s ownmost self act in and out of itself within its being-guilty represents phenomenally the authentic ability-to-be that is attested in being-there itself. Its existential structure must now be exposed. Only in this way can we penetrate to the fundamental constitution, disclosed in being-there itself, of the authenticity of its ex-sistence.

As understanding itself in its ownmost ability-to-be, wanting-to-have-conscience is a manner in which being-there is disclosed. This disclosedness is constituted not only by understanding, but also by attunement and talk. Existentiell understanding means projecting oneself upon the ownmost factual possibility of one’s ability-to-be-in-world. But the ability-to-be is understood only by ex-sisting in this possibility.

What mood corresponds to such understanding? Understanding the call discloses one’s own being-there in the uncanniness of its indivisuation. The uncanniness co-revealed in understanding is intrinsically disclosed by the attunement of dread belonging to it. The factum of the dread imbedded in conscience is a phenomenal confirmation that, in understanding the call, being-there is brought face to face with its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-conscience becomes a preparedness for dread.

The third essential element of disclosedness is talk. To the call, as primordial talk of being-there, corresponds no corresponding counter-talk — of the sort, say, that might discuss or bargain with what conscience says. In hearing the call understandingly, one forgoes all counter-talk, not because one has been overcome by an “obscure power” suppressing one’s hearing, but because this hearing takes as its own the call’s content, with no cover-up. The call places us in the face of constant being-guilty, and thus fetches the self back from the loud re-talk of the one’s intelligibility. Thus the mode of articulative talk belonging to wanting-to-have-conscience is reticence. We have characterized keeping silent as an essential possibility of talk.\(^1\) Whoever wants, by keeping silent, to allow something to be understood must “have something to say.” In the summons, being-there allows itself to understand its ownmost ability-to-be. Thus this calling is a keeping silent. The talk manifesting conscience never comes to utterance. Conscience only calls by keeping silent, i.e. the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness and calls being-there thus summoned, and as becoming still, back to the stillness of its self. Thus, only in reticence does wanting-to-have-conscience understand this silent talk appropriately. It takes the word [the “floor”] away from the commonly intelligible re-talk of the one.

The commonly intelligible interpretation of conscience, which “strictly adheres to facts,” takes the silence of conscience’s talk as an excuse to pass it off as something not at all ascertainable or on hand. That one, hearing and understanding only loud re-talk, cannot “confirm” any call, is blamed on conscience — with defensive talk about its being “mute” and manifestly not on hand. With this interpretation, the one only covers over its own failure to hear the call, and the short range of its own “hearing.”

Thus the disclosedness of being-there in wanting-to-have-conscience is constituted by the attunement of dread, by understanding as self-projection upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, and by talk as reticence. This pre-eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in being-there itself by conscience — the reticent projecting of oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, prepared for dread — we call resoluteness.

Resoluteness is a pre-eminent mode of the disclosedness of being-there. But, in an earlier passage, disclosedness was interpreted existentially as primordial truth.\(^1\) This is not primarily a quality of “judgment” or of any special comportment at all, but an essential constituent of being-in-world as such. Truth must be understood as a fundamental existential. Our ontological clarification of the statement that “being-there is in the truth” pointed to the primordial disclosedness of this being as the truth of ex-sistence; and for its delimitation we referred to the analysis of the authenticity of being-there.\(^2\)

Henceforth, with resoluteness, [we can say] we have reached the most primordial, because authentic truth of being-there. The disclosedness of the there discloses equi-primordially the whole of being-in-world — i.e. the world, the being-in, and the self that is, as “I am,” this very

---

\(^1\) Cf. §34, p. 164.

\(^2\) Cf. §44, p. 221.
II. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

being-there. With the disclosedness of world, inner-worldly beings have always already been uncovered. The discovered-ness of at-hand and on-hand beings is grounded in the disclosedness of world; for the setting-free of any given wholeness of being-bound-up of at-hand beings requires a pre-understanding of signification. In understanding signification, being-there, taking care of things, is circumspectly referred to encountered at-hand beings. The understanding of signification as the disclosedness of any world is again grounded in the understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, to which every discovering of the wholeness of being-bound-up returns. The goals of shelter, sustenance, and advancement are the closest, the constant possibilities of being-there; upon these possibilities this being, for whom its own being is an issue, has always already projected itself. Thrown into its “there,” being-there is always factically dependent on a determinate “world”—its own. At the same time, those closest factical projects are guided by lostness in the one, a lostness in taking-care. This lostness can be summoned by one’s own being-there, and the summons can be understood in the manner of resoluteness. But this authentic disclosedness then modifies, equi-primordially, the discoveredness of the “world” grounded in it and the disclosedness of the being-with-others. The “world” at hand does not become different in “content,” the circle of others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward things at hand which understands and takes care of them, and the being-with-others that cares for them, is now determined from their ownmost ability-to-be-themselves.*

As authentic being-itself, resoluteness does not detach being-there from its world, it does not isolate it as a free-floating ego. How could it—if after all resoluteness, as authentic disclosedness, is nothing other than authentically being-in-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its being together with things at hand, taking care of them, and casts it into its being-with-others, caring for them.

§60. The Structure of Authentic Ability-to-be

Out of the for-the-sake-of-which of the ability-to-be which it has itself chosen, resolute being-there frees itself for its world. Resoluteness toward itself first brings being-there to the possibility of letting others “be” in their ownmost ability-to-be, and also discloses that ability in a caring which leaps ahead and frees. Resolute being-there can become the “conscience” of others. It is from the authentic being-itself of resoluteness that authentic being-with-one-another first arises, not from the ambiguous and jealous arrangements and talkative fraternizing in the one and in what the one wants to undertake.*

In keeping with its ontological nature, resoluteness always bears on some factical being-there. The essence of this being is its ex-sistence. Resoluteness “ex-sists” only as a resolve that projects itself understandingly. But to what does being-there resolve itself in resoluteness? On what is it to resolve? Only the [situated] resolve itself can answer this. One would completely misunderstand the phenomenon of resoluteness if one were to believe that it is simply a matter of receptively taking up possibilities presented or suggested. Resolve is precisely the disclosive projection and determination of some factical possibility. The indeterminateness that characterizes every factically projected ability-to-be of being-there belongs necessarily to resoluteness. Resoluteness is certain of itself only in [some actual] resolve. But the existentiell indeterminateness of resoluteness, never itself determinate except in a resolve, nevertheless has its existential determinateness.

What one resolves upon in resoluteness is prefured ontologically in the existentiality of being-there in general as an ability-to-be in the manner of a caring for others that takes care of things. But, as care, being-there is determined by facticity and collapsing. Disclosed in its “there,” it resides equi-primordially in truth and in untruth. This “really” holds for resoluteness — this resoluteness precisely being authentic truth. Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically. Being-there is always already, and perhaps soon again, in irresoluteness. This term, “irresoluteness,” only expresses the phenomenon that was [earlier] interpreted as entrusted-ness to the dominant interpreted-ness of the one. As the one-self, being-there is “lived” by the commonly intelligible

* Heidegger here recounts one more condition of the possibility of responding to beings as they are in themselves, and thereby the possibility of each being fully disclosed in its “in-itself-ness.” Other conditions: that they arise within a context of bindings (pp. 87-88) and that they appear either as at hand (pp. 69-76) or as being-there-with (p. 118)—rather than on hand for aloof observation. These considerations will eventually draw together to form a “meaning of being” both undermining and undergirding the classical meanings.

1 Cf. §44 (b), p. 222.
ambiguity of the public sphere in which no one resolves, but which has already drawn conclusions. Resoluteness signifies letting oneself be summoned out of lostness in the one. The irresoluteness of the one nevertheless remains in dominance, yet it cannot disturb resolute existence. As the counter-concept to existentially understood resoluteness, irresoluteness does not mean an ontic, psychical quality in the sense of being burdened with inhibitions. Even resolves are dependent upon the one and its world. Understanding this [dependence] belongs to what resolve discloses, inasmuch as resoluteness first gives to being-there its authentic transparency. In resoluteness, what is at issue for being-there is its ownmost ability-to-be that, as thrown, can project itself only upon determinate factual possibilities. Resolve does not withdraw itself from “reality”%; rather, it first discovers what is factically possible — in such a way that it grasps it as being possible for one’s ownmost ability-to-be in the one. The existential determinateness of any given possible resolute being-there includes the constitutive factors of an existential phenomenon that we have so far passed over — and that we call situation.

In the term situation (position — “being in a position”), there resonates a spatial meaning. We shall not attempt to eliminate this meaning from the existential concept. For this meaning also lurks in the “there” of being-there. Being-in-world has a spatiality of its own that is characterized by the phenomenon of de-distancing and directionality. Being-there “makes room” insofar as it factically ex-sists. 1 But the spatiality of being-there, on the basis of which ex-sistence always determines its “place,” is grounded in the constitution of being-in-world. The primary element of this constitution is disclosedness. Just as the spatiality of the there is grounded in disclosedness, situation has its foundation in resoluteness. Situation is the there disclosed in resoluteness: as this “there,” an ex-sisting being is there. A situation is not a framework on hand, within which being-there transpires or into which it might bring itself. Far removed from any on-hand mixture of the circumstances and coincidences encountered, situation is only by virtue of and within resoluteness. Only for the self that is resolved for the there — the there that it has to be — does the factual character of circumstances, their being-bound-up, get disclosed. What we call co-

inciencences in the with-world and the circum-world can be-fall only resoluteness.

For the one, in contrast, the situation is essentially closed off. The one knows only the “general lay-of-the-land,” loses itself in the closest “opportunities,” and pays for its being-there by arranging the “coincidences” — considering these to be its own achievement, and passing them off as such, all the while mis-assessing them.*

Resoluteness brings the being of the there into the ex-sistence of its situation. But resoluteness delimits the existential structure of the authentic ability-to-be attested in conscience — wanting-to-have-conscience. In this ability we recognized the appropriate understanding of the summons. This makes it quite clear that the call of conscience does not dangle an empty ideal of ex-sistence before us when it summons us to our ability-to-be, but calls us forth into the situation. This existential positivity of the correctly understood call of conscience simultaneously makes us see how much the restriction of the intent of the call to actual and planned instances of indebtedness misses the disclosive character of conscience, and also how this restriction only apparently transmits a concrete understanding of the voice. The existential interpretation of understanding the summons as resoluteness reveals conscience as the manner, embedded in the ground of being-there, in which it makes its factual ex-sistence possible for itself, attesting its ownmost ability-to-be.

The phenomenon set forth under the term “resoluteness” can hardly be confused with an empty “habitus” or an indeterminate “velleity.” Resoluteness does not first notice and represent a situation to itself, but has already inserted itself into it. Resolute, being-there is already acting. We are purposely avoiding the term “action.” For, in the first place, it would have to be so broadly conceived that ... of the practical faculty as opposed to some theoretical faculty. But, as caring-for that takes-care-of, care includes the

1 Cf. §§23 & 24, pp. 104 ff. [Cf. also my annotation on Heidegger’s note on p. 54: at issue is both an understanding of the disclosure of “situation” and the possibility of dwelling instantially therein.]
III. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Resoluteness

being of being-there so primordially and completely that it must be already presupposed as a whole when we distinguish between theoretical and practical comportment; care cannot first be put together from these faculties with the help of some dialectic that is necessarily groundless because existentially unfounded. * But resoluteness is only the authenticity of care itself, cared for in care and possible as care.

The portrayal of factical existentiell possibilities in their general features and connections, and the interpretation of them according to their existential structure, belongs among the tasks of thematic existential anthropology. \(^1\) For the purpose of our investigation of fundamental ontology, it is sufficient to delimit existentially the authentic ability-to-be attested by conscience within and for being-there itself.

Now that resoluteness has been worked out as a self-projection upon one’s ownmost being-guilty in which one is reticent and prepared for dread, our investigation is in a position to delimit the ontological meaning of the authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there that we have been looking for. The authenticity of being-there is neither an empty term nor a fabricated idea. But even so, as an authentic ability-to-be-whole, the authentic being-toward-death which we [earlier] deduced existentially remains a purely existential projection, for which the attestation of being-there is lacking. Only when we have found this attestation, will our investigation be able to provide (as its problematic requires) an authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there, existentially confirmed and clarified.

\(^*\) On this question of where “action” becomes possible (and on the illusions engendered by the assumption that the difference between “practical” and “theoretical” comportment is fundamental), see Heidegger’s opening arguments in his “Letter on Humanism” (in Pathmarks, 1998).

\(^1\) In the direction of this problematic, Karl Jaspers was the first explicitly to conceive and accomplish the task of a doctrine of world-views. Cf. his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 3rd ed., 1925 [1st ed. 1919]. His work examines and determines “what man is” in terms of what man essentially can be (see the Preface to the first edition). Out of this, the existential ontological significance of [what Jaspers calls] “boundary situations” becomes clear. The philosophical intent of the work is completely missed if one “employs” it solely as an encyclopedia of “types of world-views.” [Jaspers’ work is not available in English. From the Preface: “One task of philosophy has been to develop a world-view . . . . Instead of that, my book attempts simply to understand the various ultimate positions the soul adopts, the powers that motivate it.”]
Chapter Three

Authentic Ability-to-be-whole, and
Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care

§61. Preliminary sketch of the methodological step from outlining the authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there to the phenomenal exposition of temporality

§62. The existentiell authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there as readying resoluteness

§63. The hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for interpreting the essential meaning of care, and the method-ological character of the existential analysis in general

§64. Care and selfhood

§65. Temporality as the ontological meaning of care

§66. The temporality of being-there, and the tasks arising from it of a more primordial repetition of the existential analysis

We have projected existentially an authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there. Our analysis of this phenomenon revealed authentic being-toward-death as readying.\(^1\) In the existentiell attestation, the authentic ability-to-be of being-there was shown as resoluteness, and also interpreted existentially. How can these two phenomena be brought together? Did our ontological project of authentic ability-to-be-whole not lead us into a dimension of being-there that is far removed from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death have in common with the “concrete situation” of action? Does not the attempt to force readying and resoluteness together lead us astray into an intolerable, entirely un-phenomenological construction which could no longer even claim for itself the character of a phenomenally grounded ontological project?

Any external binding of the two phenomena is of course out of the question. The only possible way, according to our method, is to start from the phenomenon of resoluteness, as attested in its existentiell possibility, and to ask: Does resoluteness, in its ownmost existentiell and essential drive, itself point to readying resoluteness as its ownmost authentic possibility? What if resoluteness, according to its own meaning, were brought into its authenticity only when it no longer projects itself upon incidental possibilities that happen to lie nearby, but rather upon the most extreme possibility lying already in store for being-there prior to every factual ability-to-be — and entered, more or less undistorted as this possibility, into every factual ability-to-be that being-there seizes upon? What if resoluteness, as the authentic truth of being-there, reached the certainty authentically belonging to it only in readying for death? What if only in readying for death every “provisionality” of resolve were authentically understood, i.e. existentiell recovered?

\(^1\) Cf. §58, pp. 280 ff.
As long as our existential interpretation does not forget that the one being it has for its theme is in the manner of being-there, and cannot be pieced together out of pieces on hand into an on-hand being, its steps must be guided by the idea of ex-sistence. For the question of the possible connection between readying and resoluteness, this means nothing less than the demand that we project these existential phenomena upon the existentiell possibilities prefigured in them and “think these possibilities through to the end” existentially. In this way the development of readying resoluteness as an existentially possible authentic ability-to-be-whole will lose the character of an arbitrary construction. It becomes an interpretation freeing being-there for its most extreme possibility of ex-sistence.

With this step, the existential interpretation also makes known its ownmost methodological character. Apart from occasional and necessary remarks, we have until now deferred explicit discussions of method. It was important that we “proceed” to the phenomena. Before expositing the meaning of being of any being revealed in its phenomenal condition, the course of our investigation needs a dwelling place — not in order to “rest,” but in order to gain enhanced momentum.

Any genuine method is grounded in an appropriate preview of the basic constitution of the “object,” or realm of objects, to be disclosed. Any genuine reflection on method, which is to be distinguished from empty discussions of technique, will therefore also tell us something about the manner in which the thematized being has its being. Only the clarification of methodological possibilities, requirements, and limitations of the existential analysis ensures the transparency that is necessary for the foundation-setting step, i.e. for the revelation of the meaning of care in its being. But the interpretation of the ontological meaning of care must culminate on the basis of a complete and constant phenomenological making-present of the existential constitution of being-there as it has been set out so far.

Ontologically, being-there is basically different from everything on

§61. From Wholeness to Temporality

hand and real. Its “condition” is not grounded in the substantiality of a substance, but in the “self-constancy” of the ex-sisting self, whose being we have conceptualized as care. The phenomenon of self embedded in care needs a primordial and authentic existential delimitation setting it off against the preparatory presentation of the inauthentic one-self. Along with this delimitation we must establish the possible ontological questions that can be directed toward the “self” if it is neither substance nor subject.

Once the phenomenon of care is sufficiently clarified in these ways, we shall examine it for its ontological meaning. The determination of this meaning leads straight to the exposition of temporality. This effort does not take us into remote, specialized realms of being-there; it simply lets us conceive of the phenomenal overall condition of the existential basic constitution of being-there, down to the final fundaments of its own ontological intelligibility. Temporality will be experienced phenomenally and primordially in the authentic being-whole of being-there, [namely] in the phenomenon of readying resoluteness. If temporality here makes itself primordially known, we may well suspect that the temporality of readying resoluteness is a pre-eminent mode of temporality. Temporality can fructify* in various possibilities and in various manners. The basic possibilities of ex-sistence, namely authenticity and inauthenticity of being-there, are grounded ontologically in possible fructifications of temporality.

If already the ontological character of its own being is remote from being-there — owing to the predominance of its collapsing understanding of being (being as on-hand-ness†) — all the more remote are the primordial foundations of this being. It should therefore come as no surprise if temporality does not at first sight correspond to what is accessible to the ordinary understanding of “time.” For this reason the concept of time built into the ordinary understanding of time, and the set of problems stemming from this experience, cannot assume the role of

---

* A botanical metaphor distinctive of Heidegger’s work: temporality bears fruit in various ways — and in this sense “takes time.” See my annotation on p. 328, at which point the metaphor assumes a dominant position in the analysis.

† Increasingly, Heidegger insists that the academic drive to know beings as simply on hand is not only “derivative” but also “collapsing”; cf. Collected Works, Vol. 82, p. 95: painful effort is always needed to contravene it.
criteria for the adequacy of an interpretation of time. Rather, our investigation must make itself *precedently* intimate with the primordial phenomenon of temporality in order then, *on the basis of this phenomenon*, to cast light on the necessity of the ordinary understanding of time — how it arises and the reason for its dominance.

The primordial phenomenon of temporality will finally become secured by showing that all the fundamental structures of being-there that we have so far laid bare — regarding their possible wholeness, unity, and development — are basically to be conceived as “temporal,” and as modes in which temporality fructifies. Thus, from the existential analysis expositing temporality, there emerges the task of *repeating* the analysis of being-there already achieved — of repeating it with a view to an interpretation of those essential structures bearing on their temporality. Temporality itself provides the outline of the basic directions of the analyses required for this repetition.* Accordingly, the Chapter is divided as follows: The existentielly authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there as readying resoluteness (§62); the hermeneutical situation at which we have arrived for interpreting the essential meaning of care, and the methodological character of the existential analysis in general (§63); care and selfhood (§64); temporality as the ontological meaning of care (§65); the temporality of being-there and the tasks arising from it regarding a more primordial repetition of our existential analysis (§66).

§62. The existentielly authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there as readying resoluteness

How does resoluteness, “thought through to the end” in regard to its ownmost essential drive, lead to authentic being-toward-death? How are we to conceive of the connection between wanting-to-have-conscience and the existentially thrown, authentic being-whole of being-there? Does welding these two together result in a new phenomenon? Or are we left with resoluteness, attested in its existentiell possibility, such that being-toward-death can incite it as an *existentiell modification*? And what does it mean to “think through to the end” existentiell the phenomenon of resoluteness?

Resoluteness was characterized as reticent self-projecting upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, a self-projecting that accepts the challenge of dread. This being-guilty belongs to the being of being-there and means: being the null ground of a nothingness.* The “guilty” belonging to the being of being-there admits of neither increase nor decrease. It is *prior* to any quantification, assuming this latter has any meaning at all. As essentially guilty, being-there is not just sometimes guilty and other times not. Wanting-to-have-conscience resolves itself for this being-guilty. In the proper sense of the term, resoluteness contains this projection upon being-guilty as what being-there is *so long as it is*. Taking over this “guilt” existentiell in resoluteness transpires authentically only when resoluteness, in its disclosing of being-there, has become *so* transparent that it understands being-guilty as *constant*. Yet this understanding becomes possible only to the extent that being-there discloses to itself its ability-to-be “through to its end.” However, for being-there, being-at-the-end means existentially: being-toward-the-end. Resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be as being-toward-the-end that understands, i.e. as readying for death. Resoluteness does not simply “have” a connection with readying as something different from itself. Resoluteness harbors in itself authentic being-toward-death as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity. It is now a question of clarifying this “connection” phenomenally.

Resoluteness means: letting oneself be called out to one’s own being-guilty. Being-guilty belongs to the being of being-there itself, which we determined primarily as ability-to-be. Saying that being-there is as constantly guilty can only mean that it always comports itself in its being as an ex-sisting that is either authentic or inauthentic. Being-guilty is not merely a lasting property of something constantly on hand, but rather the *existentiell possibility* to be either authentically or inauthentically. Any “guilty” is only in some factical ability-to-be. Thus being-guilty, since it belongs to the being of being-there, must be

* Already §1 speaks of repeating the question of being. The word suggests retrieval (“authentic been-ness we call *repetition*” — p. 339), but this “getting back” defines our future: what we must *re-enact*. The talk of “repetition” responds to Kierkegaard’s work of that title: where antiquity speaks of recollection, modernity must learn to speak of repetition. Kierkegaard (ontically) exemplifies the thought in *The Concept of Dread*: a clergyman must learn to recite the required prayer and to baptize children — Sunday after Sunday.

* Remember that the adjective “null” corresponds to the noun “nothingness”: the self is “ground” by being care — not by being a substance that could be discovered and fostered. Cf. p. 14: Aristotle’s remarks on “soul.”
conceived as ability-to-be-guilty. Resoluteness projects itself upon this ability-to-be, i.e. understands itself in this ability. Accordingly, this understanding maintains itself in a primordial possibility of being-there. It holds itself authentically in this possibility whenever resoluteness is primordially what it drives to be. But the primordial being of being-there, its being toward ability-to-be, we revealed as being toward death, i.e. toward the pre-eminent possibility of being-there that we have characterized. Readying discloses this possibility as possibility. For this reason, only as readying does resoluteness become a primordial being toward the ownmost ability-to-be of being-there. Resoluteness understands the “enabling” of the ability-to-be-guilty only when it “qualifies” as being-toward-death.

Once resolved, being-there takes upon itself authentically, in its existence, its being the null ground of its nothingness. Death we conceived and characterized existentially as the possibility of the impossibility of ex-sistence, i.e. the utter nothingness of being-there. Death does not get stuck onto being-there at its “end,” but rather, as care, being-there is the thrown (i.e., null) ground of its death. The nothingness primordially infiltrating the being of being-there reveals itself to being-there in authentic being-toward-death. Readying makes being-guilty evident only from the ground of the whole being of being-there. Care harbors within itself death and guilt equi-primordially. Only readying resoluteness understands the ability-to-be-guilty authentically and wholly, i.e. primordially.  

Understanding the call of conscience reveals the lostness in the one.

We should be careful to distinguish the being-guilty belonging primordially to the essential constitution of being-there from the theologically understood status corruptionis. Theology can find in our existentially determined being-guilty an ontological condition of its factual possibility. The guilt included in the idea of that status is a factual indebtedness of a completely different sort. It has its own attestation, one that remains in principle closed to all philosophical experience. The existential analysis of being-guilty proves neither anything for nor anything against the possibility of sin. Strictly speaking, we cannot even say that, from its own standpoint, the ontology of being-there leaves this possibility open at all—inasmuch as such ontology, as philosophical questioning, “knows” nothing of sin. [Heidegger recurrently contrasts his own work with that of theology (his “first love”); cf. his Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 7 (1935) and his comments in the “Zurich Seminar” (1951, in Collected Works, Vol. 15, pp. 436-437).]
that the resolve must be held open according to its own meaning of disclosure — open to the factual possibility that happens to be. The certainty of the resolve signifies: holding itself free for its possible and perhaps factically necessary revocation. Still, such holding-to-be-true in resoluteness (as truth of ex-sistence) in no way allows any falling back into irresoluteness. On the contrary: this holding-to-be-true, as resolute holding-oneself-free for revocation, is the authentic resoluteness for the repetition of itself. In precisely this way, lostness in irresoluteness is existentielly undermined. In keeping with its own meaning, the holding-to-be-true belonging to resoluteness strives to hold itself constantly free, i.e. free for the whole ability-to-be of being-there. This constant certainty is guaranteed for resoluteness only inasmuch as it comports itself toward that possibility of which it can be utterly certain. In its death being-there must utterly “revoke.” Constantly certain of this, i.e. reading itself, resoluteness achieves its authentic and whole certainty.

Yet being-there is equi-primordially in untruth. Reading resoluteness at once gives it the primordial certainty of its closedness. Reading and resolved, being-there holds itself open for its constant lostness in the irresoluteness of the one — a lostness made possible at the ground of its very own being. As the constant possibility of being-there, irresoluteness is also certain [to recur]. Resoluteness that is transparent to itself understands that the indeterminateness of its ability-to-be only becomes determinate in a resolve regarding the situation that happens to prevail. It knows about the indeterminateness that pervades any being that exists. But this knowing must itself, if it is to correspond to authentic resoluteness, spring from a disclosing that is authentic. The indeterminateness of its own ability-to-be, even though certain in the resolve, becomes wholly manifest, however, only in being-toward-death. Reading brings being-there up to a possibility that is constantly certain and yet at every moment indeterminate in regard to when the possibility becomes impossibility. It makes manifest that being-there has been thrown into the indeterminateness of its “boundary situation,” in the resolute facing of which it achieves its authentic ability-to-be-whole.*

The indeterminateness of death discloses itself primordially in dread. However, this primordial dread strives to take resoluteness upon itself. It dispels every cover-up which covers over the abandonment of being-

* About “boundary situation” (Karl Jaspers’ coinage), see Heidegger’s note on p. 301; he again refers to this notion on the top of p. 349.

§62. Reading Resoluteness

The analysis has revealed, in sequence, the factors of modalization growing out of authentic being-toward-death as the ownmost, non-relational, unshirkable, certain and yet indeterminate possibility — factors toward which resoluteness drives on its own accord. Resoluteness is authentic and whole, is what it can be, only as reading resoluteness.

Conversely, however, our interpretation of the “connection” between resoluteness and reading has only now reached a complete existential understanding of reading itself. Hitherto, it made sense only as an ontological project. Now it has become apparent that reading is not a possibility we have dreamed up and forced upon being-there, but rather the mode of an existentiell ability-to-be attested in being-there, a mode that being-there strives to take upon itself whenever it understands itself authentically as resolved. Reading “is” not as a free-floating behavior but must be conceived as the possibility of its authenticity — a possibility concealed and thus also attested in existentielly attested resoluteness. Authentic “thinking of death” is a wanting-to-have-conscience that has become existentielly transparent to itself.

If resoluteness, as authentic, drives toward the mode delimited by reading, and if reading constitutes the authentic ability-to-be of being-there, then in existentielly attested resoluteness an authentic ability-to-be-whole is also attested. The question of the ability-to-be-whole is a factual and existentiell question. Being-there answers this question in being resolute. The question of the ability-to-be-whole of being-there has now completely shed the character it had at first,¹ when it appeared as simply a theoretical and methodological question in the analysis of being-there, stemming from the effort to achieve a complete “given-ness” of being-there as a whole. The question of the wholeness of being-there, at first understood only as ontological and methodological, was justified — but only because its ground goes back to an ontic possibility of being-there.

The clarification of the “connection” between reading and resoluteness, a connection in the sense of a modalization of the second by the first, has turned into the phenomenal exhibition of an authentic

¹ Cf. §45, pp. 231 ff.
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

ability-to-be-whole of being-there. If with this phenomenon we have hit upon a manner in which being-there has its being, a way in which being-there brings itself to itself and before itself, then this phenomenon must remain unintelligible to the everyday, commonly intelligible interpretation of being-there provided by the one. It would be a misunderstanding either to dismiss this existentiell possibility as “unproven” or even to want to “prove” it theoretically. Still, the phenomenon deserves to be protected from the crudest distortions.*

Readying resoluteness is not a way out, a way devised to “overcome” death; it is rather an understanding that hearkens to the call of conscience, an understanding that frees death into becoming our possibility of mastering the ex-sistence of being-there and of dispersing, at its very root, every fleeing cover-up of itself. Nor, as being-toward death, does wanting-to-have-conscience signify a world-fleeing detachment; it rather brings one, without illusions, into the resoluteness of “action.” Nor does readying resoluteness stem from an “idealistic” challenge soaring above ex-sistence and its possibilities; it rather springs from sober understanding of factual and basic possibilities of being-there. The sober dread that brings one before one’s individuated ability-to-be goes together with the firm joy in this possibility. In such joyful dread, being-there frees itself from the “incidentally” by which it is [otherwise] sustained, and which busy curiosity devises for itself primarily out of the facts and figures of the “world.” However, the analysis of these basic moods would take us beyond the limits drawn for our present interpretation by its goal of fundamental ontology.

But does not some determinate ontic view of authentic ex-sistence, some factual ideal of being-there, underlie the ontological interpretation of the ex-sistence of being-there? Indeed it does. This factum we must not only not deny, and only admit when forced to do so; we must rather conceive it in its positive necessity, doing so in terms of the thematic object of our investigation. Philosophy should never want to disavow its “presuppositions,” but neither may it merely admit them. It conceptualizes its presuppositions—and more penetratingly develops, along with them, that for which they are presuppositions. The methodological considerations that are now incumbent upon us have this function.


§63. The Hermeneutical Situation

With readying resoluteness, being-there is made phenomenally visible in regard to its possible authenticity and wholeness. The hermeneutical situation that was previously inadequate for the interpretation of the meaning of care in its being has now attained the required primordiality. Being-there is primordially placed into our pre-having, especially in regard to its authentic ability-to-be-whole; the guiding pre-seeing, the idea of ex-sistence, has gained its determinateness through the clarification of the ownmost ability-to-be; with the structure of being-there we have concretely worked out, its ontological peculiarity, in opposition to everything on hand, has become so clear that the pre-seeing of the existentiality of being-there possesses an articulation sufficient for securely guiding the conceptual development of existentials.

The path of the analysis of being-there so far traversed has led to the concrete demonstration of the thesis merely suggested at the outset: The being that we ourselves are is ontologically the farthest. The basis for this lies in care itself. Collapsing being-near the closest things taken care of: this guides all everyday interpretation of being-there and ontically covers over the authentic being of being-there, so that it denies the appropriate basis for the ontology directed to being-there. For this reason there is nothing less self-evident than the primordial and phenomenal pre-givenness of being-there, even when ontology initially pursues the course of the everyday interpretation of being-there. Rather, the exposition of the primordial being of being-there must be wrested from it in opposition to the collapsing ontic-ontological drive of interpretation.*

---

1 Cf. §45, p. 232.
2 Cf. §5, p. 15.
3 off target! As though ontology could be read off a genuine ontic analysis. What can a genuine ontic analysis be if not genuine [because deriving] from a pre-ontological projection—assuming the entire consideration can remain within this difference. [Circularity, again: there is no way we can sneak up to ontology.]
4 On wresting, see p. 222:
Truth (discovered-ness) must always first be wrested from beings.
Beings must be ripped out of concealedness. Any given factual
Not only the exhibition of the elementary structures of being-in-world, the delimitation of the concept of world, the clarification of the nearest and average who of being-in-world (the one-self), and the interpretation of the “there,” but above all the analyses of care, death, conscience, and guilt: these all show how, in being-there itself, the intelligibility that takes-care takes over the ability-to-be and the disclosure, i.e. the closing off of ability-to-be.

Thus the manner in which being-there is requires of any ontological interpretation aiming for a primordiality of phenomenal exhibition that it fight for the being of being-there against its own drive to cover itself up. Thus, to those claiming self-evidence for the everyday interpretation, as well as to those satisfied with its tranquilizing effects, our existential analysis constantly appears as having the character of doing violence. To be sure, this character is especially distinctive of the ontology of being-there, yet it belongs to any interpretation, since the understanding taking shape in it has the structure of a projecting. But is there not some appropriate guidance and regulation for these efforts? From where do ontological projections derive the evidence of phenomenal adequacy for their “findings”? Ontological interpretation projects pre-given beings upon their own being in order to conceptualize them in their structure.

Fragment 123 of Heracleitus ... reads: φυσις κρυπτεσθαι ϕιλει — being [nature] loves to hide. What does this mean? It has been and still is assumed that this fragment means that being has secure[d] itself, as emerging into unconcealedness — φυσις. Only that which, according to its own essence, un hides and must un hide itself, can love to conceal itself. Only what is as un hiding can be as concealing. And therefore the point is not to overcome the κρυπτεσθαι [the self-encrypting] of φυσις, not to strip it from her. Rather, the task, much more difficult, is to leave to φυσις the κρυπτεσθαι that belongs to her — this very hiding in all its pure essence.

Where are the guideposts to direct such projection so that it might hit upon the being of those beings? And what if the being chosen as the theme of existential analysis, namely being-there, conceals its being, doing so within the manner of its own being? — To answer these questions we must first of all restrict ourselves to clarifying the demands they direct to the analysis of being-there.

Self-interpretation belongs to the being of being-there. In the discovery of “world” — discovery in circumspect taking-care — the taking-care is co-sighted. Being-there always already understands itself factically in determinate existential possibilities, even if the projections derive from the intelligibility of the one. Ex-sistence is somehow understood as well, whether explicitly or not, whether adequately or not. Every ontic understanding has “complexities” that it grasps, if only pre-ontologically, i.e. not theoretically or thematically. Every ontologically explicit question regarding the being of being-there is already prepared for in the way being-there has its being.

But also, to what can we look to discover what constitutes the “authentic” ex-sistence of being-there? Without an existentiell understanding, every analysis of existentiality will have no basis. Does not an ontic construal of ex-sistence lie at the basis of our interpretation of the authenticity and wholeness of being-there, one that may be possible but need not be binding for everyone? Existential interpretation may never set itself up as an authority on what is existentiell possible or binding. But must not such interpretation still justify itself in regard to those existentiell possibilities with which it provides the ontic basis for its ontological interpretation? If the being of being-there is essentially ability-to-be and being-free for its ownmost possibilities, and if ex-sists in any instance only in the freedom for these possibilities (or in unfreedom in opposition to them), can an ontological interpretation take as its basis anything other than ontic possibilities (variations of ability-to-be) and project these upon their ontological possibility? And if being-there gets interpreted mostly in terms of its lostness in taking care of its “world,” isn’t the manner of disclosure appropriate to being-there the determination (in opposition to that lostness) of ontic-existentiell possibilities, and the existential analysis based on them? Then won't the violence of projection amount to freeing the undisguised phenomenal condition of being-there?

The “violent” presentation of possibilities of ex-sistence might be methodologically required, but can it escape being merely arbitrary? If
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

Our analysis, itself an existentially authentic ability-to-be, takes readying resoluteness as its basis — to which possibility being-there itself summons, and from the ground of its ex-sistence — is this possibility then an arbitrary one? Is the way the ability-to-be of being-there relates to its distinctive possibility, to death — is this way something just picked up incidentally? Does being-in-world have a higher proof of its ability-to-be than its death?

The ontic-ontological projection of being-there upon an authentic ability-to-be-whole may indeed not be arbitrary, but is our existential interpretation of these phenomena already justified on that account? Where does our interpretation get its guidelines if not from a “presupposed” idea of ex-sistence in general? How are the steps in the analysis of inauthentic everydayness regulated, if not by the concept of ex-sistence we have supposed? And when we say that being-there “collapses,” and that therefore the authenticity of its ability-to-be must be wrested in opposition to this essential drive — from what perspective are we here speaking? Isn’t everything already illuminated, even if dimly, by the light of our “presupposed” idea of ex-sistence? Where does this idea get its justification? Was the first projection indicating this idea without guidance? Not at all.

Our formal indication of the idea of ex-sistence was guided by the understanding of being lurking within being-there itself. Without any ontological transparency, this understanding reveals that the being we call being-there is in each instance I myself, as an ability-to-be concerned that it be this being. Being-there understands itself as being-in-world, even though without adequate ontological determinateness. In the world, it encounters beings having their being as at hand and on hand. No matter how far removed from an ontological concept the difference between ex-sistence and reality might be, no matter even if being-there at first understands ex-sistence to be reality, it itself is not merely on hand but has already understood itself in each instance, however mythical and magical its interpretation might be. The idea of ex-sistence we have proposed is an existentially non-binding prefiguration of the formal structure of the understanding of being-there in general.

Under the guidance of this idea, we carried out the preparatory analysis of our closest everydayness so far as the first conceptual delimitation of care. This phenomenon enabled us to grasp, in precise terms, ex-sistence and its relation to facticity and collapsing. The delimitation of the structure of care provided the basis for a first effort to distinguish ex-sistence and reality. This led to the thesis: The substance of human being is ex-sistence.

But even this formal and existentially non-binding idea of ex-sistence already contains within itself a determinate though unprofiled ontological “content” that “presupposes” an idea of being in general — just as does the contrasting idea of reality. Only within the horizon of that idea can the difference between ex-sistence and reality make full sense. For both refer to being.

But shouldn’t we achieve our ontologically clarified idea of being by first working out the understanding of being that belongs to being-there? Yet this understanding can be grasped primordially only on the basis of a primordial interpretation of being-there guided by the idea of ex-sistence. Does it not thus finally become wholly obvious that the problem of fundamental ontology which we have reopened is moving in a “circle”?

To be sure, we have already shown, during the analysis of the structure of understanding in general, that what gets criticized under the inappropriate name of “circle” belongs to the essence and distinctiveness of understanding itself. Nevertheless, our investigation must now return explicitly to this “circular argument” with a view to clarifying the hermeneutical situation of the problematic of fundamental ontology. The “charge of circularity” directed against our existential interpretation is that the idea of ex-sistence and of being gets “presupposed,” and being-there “afterwards” gets interpreted in order to extract the idea of being. But what does “presupposing” signify? With the idea of ex-sistence are we supposing a proposition from which we deduce further propositions according to formal rules of inference? Or does this pre-supposing have the character of an understanding projection, one that the interpretation informing such understanding first allows what is to be interpreted to come into words — so that it can be decided of its own accord whether it, as this being, provides the essential constitution onto which it got

§63. The Hermeneutical Situation

[Heidegger insists on retaining the “neutral” character of the existentiell condition for consummation; see bottom of p. 248.]

---

In other words: (1) Any story we tell about our condition stems from the projection already built into being-there. (2) What common intelligibility wishes to get rid of by avoiding the “circle,” thinking it is satisfying the greatest rigor of scientific investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Constituted primordially by care, being-there is in any instance already ahead of itself. To be at all, being-there is already projected onto determinate possibilities of its ex-sistence; and, in such existentiell projections, some version of ex-sistence and being are pre-ontologically projected as well. Can we then deny to our own research this projection belonging essentially to being-there — research which, itself a way of being-there that discloses (like all research), intends to work out and to conceptualize the understanding of being belonging to ex-sistence?

But the “charge of circularity” itself derives from the way being-there has its being. The common intelligibility embedded in our caring absorption in the one necessarily finds offensive anything like a projecting, and especially an ontological projecting, because it “in principle” barricades itself against such projecting. Such intelligibility takes care only of those things it can oversee, whether “theoretically” or “practically,” in its circumspection. What is distinctive about such intelligibility is that it believes it only experiences things that “factually” are — so that it can dispense with any understanding of being. It fails to recognize that things can only be “factually” experienced when being is already understood, even if not conceptualized. Our common intelligibility misunderstands understanding. And for this reason it will necessarily proclaim anything to be “violent” that lies beyond the scope of its intelligibility, or any movement in that direction.

The talk about the “circle” of understanding expresses a failure to recognize two things: (1) that understanding itself constitutes a funda-

formally and indicatively disclosed in the projection?* Is there any other way a being [something determined] can come into words in regard to its being? In an existential analysis a “circle” in the proof cannot even be “avoided”—simply because it does not prove anything at all with “rules of inference.” What common intelligibility wishes to get rid of by avoiding the “circle,” thinking it is satisfying the greatest rigor of scientific investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of care. Constituted primordially by care, being-there is in any instance already ahead of itself. To be at all, being-there is already projected onto determinate possibilities of its ex-sistence; and, in such existentiell projections, some version of ex-sistence and being are pre-ontologically projected as well. Can we then deny to our own research this projection belonging essentially to being-there — research which, itself a way of being-there that discloses (like all research), intends to work out and to conceptualize the understanding of being belonging to ex-sistence?

But the “charge of circularity” itself derives from the way being-there has its being. The common intelligibility embedded in our caring absorption in the one necessarily finds offensive anything like a projecting, and especially an ontological projecting, because it “in principle” barricades itself against such projecting. Such intelligibility takes care only of those things it can oversee, whether “theoretically” or “practically,” in its circumspection. What is distinctive about such intelligibility is that it believes it only experiences things that “factually” are — so that it can dispense with any understanding of being. It fails to recognize that things can only be “factually” experienced when being is already understood, even if not conceptualized. Our common intelligibility misunderstands understanding. And for this reason it will necessarily proclaim anything to be “violent” that lies beyond the scope of its intelligibility, or any movement in that direction.

The talk about the “circle” of understanding expresses a failure to recognize two things: (1) that understanding itself constitutes a funda-

mentally in which being-there is and (2) that being-there is as care. Denying the circle, hiding it, or even trying to overcome it, we henceforth congeal the failure. We must rather apply ourselves to leaping into the “circle” primordially and wholly — in order to assure, already at the inception of our analysis of being-there, a complete view of the circular being of being-there. Not too much, but rather too little gets “pre-supposed” for the ontology of being-there when one “starts out” with a worldless I and then tries to provide this I with an object and an ontologically groundless relation to it. Too shortsighted is any effort to take “life” as the problem and then come around incidentally to take account of death. Our thematic object is artificially and dogmatically curtailed if we concentrate “first of all” on a “theoretical subject” and then complement it “for practical purposes” with an add-on “ethic.”

So much suffices to clarify the existential meaning of the hermeneutical situation of the primordial analysis of being-there. With the exhibition of readying resoluteness, being-there is brought into our pre-having in regard to its authentic wholeness. The authenticity of the ability-to-be-a-self guarantees the pre-seeing of primordial existentiell, and this in turn assures the formation of appropriate existential conceptuality.

The analysis of readying resoluteness leads us at once to the phenomenon of primordial and authentic truth. Earlier on, it was shown how the understanding of being that initially and mostly prevails conceives of being as on-hand-ness and in this way covers over the primordial phenomenon of truth. If, however, “there is” being only in so far as truth “is,” and if our understanding of being always varies in accordance with the variations of truth, then it is truth in the primordial and authentic sense that must provide the warranty for our understanding of the being of being-there. The ontological “truth” of our existential analysis must develop on the basis of primordial existentiell truth. * However, this latter does not necessarily need the former. The most

---

1 Cf.§44 (b), pp. 219 ff.

* Or: philosophy is not for everyone! Cf. p. 13:

Only when philosophically investigative questioning is itself understood existentiell… does the possibility arise… of taking a firm hold on any sufficiently grounded ontological problematic.

Heidegger is accounting for the “esoteric” nature of our vocation—but without appealing either to “talent” or to “intelligence.”
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

primordial, the foundational existential truth to which the problematic of fundamental ontology strives — preparing for the question of being in general — is the disclosure of the essential meaning of care. For the exposition of this meaning we must hold before us the full structural condition of care.

§64. Care and selfhood

The unity of the constitutive factors of care, namely existentiality, facticity, and collapsedness, made possible a first ontological delimitation of the wholeness of the whole structure of being-there. The structure of care was given an existential formulation: being-ahead-of-itself-already-within (a world) as being-near (inner-worldly beings arising for encounter). The wholeness of the structure of care does not emerge from a splicing, yet it is jointed. We had to assess this ontological result to decide how well it satisfies the requirements for a primordial interpretation of being-there. This consideration led to the conclusion that we had made thematic neither the whole of being-there nor its authentic ability-to-be. However, the attempt to grasp phenomenally the whole of being-there seemed to fail precisely when it came to the structure of care. The ahead-of-itself appeared as a not-yet. Still, the ahead-of-itself, characterized in the sense of a remainder, revealed itself to our intrinsically existential observation as being-toward-death, something that every being-there is in the ground of its being. Similarly, we made it clear that, in its call of conscience, care summons being-there to its ownmost ability-to-be. Understanding this summons revealed itself —primordially understood—as readying resoluteness, which includes an authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there. The structure of care does not gainsay a possible being-whole, it is rather the condition of the possibility of such an existentiell ability-to-be. In the course of these analyses it became clear that the existential phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt find their anchor in the phenomenon of care. The manner in which the structural whole [of being-there] configures itself into a wholeness has become richer, and therewith the existential question of the unity of this wholeness has become more pressing.

How might we conceptualize this unity? How can being-there exist as a unit in the named manners and possibilities of its own being? Obviously it can only do so in that it itself, in its essential possibilities, is this being — that it is in each instance I who am the being-there. The “I” seems [misleadingly] to “hold together” the wholeness of the structural whole. The “I” and the “self” have been conceptualized throughout our [modern] tradition of the “ontology” of being-there as the supporting ground (substance, or subject). Already in the preparatory characterization of everydayness our present analysis came upon the question of the who of being-there. It was shown that, initially and mostly, being-there is not itself — it is rather lost in the one-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. The question of the ontological constitution of selfhood has remained unanswered. To be sure, we have in principle already established the guidelines of the problem: if the self belongs among the essential determinations of being-there, and the “essence” of being-there lies in ex-sistence, then I- hood and self-hood must be conceived existentially. Negatively, it was also shown that the ontological characterization of the one ruled out any application of categories of on-hand-ness (substance). In principle this became clear: care is ontologically not to be derived from reality or to be built up with categories of reality. Care already contains the phenomenon of self, if indeed our thesis is correct that the expression “care of oneself,” measured along the lines of caring for others, would be tautological. But then the problem of the ontological determination of the selfhood of being-there gets sharpened to the question of the existential “connection” between care and selfhood.

To clear up the existentiality of the self, we will take as our “natural” point of departure the everyday interpretation of being-there that expresses itself, talks about itself, in saying “I.” No utterance is here

---

1 [i.e.,] being-there itself is this being [not just “I”].
2 the “I” as the (in a certain sense) “closest,” the up-front, and so the apparent self.
1 Cf. §25, pp. 114 ff.
2 Cf. §43 (c), p. 211.
3 Cf. §41, p. 193. [See annotation on that page.]
The “I” is a bare consciousness that accompanies all concepts. With it, “nothing more is represented than a transcendent subject of thoughts. ... consciousness in itself is not really a representation ... it is rather a form of representation in general.” The “I think” is “the form of apperception that adheres to every experience, and precedes it.”

Kant rightly grasps the phenomenal content of the “I” in the expression “I think” or (if we also consider the relation of “practical person” to “intelligence”) as “I act.” In Kant’s sense, saying-I must be grasped as saying-I-think. Kant tries to establish the phenomenal content of the I as res cogitans. When he then calls this I a “logical subject” this does not mean that the I in general is a concept that could be gained by merely logical means. The I is much rather the subject of logical behavior, of binding together. The “I think” means “I bind together.” All binding together is “I bind together.” Within every taking together and relating to another, the I always already underlies — ὑποκείμενον.

For this reason, the subject is “consciousness in itself” — not a representation but rather the “form” of representations. This means: the I think is nothing represented, it is rather the formal structure of representing as such, that by which anything represented first becomes possible. Form of representation means neither a framework nor a universal concept, but rather what, as εἴδος, makes everything represented, and every representing, what it is. The I, understood as form of representation, means the same as: it is a “logical subject.”

Kant’s analysis has two positive aspects: first, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the I to a substance and, second, he holds fast to the I as “I think.” Yet he still grasps this I as subject and thereby in a way that is ontologically inappropriate. For the ontological concept of a subject characterizes not the selfhood of the I as self, but rather the sameness and constancy of something always already on hand. To determine the I ontologically as subject means to suppose it to be something on hand. The being of the I gets understood as the reality of...
the *res cogitans*.\(^1\)

\(^1\) That Kant still basically grasped the ontological character of the personal self within the horizon of the inappropriate ontology of inner-worldly things on hand, as “substantial,” becomes clear in the material that H. Heimsoeth developed in his essay “Persönlichkeitsbewußtsein und Ding an sich in der Kantischen Philosophie” (reprinted from *Immanuel Kant: Festschrift zur zweiten Jahrhundertfeier seines Geburtstages*, 1924). This essay aspires to be more than a merely historical report and aims at the “categorical” problem of personality. Heimsoeth says:

> There is still too little consideration of the close interconnection of theoretical and practical reason as Kant applied and planned it. Readers do not sufficiently notice how it is here that even the categories (in contrast to their naturalistic fulfillment in the “System of all Principles of Pure Understanding”) are explicitly supposed to obtain their validity and, with the primacy of practical reason, to find a new application independent of naturalistic rationalism (e.g., substance in “person” and durable personal immortality, causality as “causality through freedom,” reciprocity in the “community of rational beings,” etc.). As a means of establishing thoughts, categories provide a new access to the unconditioned without thereby intending to provide knowledge of objects by way of reasoning.

But here the authentic ontological problem has been passed over. We cannot leave aside the question whether these “categories” can retain their primordial validity and need only be applied differently — whether they don’t at bottom distort the ontological problematic of being-there. Even if theoretical reason gets built into the practical, the existential-ontological problem of the self remains not only unsolved but also unasked. On what ontological basis is the “interconnection” of theoretical and practical reason supposed to transpire? Which determines the being of the person — theoretical or practical comportment, or neither of the two? Do not the paralogisms, despite their fundamental significance, reveal the lack of ontological foundation of the problematic of the self from Descartes’ *res cogitans* through Hegel’s concept of spirit? One need not think “naturalistically” and “rationalistically” to engage in an even more insidious, because apparently self-evident, service to the ontology of the substantial. — Cf., as essentially complementing this one essay, Heimsoeth’s “Die metaphysischen Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus” in *Kantstudien*, Vol. 29 (1924), pp. 121 ff. For a critique of Kant’s concept of the I, see also Max Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value*, Part 2, in this *Yearbook*, Vol. II (1916), p. 246 ff. [translation 1973, Northwestern University Press, pp. 274 ff.] (On Person and the “Ego” of Transcendental Apperception).

But why is it that Kant is unable to exploit the genuine phenomenal point of departure available in the “I think” and must fall back on the “subject,” on the substantial? The I is not only an “I think” but an “I think something.” And doesn’t Kant himself emphasize again and again that the I remains related to its representations and would be nothing without them?

But for Kant these representations are what is “empirical,” what the I “accompanies,” the appearances to which the I “adheres.” Nowhere does Kant show the manner in which this “adherence” and “accompanying” have their being. Yet at bottom this manner is understood as constant on-hand-ness. To be sure, Kant avoided the severance of the I from the thinking — without, however, working out fully the “I think” itself in its essential content as “I think something” and, more importantly, without seeing the ontological “presupposition” for the “I think something” as the basic determination of the self.\(^8\) For the departure point of the “I think something” is ontologically underdetermined, since the “something” remains undetermined. If by this “something” we understand something *inner-worldly*, there tacitly lies herein the presupposition of *world*, and this phenomenon of world belongs to the determination of the I, if indeed it is possible for there to be something like “I think something.” Saying I bears on that being, as which in each instance I am: “I-am-in-a-world.” Kant did not see the phenomenon of world and was sufficiently consistent to keep “representations” away from the *a priori* content of the “I think.” But again the I was driven back to being an isolated subject that in some fully undetermined way accompanies representations.\(^1\)

_Saying I, being-there expresses itself as being-in-world. But does everyday I-saying mean itself as being-in-world?_ Here we must distinguish. Saying I, being-there does indeed mean the being that it in each instance is. But the everyday interpretation tends to understand itself in terms of the “world”\(^*\) it is taking care of. Meaning itself ontically, being-there mis-sees itself in regard to the way it is. And this

\(^8\) i.e., temporality [is the “presupposition” of “thinking something”: we can only “think” what comes upon us — world, being-there; the topic of §65].

\(^1\) Cf. the phenomenological criticism of Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism” in §43 (a), pp. 202 ff.

\(^*\) Recall that “world” (in quotation marks) means “the totality of beings that can be on hand within a world” (pp. 64-65).
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

408

What motivates this “fleeing” I-saying? The collapsing of being-there: as collapsing, it flees into the one. The “natural” I-talk is effected by the one-self. In the “I” a self is expressed that, initially and mostly, I am not—not authentically. Absorbed in the everyday multiplicity and in the chase after things to be taken care of, the self of the self-forgetting “I take care” shows itself as what is constantly and identically simple, but indeterminate and empty. One is, after all, what one takes care of. That the “natural” and ontic I-talk overlooks the phenomenal content of the being-there intended by the I: this does not give an ontological interpretation the right to indulge in this overlooking and to enforce an inappropriate “categorial” horizon onto the problematic of the self.

Of course, our ontological interpretation of the “I” hardly solves the problem just by refusing to follow the everyday manner of I-talking. Yet it has indeed prefigured the direction in which we must pursue the question. The I invokes the being that one is as being-in-world. But already-being-in-a-world means primordially, as being-near-inner-worldly-things-at-hand, being-ahead-of-itself. “I” invokes the being whose being is at issue for it. With “I,” care expresses itself—initially and mostly in the “fleeing” I-talk of taking care. The one-self says I!-I!—says it most loudly and most often because it is basically not authentically itself, and because it evades authentic ability-to-be. If the ontological constitution of the self does not allow for any reduction either to an I-substance or to a “subject,” but rather conversely the everyday fleeing I!-I!-saying must be understood in terms of authentic ability-to-be, it does not follow that the self is then the constantly on-hand ground of care. We can only detect selfhood existentially in authentic ability-to-itself, i.e. in the authenticity of the being of being-there as care. It is from care that the constancy of the self, as the supposed persistence of the subject, receives its elucidation. The phenomenon of authentic ability-to-be is then opens the view out onto the constancy of the self—understood now in the sense of having-gained-a-stand. The authentic possibility, the one countering the unself-constancy of unresolved collapsing, is constancy of the self in a twofold sense: a stand both continuous and firm. Such constancy of self, as self-sufficiency in taking a stand, means, existentially, nothing less than readying resoluteness. The ontological structure of such resoluteness reveals the existentiality of the selfhood of the self.

Being-there is authentically itself in the primordial individuation of reticent resoluteness taking dread upon itself. Keeping silent, this self never says “I!-I!”; it rather “is,” in reticence, the thrown being that it can authentically be. The self that the reticence of resoluteness reveals is the primordial phenomenal basis for the question of the being of the “I.”

Care does not need a foundation in a self. Rather, existentiality, as a constituent of care, provides the ontological constitution of the self-constancy of being-there, to which there belongs, corresponding to the full structural content of care, factual having-collapsed into unself-constancy. The structure of care, conceived in full, includes the phenomenon of selfhood. The clarification of this phenomenon transpires as the interpretation of the meaning of care, as which we determined the essential wholeness of being-there.

§65. Temporality as the ontological meaning of care

When characterizing the “connection” between care and selfhood our goal was not only to clarify the special problem of I-ness, it was to serve the ultimate preparation for grasping the wholeness of being-there, itself a structural whole. We need unwavering discipline in posing existential questions if we are not in the end to distort, for our ontological view, the way being-there has its being — distort it ... and wholeness of being-there. We must take an un-dispersed view of these, understanding them existentially, in order to

1 Cf. §§12 & 13, pp. 52 ff.
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

complete the exposition of the ontological meaning of the being of being-there.

What are we looking for ontologically with the meaning of care? What does *meaning* signify? Our investigation encountered this phenomenon in the context of the analysis of understanding and interpretation. On that account, meaning is that in which intelligibility lodges, without it having to come explicitly and thematically into view. Meaning signifies that upon which the primary projection projects itself, that in terms of which something can be conceived as what it is, i.e. in its possibility. Projection discloses possibilities, i.e. what makes things possible.

To expose that upon which a projection projects means to disclose what makes possible whatever is projected. Methodologically, such exposition requires that we pursue the projection (mostly unexpressed) underlying an interpretation — pursue it in such a way that what is projected in the projection becomes disclosed and graspable in regard to its upon-which. So, to set out the meaning of care means this: to pursue the projection underlying and guiding the primordial existential interpretation of being-there in such a way that, in what is projected, its own upon-which becomes visible. What is projected [in the current investigation] is the being of being-there, this being as disclosed in what constitutes its authentic ability-to-be-whole. The upon-which of this projected being, of the disclosed being thus constituted, is what makes possible this constitution of the being [of being-there] as care. With the question of the meaning of care we are also asking: *What makes possible the wholeness of the jointed structural whole of care in the unity of its unfolded articulation?*

Taken strictly, meaning signifies the upon-which of the primary projection in which there is already an understanding of being. Any being-in-world that has become disclosed to itself understands equi-primordially, with the being of that being that it itself is, the being of inner-worldly uncovered beings, even if only unthematically and without differentiating the primary modes of ex-sistence and reality. Every ontic experience of beings, the circumspect arranging of things at hand as well as the knowing of things on hand in the manner of the positive sciences, is grounded in more or less transparent projections of the being of the beings in question. And these projections contain in themselves an upon-which from which the understanding of being draws, as it were, its nourishment.

When we say that beings “have meaning” this signifies that they have become accessible in *their* being, and it is “really” this being, projected upon its upon-which, that “has meaning.” Beings only “have” meaning inasmuch as they, disclosed beforehand as being, become intelligible in the projection of being, i.e. in terms of the upon-which of the projection. The primary projection of the understanding of being “provides” the meaning. The question about the meaning of being takes as its theme the upon-which of the understanding of being, an understanding that underlies any being of beings.*

In regard to its ex-sistence, being-there is disclosed to itself either authentically or inauthentically. Ex-sisting, it understands itself in such a way that this understanding does not present a pure grasping; rather, it constitutes the existentiell being of factual ability-to-be. The being disclosed is that of a being whose being is at issue for it. The meaning of this being, i.e. the meaning of care, the meaning that makes care possible in its constitution, constitutes primordially the being of ability-to-be. The meaning at issue in the being of being-there is not something other and “outside” of being-there, it is rather being-there itself — being-there that understands itself. What makes this being of being-there possible, and therewith its factual ex-sistence?

What, in the primordial existential projection of ex-sistence, gets projected has been revealed as readying resoluteness. What makes this

---

1 Cf. §32, pp. 148 ff., especially pp. 151 f. [Cf. also p. 86, where the phenomenon of world is defined as “the wherein of self-referring understanding as the upon-which of the letting-be-encountered of beings in the manner in which being-bound-up-with has its being.”] Heidegger is now rooting the contemplative question (What is the meaning of being?) in the phenomena of world and the meaning already structuring world.

* Readers might recall that this “upon-which” is world (the “wherein” of a being-bound-up); cf. the definition of world on p. 86, cited in the previous annotation. Heidegger recurrently claims that traditional philosophy drifts away from this most intimate “starting point” of both ordinary and contemplative engagements — collapsing, then, into investigations of on-hand beings. *Today, the projections of socio-biology provide the most remarkable “meaning of being” — and therewith the strongest *oblivion* of being.*

a equivocal: [1] existentiell projection, and [2] existential projecting that inserts itself into this projection; here the two go together.
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

§65. Temporality as the Meaning of Care

authentic being-whole of being-there possible in regard to the unity of its jointed structural whole? Grasped in a formal and existential manner, without as yet naming constantly the full structural content, readying resoluteness is being-toward one's ownmost pre-eminent ability-to-be. Such a thing is possible only inasmuch as being-there can at all come to itself in its ownmost possibility and endure the possibility as possibility within this letting-it-come-to-itself—that is, inasmuch as it ex-sists. This letting itself come to itself, enduring the possibility pre-eminent for being-there, is the primordial phenomenon of the future.* If authentic or inauthentic being-toward-death belongs to the being of being-there, this is only possible as futural in the meaning now indicated and to be more exactly determined. Here, "future" does not mean a "now" that has not yet become actual and will be eventually; rather, it means the coming in which being-there comes to itself in its ownmost ability-to-be. Readying makes being-there authentically futural—in such a way that readying is itself only possible insofar as being-there, just as being, always already comes to itself, i.e. is futural already in its being.

Readying resoluteness understands being-there in its essential being-guilty. This understanding means: to take over, in ex-sisting, being-guilty, to be the thrown ground of nothingness. Yet to take over thrownness signifies to be authentically the being-there in its how it has instantly already been. And this taking over of thrownness is only possible inasmuch as futural being-there can be its ownmost "how it has instantly already been," its "been-ness." Only insofar as being-there itself is as "I am been-ness" can it come to itself futurally so that it comes back. Authentically futural, being-there is what it has been. Readying for one's most extreme and ownmost possibility is an understanding coming-back upon one's ownmost been-ness. Being-there can only be as authentically "having been" to the extent that it is futural. In a certain way, been-ness springs from the future.

* Many languages (French, German, Greek, . . . ) express "the future" with the metaphor of "what's coming," or "the coming toward." Heidegger plays on this linguistic fact. Note also that the existential possibility of "my taking thrownness upon myself" depends on the existential possibility (or factum) of this thrownness coming upon, even down upon "myself"—the "self" here being, initially and mostly, the one-self, and the individuated self first "happening" in the "taking" of this "what's coming." Heidegger's later discussion of historicity and destiny depend upon these earlier considerations.

Readying resoluteness discloses the instanial situation of the there in such a way that ex-sistence, acting circumspectly, takes care of the things factically at hand in the circum-world. Resolute being-near-to-things-at-hand in a situation, i.e. the letting-arise-for-encounter of beings presenting themselves in a circum-world, is only possible in a finding-present of these things. Only as presence, in this sense of finding-present, can resoluteness become what it is: the undistorted letting-arise-for-encounter of what it takes hold of in acting.*

Futurally coming back to itself, resoluteness brings itself into its situation, finding things present. Been-ness springs from the future inasmuch as the settled (better: settling) future releases from itself the present. We call temporality precisely this unified phenomenon: the future as the finding-present of been-ness. Only insofar as being-there is determined as temporality does it make possible for itself the authentic ability-to-be-whole we have characterized as constituting readying resoluteness. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care.

The phenomenal content of this meaning of care, content drawn from the essential constitution of readying resoluteness, completes the significance of the term "temporality." We must now keep the terminological use of this expression clear of all the other significances of "future," "past," and "present" that urge themselves upon us from the ordinary concept of time. Similarly with the concepts of a "subjective" and "objective," or "immanent" and "transcendent" "time."† Inasmuch

† Soon (p. 338), Heidegger will distinguish the authentic present ("the moment") from this generalized, possibly inauthentic present ("finding present"). — Thinkers from Plato through Kant and beyond have interpreted the moment of encounter with the twin categories of passivity and activity (undergoing and responding, receptivity and spontaneity). Here Heidegger offers an alternative. In his Discourse on Thinking (pp. 62 ff.; original 1955), he rethinks it under another name: waiting. On overcoming the twin categories, cf. also Gabriel Marcel's Mystery of Being, Vol. I (Chicago, 1960, p. 144; original 1949): "... effective participation transcends the traditional opposition between activity and passivity...."
as being-there understands itself initially and mostly inauthentically, we may suspect that the “time” of the ordinary understanding presents a genuine phenomenon, but a derivative one. It springs from inauthentic temporality, which has its own origin. The concepts of “future,” “past,” and “present” grew out of the inauthentic understanding of time. The terminological delimitation of the corresponding primordial and authentic phenomena struggles with the same difficulty adhering to all ontological terminology. In this field of investigation certain violences [in terminology] are not at all arbitrary but rather necessary—rooted as they are in the matter itself.* Still, in order to point up thoroughly the origination of inauthentic temporality from primordial and authentic temporality, we need first to work out concretely the primordial phenomenon that we have as yet only roughly characterized.

If resoluteness constitutes the mode of authentic care, and care itself is only possible through temporality, then the phenomenon at which we arrived when examining resoluteness must present only a modality of temporality—a modality that makes care at all possible. The essential wholeness of being-there as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being-near (encountered inner-worldly beings). When we first established this jointed structure we pointed out that, considering this jointedness, we had to take the ontological question still farther back to the exposition of the wholeness of the structural manifold.² The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.

The ahead-of-itself is grounded in the future. The already-being-in… announces itself in the been-ness. The being-near… becomes possible in finding-present. After what we have said, these phenomena forbid us to conceive the “ahead” in “ahead-of-itself,” as well as the “already,” in terms of the ordinary understanding of time. The “ahead” does not have the meaning of “not yet now, but later”; and similarly the “already” does not signify a “no longer now, but earlier.” If the expressions “ahead” and “already” had this time-like meaning (which they can also have), then we would be saying that the temporality of care was something that is at once both “earlier” and “later,” “not yet” and “no longer.” We would then conceive of care as something that comes up and goes away “in time.” Then the being of any being having the character of being-there would become an on-hand being. If that is impossible, the time-like meaning of those expressions would have to be a different one. The “ahead” and the “ahead-of-itself” points to the future—to the [kind of] future making it possible for being-there to be as the being for whom its ability-to-be is at issue. The self-projection, grounded in the future, onto the “for the sake of itself” is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future.

While our first “position” as being-in-world is one in which we are letting things arise for encounter, our position as intellectuals is one of battle. And whereas Wittgenstein also does battle with “confusions arising when language is like an engine idling” and also tries to “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (Logical Investigations, §§132 & 116), he does not inaugurate any other form of thinking; rather (ibid., §133): “The genuine discovery is one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.” In contrast, Heidegger’s aim is to disclose what it is that incites us to think philosophically.

¹ Cf. §41, p. 196.
² The text does read “and,” but “in” would better fit both the context (the first part of the paragraph) and the grammar (the singular verb “points”).
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

For this reason, being-there, as ex-sisting, can never be located as an on-hand fact that “in the course of time” arises and passes, and is partly gone. Being-there “finds itself” always only as a thrown factum. In the finding-itself we called attunement, being-there gets invaded by itself as the being that it, still being, already has been — i.e., the being that is constantly as having been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in been-ness. With the expressions “ahead” and “already,” the formulation of the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of both existentiality and facticity.

In contrast, there is no such indication for the third constitutive factor of care: collapsing being-near . . . . That does not intend to mean that such collapsing is not also grounded in temporality; rather, it intends to intimate that the finding-present (in which collapsing, in taking care of beings at hand and on hand, is primarily grounded) remains included, in the mode of primordial temporality, in the future and in the been-ness. As resolute, being-there has fetched itself back out of collapsing in order to be all the more authentically “there” for the disclosed situation “viewed” at the moment.

Temporality makes possible the unity of ex-sistence, facticity, and collapsing—and in this way primordially constitutes the wholeness of the structure of care. The factors of care are not pieced together cumulatively, any more than temporality itself gets assembled “in the course of time” out of future, been-ness, and presence. Temporality “is” not a being at all. It is not, it rather fructifies itself. Why it is that we still can’t get around saying such things as “Temporality ‘is’ . . . the meaning of care,” and “Temporality ‘is’ . . . determined in such-and-such a way”: this can only become intelligible once we have clarified the idea of being and of the “is” in general. Temporality fructifies,* and in various possible versions of itself. These various versions make possible the manifoldness of the modes of being that being-there has, above all the basic possibility of authentic and inauthentic ex-sistence.

Future, been-ness, and presence indicate the phenomenal characteristics “toward-itself,” “back on,” and “letting-be-encountered by.” The phenomena of toward . . . , on . . . , near . . . reveal temporality as the ἑκστατικὸν pure and simple.* Temporality is the primordial “outside itself” in and for itself. For this reason we call the phenomena we have characterized as future, been-ness, and presence the ecstacies of temporality. Temporality is not something that already is and then steps out of itself; rather, its essence is fructification in the unity of the ecstacies. Characteristic of the “time” accessible to ordinary understanding is, among other things, precisely that it levels out the ecstatic character of primordial temporality into a pure succession of nows, without beginning or end. But even this levelling is grounded, in its existential meaning, within a determinate possible fructification, according to which inauthentic temporality fructifies that kind of “time.” If, then, we display the “time” accessible to the common intelligibility of being-there as not primordial but rather as deriving from authentic temporality, we are justified, in reference to the principle a potiori fit denominatio,† in calling the temporality we have exposited: primordial time.

When enumerating the ecstacies, we have always mentioned the future first. This intends to suggest that the future has a primacy in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality—even though temporality does not first originate from an accumulation and succession of ecstacies, but rather fructifies itself in the equi-primordiality of the three. Yet, within their equi-primordiality, the modes of fructification are different. And the difference lies in the ability of fructification to determine itself primarily from different ecstacies. Primordial and authentic temporality fructifies itself out of the authentic future—in such a way that this temporality, as futural been-ness, is what first awakens the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The primacy of the future will itself vary

§65. Temporality as the Meaning of Care

For this reason, being-there, as ex-sisting, can never be located as an on-hand fact that “in the course of time” arises and passes, and is partly gone. Being-there “finds itself” always only as a thrown factum. In the finding-itself we called attunement, being-there gets invaded by itself as the being that it, still being, already has been — i.e., the being that is constantly as having been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in been-ness. With the expressions “ahead” and “already,” the formulation of the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of both existentiality and facticity.

In contrast, there is no such indication for the third constitutive factor of care: collapsing being-near . . . . That does not intend to mean that such collapsing is not also grounded in temporality; rather, it intends to intimate that the finding-present (in which collapsing, in taking care of beings at hand and on hand, is primarily grounded) remains included, in the mode of primordial temporality, in the future and in the been-ness. As resolute, being-there has fetched itself back out of collapsing in order to be all the more authentically “there” for the disclosed situation “viewed” at the moment.

Temporality makes possible the unity of ex-sistence, facticity, and collapsing—and in this way primordially constitutes the wholeness of the structure of care. The factors of care are not pieced together cumulatively, any more than temporality itself gets assembled “in the course of time” out of future, been-ness, and presence. Temporality “is” not a being at all. It is not, it rather fructifies itself. Why it is that we still can’t get around saying such things as “Temporality ‘is’ . . . the meaning of care,” and “Temporality ‘is’ . . . determined in such-and-such a way”: this can only become intelligible once we have clarified the idea of being and of the “is” in general. Temporality fructifies,* and in various possible versions of itself. These various versions make possible the manifoldness of the modes of being that being-there has, above all the basic possibility of authentic and inauthentic ex-sistence.

Future, been-ness, and presence indicate the phenomenal characteristics “toward-itself,” “back on,” and “letting-be-encountered by.” The phenomena of toward . . . , on . . . , near . . . reveal temporality as the ἑκστατικὸν pure and simple.* Temporality is the primordial “outside itself” in and for itself. For this reason we call the phenomena we have characterized as future, been-ness, and presence the ecstacies of temporality. Temporality is not something that already is and then steps out of itself; rather, its essence is fructification in the unity of the ecstacies. Characteristic of the “time” accessible to ordinary understanding is, among other things, precisely that it levels out the ecstatic character of primordial temporality into a pure succession of nows, without beginning or end. But even this levelling is grounded, in its existential meaning, within a determinate possible fructification, according to which inauthentic temporality fructifies that kind of “time.” If, then, we display the “time” accessible to the common intelligibility of being-there as not primordial but rather as deriving from authentic temporality, we are justified, in reference to the principle a potiori fit denominatio,† in calling the temporality we have exposited: primordial time.

When enumerating the ecstacies, we have always mentioned the future first. This intends to suggest that the future has a primacy in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality—even though temporality does not first originate from an accumulation and succession of ecstacies, but rather fructifies itself in the equi-primordiality of the three. Yet, within their equi-primordiality, the modes of fructification are different. And the difference lies in the ability of fructification to determine itself primarily from different ecstacies. Primordial and authentic temporality fructifies itself out of the authentic future—in such a way that this temporality, as futural been-ness, is what first awakens the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. The primacy of the future will itself vary

* From here on out, the botanical metaphor of “fructifying” will dominate the considerations of the way temporality “is.” The verb was first employed on p. 22 (tradition has fructified cover-ups); then on 152 (asking how interpretation, if circular, can fructify legitimate results); on p. 235 there is a promise that the illumination of the origin of “time” will reveal an essential possibility of fructification, which in turn will reveal a more primordial fructification of temporality. As transitive, the verb suggests “bringing something to bear fruit (not necessarily sweet).” As reflexive, it suggest that temporality can bear fruit on its own accord.

† The ἑκστατικὸν: ek-statikon, what juts out; from which we have both “existence” and “ecstasy.”

†‡ Roughly: “the more powerful version gets the name.” As when Plato and Aristotle argue that what really deserves to be called “pleasure” is the pleasure accompanying intellectual activity, whereas the pleasure of eating is really relief from pain.
according to the modified fructification of inauthentic temporality, but it will nonetheless also make its appearance in derivative “time.”

Care is being-toward-death. We determined readying resoluteness as authentic being in the face of the possibility characterized as the pure-and-simple impossibility of being-there. In such being-toward-the-end being-there authentically ex-sists wholly as the being that can be “thrown into death.” It does not have an end at which it simply ceases, it rather ex-sists end-ly, i.e. finitely. The authentic future, the future primarily fractifying the temporality that constitutes the meaning of readying resoluteness, reveals itself in this regard as finite. But doesn’t “time go on” despite the no-longer-being-there of myself? And can’t all kinds of things still lie “in the future” and arrive out of it?

These questions must be answered in the affirmative. Nevertheless, they contain no objection to the finitude of primordial temporality — because they no longer deal with it at all. The question is not what all can still happen “further on in time” or what sort of letting-things-come-toward-one can occur “during that time,” but rather how the coming-toward-itself is itself primordially determined as such. The finitude of this coming-toward-itself does not primarily mean a cessation, it is rather a characteristic of fructification itself. The primordial and authentic future is this toward-itself — taking upon oneself, in ex-sisting, the unshirkable possibility of nothingness. The ecstatic character of the primordial future lies precisely in this future's closing-off of the ability-to-be, i.e. its being itself closed and, as closed, making possible the resolute existential understanding of nothingness. Primordial and authentic coming-toward-itself is the meaning of ex-sisting in one’s ownmost nothingness. The thesis of the primordial finitude of temporality does not deny that “time goes on”; it rather intends to firm up the phenomenal character of primordial temporality, a character displaying itself in anything projected in the primordial existential projection of being-there itself.

The temptation to overlook the finitude of the primordial and authentic future, and therewith also of temporality, or even to consider it to be “a priori” impossible, springs from the constant intrusion of the ordinary understanding of time. If this understanding rightly knows an infinite time, and only such time, this by itself hardly proves that it already understands this time and its “infinitude.” What does it mean for time to “go on” or to “pass by”? What does “in time” mean — and especially the “in” [of “in time”] and “out of the future”? In what sense is “time” endless? All this demands clarification if the ordinary objections to the finitude of primordial time will not remain groundless. But we can engage in such clarification only when we have obtained an appropriate position for questioning finitude and non-finitude. And we occupy this position [only] when we view the primordial phenomenon of time understandingly. The problem cannot be formulated: How does the “derivative,” the infinite time — the time in which on-hand beings show up and pass by — become primordial, finite temporality, but rather: How does inauthentic temporality spring from finite authentic temporality, and how does the inauthentic version, as inauthentic, fractify, out of the finite version, a non-finite time? Only because primordial time is finite can the “derivative” version get fructified as non-finite. In the order of our understanding, the finitude of time becomes fully visible only when we have exhibited “endless time,” so that we can set it against the other.

We may summarize in the following theses our analysis-to-date of primordial temporality: Time is primordially as fructification of temporality, thereby making possible the constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatic. Temporality fractifies itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite.

Yet the interpretation of care as temporality cannot remain restricted to the narrow basis we have so far attained, even if it has taken the first steps with a view to the primordial authentic being-whole of being-there. The thesis that temporality is the meaning of being-there must find confirmation in the concrete condition of the basic constitution of being-there.

§66. The temporality of being-there, and the tasks arising from it of a more primordial repetition of the existential analysis.

The phenomenon of temporality we have exposited not only requires a more wide-ranging confirmation of its constitutive power, it itself will only thereby come into view in regard to its basic possibilities of fructification. For short, and only provisionally, we shall call our effort to ascertain, in reference to temporality, the possibility of the essential constitution of being-there: “temporal” interpretation.

Our next task is to make visible the inauthenticity of being-there in its specific temporality — beyond the temporal analysis of authentic
ability-to-be-whole and a general characterization of temporality as care. Temporality showed itself first of all within readying resoluteness. This is the authentic mode of disclosure, which mostly remains within the inauthenticity of the collapsing self-interpretation of the one. Characterizing the temporality of disclosure in general will lead to the temporal intelligibility built into the being-in-world closest to us and taking care of things — and thereby lead to the average indifference of being-there from which our existential analysis first started out. ¹ We called the average way in which being-there is, the one in which it initially and mostly remains, everydayness. By way of repetition of the earlier analysis, everydayness must be revealed in its temporal meaning so that the problematic enclosed within temporality can come to light, and so that the seeming “self-evidence” of our preparatory analyses can disappear altogether. To be sure, temporality should find confirmation in all the essential structures of the basic constitution of being-there. But that does not require us to run through the completed analyses again, in an externally schematic manner and in the same sequence. Differently directed, the course of our temporal analysis will aim to make clearer the way our earlier considerations cohered, and to remove their fortuity and apparent arbitrariness. However, beyond these methodological necessities, there are motives lying in the phenomenon itself that press in upon us, and that will compel us to articulate the analysis differently as we repeat it.

The ontological structure of the being that I my-self in any instance am, is centered in the self-constancy of ex-sistence. Because the self can be conceived neither as substance nor as subject, but is rather grounded in ex-sistence, we kept the analysis of the inauthentic self, of the one, wholly within the scope of the preparatory analysis of being-there.² Now that we have brought selfhood explicitly back into the structure of care, and thereby into the structure of temporality, the temporal interpretation of self-constancy and unself-constancy will acquire a weight of its own. It stands in need of a special thematic execution. But it will not only provide the right protection against the paralogisms [which Kant analyzed], and against the ontologically inappropriate questions about the

¹ Cf. §9, p. 43. [Note the circularity of the analysis: only once we have taken the whole upon ourselves are we in a position to make unwholeness visible — the very unwholeness analyzed in Division One.]

² Cf. §§25 ff., pp. 113 ff. being of the I in general; it will also devise, in accordance with its central function, a more primordial view into the structure allowing temporality to fructify. This structure will reveal itself as the historicity of being-there. Being-there is historical: this will be confirmed as an existential and ontological statement of foundational significance. It is far removed from a merely ontic ascertainment of the fact that being-there occurs in “world-history.” The historicity of being-there is rather the ground of a possible historiographical understanding that, in its turn, carries within itself the possibility for grasping a special development of historiography as a science.

The temporal interpretation of everydayness and historicity will secure the view of primordial time sufficiently to uncover it as the condition of the possibility and necessity of the everyday experience of time. Being-there expends itself, as the being whose being is at issue for it, primarily and whether explicitly or not, for itself. Initially and mostly, care takes the form of circumspect taking care of things. Expending itself for the sake of itself, being-there “uses itself up.” Using itself up, being-there needs itself, i.e. it needs time. Needing time, it reckons with it. Circumspect and reckoning, taking-care initially discovers time and leads to developing ways of reckoning time. Reckoning with time is constitutive for being-in-world. Reckoning with its time, the care-bound uncovering essential to circumspection allows beings to arise for encounter, to be discovered as at hand or on hand. In this way, inner-worldly beings become accessible as “being in time.” We call the time-determinateness of inner-worldly beings: inner-timely-ness. The “time” initially and ontically founded on this inner-timely-ness will serve as the basis for seeing how the ordinary and traditional concept of time takes shape. Now, the time we call inner-timely-ness springs from an essential kind of fructification of primordial temporality. With a view to this origin we can see that the time “in which” on-hand beings show up and pass away is a genuine phenomenon of time and not the externalization into space of a “qualitative time,” as Bergson’s time-interpretation — ontologically entirely indeterminate and inadequate as it is — would have us believe.

The elaboration of the temporality of being-there as everydayness [Chapter Four], historicity [Chapter Five], and inner-timely-ness [Chapter Six] will first give us relentless insight into the complexities of a primordial ontology of being-there. As being-in-world, being-there ex-
II. Chapter Three: Authenticity and Temporality

sists factically with and near inner-worldly encountered beings. For this reason, the being of being-there receives its comprehensive ontological transparency only within the horizon of the clarified being of beings not taking their measure from being-there, and this also means: the being of what, not at hand and not on hand, only “subsists.”

* This sentence formed the focus of a long afternoon discussion I had with Heidegger on June 28, 1965. We had been debating the senses in which experience could serve or not serve as a standard for reflection (two senses of “experience”: what we have undergone and to what we then appeal for justification, and what we can witness as what demands projective elicitation). And then also the ways Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness differs from Being and Time (the chief difference being that Sartre’s work continues the tradition of subjectivity, whereas Heidegger’s understands human being as ecstatic dwelling). In this context I asked him whether his essay on “The Thing” was addressing the third kind of being: not at hand, not on hand, only “subsisting.” He fetched his copy, in which the passage was already underlined in red. Laying one hand on the left side of the book, he said that everything up to that point intended only to prepare for this question; that indeed the essay on “The Thing” and his “The Origin of the Work of Art” were addressing it; and that the “turning” he talks about elsewhere, e.g. in his “Letter on Humanism,” pivots on this address. When I asked him whether the alternatives of authenticity and inauthenticity applied to the things we deal with, he answered: “Without authentic thing, no authentic self, and vice versa.” Whereas Sartre-bound readers (and tradition-bound readers generally) concentrate on the easily recognized developments of human character, Heidegger insisted throughout our discussion that Sartre’s work continues the tradition of subjectivity, whereas Heidegger’s understands human being as ecstatic dwelling. Artists often intuit the primordial temporality imbuing full encounter. I think of William Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun: “The past is not dead, it’s not even past,” and “past is something like a promissory note which, as long as nothing goes wrong can be manumitted in an orderly manner, but which fate or luck or chance can foreclose on you without warning.” Also of D.H. Lawrence’s Sea and Sardinia: “apart from the great rediscovery backwards, which one must make before one can be whole at all, there is movement forwards. There are unknown, unworked lands where the salt has not lost its savour. But one must have perfected the past first.”

§66. The Tasks of Repetition

interpretation of these variations in the being of all things about which we say that they are — this interpretation stands in need of a prior, adequately illuminated idea of being in general. As long as we have not achieved this idea, the analysis of being-there, even the repetition of it, remains incomplete and marred by unclarities — not to speak at length about the difficulties posed by the matter itself. The existential-temporal analysis of being-there will in turn require a renewed repetition within the framework of a foundational discussion of the concept of being.*

* All this in the never-published Division Three. Since many readers wonder what happened with this portion, I record Heidegger’s own account (1937/38), as published in Vol. 66 of his Collected Works (1997, pp. 413-414.). After remarking that he worked on the book during 1922-1926, and that it was aiming to establish an entirely new approach to the question of being “with a view to the central questions in the history of metaphysics,” he goes on:

But, in the first version, the actual “systematic” Division on time and being remained inadequate; and, happily, extraneous circumstances (the volume of the Yearbook was swelling) also prevented the publication of this portion — in which I had no great confidence anyway, given my recognition of its inadequacy. The draft was destroyed; but I then forged a new running-start in my lectures of the Summer Semester, 1927 — proceeding more historically. [Indeed, these lectures, now available as Basic Problems of Phenomenology, mainly “destructure” the Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions, and then briefly review the argument regarding primordial temporality and ordinary time; only the final two sections (§§21 & 22) broach the question of temporality and “time-bounded-ness” afresh.]

Yet, viewed now in retrospect, the publication of the wholly inadequate portion would have had importance after all. It would have thwarted to some extent the misinterpretation of Being and Time as a mere “ontology” of human being, and the underestimation [of its stated goal] of “fundamental ontology” — as happened, and continues to happen.

Precisely because the question about the meaning of being (about the projectional truth of being — not of beings) is other than what one finds throughout all previous metaphysics, this sort of questioning — even though it often enough says what it intends — would have been able to show what it was up to. For the inadequacy of the portion held back from publication lay not in any insecurity regarding the direction of the question or of its domain, but only in the right way of working it out.
Chapter Four
Temporality and Everydayness

§67. The basic condition of the existential constitution of being-there, and the prefiguration of its temporal interpretation

Our preparatory analysis has made accessible a multiplicity of phenomena that must not disappear from our phenomenological view, despite our concentration on the founding structural wholeness of care. Far from excluding such a multiplicity, the primordial wholeness of the essential constitution of being-there demands this multiplicity—inasmuch as its constitution is jointed. Primordiality of an essential constitution does not coincide with the simplicity and uniqueness of an ultimate structural element. The ontological origin of the being of being-there is not “less” than what arises from it, but already exceeds it in power. Any “derivation” in the field of ontology is degeneration. The ontological drive toward the “origin” does not arrive at things that are ontically self-evident for “common sense”; rather, in this drive everything [supposedly] self-evident becomes questionable.

In order to bring the phenomena at which we arrived in our preparatory analysis back into a phenomenological view, a reference to the stages we have gone through will have to suffice. The delimitation of care emerged from our analysis of the disclosedness that constitutes the being of the “there.” The clarification of this phenomenon signified a provisional interpretation of the basic constitution of being-there. Our investigation began with a characterization of being-in-world—in order to secure from the very beginning an adequate phenomenal horizon, as opposed to the inappropriate (mostly tacit) ontological predeterminations of being-there. Being-in-world was initially characterized with regard to the phenomenon of world. Indeed, our explication moved from an ontic and ontological characterization of at-hand and on-hand beings “within” the circum-world to a delimitation of inner-worldliness, thus making the phenomenon of worldliness as such visible. But the structure of worldliness, signification, turned out to be coupled with that upon which the understanding belonging essentially to disclosedness projects itself—i.e. with the ability-to-be of being-there, the ability for the sake of which

1 Cf. Division One, pp. 41-230 [i.e., the first six chapters of the book].
being-there ex-sists.

The temporal interpretation of everyday being-there must begin with the structures in which disclosedness constitutes itself. These are: understanding, attunement, collapsing, and talk. The modes of the fructification of temporality to be exposed with regard to these phenomena provide the basis for determining the temporality of being-in-world. This leads again to the phenomenon of world, and permits us to delimit the specifically temporal problematic of worldness. Such delimitation must be confirmed by characterizing the everyday being-in-world closest to us — collapsing and circumspect taking-care. The temporality of this manner of taking-care makes it possible for circumspection to be modified into a perceiving that looks on at things, and into the theoretical cognition based on such perceiving. The temporality of being-in-world that thus emerges also turns out to be the foundation of the specific spatiality of being-there. The temporal constitution of de-stancing and directionality must be shown. The whole of these analyses reveals a fructification-possibility of temporality, a possibility in which the inauthenticity of being-there is ontologically grounded, and it leads to the question of how the temporal nature of everydayness — the temporal meaning of the “initially and mostly,” terms we have constantly been using — is to be understood. Focussing on this problem makes clear that and how the clarification of the phenomenon so far attained is not sufficient.

The present chapter thus has the following articulation: the temporality of disclosedness as such (§68); the temporality of being-in-world and the problem of transcendence (§69); the temporality of the spatiality belonging to being-there (§70); the temporal meaning of the everydayness of being-there (§71).

§68. The temporality of disclosedness as such

The resoluteness which we have characterized with regard to its temporal meaning represents an authentic disclosedness of being-there. Disclosedness constitutes a being in such a way that, ex-sisting, it can itself be its “there.” With respect to its temporal meaning, care was characterized only in its basic features. To display its concrete temporal constitution we must interpret in temporal terms the detail of its structural factors, i.e. understanding, attunement, collapsing, and talk. Every understanding has its mood. Every attunement has an understanding. Attuned understanding has the character of collapsing. Collapsingly attuned understanding articulates itself, its intelligibility, within talk. Any actual temporal constitution of these phenomena leads back to that one temporality that holds within itself the possible structural unity of understanding, attunement, collapsing, and talk.

(a) The temporality of understanding

With the term understanding we mean a fundamental existential; neither a determinate kind of cognition, as distinct from explaining and conceiving, nor any cognition at all of the sort that grasps things thematically. Understanding constitutes the being of the there in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, a being-there can develop ex-sistingly the various possibilities of vision, of looking around, and of just looking on. As the understanding uncovering of what is unintelligible, all explaining is rooted in the primary understanding of being-there.

Formulated primordially and existentially, understanding means: to be projecting toward an ability-to-be for the sake of which being-there in each instance ex-sists. Understanding discloses its own ability-to-be in such a way that being-there always somehow knows understandingly what is going on with itself. This “knowing,” however, does not mean that it has discovered some fact, but that it holds itself in an existentiell possibility. The unknowing that corresponds to this knowing does not consist in a failure to understand, but must be taken as a deficient mode of the projectedness of its ability-to-be. Ex-sistence can be questionable. If it is possible for something “to be in question,” a disclosedness is necessary. When being-there understands itself projectively in an existentiell possibility, the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-upon-itself from the given possibility as which being-there now happens to ex-sist. The future makes ontologically possible a being that is in such a way that it ex-sists understandingly within its ability-to-be. Projecting, which is fundamentally futural, does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically by pondering it, but throws itself into it as possibility. Understandingly, being-there in each case is as it can be. Resoluteness turned out to be primordial and authentic ex-sisting. Of course, initially and mostly being-there remains irresolute, i.e. it remains closed off from its ownmost ability-to-be, to which it brings itself only in individuation. This means that temporality does not constantly

1 Cf. §31, pp. 142 ff.
fructify itself out of the authentic future. However, this inconstancy does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks the future, but rather that the fructification of the future can vary.

We shall retain the expression *readying* for the terminological characterization of the authentic future. It indicates that being-there, authentically ex-sisting, lets itself come upon itself as its ownmost ability-to-be—that the future must first be won not from a present, but from the inauthentic future. The formally undifferentiated term for the future lies in the designation of the first structural factor of care: *being-ahead-of-itself*. Factually, being-there is constantly ahead-of-itself, but it is inconstantly readying for its existentiell possibility.

How then is the inauthentic future to be brought into relief? Just as the authentic future is revealed in resoluteness, so the inauthentic future, as an ecstatic mode, can reveal itself only in an ontological recourse to the existential and temporal meaning of the everyday inauthentic understanding that takes care of things. As care, being-there is essentially ahead-of-itself. Initially and mostly, the being-in-world that takes care understands itself in terms of what it takes care of. Inauthentic understanding projects itself upon what can be taken care of, what can be done, what is urgent or indispensable in the business of everyday activity. But what is taken care of is as it is for the sake of the ability-to-be that cares. This ability lets being-there come upon itself in its heedful being, together with what is to be taken care of. Being-there does not come upon itself primarily in its ownmost, non-relational ability-to-be, it rather *waits around*, concerned about the yield, or lack thereof, of what it takes care of. Being-there comes upon itself in terms of what it takes care of. The inauthentic future has the character of *waiting-for*. The self-understanding belonging to the concerned one-self, an understanding directed to one's affairs, has the "ground" of its possibility in this ecstatic mode of the future. And *only because* factical being-there is thus waiting for its ability-to-be, basing this on what it takes care of, can it expect things, wait for things. Waiting-for must in each instance have already disclosed the horizon and scope within which something can be expected. *Expecting* is a mode of the future founded in waiting-for, while the future fructifies itself authentically as *readying*. Thus there lurks in readiness a being-toward-death more primordial than in the taking-care-expectation of it.

However it may be projected as an ex-sisting in ability-to-be, under-

standing is *primarily* futural. But it would not fructify itself if it were not temporal, i.e. equi-primordially determined by been-ness and presence. The way in which the ecstasy of the present helps constitute inauthentic understanding has already become clear in rough outline. Everyday taking-care understands itself from the ability-to-be that confronts it as coming from its possible success or failure with regard to what is actually taken care of. To the inauthentic future (waiting-for) there corresponds its own way of being *near* what is taken care of. The ecstatic mode of this present reveals itself if we adduce for comparison this very same ecstasy, but in the mode of authentic temporality. To the readying of resoluteness there belongs a present in keeping with which a resolution discloses the situation. In resoluteness, the present is not only brought back from the dispersion in what is taken care of closest at hand, but is held within both its future and its been-ness. We call the *present* that is held in authentic temporality, and is thus *authentic*, the *moment*. This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasy. It means the resolute rapture of being-there, which is yet held in resoluteness, in what is encountered as possibilities, as circumstances to be taken care of in the situation. The phenomenon of the moment can *in principle not* be clarified in terms of the *now*. The now is a temporal phenomenon that belongs to time as inner-timely-ness: the now “in which” something comes into being, passes away, or is on hand. “At the moment” nothing can come about, but as an authentic present it lets us *encounter for the first time* what can be “in a time” as something at hand or on hand.¹

In contrast to the moment as authentic presence, we shall call the

---

¹ Søren Kierkegaard saw the *existentiell* phenomenon of the moment in the most penetrating way, which does not mean that he also was as successful in the existential interpretation of it. He remains stuck in the ordinary concept of time and defines the moment with the help of the now and eternity. When Kierkegaard speaks of “temporality,” he means the being-in-time of human being. Time as inner-timely-ness knows only the now, but never a moment. But if the moment is experienced existentially, a more primordial temporality is presupposed, although existentially inexplicit. Regarding the “moment,” cf. Karl Jaspers’ *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 3rd edition, 1925, pp. 108 ff., and also his review of Kierkegaard, pp. 419-32. [The pagination is the same for the 2nd edition, 1922. Cf. Heidegger’s footnotes regarding Jaspers on pp. 249 and 301.]
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

430  When first introduced on p. 326, “finding-present” named the generic basis of authentic presence. For the provenance of this neologism, see the annotation appended to Heidegger’s note on p. 363.

† Cf. p. 2 and §74: “repetition” is what Heidegger requires of us as readers.

Inauthentic understanding fructifies itself as a waiting-for that finds-present — a waiting-for to whose ecstatic unity a corresponding been-ness must belong. The authentic coming-upon-itself of readying resoluteness is at the same time a coming back upon the ownmost self thrown into its individuation. This ecstasy makes it possible for being-there to be able to take over resolutely the being that it already is. In readying, being-there brings itself again into its ownmost ability-to-be, brings it to the fore. We call authentic been-ness repetition. But then inauthentic self-projection upon the possibilities drawn from what is taken care of, finding it present, is possible only because being-there has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown ability-to-be. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a “positive” ecstatic mode of been-ness, a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasy (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away from one’s ownmost having been, a backing away that closes itself off. This backing away from...ecstatically closes off what it is backing away from, and thus closes the backing off as well. Thus, as inauthentic been-ness, oblivion bears on its own thrown being. Oblivion is the temporal meaning of the manner in which I, initially and mostly, am my been-ness. And only on the basis of this forgetting can finding-present that waits-for and takes-care retain anything — retain, indeed, beings in the circum-world that do not take their measure from being-there. To this retention corresponds a non-retention permitting a “forgetting” in the derivative sense.

Just as expectation is possible only on the basis of waiting-for, re-

339  $\$68. The Temporality of Disclosedness

membrance is possible only on the basis of forgetting, and not the other way around. In the mode of oblivion, been-ness primarily “discloses” the horizon in which being-there can remember anything, lost as it is in the “superficiality” of what it takes care of. Waiting-for that forgets and finds-present is an ecstatic unity in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding fructifies itself with regard to its temporality. The unity of these ecstasies closes off one’s authentic ability-to-be, and is thus the existential condition of the possibility of irresoluteness. Although inauthentic understanding-taking-care is determined on the basis of finding-present what is taken care of, the fructification of understanding comes about primarily within the future.*

(b) The temporality of attunement

Understanding is never free floating, but always attuned. In each instance equi-primordially, the there is disclosed — or closed off — by mood. Attunement brings being-there before its thrownness: precisely not as something known as such, but rather, and far more primordially, as disclosing “how one is.” Being thrown means existentially “finding oneself” in one way or another. Thus attunement is grounded in thrownness. Mood presents the way in which I am in each instance primarily the being that has been thrown. How does the temporal constitution of attunement become visible? How does the existential connection between attunement and understanding become

* Heidegger is here dialoguing with Plato’s “doctrine of recollection” as an alternative to the “allegory of the cave.” Yet he seems never to have the confidence in his understanding of Plato as he does in his understanding of Aristotle. Georg Picht (1913–1982) reports the following in Erinnerungen an Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977, p. 203; reprinted by Neske in Antwort: Martin Heidegger im Gespräch, 1988, p. 181):

Shortly after the war we were taking a walk in the woods above his house. I braced myself and tried to tell him why I found his interpretation of the allegory of the cave unconvincing. Here was a central point, since his whole interpretation of European metaphysics depended on it. Never again have I met anyone who could listen so intently. After a series of pointed and exact questions, posed with restrained passion, to which I did not give in, he stopped in his tracks and said: “One thing I must admit to you: the structure of Platonic thinking is entirely obscure to me.” A long pause of silence: “We had better turn back.”

† Cf. §29, pp. 134 ff.
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

Recall the principle formulated by Hegel in the Preface to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*: "In general, what's [already] familiar is, because it is familiar, not [fully] known."

Mood discloses in the way one is turning toward or turning from one's own being-there. Whether authentically revealing or inauthentically concealing, the *bringing* [of being-there] *before* the that of its own thrownness is existentially possible only if the being of being-there, by its very meaning, *is* as constantly having-been. This bringing-before of the thrown being that one is oneself does not fabricate been-ness; rather, the ecstasy of been-ness first makes possible the finding of oneself in the mode of attunement. Understanding is primarily grounded in the future; *attunement*, in contrast, fructifies itself *primarily* as been-ness. Mood fructifies itself (i.e., its specific ecstasy belongs to a future and a present), but in such a way that been-ness modifies the [other] equi-primordial ecstasies.

We have emphasized that, whereas moods are ontically familiar, they are not, in their primordial and existential function, known.* They are [familiarly] taken as fleeting experiences that “color” one’s whole “psychical condition.” What, as [simply] observed, has the character of fleeting emergence and disappearance belongs to the primordial constancy of ex-sistence. But still, what might moods have in common with “time”? That these "experiences" come and go, that they run their course “in time,” is a trivial ascertainment; indeed, and it is moreover an ontic-psychological one. But our task is to display the ontological structure of attunedness in its existential-temporal constitution. And, initially, this is only a matter of for once rendering the temporality of mood as such visible. The thesis that “attunement is primarily grounded in been-ness” means that the basic existential character of mood is a *bringing back upon*. . . . This does not first produce been-ness; rather, attunement in each case reveals a mode of been-ness for our existential analysis. Thus the temporal interpretation of attunement cannot intend to deduce moods from temporality and dissolve them in the pure phenomena of fructification. The point is simply to show that moods are *not possible*, in what they “signify” existentially, or how they “signify” it, except on the basis of temporality. Our temporal interpretation will restrict itself to the phenomena of fear and dread, which were already analyzed in a preparatory way.

We begin our analysis by displaying the temporality of *fear*.1 Fear was characterized as inauthentic attunement. In what way does the existential meaning that makes such an attunement possible lie in been-ness? What mode of this ecstasy characterizes the specific temporality of fear? Fear is a *fearing in the face of something threatening*—something detrimental to the factual ability-to-be of being-there, something approaching within the range of at-hand or on-hand beings taken care of (as earlier described). In the mode of everyday circumspection, fearing discloses something threatening. A subject merely looking on could never discover anything of the sort. But is not this disclosing of fear in the face of . . . a letting-something-come-upon-oneself? Has not fear been justifiably described as the expectation of a coming evil (*malum futurum*)? Is not the primary temporal meaning of fear the future, and least of all been-ness? Fearing incontestably “bears” not only on “something futural” in the sense of what will only arrive “in time,” but this bearing is itself futural in the primordially temporal sense. Obviously, a *waiting-for* belongs to the existential and temporal constitution of fear. But this only means that the temporality of fear is initially *inauthentic*. Is fearing in the face of . . . merely an expecting of something futurally threatening? The expectation of something futurally threatening need not already be fear, and it is so far from being such that it lacks the specific character of the mood of fear. Within the waiting-for in which fear arises, this character consists in letting what is threatening *come back* upon the ability-to-be that is factically taking care of things. Only if that upon which this comes back is already ecstatically open can what is threatening come *back upon* my waiting-for, back upon the being that I am. That fearful waiting-for fears for itself, i.e., that fearing in the face of . . . is in each case a fearing *about* . . . : herein lies the mood- and *affect*-character of fear. The existential and temporal meaning of fear is constituted by a self-forgetting: a confused backing away from one’s own factual ability-to-be, as which the threatened being-in-world takes care of what is at hand. Aristotle correctly describes fear as a *λυπη τις η ταραχη*, an oppression or a confusion.2 Oppression forces being-there back to its thrownness, but in such a way that its thrownness is precisely closed off. Confusion is based upon forgetting.

---

1 Cf. §30, pp. 140 ff.
2 Cf. *Rhetoric* B 5, 1382 a 21 [literally: “some sort of pain or tumult”].
When one forgets, backs away from a factual, resolute ability-to-be, one keeps to those possibilities of self-preservation and evasion that have already been circumspectly discovered beforehand. The taking care of things which fears for itself leaps from one proximate thing to the next, because it forgets itself and thus cannot grasp any one definite possibility. All “possible” possibilities offer themselves, and that means impossible ones, too. One who fears holds to none of them; the “circum-world” does not disappear, but one encounters it in the mode of no longer knowing one’s way around in it. This confused finding-present of the closest-best-thing belongs to forgetting oneself in fear. It is a familiar fact, for example, that the inhabitants of a burning house often “save” the most insignificant things at hand. Such self-forgetting finding-present in a jumble of floating possibilities: this makes possible the confusion constituting the mood-character of fear. The oblivion of confusion also modifies the waiting-for, characterizing it as oppressed or confused — something quite distinct from pure expectation.

The specific ecstatic unity that makes fearing for oneself existentially possible: this gets fructified primarily out of the forgetting we described, a forgetting that, as a mode of been-ness, modifies the present and the future in their fructification. The temporality of fear is a forgetting that waits-for and finds-present. In accordance with its orientation toward things encountered within the world, the commonly intelligible interpretation of fear initially seeks to determine the “approaching evil” as what it is afraid of, and to describe its relation to that evil as expectation. Whatever else belongs to the phenomenon remains a “feeling of pleasure or pain.”

How is the temporality of dread related to that of fear? We called this phenomenon a basic attunement. It brings being-there before its ownmost thrownness and reveals the uncanniness of everyday, familiar being-in-world. Like fear, dread is formally determined by something in the face of which one dreads and something about which one is anxious. However, our analysis showed that these two phenomena coincide. That is not supposed to mean that the structural characteristics of the two are fused, as if dread dreaded neither in the face of… nor about…. Their coincidence means that the being filling these structures [i.e., the two ellipses] is the same, namely being-there. In particular, that before which one has dread is not encountered as something determinate to be taken care of; the threat does not come from something at hand or on hand, but rather from the fact that everything at hand and on hand simply has nothing more to “say” to us. Things in the circum-world no longer have any bound-up-ness. The world in which I ex-sist has sunk into non-signification, and the world thus disclosed can only set free beings that have no bound-up-ness. The nothingness of the world in the face of which dread is anxious does not entail that in dread one experiences an absence of inner-worldly beings on hand. They must be encountered in just such a way that they are of no bound-up-ness at all and can show themselves in a barren mercilessness. However, this means that our taking-care-waiting-for finds nothing in terms of which it might understand itself, and it grasps at the nothingness of the world. Yet, thrust up to the world, understanding is, by dread, brought up to being-in-world as such; but that in the face of which dread is anxious is simultaneously that about which it dreads. Dread in the face of… has the character neither of an expectation nor of any expectant waiting-for at all. That in the face of which one has dread is, after all, already “there”; it is being-there itself. Then is not dread constituted by a future? Certainly, yet not by the inauthentic one of waiting-for.

The non-signification of the world disclosed in dread reveals the nothingness of what can be taken care of — i.e., the impossibility of projecting oneself upon an ability-to-be of ex-sistence primarily based upon what is taken care of. But the revelation of this impossibility signals an opportunity to let the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be shine forth. What is the temporal meaning of this revealing? Dread is anxious about naked being-there as this is thrown into uncanniness. It brings one back to the pure that of one’s ownmost, individuated thrownness. This bringing-back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting, nor that of a remembering. But neither does dread already imply that one has already taken over one’s ex-sistence in a resolution repeating it. On the contrary, dread brings one back to thrownness as something to be possibly repeated. And thus it also reveals the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be that must, as something futural in repetition, come back to the thrown there. Bringing [being-there] before the possibility of repetition: this is the specific ecstatic mode of the been-ness that constitutes the attunement of dread.

1 Cf. §40, pp. 184 ff.
contrast to this frantic finding-present, the presence engendered by dread is held in bringing one back to one’s ownmost thrownness. In accordance with its existential meaning, dread cannot lose itself in anything taken care of. If anything like this happens in a similar attunement, this is fear, which everyday understanding mixes up with dread. Although the present of dread is held, it does not as yet have the character of the moment that gets fructified in resolution. Dread only brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. The present of dread holds the moment, as which the present itself is possible (and only so), in abeyance.

In the temporality peculiar to dread (that dread is primordially grounded in been-ness and that future and present fructify themselves only out of this been-ness) it becomes evident just how powerful the mood of dread can be, and how distinctive it is. In it, being-there is taken back fully to its naked uncanniness and taken over by it. But this not only takes being-there back from its “worldly” possibilities, it simultaneously gives it the possibility of an authentic ability-to-be.

Yet neither of these moods, neither fear nor dread, ever “comes up” as isolated in the “stream of experience.” They attune an understanding or get attuned by an understanding. Fear is occasioned by beings taken care of in the circum-world. In contrast, dread arises from being-there itself. Fear comes over us from inner-worldly beings. Dread arises from being-in-world as thrown being-toward-death. Understood temporally, this “emergence” of dread from being-there means that the future and the present of dread fructify themselves out of a primordial been-ness, so that we are brought back to the possibility of repetition. But dread can arise authentically only in a resolute being-there. He who is resolute knows no fear, but understands the possibility of dread as the mood that does not hinder or confuse him. Dread frees us from “null” possibilities and sets us free for authentic ones.

Although both modes of attunement, fear and dread, are primarily grounded in been-ness, their origin is different with regard to the fructification belonging to each in the whole of care. Dread springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost present of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, thus collapsing into it more than ever.

But is not the thesis of the temporality of moods perhaps valid only for the phenomena that we selected? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid out-of-tune-ness that dominates the “gray everyday”? And how about the temporality of moods and affects such as hope, joy, enthusiasm, and gaiety? That not only fear and dread are founded existentially in a been-ness, but other moods, too, becomes clear if we just mention such phenomena as tedium, sadness, melancholy, and despair. To be sure, these must be interpreted on the broader basis of a developed existential analysis of being-there. But even a phenomenon such as hope, which seems to be completely founded in the future, must be analyzed in a way similar to fear. In contrast to fear which is related to a malum futurum, hope has been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum. But what is decisive for the structure of hope as a phenomenon is not so much the “futural” character of that to which it is related as the existential direction of hoping itself. Here, too, the mood-character lies primarily in hoping as hoping something for oneself. He who hopes takes himself, so to speak, along in the hope and brings himself toward what is hoped for. But that presupposes having-gained-oneself. The fact that hope brings relief from depressing distress only means that even this attunement remains related, in the mode of been-ness, to a burden. Elevated or, better, elevating moods are ontologically possible only in an ecstatic-temporal relation of being-there to the thrown ground of itself.

The pallid out-of-tune-ness of apathy to everything, which clings to nothing and urges on to nothing, and which goes along with what the day brings, yet in a way takes everything with it, demonstrates most penetratingly the power of forgetting in the everyday moods of taking care of what is closest. Just barely living, which “lets everything be” as it is, is grounded in giving oneself over to thrownness and forgetting. It has the ecstatic meaning of an inauthentic been-ness. Apathy, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, is to be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This mood springs from the resoluteness that, in and for the moment, has a view to the possible situations of the ability-to-be-whole disclosed in the anticipation of death.

Only those beings can be affected that, in accordance with the meaning of their being, are attuned, i.e. ex-sistingly have in each instance already been, and ex-sist in a constant mode of been-ness. Ontologically, affection presupposes finding-present, and in such a way that in it being-there can be brought back upon itself as having-been. It remains a problem in itself how, in beings that are simply alive, stimulation and emotion of the senses are to be ontologically delimited, how and where
the being of animals is constituted at all, e.g. by some sort of “time.”

(c) The temporality of collapsing

The temporal interpretation of understanding and attunement not only
came up against a primary ecstasy for each of these phenomena, but at
the same time always came up against temporality as a whole. Just as the
future primarily makes understanding possible, and having-been makes
moods possible, the third constitutive factor of care, collapsing, has its
existential meaning in the present. Our preparatory analysis of collapsing
began with an interpretation of re-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Our
temporal analysis of collapsing should follow the same path. We shall
restrict our investigation, however, to a consideration of curiosity because
here the specific temporality of collapsing is most easily seen. However,
our analysis of re-talk and ambiguity already presupposes a clarification
of the temporal constitution of talk and explication (interpretation).

Curiosity is a pre- eminent drive in which being-there has its being.
In accordance with this drive, being-there cultivates an ability to see. Like the concept of sight, “seeing” is not limited to perceiving with the
“body’s eyes.” Perceiving in the broader sense lets beings at hand or on
hand be encountered “bodily” with regard to how they look. This being-encountered is grounded in a present. This present first provides the
ecstatic horizon within which beings can present themselves bodily.
Curiosity, however, does not find-present what is on hand in order to
understand it, staying with it, it rather seeks to see only in order to see
and to have seen. As this finding-present that gets tangled up in itself,
curiosity has an ecstatic unity with a corresponding future and been-ness.
As greed for the new, it does indeed penetrate to something not yet
seen, but in such a way that the finding-present attempts to withdraw
from what it is waiting for. Curiosity is inauthentically futural through
and through, and in a way that it does not linger on any possibility but
only desires possibility as something real within its greed. Curiosity is
constituted by an incontinent finding-present that, only finding-present,
constantly tries to run away from the waiting-for in which it is
nevertheless “held,” although in an incontinent way. The present
“springs” from this waiting-for that, as we have emphasized, runs away.

But the finding-present that “springs up” in curiosity is so little
committed to the “matter” that, as soon as it catches sight of it, it already
looks for the next thing. The finding-present “springing” from waiting
for a determinate grasped possibility makes ontologically possible the
undwelling distinctive of curiosity. Finding-present “springs” from
waiting-for, but not in a way that would, as it were, ontically disengage
itself from waiting-for and leave it to itself. The “springing” is an
ecstatic modification of waiting-for: this latter leaps after finding-present,
pursues it. Waiting-for gives up, as it were; it no longer lets inauthentic
possibilities of taking care of things come upon it from what is taken care
of, unless they serve the purpose of an incontinent finding-present. The
ecstatic modification of waiting-for — a modification engendered by
finding-present that is [itself already a kind of] leaping — into one that
simply leaps after things: this modification is the existential-temporal
condition of the possibility of dispersion.

Finding-present is abandoned more and more to itself as it is
modified into a leaping waiting-for. It finds things present for the sake
of presence. Thus tangled up in itself, dispersed undwelling turns into
homelessness. This mode of the present is the most extreme opposite
phenomenon to the moment. In homelessness, being-there is everywhere
and nowhere. The moment brings ex-sistence into its situation and
discloses the authentic “there.”

The more inauthentic the present is, i.e. the more finding-present
comes to be “itself,” the more it flees from any determinate ability-to-be,
closing it off — and the less, then, the future can come back upon the
being that has been thrown. In the “springing up” of the present lies a
progressive forgetting. The keeping to what is closest and the forgetting
of what went before — so distinctive of curiosity — does not directly
result from curiosity, but is the ontological condition for curiosity itself.

With regard to their temporal meaning, the characteristics of
collapsing that we described — temptation, tranquilization, alienation,
and self-entanglement — entail that the finding-present which “springs up”
seeks to fructify itself out of itself in accordance with its ecstatic drive.
Being-there entangles itself, and this determination has an ecstatic
meaning. The rapture of ex-sistence in finding-present does not mean
that being-there is separated from its I and its self. Even in the most
extreme finding-present, being-there remains temporal, i.e. waiting-for
and forgetting. Even in finding-present, being-there still understands

1 Cf. §38, pp. 175 ff.
2 Cf. §§35 ff., pp. 167 ff.
3 Cf. §36, pp. 170 ff.
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

440

§68. The Temporality of Disclosedness 441

being-toward-death, are disclosed as a held moment.*

(d) The temporality of talk

The complete disclosedness of the there constituted by understanding, attunement, and collapsing is articulated by talk. Thus talk does not fructify itself primarily in any one determinate ecstasy. But since talk is mostly expressed in language, and initially speaks in some manner of addressing the “circum-world” while taking care of it and talking about it, finding-present has a preferred constitutive function.

Tenses, like the other temporal phenomena of language — “aspects” and “progressives” — do not originate from the fact that talk “also” speaks about “temporal” processes, namely, processes that are encountered “in time.” Nor does the reason for these linguistic phenomena lie in the fact that speaking occurs “in psychical time.” Talk is in itself temporal, since all talking about..., from . . ., or toward . . . is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. The aspects [of verbs] are rooted in the primordial temporality of taking care of things, whether this care bears on things within time or not. With the help of the ordinary and traditional concept of time (which linguistics is forced to make use of) the problem of the existential and temporal structure of aspects cannot even be formulated.3 But because talk always addresses beings, although not primarily and predominantly in the form of theoretical statements, our analysis of the temporal constitution of talk and the explicating of the temporal characteristics of language patterns can be tackled only once the problem of the fundamental connection between being and truth has been unfolded in terms of the problematic of temporality. Then the ontological

---

* Recall the earlier acknowledgement of Jaspers’ “boundary situations” on p. 308 and in the notes on pp. 249 and 301. Heidegger will later discuss the “movedness” of being-there; cf. pp. 374-5 and 389.

2 Cf. §34, pp. 160 ff.

3 Cf. J. Wackernagel, Vorlesungen über Syntax, Vol. 1 (1920), p. 15 and especially pp. 149-210. See also G. Herbig, “Aktionssart und Zeitstufe,” Indogermanische Forschung Vol. 6 (1896), pp. 167 ff. [The aspect of a verb is the manner in which the action is regarded, especially with reference to its beginning, duration, completion, or repetition, whether by a set of inflectional forms (I cooked vs. I have cooked), by the meaning of the word itself (find vs. seek), by an adverbial modifier (sit down over there vs. sit until I call you), or by progressive tenses (I clean the house vs. I am cleaning the house). — Heidegger again considers “temporality and talk” in §§79 & 80.]
meaning of the “is” can be delimited, something that a superficial theory of propositions and judgments has distorted into the “copula.” The “origination” of “meaning” can be clarified and the possibility of the formulation of concepts can be made ontologically intelligible only in terms of the temporality of talk — i.e., of being-there as such.¹

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (either in readying or in waiting-for). Attunement fructifies itself primarily in been-ness (either in repetition or in oblivion). Collapsing is temporally rooted primarily in the present (either in a finding-present or in a moment). Still, understanding is in each instance a present that “has-been.” Still, attunement fructifies itself as a future that “finds-present.” Still, the present either “springs” from or is held by a future that has-been. From this it becomes evident that temporality fructifies itself entirely in each ecstasy. That is, the wholeness of the structural whole of ex-sistence, facticity, and collapsing — a whole identical to the unity of the structure of care — is grounded in the ecstatic unity of each complete fructification of temporality.

Fructification does not signify a “succession” of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the been-ness, and the been-ness is not earlier than the present. Temporality fructifies itself as a future that has been and that finds present.

The disclosedness of the there and the fundamental existential possibilities of being-there, authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded in temporality. But disclosedness always pertains equi-primordially to the entire being-in-world, to being-in as well as to world. So, orienting ourselves with regard to the temporal constitution of disclosedness, we must be able to display the ontological condition of the possibility that there can be beings that ex-sist as being-in-world.

¹ Cf. Division Three, Chapter Two, of this treatise. [Starting with the 7th edition (1953), this footnote was eliminated. Yet references to Division Three are retained elsewhere, e.g. on pp. 39, 100, 160, and in the note on p. 363. Cf. the second annotation on p. 333, where I translate Heidegger’s elaborate account of how he wrote this portion, found it inadequate, and destroyed it — but wished he had published it, so that readers would not think Being and Time offered only an ontology of human being.]
be modified into a discovering of inner-worldly beings that “only” lookson—in the form of certain possibilities of scientific investigation. Ourinterpretation of the temporality of taking-care-being-near inner-worldlybeings, whether at hand or on hand (whether circumspect or theoretical),simultaneously shows, already in advance, how the very same temporalityunderlies the condition of the possibility of the being-in-world in whichbeing near inner-worldly beings is grounded. The thematic analysis ofthetimeanuary constitution of being-in-world leads to the [next] questions:How is something like world possible at all? In what sense is world?What and how does the world transcend? How are “independent” inner-worldlybeings “connected” with the transcending world? The ontological expositionof these questions does not already entail their answer. On the other hand,such exposition does bring about the precedentinal and necessary clarification of those structures with reference towhich the problem of transcendence might be raised. The existential-temporalinterpretation of being-in-world considers three things: (a) the temporality ofcircumspect taking-care; (b) the temporal meaning of the modification ofcircumspect taking-care into theoretical knowledge of inner-worldly on-handbeings; (c) the temporal problem of the transcendence of the world.

(a) The temporality of circumspect taking-care

How are we to gain the perspective for an analysis of the temporality oftaking-care? The taking-care that is near the “world” we called dealingsin and with the circum-world. As exemplary phenomena of being near . . .wecalled dealings, handling, and producing of at-hand beings, along withtheir deficient and undifferentiated modes, i.e. the being near whateverbelongs to everyday need. Authentic ex-sistence of being-there also unfoldswithin such taking-care, even when this care “makes no difference” to it. The beings at hand that we take care of do not cause the taking-care, as if this were to arise only on the basis of the effects ofinner-worldly beings. Neither can being near beings at hand be explainedontologically in terms of those beings, nor can these be derived from [our]being near them. Still, taking-care, as an essential way being-there is, andbeings taken care of, as inner-worldly things at hand, are not simplyon hand together. Yet there is a “connection” between them. Correctlyunderstood, that with which dealings deal sheds light on dealings takingcare of things. On the other hand, if we miss the phenomenal structureof this with which, we fail to recognize the existential constitution ofdealings. It is indeed already an essential gain for the analysis of thebeings encountered closest to us if it does not bypass their specificallyinstrumental character. But we must understand further that dealingsnever have to do with a single instrument. Using and handling some oneinstrument remains, as using and handling, oriented toward a context ofinstruments. If, for example, we look for a “misplaced” instrument suchlooking does not focus, either simply or primarily, on what is lookedfor, in an isolated “act”; rather, the context of the instrumental whole hasalready been pre-uncovered. No “getting down to work,” no intervening,stumbles out of nowhere to encounter an instrument in isolation; it rathercomes back to one—interveningly, and within a work-world in eachinstance already disclosed.

§69. Temporality of Being-in-world

Such considerations show that, for the analysis of our dealings withthings (where we search out that “with which” we are dealing), we cannotrightly orient our ex-sistent being-near-those-beings-we-take-care-of inreferenceto an isolated instrument at hand; rather, we must orient suchex-sistent being in reference to an instrumental whole. Our reflectionupon the pre-eminent character of the being of instruments at hand,being-bound-ness, also forces us to this conception of what we deal with. Such talk as “there’s a binding here of this one thing with thatother thing” should not be understood as ontically establishing a fact;rather, it points up the way beings at hand have their being. The relationalcharacter of being-bound points to the ontological impossibility ofthere being one instrument. To be sure, a single useful instrumentmaybe at hand while another is “missing.” But herein lies the announcementthat the one thing at hand belongs to the other. Heedful dealing can only letbeings at hand be encountered circumspectly if it already understands somethinglike a being-bound in which each thing is along with and tied into others. The being near . . . that takes-care, circumspectly uncovering, lets things be bound, i.e. projects bound-up-ness understandably. If letting beings be bound up constitutes theexistential structure of taking-care, and if taking-care as being near . . .belongs to the essential constitution of care, and if care in turn isgrounded in temporality, then the existential condition of the possibility

1 Cf. §15, pp. 66 ff.
2 Cf. §12, pp. 56-7.
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

Plato and Aristotle already noted that a thing is its function, εργον, and thus becomes available to us primarily in use, in our taking care of it; thus their incessant recollection of craft, τεχνη, as the condition of contacting things. Heidegger raises the question of the initial condition of possible availability; and, unlike Plato and Aristotle, understands temporality — rather than competence — as essential to this condition.

The waiting-for embedded in the where-to is neither an observation of the “purpose” nor an expectation of the impending completion of the work to be produced. It does not have the nature of a thematic grasping at all. Nor does retaining the context within which it has its binding mean holding fast to it thematically. And just as little does dealing with things, handling them, relate solely to what is near or solely to the context letting beings be. Rather, letting-be-bound constitutes itself in the unity of waiting-for and retaining — and in such a way that the finding-present arising from this makes possible the characteristic absorption of taking-care within the world of its instruments. When one is “really” busy with . . . , wholly immersed in it, one is neither solely with the work nor solely with the tools nor with both “together.” Grounded in temporality, letting-be-bound has already founded the unity of the relations in which taking-care “moves” circumspectly.

A specific kind of forgetting is essential for the temporality that constitutes letting-be-bound. In order to be able “really” to get to work, to be “lost” in the world of instruments and to handle them, the self must forget itself. But since, in the unity of circumspectly letting something be encountered that we earlier characterized as conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy,1 an instrument at hand is precisely not encountered with regard to its “true in-itself” in a thematic perception of things; rather, it is encountered in the inconspicuousness of what is “self-evidently” and “objectively” found to be there. Thus, whenever something becomes conspicuous in the whole of these beings, there lurks the possibility that the instrumental whole as such might obstruct itself as well. How must letting-be-bound be existentially structured so that it can let something conspicuous be encountered? This question does not now aim at factual occasions that direct attention to something already available, but at the ontological meaning of this directability as such.

Something that cannot be used — e.g., a tool that will not work — can be conspicuous only within and for our dealings. Even the most sharp and persistent “perception” and “representation” of things could never discover anything like damage to the tool. For something to arise for encounter as un-handy, the handling of it must be hamper-able. But what does this mean ontologically? The finding-present that waits-for and retains is stymied with regard to its absorption in the relations of the being-bound, and it is stymied by something which afterwards turns out to be a damage. Finding-present, which equi-primordially waits for a where-to, is held up with the tool used, and in such a way that the where-to [what the tool bears on] and the in-order-to [what the work is for] are only now explicitly encountered. However, finding-present itself can only meet up with something unsuited for . . . insofar as it is already moving in a waiting-for/retaining of its being-bound. That finding-present is “held up”: this means that, in the unity of the waiting-for that retains, it shifts more into itself and in this way constitutes an “inspection,” a checking, and a removal of the disturbance. If taking-care-dealing were simply a succession of “experiences” occurring “in time” — no matter how intimately these experiences “associated” with

---

1 Cf. §16, pp. 72 ff.
each other—it would be ontologically impossible to let a conspicuous, unusable instrument arise for encounter. Letting things be bound must, as such, be grounded in the ecstatic unity of the finding-present that waits-for and retains—whatever else it might make accessible by way of interconnections within our dealings.

And how is it possible to “ascertain” that something is lacking, i.e. not at hand at all and not just at hand in an unhandy way? Things not at hand are discovered circumspectly in their being missing. This, and then also “confirming” that something is not on hand (this latter being founded in the former), have their own existential presuppositions. Missing something is by no means a not-finding-present, it is a deficient mode of presence: an un-finding-present of something expected, or even always available already. If circumspect letting-be-bound were not at the very outset waiting for what is taken care of, and if waiting-for did not fructify itself in the unity with a finding-present, being-there could never “find” that something is lacking.

On the other hand, the possibility of being surprised by something consists in this: finding-present that waits-for something at hand is not prepared, i.e. not-waiting-for something else that stands in a possible context of binding with the former. The not-waiting-for of bewildered finding-present first discloses the wider “horizon” wherein something surprising can fall upon being-there.

What a taking-care-dealing fails to master, whether when producing or procuring, or even when turning away, keeping at a distance, protecting itself from…: this gets revealed in its insurmountability. Taking-care comes to terms with this. But coming to terms with… is in itself a mode of circumspectly letting something arise for encounter. On the basis of this uncovering, taking-care can meet up with things inconvenient, disturbing, hindering, jeopardizing, or otherwise resistant in some way. The temporal structure of such coming-to-terms lies in a non-retention [i.e., a not-holding-together] that waits-for and finds-present. The finding-present that waits-for does not, for example, “count on” something that is unsuitable and yet still available. Not counting on… is a mode of taking into account what one cannot hold on to. It is not forgotten, but retained so that it remains at hand precisely in its unsuitability. Such at-hand beings belong to the everyday condition of any factically disclosed circum-world.

Only because things offering resistance are disclosed on the basis of the ecstatic temporality of taking-care, can factical being-there understand itself in its dependence upon a “world” which it can never master. Even if taking-care remains restricted to what is urgent among everyday needs, it is never a pure finding-present; rather, it arises from a retention that waits-for—on the basis of which, or as such a “basis,” being-there exists in a world. For this reason factically ex-sisting being-there in some way always already knows its way around, even in a strange “world.”

The letting-be-bound essential to taking-care is founded in temporality. It is an entirely pre-ontological, a non-thematic understanding of being-bound-ness and at-hand-ness. In what follows, we shall show how, in the end, temporality also finds the intelligibility of these determinations of being [being-bound and at-hand-ness]. We must first demonstrate still more concretely the temporality of being-in-world. With this as our aim, we shall trace the “emergence” of the theoretical mode of behavior toward the “world” out of circumspect taking care of things at hand. The circumspect as well as the theoretical discovery of inner-worldly beings is founded upon being-in-world. The existential-temporal interpretation of such discovery will prepare the temporal characterization of this basic constitution of being-there.

(b) The temporal meaning of the modification of circumspect taking-care into the theoretical discovery of beings on hand in the world

When in the course of our existential-ontological analyses we ask about the “emergence” of theoretical discovery from circumspect taking-care, this already means that we are not making a problem out of the ontic history and development of science, what factically occasions it or what it most intimately intends. Searching for the ontological genesis of the theoretical comportment, we ask: What are the existentially necessary conditions of possibility, within the essential constitution of being-there, for being-there to be able to ex-sist in the manner of scientific research? This question aims at an existential concept of science. This is distinct from the “logical” concept that understands science with regard to its results and defines it as a “justificatory context of true, i.e. valid propositions.” The existential concept understands science as a manner of ex-sistence and thus as a mode of being-in-world that discovers (or even discloses) beings (or even being). However, a completely adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the
meaning of being and the “connection” between being and truth have been clarified in terms of the temporality of ex-sistence. The following considerations prepare an understanding of this central problematic; it is within this problematic that the idea of phenomenology will be developed—in a way that differs from the pre-conception indicated in the Introduction.

In accordance with the level our considerations have so far attained, a further restriction will be imposed upon our interpretation of theoretical comportment. We are only investigating the way in which circumspect taking care of at-hand beings shifts into research into on-hand beings in the world; and in this we shall be guided by our aim of penetrating to the temporal constitution of being-in-world in general.

It is tempting to characterize the shift from “practically” circumspect handling, using and the like, to “theoretical” research as follows: pure looking at beings arises when taking-care abstains from any kind of handling. What is decisive about the “arising” of theoretical behavior would then lie in the disappearance of practice. So, if one posits “practical” taking-care as the primary and predominant way factual being-there has its being, the ontological possibility of “theory” will be due to the absence of practice, i.e. to a privation. But the cessation of a specific kind of handling in dealings taking care of things does not simply leave its guiding circumspection behind as a remnant. When that happens, taking-care simply transposes itself into just-looking-around. But this is by no means the way in which the “theoretical” attitude of science is reached. On the contrary, the dwelling that takes place when we cease handling things can assume the character of a more precise circumspection: as “inspecting,” as checking what has been attained, as surveying the operations just now “brought to a standstill.” Refraining from the use of instruments is far from being already “theory”; indeed, the circumspection which dwells and observes remains completely glued to the instruments at hand and taken care of. “Practical” dealings have their own way of dwelling. And just as practice has its own specific sight (“theory”), theoretical research is not without its own practice. Reading off the measurements that result from an experiment often requires a complicated “technological” set-up for the experimental arrangement. Observation by means of a microscope is dependent upon

the production of “prepared slides.” Archeological excavation that precedes any interpretation of the “findings” demands the coarsest handleings. But even the most “abstract” working out of problems, and the refinement of what has been gained, require us to handle things such as writing instruments. As “uninteresting” and “self-evident” as these components of scientific research may be, they are by no means ontologically insignificant. The explicit reminder that scientific comportment, as a way of being-in-world, is not exclusively a “purely intellectual activity” might seem unnecessarily complicated and superfluous. If only it did not become clear from this triviality that it is by no means obvious where the ontological boundary between “theoretical” and “a-theoretical” comportment really lies!

One will want to assert that all manipulation in the sciences only serves pure observation, the investigative discovery and disclosure of the “things themselves”—that, taken in its broadest sense, “seeing” regulates all the “[laboratory] arrangements” and retains its primacy. “In whatever manner and by whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed.” The idea of an intuitus has guided all interpretation of knowledge from the beginnings of Greek ontology until today, whether that intuition is factically attainable or not. In accordance with the primacy of “seeing,” the presentation of the existential genesis of science will have to start out by characterizing the circumspection that guides “practical” taking care of things.

Circumspection moves within the binding-relations of the instrumental context at hand. It stands under the guidance of a more or less explicit overview of the instrumental whole of some instrumental world and of the public circum-world belonging to it. This overview is not simply one that belatedly scrapes together things on hand. Essential in the overview is the primary understanding of the wholeness of being-bound within which any given factual taking-care starts out. The overview, illuminating taking-care, gets its “light” from the ability-to-be of being-there—and it is for the sake of being-there that taking-care exists as care. The “overseeing” circumspection of taking-care brings beings at hand nearer to being-there during each concrete using and handling, and it does this in the mode of interpreting whatever is seen. We call the specific, interpretive bringing-near of what is taken care of

[1] 1 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19, B33. [Heidegger’s emphasis.]
circumspectly: reflection. The schema peculiar to it is “if-then”: if this or that is to be produced, put into use, or prevented, then these or those means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities are needed. Circumspect reflection throws light on each concrete factical position of being-there in the circum-world it takes care of. Thus it never simply “confirms” that something is on hand, or that it has certain properties. Reflection can also come about without what is circumspectly brought near itself having to be tangibly at hand or available within range of sight. Bringing the circum-world nearer in circumspect reflection [still] has the existential meaning of a finding-present. For the making-present is only a mode of finding-present. In it, reflection catches sight directly of what is needed, but not at hand. Circumpection that makes-present does not relate itself to anything like “mere representations.”

But circumspect finding-present is a multiply founded phenomenon. First of all, it belongs to the full ecstatic unity of temporality. It is grounded in a retention of an instrumental context that being-there takes care of in waiting for a possibility. What has already been disclosed in waiting-for/retention is brought nearer by one’s reflective finding- or making-present. But if reflection is to move in the schema of “if-then,” taking-care must already understand, “overviewingly,” a context of being-bound. What is addressed with the “if” must already be understood as such-and-such. For this, it is not necessary that the instrumental understanding express itself in a predication. The schema “something as something” is already prefigured in the structure of pre-predicative understanding. The as-structure is ontologically grounded in the temporality of understanding. Only inasmuch as being-there, waiting for possibility (here, a what-for), has come back to a for-this (i.e., retains something at hand), can, conversely, the finding-present that belongs to this waiting-for/retention start with this retention, bring it explicitly nearer in its reference to the what-for. The reflection that brings-near must, in the schema of finding-present, adapt itself to the manner in which what is to be brought near has its being. The character of bound-ness of what is at hand is not first discovered by reflection, it is only brought near—so that it circumspectly lets that whereby it is bound be seen as this.

The rootedness of the present in the future and in been-ness is the existential-temporal condition of the possibility that what is projected in circumspect understanding can be brought nearer in a finding-present—in such a way that the present must adapt itself to what is encountered within the horizon of waiting-for/retention, i.e. interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure. This gives us the answer to our earlier question whether the as-structure is existentially-ontologically connected with the phenomenon of projecting. Like understanding and interpretation in general, the “as” is grounded in the ecstatic and horizontal unity of temporality. In our fundamental analysis of being, and indeed in connection with the interpretation of the “is” (which as a copula “expresses” the addressing of something as something), we must once again make the as-phenomenon thematic and delimit the concept of the “schema” existentially.*

What, though, does the temporal characterization of circumspect reflection and its schemata contribute to answering our hovering question about the genesis of the theoretical comportment? Only enough to clarify the situation of being-there in which a circumspect taking-care shifts into theoretical discovery. We may then try to analyze this shift itself, following the guideline of an elemental assertion regarding circumspect reflection and its possible modifications.

In our circumspect use of tools, we can say that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the sentence, “The hammer is heavy” can express a reflection within taking-care, and can mean that it is not light—that it requires force to use it, or that it makes using it difficult. But the statement can also mean that the being before us, with which we are circumspectly familiar as a hammer, has a weight, i.e. the “property” of heaviness: it exerts a pressure on what lies beneath it, and when that is removed, it falls. Talk understood in this way no longer gets spoken within the horizon of the waiting-for/retention of an instrumental whole and its binding-relations. What is said has been drawn from looking at

---

1 Cf. §32, p. 151.

* This paragraph contains the last reference to the as-structure (introduced on p. 149). In his prefatory remarks to the lecture “Time and Being” (1962) Heidegger says: “The point is not to listen to a series of propositions, but rather to follow the course of the showing” (cf. On Time and Being, 1972, p. 2). On the word for “showing” (indicating, pointing out), Heidegger inscribed a parenthetical note in his personal copy: “the disappearance of the »as«” (Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 6). While assertions presuppose the “as-structure” of understanding, both the most ordinary and most powerful speech undermines it: in both kinds, even if much differently, saying and showing are inextricably wedded.
what is appropriate for a being with “mass.” What is now in view is appropriate for the hammer, not as a tool, but as a corporeal thing that is subject to the law of gravity. Here, circumspect talk about being “too heavy” or “too light” no longer has any “meaning”; that is, the being now encountered does not of itself provide us with anything in relation to which it could be “found” to be too heavy or too light.

Why does what we are talking about, the heavy hammer, show itself differently when our way of talking is modified? Not because we are keeping our distance from handling, nor because we are only looking away from the useful character of this being, but because we are looking at the thing at hand encountered in a “new” way — as something on hand. The understanding of being guiding the taking-care-dealings with inner-worldly beings has shifted. But does this already constitute a scientific comportment — that we “comprehend” things at hand as on hand, instead of circumspectly reflecting on them? Besides, even things at hand can be made a theme of scientific investigation and determination. For example, one may research a circum-world, a milieu, in connection with writing an historical biography. The everyday at-hand instrumental context — its emergence, exploitation, and factual role in being-there — forms the object of the science of economics. Beings at hand need not lose their instrumental character in order to become the “object” of a science. A modification of our understanding of being seems not to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis of the theoretical comportment “regarding things.” Certainly — if modification is supposed to mean a change in the manner in which the beings before us have their being as already formed by understanding itself.

In our first characterization of the genesis of theoretical comportment out of circumspection, we took as basic one manner of grasping inner-worldly beings theoretically, the grasping of physical nature, in which the modification of our understanding of being amounts to a shift. In the “physics” statement that “the hammer is heavy,” not only the tool-character of the being encountered is overlooked but also that which belongs to every instrument at hand: its place. The place becomes insignificant. Not that the on-hand being loses its “location” altogether. Its place becomes a position in space and time, a “point in the world” which is not distinguished from any other. This means that the multiplicity of places of at-hand instruments, a multiplicity that a circum-world contains, is not just modified to a sheer multiplicity of positions, but the beings of the circum-world are de-contained. The totality [τὸ πᾶν] of on-hand beings becomes thematic.*

In this case, a de-containment of the circum-world belongs to the modification of the understanding of being. Following the guideline of the understanding of being as on-hand-ness, this de-containment becomes at once a delimitation of the “region” of what is on hand. The more the being of the investigated beings is understood in keeping with this guiding understanding of being, and the more the whole of beings, in all their basic determinations, is articulated as a possible domain for a science, the more assured will be its perspective of methodological questioning.

The classic example for the historical development of a science, and even for its ontological genesis, is the emergence of mathematical physics. What is decisive for its formation lies neither in its higher esteem of the observation of “facts,” nor in the “application” of mathematics in determining events of nature, but in the mathematical projection of nature itself. This projection uncovers in advance something constantly on hand (matter) and opens the horizon for the guiding perspective on its quantitatively determinable and constitutive moments (motion, force, location, and time). Only “in the light of” a nature thus projected can anything like a “fact” be found and be taken as a point of departure for an experiment defined and regulated in terms of this projection. The “founding” of “factual science” became possible

* Heidegger here “derives,” phenomenologically, the concern for totality (τὸ πᾶν) that has marked, in varying degrees, the philosophical enterprise right from the beginning — but especially since the dawn of modernity. He first mentions this concern on p. 9 (the totality of beings is broken up into various regions of investigation); then on p. 64 (as an ontic concept, world means the totality of beings); and finally on p. 248 (one might wonder what death “means” in the totality of beings). Already from Periander we have: μελέτα τὸ πᾶν, “take care of the totality” (which likely means the totality of the city). “Post-modern” philosophers generally detect a source of delusion in the modern concern to “get at” the totality of an art work (Jacques Derrida), let alone of mathematics (Jean Toussaint Desanti). Heidegger has already argued that possibilities only become understood as finite (p. 264), that being-there exists finitely (p. 329). In later works, he builds on the thought intimated in this “derivation”: beings “fully” arise for encounter only as they are “in place” — in a place. This “stricture” (finitude) is one dimension of the “meaning of being” at issue throughout Heidegger’s works.
only when researchers understood that there are in principle no “bare facts.” What is decisive about the mathematical projection of nature is again not primarily the mathematical element as such, but rather that the projection discloses an a-priori [of its own]. And what’s exemplary about mathematical natural science does not lie in its specific exactitude and validity for “everyone”; it lies rather in the fact that, in such science, the beings it takes as its theme are uncovered in the only way that beings can ever be uncovered: in a prior projection of their essential constitution. Working out the basic concepts of that guiding understanding of being, we [would] determine the leading methods, the conceptual structure, the pertinent possibility of truth and certainty, the manners of justification and proof, the mode of necessity and the manner of communication. The whole of these moments constitutes the entire existential concept of science.

The scientific projection of beings (in each case, these somehow already encountered) lets the manner in which they have their being be understood explicitly; and, with this letting, the possible paths of pure discovery of inner-worldly beings become evident. The articulation of the understanding of being, the delimitation of the domain guided by that understanding, and the prefiguration of the concepts suitable to these beings: all these belong to the whole of this projecting, a whole we call thematizing. It aims at freeing beings encountered within the world in such a way that they can “throw” themselves against pure discovery — i.e., become objects. Thematizing objectifies. It does not first “posit” beings, but frees them so that they become “objectively” examinable and determinable. This objectifying way of being near inner-worldly on-hand beings has the character of a pre- eminent finding-present.¹ It dis

¹ The thesis that all cognition aims at “intuition” has the temporal meaning that all cognition is a finding-present. Whether every science or even philosophical cognition aims at a finding-present must remain undecided here. Husserl uses the expression “finding-present” to characterize sense perception. Cf. the sixth of his Logical Investigations §§37 & 47 (1901 [English from Humanities Press, 1970]). The intentional analysis of perception and intuition in general had to suggest this “temporal” characterization of the phenomenon. How the intentionality of “consciousness” is grounded in the ecstatic temporality of being-there will be shown in the following Division. [This is the “Division Three” that was never published. In modified translation, those passages from Husserl read:

§69. Temporality of Being-in-world

The intentional character of perception is finding-present, in contrast to the making-present of the imagination. (p. 761)

...so also is the act of perception always a homogeneous unity, one that finds its object present in a simple and immediate way. Thus the unity of perception does not arise through our own synthesizing acts... (p. 789)

Husserl and Heidegger agree only in the project of overcoming the Kantian understanding of perception as synthesizing (“imposing”) unity.

* Elsewhere (e.g., p. 304), Heidegger suggests that the study of beings as on-hand necessarily takes place in the mode of collapsing.
supporting taking-care-being-near inner-worldly beings, whether this being-near is theoretical or practical.

(c) The temporal problem of the transcendence of the world.

The understanding of a wholeness of being-bound inherent in circumspect taking-care is grounded in a prior understanding of the relations of in-order-to, where-to [of serviceability], what-for [of usefulness], and for-the-sake-of-which [being-there]. We earlier set forth the connection of these relations as signification. Their unity constitutes what we call world. Now the question arises: How is anything like world, in its unity with being-there, ontologically possible? In what way must world be for being-there to be able to exist as being-in-world?

Being-there exists for the sake of an ability-to-be-itself. Existing, it is thrown; and as thrown, it is delivered over to the being it needs in order to be able to be as it is, namely for the sake of itself. Inasmuch as being-there exists factically, it understands itself within this context of the for-the-sake-of-itself with, in any instance, an in-order-to. That within which existing being-there understands itself, its wherein: this too is “there” along with its factual existence. The being of the wherein of primary self-understanding is that of being-there. Being-there is, existingly, its world.

We defined the being of being-there as care. Its ontological meaning is temporality. We showed that and how temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the there. Along with the disclosedness of the there, world is also disclosed. The unity of signification, i.e., the ontological constitution of the world, must then also be grounded in temporality. The existential and temporal condition of the possibility of the world lies in this: temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has some sort of horizon. The ecstasies are not simply raptures into... Rather, a “where-to” of rapture belongs to each ecstasy. We call this... of thrownness, or as that to which it has been abandoned: it characterizes the horizontal structure of been-ness. Existing for the sake of itself in being abandoned to itself as

§69. Temporality of Being-in-world

Whereas Kant provides a temporal schema for each category (pertaining to on-hand beings), Heidegger provides a phenomenal schema for each “dimension” of time (retaining at-hand beings in their manifold possibilities of place; see the second annotation on p. 112).

World is transcendent: our Platonic tradition assumed that the being of beings “in nature” is transcendent, and our Kantian tradition assumes that “we” are transcendent. Thus, in the latter case, we can talk of “structures” of consciousness (conditions for the possibility of experiencing things on hand) —and, in modern thought, of the structures of nature (somewhat Platonically after all!). In contrast, Heidegger’s account asks us to consider “structure” as

1 Cf. §18, pp. 87 ff. [The section begins on p. 83.]
worldly beings can arise from it for encounter. Temporality already holds itself ecstatically in the horizons of its ecstasies and, fructifying itself, comes back to the beings encountered in the there. With the factual existence of being-there, inner-worldly beings are also already encountered. That such beings are discovered in the there of its own ex-sistence is not up to being-there. Only what, in any one instance, in which direction, to what extent, and how it discovers and discloses is a matter of its freedom, although always within the limits of its thrownness.*

The relations of signification that determine the structure of world are thus not a network of forms imposed upon some material by a worldless subject. Rather, factual being-there, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in the unity of the there, comes back from these horizons to the beings encountered in them. Coming back to beings understandingly is the existential meaning of letting them arise for encounter, i.e. finding them present; for this reason they are called inner-worldly. The world is already “more outside,” so to speak, than any object could ever be. The “problem of transcendance” cannot be reduced to the question how a subject gets outside to an object, whereby the collection of objects is identified with the idea of the world. We must rather ask: What makes it ontologically possible for beings to arise for encounter within the world and be objectified as encountered beings?

grounded in world; in this way, we can consider how self and thing can “happen” (or not) within or through world — how world can become transparent.

* On the priority of the that (over the what, the direction, the extent, and the how), see Heidegger’s 1943 “Postscript” to “What is Metaphysics?”:

To be ready for dread is to say “yes” to in-dwelling, to fulfill the highest claim that touches the nature of man alone. Man alone of all beings, when addressed by the voice of being, experiences the wonder of all wonders: that beings are. Therefore the one who is called in his very nature to the truth of being is always attuned in an essential sense. The clear courage for essential dread guarantees that most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of being. For hard by essential dread, in the terror of the abyss, there dwells awe. Awe clears and enfolds that region of human being within which man endures, as at home, in what endures.

Aristotle also insists on the priority of “that S is P” over “why S is P” (more essentially, of “S is” over “What S is”)—but only “in time” (see his Posterior Analytics, the opening lines of Book Two).

Recourse to the ecstatically and horizonally founding transcendence of the world provides the answer.

If the “subject” is conceived ontologically as ex-sisting being-there, whose being is grounded in temporality, we must say then that the world is “subjective.” But this “subjective” world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is then “more objective” than any possible “object.”

By tracing being-in-world back to the ecstatic and horizontal unity of temporality, we have made intelligible the existential and ontological possibility of this basic constitution of being-there. It also becomes clear that we can take upon ourselves the task of working out concretely the structure of world as such, and its possible variations, only when our ontology of possible inner-worldly beings is adequately oriented toward a clarified idea of being as such.* The possible interpretation of this idea requires that we first set forth the temporality of being-there; here our characterization of being-in-world will be of service.

§70. The Temporality of Spatiality

Although the expression “temporality” does not mean what talk about “space and time” understands by time, spatiality does seem to constitute, just as temporality does, a basic feature of being-there. With the spatiality of being-there, our existential-temporal analysis thus appears to reach a limit, with the result that this being we call being-there must be addressed coordinately as “temporal” “and also” as spatial. Is the existential-temporal analysis of being-there held up by the phenomenon that we came to know as the spatiality of being-there, and which we showed to belong to being-in-world?¹

That, in the course of our existential interpretation, our talk about the “spatio-temporal” determination of being-there does not imply that this being is on hand “in space and also in time”: this needs no further discussion. Temporality is the meaning of care, the way care is. The

* For Heidegger’s “ontology of possible inner-worldly beings,” fully oriented in regard to a clarified idea of being as such, we must turn to such later works as his “Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Thing” (translated in Poetry, Language, Thought: Harper & Row, 1971).

¹ Cf. §§22-24, pp. 101 ff. [Two senses for “held up” are possible: “brought to a halt” and “supported by”—and Heidegger’s account moves from the first to the second.]
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

462

constitution of being-there, and the various ways it is, are ontologically possible only on the basis of temporality, apart from whether this being occurs “in time” or not. But then the specific spatiality of being-there must be grounded in temporality. On the other hand, the demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality cannot aim either at deducing space from time, or at dissolving it into pure time. If the spatiality of being-there is “embraced” by temporality as its existential foundation, this connection (which is to be clarified in what follows) is also different from the priority of time over space as Kant understands it. That the empirical representations of what is on hand “in space” occur as psychical events “in time,” so that “the physical” also occurs indirectly “in time,” does not yield an existential-ontological interpretation of space as a form of sensibility; it rather ascertains ontically that what is psychically on hand runs its course “in time.”

We shall ask existential-analytically about the temporal conditions of the possibility for the spatiality of being-there — the spatiality that in turn founds the uncovering of space within the world. First, though, we must remember in what way being-there is spatial. Being-there can be spatial only as care — care taken in the sense of factically collapsing ex-sisting. Negatively, this means that being-there is never, not even just initially, on hand in space. It does not fill out a piece of space, neither as a real thing nor as an instrument, so that the boundary separating it from the surrounding space would itself be a spatial determination of space. In common parlance, being-there arranges space [arranges for space, and only thereby “takes up” space]. It is by no means merely on hand in the piece of space that a body fills out. Ex-sisting, it has in each instance already made room for itself. It determines its own location in such a way that it comes back from the space it has arranged to a “place” that it has taken over. To be able to say that being-there is on hand at a position in space, we must first construe this being in an ontologically inappropriate way. Nor does the difference between the “spatiality” of an extended thing and that of being-there lie in the fact that being-there knows about space; for making-room, far from being identical with the “representation” of something spatial, is what the latter presupposes. Nor may the spatiality of being-there be interpreted as a kind of imperfection that adheres to ex-sistence on account of the fatal “connection of the

spirit with a body.” Rather, being-there can be spatial, and in a way that essentially remains impossible for an extended corporeal thing, because and only because it is “spiritual.”

The making-room essential to being-there is constituted by directionality and de-stancing. How is something like this existentially possible on the basis of the temporality of being-there? Here we must briefly indicate the function of temporality that founds the spatiality of being-there, and only to the extent necessary for later discussions of the ontological meaning of the “coupling” of space and time.* The directional uncovering of anything like a where-abouts belongs to the making-room of being-there. With this expression we mean initially the whereto of the possible belonging-somewhere of at-hand and place-able instruments in the circum-world. Whenever one comes across tools, handles them, moves them around or out of the way, a where-abouts has already been uncovered. Being-in-world, taking-care, is directed — is self-directingly. The belonging-somewhere [of things] has an essential relation to being found. It is always factically determined in terms of the binding-context of the beings taken care of. The binding-relations are intelligible only within the horizon of a disclosed world. The horizontal character of these relations also first makes possible the specific horizon of the where-to belonging to the where-abouts. The self-directing uncovering of a where-abouts is grounded in an ecstatically retentive waiting for things possible over-there or right-here. As directed waiting-for-a-where-abouts, making-room is equi-primordially a bringing-near (de-stancing) of beings at hand or on hand. De-stancing, taking care comes back out of the previously uncovered where-abouts to what is closest. Bringing-near, and also the estimating and measuring of distances within de-stanced beings on hand within a world, are grounded in a finding-present that belongs to the unity of temporality, and in which directionality is possible too.

Because, as temporality, being-there is ecstatic and horizonal in its being, it can factically and constantly take along an arranged space. With regard to this ecstatically won space, the here of its factual situation in any one instance never signifies a position in space, but rather the free space that is opened up in directionality and de-stancing, the space of the encirclement formed by an instrumental whole of things most attended to.

In the bringing-close that makes possible the “absorbed” handling of and busy-ness with things, the essential structure of care—collapsing—becomes prominent. Its existential-temporal constitution is distinguished by this: in collapsing, and thus also in the bringing-near which is “presently” founded, the forgetting that waits for things chases after the present. In the finding-present that brings something near from its over-there, finding-present loses itself in itself, forgetting the over-there. For this reason, whenever the “observation” of inner-worldly beings picks up on this sort of finding-present, the illusion arises that “at first” only a thing is on hand—as indeed “here,” but indeterminately in a generalized space.

Only on this basis of ecstatic and horizontal temporality is it possible for being-there to break into space. World is not on hand in space; indeed, only within a world can space be uncovered. The ecstatic temporality of the spatiality essential to being-there makes space’s independence from time intelligible; on the other hand, though, this same temporality also makes intelligible the “dependency” of being-there upon space—a dependence that makes itself manifest in the familiar phenomenon that both the self-interpretation of being-there and the meanings available in the vocabulary of a language are to a large extent dominated by “spatial representations.” This priority of the spatial in the articulation of meanings and concepts has its ground, not in some specific potency of space, but rather in the way being-there has its being. Essentially collapsing, temporality gets lost in finding-present: [being-there] not only understands itself circumspectly from the at-hand beings it takes care of, it also takes its guidelines for articulating what is understood (and what can be interpreted in understanding in general) from what finding-present constantly meets up with—from spatial relations.

§71. The Temporality of Everydayness

At the outset, our analysis did not choose as its theme a definite, preeminent possibility of ex-sistence of being-there; it rather took its orientation from the inconspicuous, average manner of ex-sisting. The way in which being-there holds itself initially and mostly we called everydayness.¹

It has remained obscure what this expression, “everydayness,” basically signifies, and how it is ontologically delimited. At the beginning of our investigation there was no way even to make the existential-ontological meaning of everydayness a problem. But now the ontological meaning of being-there has been illuminated as temporality. Can there still be any doubt with regard to the existential-temporal significance of the term “everydayness”? Yet we are still far from possessing an ontological concept of this phenomenon. It even remains questionable whether the explication of temporality so far carried out is adequate to delimit the existential meaning of everydayness.

Everydayness evidently means that manner of ex-sisting in which being-there holds itself “each day.” And yet “each day” does not signify the sum of the “days” that are allotted to being-there during its “lifetime.” Although “each day” is not to be understood in reference to a calendar, some such temporal determination still resonates in the significance of the term “everyday.” Still, the expression “everydayness” primarily signifies a certain how of ex-sistence that prevails in being-there “as long as it lives.” In our earlier analyses we often used the expressions “initially and mostly.” “Initially” signifies the way in which being-there is “manifest” in the being-with-one-another of the public sphere, even if it has “at bottom” “overcome” everydayness in some existentiell way. “Mostly” signifies the way in which being-there shows itself for everyone—not always, but “as a rule.”

Everydayness means the How in accordance with which being-there “lives out its day,” whether in all its comportments or only in certain ones prefigured by being-with-one-another. Furthermore, being comfortable in habit belongs to this How, even if habit forces us into what is burdensome and “repulsive.” The tomorrow that everyday taking-care waits for is the “eternal yesterday.” The monotony of everydayness takes as its diversion whatever the day happens to bring. Everydayness determines being-there even when it has not chosen the one as its

---

¹ Cf. §9, pp. 42 ff.
II. Chapter Four: Temporality and Everydayness

466

But these manifold features of everydayness do not at all characterize it as a mere “aspect” that being-there proffers when “one looks at” the things human beings do. Everydayness is a way to be — to which, of course, public manifestness belongs. But as a way of its own ex-sisting, everydayness is more or less familiar to any “individual” being-there — namely, in the attunement of pallid out-of-tune-ness.† Being-there can “suffer” quietly from everydayness, sink into its dullness, and evade it by looking for new ways in which its dispersion into its affairs may be further dispersed. But ex-sistence can also master the everyday in the moment — and often, of course, only “for the moment.” However, it can never extinguish it.

What is ontically so familiar in the factical interpretedness of being-there that we don’t even pay any attention to it, contains, existential-ontologically, enigma upon enigma. The “natural” horizon for starting the existential analysis of being-there is only seemingly self-evident.‡

* Cf. p. 385: being-there will inevitably choose a “hero” — usually “the one” but also sometimes an “authentic repetition of a been-possibility of existence.” This latter accounts not only for the tragic stance evident in much great literature, but also for the possibility of contemplation itself — of philosophy, phenomenology, and hermeneutics as Heidegger understands these. Heidegger is perhaps responding obliquely to Hegel’s consideration of the adage, “No man is a hero to his valet” (Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller, §665; and Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hacket Publishing Co., 1998, p. 34.

† Heidegger introduced the notion of “pallid out-of-tune-ness” already on p. 134, and commented on it twice on p. 345.

‡ Once again, Heidegger plays on Hegel’s principle that what’s familiarly known is not for that reason really known. He first introduced this distinction on pp. 58 f.: starting with what is familiarly known, the effort to know in a carefully wrought way can jump the gun by taking knowing itself as the theme — whereas we should first ask how what’s familiar (and trusted) can come into focus at all. In a similar vein, he argues (pp. 134 and 340) that being-there is disclosed to itself prior to being known to itself. Then his footnote on p. 244: the distinction between an “all” and a “whole” is familiar to us in Aristotle, but that does mean we know it. — In general, Heidegger’s analysis aspires to account for the difficulty of contemplative inquiry; we constantly settle back into, and for, what is simply familiar: “Overnight, everything primordial is flattened out into something long familiar” (p. 127).

§71. The Temporality of Everydayness

But are we now, after our earlier interpretation of temporality, in a more promising position with regard to the existential delimitation of the structure of everydayness? Or does this confusing phenomenon precisely make evident the inadequacy of our foregoing explication of temporality? Have we not been constantly immobilizing being-there in certain positions and situations, “consequently” failing to see that, in living out its days, being-there stretches itself along “temporally” in the succession of its days? The monotony, the habit, the “like yesterday, so today and tomorrow,” and the “mostly”: these cannot be grasped without recourse to the “temporal” stretching-along of being-there.

And is it not also a factum belonging to ex-sisting being-there that, passing its time, it takes “time” daily into account and regulates the “calculation” of time astronomically with a calendar? Only if we bring the everyday “happening” of being-there, and the taking-care-calculation of “time” in this happening, into the interpretation of the temporality of being-there, will our orientation become comprehensive enough to enable us to make the ontological meaning of everydayness as such problematic.

However, since basically nothing other is meant by the term everydayness than temporality, and since temporality makes the being of being-there possible, an adequate conceptual delimitation of everydayness can succeed only within the framework of a fundamental elucidation of the meaning of being as such and its possible variations.
§72. Existential-ontological exposition of the problem of history

All our efforts in existential analysis are geared to the one goal of finding a possibility of answering the question of the meaning of being in general. The development of this question requires that we delimit the phenomenon in which anything like being itself becomes accessible—the phenomenon of the intelligibility of being. But this phenomenon belongs to the essential constitution of being-there. Only when being-there has been interpreted beforehand, and in a sufficiently primordial way, can the intelligibility of being contained in its essential constitution—the intelligibility itself—be conceptualized; and only on that basis can we position the question of the being [of beings] understood in this understanding as well as the question of what such understanding “presupposes.”

Although many structures of being-there still remain obscure with regard to particulars, it does seem that, with the clarification of temporality as the primordial condition of the possibility of care, we have reached the required primordial interpretation of being-there. Temporality was displayed with a view to the authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there. The temporal interpretation of care was then confirmed by demonstrating the temporality of being-in-world that takes care of things. Our analysis of the authentic ability-to-be-whole revealed that an equiprimordial connection of death, guilt, and conscience is rooted in care. Can being-there be understood still more primordially than in the projection of its authentic existence?

Although hitherto we have not seen any possibility of a more radical starting point for our existential analysis, our earlier discussion of the ontological meaning of everydayness awakens a serious reservation: Have we indeed brought the whole of being-there, its authentic being-whole, into the pre-having of our existential analysis? Our manner of questioning the wholeness of being-there may possess an intrinsically ontological univocality of its own. The question itself may even have been answered with regard to being-toward-the-end. However, death is, after all, only the “end” of being-there, and formally speaking, it is just
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

The expression “life’s connectedness” stems from Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger takes this term as only weakly reflecting the concern for “birth”: for historicity as marking where we can begin (catch on, get moving), especially as creative intellectuals.

One of the ends that embraces the wholeness of being-there. The other “end” is the “beginning”: “birth.” Only the being that is “between” birth and death presents the whole we are looking for. So the previous orientation of our analysis has remained “one-sided”—for all its intention to consider ex-sisting being-whole, and despite the intrinsic explication of authentic and inauthentic being-toward-death. Being-there has been our theme only as to how it ex-sists “forward,” so to speak, and leaves “behind” everything that has been. Not only has being-toward-the-beginning remained unnoticed, so too has the way being-there stretches along between birth and death. Precisely “life’s connectedness”—in which, after all, being-there constantly somehow holds itself—was overlooked in our analysis of being-whole.

Even though such talk about the “connectedness” between birth and death is ontologically very obscure, must we not revoke our decision to take temporality as the clue to how the wholeness of being-there has its being? Or does temporality, as we have set it forth, first give the foundation on which to provide an unequivocal direction for the existential-ontological question of that “connectedness”? Perhaps it is already a gain in the field of this investigation if we learn not to take the problems too lightly.

What seems “more simple” than the characterization of “life’s connectedness” between birth and death? It consists of a succession of experiences “in time.” If we pursue more penetratingly this characterization of the connectedness, and above all the ontological assumption behind it, something remarkable happens. In this succession of experiences only the experience that is on hand “in the now at this point” is “really real.” The experiences that are past or yet to come are no longer or not yet “real.” Being-there traverses the time-span allotted to it between the two boundaries in such a way that it is “real” only in the now—and hops, as it were, through the succession of nows of its “time.” For this reason one says that being-there is “temporal.” The self maintains itself in a certain self-sameness throughout this constant change of its experiences. Opinions diverge as to how to determine this persistent self and its possible relation to its changing experiences. The

* The expression “life’s connectedness” stems from Wilhelm Dilthey. Heidegger takes this term as only weakly reflecting the concern for “birth”: for historicity as marking where we can begin (catch on, get moving), especially as creative intellectuals.

§72. The Problem of History

374 With regard to what, under the rubric of temporality, was developed as the essential meaning of care, we found that, while following the guideline of the ordinary interpretation of being-there (an interpretation justifiable and adequate within its own limits), we could not carry through an intrinsic ontological analysis of how being-there stretches along between birth and death, nor could we even establish such an analysis as a problem.

Being-there does not ex-sist as the sum of momentarily real experiences that succeed each other and disappear. Nor does this succession gradually fill up a framework. For how should that framework be on hand if always only the experience one is having “right now” is “real,” and if the boundaries of the framework—birth which is past and death which is yet to come—are lacking reality? At bottom, even the ordinary interpretation of “life’s connectedness” does not think of a framework spanned “outside” of being-there and embracing it, but correctly looks for it in being-there itself. But the tacit ontological assumption that being-there is something on hand “in time” dooms every attempt at an ontological characterization of the being [at stake] “between” birth and death.

Being-there does not first fill up, through momentarily actual phases, an on-hand path or stretch of “life”; it rather stretches itself out in such a way that its own being is constituted beforehand as this stretching-out. The “between” of birth and death already lies in the being of being-there. It is by no means the case that being-there is real at one point of time and, in addition, “surrounded” by the non-reality of its birth and its death. Understood existentially, birth is never something past in the sense of what is no longer on hand—anymore than death is in the manner of something remaining, i.e. not yet on hand but coming along. Factual being-there ex-sists as born, and, as born, it is already dying in the sense of being-toward-death. Both “ends” and their “between” are as long as being-there factically ex-sists, and they are in the sole way possible, given the basis of the being of being-there: as care. In the unity of thrownness and fleeing (or perhaps readying) being-toward-death, birth and death “hang together” in a way distinctive of being-there. As care,
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

Heidegger introduced the terms “happening” and “stretched” already in the last two paragraphs of the previous chapter. As a happening, being-there unfolds in a story—or rather, it is itself the “storying” of its “stretch.” What most concretely comes upon us at any moment (our future) is a been-ness; now Heidegger explores the ways this been-ness takes the form of storied-ness: our historicity.

With the analysis of the specific movedness and persistence appropriate to the happening of being-there, our investigation returns to the problem touched upon right before the exposition of temporality: to the question of the constancy of the self that we determined as the who of being-there. Self-constancy is a manner in which being-there is, and is thus grounded in a specific fructification of temporality. The analysis of happening brings us into the problems of a thematic investigation into fructification as such.

If the question of historicity returns us to these “origins” [movedness, persistence, constancy of self, fructification], the place of the problem of history has thus already been decided upon. We must not search for this place in historiography, the science of history. Even if the scientific-theoretical treatment of the problem of “history” does not merely aim at an “epistemological” clarification of historiographical comprehension (Simmel), or at the logic of the concept-formation of historiographical portrayal (Rickert), but is rather oriented toward the “objective side,” history remains accessible (in this way of posing the questions) only as the object of a science. The basic phenomenon of history, which precedes the possibility of historiographical thematizing and underlies it, is thus irrevocably repudiated. How history can become a possible object for historiography: this we can learn only from the way what is itself historical [namely, being-there] is, i.e. from historicity and its rootedness in temporality.

If historicity itself is to be illuminated in terms of temporality, and primordially in terms of authentic temporality, then it is essential to this task that it can only be carried out by way of a phenomenological construction. The existential and ontological constitution of historicity must be captured in opposition to the ordinary interpretation of the history of being-there — which covers it over. The existential construction of historicity has its definite hold in the ordinary understanding of being-there, and its guidance in the existential structures attained so far.

We shall first describe the ordinary concepts of history, so that we may orient our investigation with a view to the factors which are generally held to be essential for history. Here it must become clear what we are to address primordially as historical. Thus we will have designated the point at which we may enter upon the exposition of the ontological problem of historicity.

Our interpretation of the authentic ability-to-be-whole of being-there, and our subsequent analysis of care as temporality, offer the guideline for the existential construction of historicity. The existential projection of the historicity of being-there only reveals what already lies enveloped in the fructification of temporality. Corresponding to the rootedness of historicity in care, being-there always ex-sists as authentically or inauthentically historical. What we had in view under the title “everydayness” for the existential analysis of being-there as the closest horizon becomes clarified as the inauthentic historicity of being-there.

Disclosure and interpretation belong essentially to the happening of

---

1 Heidegger introduced the terms “happening” and “stretched” already in the last two paragraphs of the previous chapter. As a happening, being-there unfolds in a story—or rather, it is itself the “storying” of its “stretch.” What most concretely comes upon us at any moment (our future) is a been-ness; now Heidegger explores the ways this been-ness takes the form of storied-ness: our historicity.

1 Cf. §64, pp. 316 ff.

* Hitherto, Heidegger has spoken of “construction” in philosophy as free-floating (p. 28), arbitrary (p. 260), or unphenomenological (p. 302). On these pages he speaks of it as appropriately “phenomenological” or “existential.” See the annotation appended to Heidegger’s note on p. 50.
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

being-there. From the way a being that ex-sists historically has its being, there arises the existentiell possibility of an explicit disclosure and construal of history. Thematizing, i.e. disclosing history historiographically, is the presupposition for the possibility of “forging the historical world in the human sciences [i.e., in the humanities].” The existential interpretation of historiography as a science aims solely at displaying its ontological provenance from the historicity of being-there. Only from here are the boundaries to be staked out within which any theory of science, oriented by its factical operations, may take account of the contingencies arising within its inquiries.

The analysis of the historicity of being-there attempts to show that this being is not “temporal” because it “is in history,” but rather ex-sists and can ex-sist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being.

Nevertheless, being-there must also be called “temporal” in the sense of its being “in time.” Factical being-there needs and uses the calendar and the clock even without a developed historiography. What happens “to it,” it experiences as happening “in time.” In the same way, the processes of both life-less and living nature are encountered “in time.” They are inner-timely. Thus it would be tempting to place the analysis of the origin of the “time” of inner-timely-ness (which we will in fact postpone to the next Chapter1) before the discussion of the connection between historicity and temporality. What is historical is ordinarily characterized with the aid of the time of inner-timely-ness. But if this ordinary characterization is to be stripped of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness, historicity is to be “deduced” beforehand purely from the primordial temporality of being-there — as also bestfits the “matter” itself. But since time as inner-timely-ness also “stems” from the temporality of being-there, historicity and inner-timely-ness turn out to be equi-primal. The ordinary interpretation of the temporal character of history is thus justified within its own limits.

After this first characterization of the course of the ontological exposition of historicity in terms of temporality, do we still need explicit assurance that the following investigation does not believe that the problem of history can be solved by any easy stratagem? The paucity of the presently available “categorial” means, and the uncertainty of the primary ontological horizons, become ever more obtrusive the more the

---

1 Cf. §80, pp. 411 ff.
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

we say: “One cannot evade history.” Here, history means what is past but nevertheless still has an effect. In either case, what is historical as what is past is understood as having an effective bearing, whether positive or privative, on the “present” construed as what is real “now” and “today.” The “past” has a remarkable twofold meaning here. Anything “past” belongs irrevocably to an earlier time, it belonged to former events, and can yet still be on hand “now,” e.g. the remains of a Greek temple. A “piece of the past” still “lingers” in it.

Thus history does not so much mean the “past” construed as having passed by, as it means what comes from it. Whatever “has a history” stands within the context of a becoming. Here the “development” is sometimes a rise, sometimes a decay. Whatever “has a history” in this way can at the same time “make” history. “Epoch making,” it “presently” determines a “future.” Here history signifies an “inter-connection” of events and “effects” that pervades the “past,” the “present,” and the “future.” On this account, the past has no particular priority.

Furthermore, history signifies the whole of beings that change “in time,” the transformations and destinies of humankind, human institutions and their “cultures”—in contradistinction to nature, that similarly moves “in time.” Here, history signifies not so much the manner in which being-there has its being—the manner of happening—as the region of beings we distinguish from nature by looking to the essential determination of human being, ex-sistence, as “spirit” and “culture” (although nature, too, belongs in a way to history thus understood).

And finally, what has been handed down as such [tradition: e.g., laws and rituals] is understood as “historical,” whether it [the tradition] be known historiographically or taken over as self-evident and concealed in where it comes from.

If we consider the four meanings together, we may extract this: [in its ordinary sense] history is the specific happening of ex-sisting being-there unfolding in time—so that we can understand history in the emphatic sense as the happening of being-with-one-another that is “past” and simultaneously “handed down” and still having its effect.

The four meanings interconnect in that they all bear on human being as the “subject” of events. How might we determine the way these events happen, the character of their happening? Is the happening a succession of occurrences, an alternating coming and going of incidents? In what way does this happening of history belong to being-there? Is being-there first factically already “on hand,” whereupon it can then occasionally get involved in “a story”? Does being-there first become historical through an interweaving of circumstances and incidents? Or is the being of being-there first constituted by its happening, so that only because being-there is historical in its being are anything like circumstances, incidents, and destinies ontologically possible? Why does precisely the past have such an important function in the “temporal” characterization of being-there happening “in time”?

If history belongs to the being of being-there, and if this being is grounded in temporality, it seems appropriate to begin the existential analysis of historicity with those characteristics of what is historical that evidently have a temporal meaning. Thus a more precise characterization of the remarkable priority of the “past” in the concept of history should prepare for the exposition of the fundamental constitution of historicity.

The “antiquities” preserved in museums (household utensils, for example) belong to a “time past,” and are yet still on hand in the “present.” How are these instruments historical when they are, after all, not yet gone? Only because they have become objects of historiographical interest, of the cultivation of antiquity, and of national lore? But such instruments can, after all, be historiographical objects only because they are somehow in themselves historical. We repeat the question: With what justification do we call these beings historical when they are not yet gone? Or do these “things” indeed have “something past” “about” them, even though they are still on hand today? Are these on-hand things then still what they were? Evidently these “things” have changed. The utensils have become, “in the course of time,” fragile and worm-eaten. Still, the specific character of the past that makes them something historical does not lie in their perishability (a condition that also progresses during their on-hand-ness in the museum). But then what is past about these instruments? What were the “things” that they no longer are today? They are still determinate instruments of use—but out of use. However, if they were still in use, like many heirlooms in the household, would they then not be historical? Whether in use or out of use, they are no longer what they were. What is “past,” “gone”?

Nothing other than the world wherein they were encountered as things at

---

a What has gone before and now stays behind.
hand belonging to a context of instruments and used by heedful being-there having its being in that world. That world is no longer. But what was previously inner-worldly in that world is still on hand. Things now on hand can, as instruments belonging to that world, nevertheless belong to the “past.” But what does it mean that the world no longer is? World is only in the manner of ex-sisting being-there — a being that factically is as being-in-world.

The historical character of extant antiquities is thus grounded in the “past” of the being-there to whose world that past belongs. Accordingly, only “past” being-there would be historical, but not “present” being-there. However, can being-there be past at all, if we define “past” as “now no longer either on hand or at hand”? Evidently being-there can never be past, not because it is imperishable, but because it can essentially never be on hand. Rather, if it [at all] is, it is ex-sisting. But being-there that is no longer ex-sisting is not past in the ontologically strict sense; it is, rather, as having-been-there. The antiquities still on hand have the character of a “past” and of a history because they belong to an instrumental context and come from a world that has-been — the world of a being-there that has-been-there. Being-there: this is what is primarily historical. But does being-there first become historical by no longer being there? Or is it historical precisely as factically ex-sisting? Does being-there emerge in its been-ness only as a been-there, or does its been-ness include a futural finding-present i.e. emerge within the fructification of its temporality?

From this provisional analysis of instruments partaking of history, still on hand and yet somehow “past,” it becomes clear that these beings are historical only on the basis of their belonging to a world. But world has an historical manner of being [only] because it constitutes an ontological determination of being-there. And something more becomes manifest: the designation of a time as “the past” is not unequivocal, and must clearly be distinguished from the been-ness we came to know as a constituent of the ecstatic unity of the temporality of being-there. But then the enigma only becomes more acute — why it is that precisely the “past” (or, better formulated, been-ness) predominately determines what is historical when, after all, been-ness fructifies itself equi-primordially with present and future.

We asserted that being-there is what is primarily historical. But secondarily historical is what is encountered within the world, not only at-hand instruments in the broadest sense, but also the surrounding nature as the “soil of history.” We call beings not taking their measure from being-there, those that are historical by reason of their belonging to the world, “world-historical.” We can show that the ordinary concept of “world-history” arises precisely from an orientation toward what is secondarily historical. Things world-historical are not first historical on the basis of a historiographical objectification, but rather as the beings that they are in themselves, as encountered in the world.

The analysis of the historical character of instruments still on hand has not only led us back to being-there as what is primarily historical; the analysis also made it dubious whether the temporal characteristics of what is historical should at all be primarily oriented toward the being-in-time of on-hand things. Beings do not become “more historical” as we go ever farther back into the past, so that what is most ancient would be the most authentically historical. Moreover, the “temporal” distance from now and today has no primarily constitutive significance for the historicity of authentically historical being-there, not because being-there is not “in time” or is timeless, but rather because it primordially ex-sists temporally, and in a way that nothing on hand “in time,” whether going away or coming up, could ever, by its ontological nature, be temporal.

It will be said that these are overly complicated remarks. No one denies that, at bottom, human being-there is the primary “subject” of history, and the ordinary concept of history we considered says this clearly enough. But the thesis that “being-there is historical” not only signifies the ontic factum that human being presents a more or less important “atom” in the business of world-history, and remains the playing of circumstances and events, it also poses the problem: Why, and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicity belong to the subjectivity of the “historical” subject as essential to its constitution?

§74. The fundamental constitution of historicity

Factly, being-there always has its “history,” and it can have something of the sort because the being of this being is constituted by historicity. We want to justify this thesis with the intention of setting forth the ontological problem of history as an existential one. The being of being-there was delimited as care. Care is grounded in temporality. Within the scope of temporality we must then search for a happening that determines
ex-sistence as historical. Thus the interpretation of the historicity of being-there turns out to be basically just a more concrete working-out of temporality. We revealed temporality first of all with regard to the mode of authentic ex-sisting that we characterized as readying resoluteness. How does this involve an authentic happening of being-there?

We determined resoluteness as reticent and dread-prepared self-projection upon one’s own being guilty. It attains its authenticity as readying resoluteness. In it, being-there understands itself, with regard to its ability-to-be, in a way that keeps death in sight so that it can take over wholly the being that it itself is in its thrownness. Resolutely taking over one’s own factual “there” entails at once a resolution taking one into the situation. In the existential analysis we cannot, on principle, discuss what being-there factically happens to resolve upon. Our present investigation excludes even the existential projection of factual possibilities of ex-sistence. Nevertheless, we must ask: From where can those possibilities be drawn at all — those upon which being-there factically projects itself? Ready ing self-projection upon the one possibility of ex-sistence that cannot be taken over — upon death — guarantees only the wholeness and authenticity of resoluteness. The factically disclosed possibilities of ex-sistence cannot be extracted from death. All the less so, since readying for this possibility signifies not a speculation about it, but rather a return to the factual there. Might the taking-over of the thrownness of the self into its world disclose a horizon from which ex-sistence seizes its factual possibilities? Did we not say, moreover, that being-there can never get around its thrownness? Before we rashly decide whether being-there draws its authentic possibilities of ex-sistence from thrownness or not, we must assure ourselves of the complete concept of this fundamental determination of care.

As thrown, being-there is indeed consigned to itself and its ability-to-be, but still as being-in-world. As thrown, it is dependent upon a “world,” and ex-sists factically with others. Initially and mostly, the self is lost in the one. It understands itself in terms of the possibilities of ex-sistence that circulate in the “average” public interpretedness of being-there that reigns day by day. Mostly these possibilities are made unrecognizable by ambiguity, but they are still familiar. Authentic ex-sistentiell understanding, far from extricating itself from the received interpretedness, always grasps its chosen possibility in a resolution from it, against it, and yet again for it.

The resoluteness in which being-there comes back to itself discloses the reigning factual possibilities of authentic ex-sisting from the inheritance it takes over as thrown. Resolute coming back to thrownness involves submitting itself to received possibilities, although not necessarily as they are received. If everything “good” is inherited, and if the character of “goodness” lies in making authentic ex-sistence possible, then it is within resoluteness that the tradition, i.e. reception of an inheritance, is on each occasion constituted. The more authentically being-there resolves itself, i.e. understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost pre-eminent possibility in readying for death, the more unequivocal and inevitable is the choice in finding the possibility of its ex-sistence. Only the readying for death drives every incidental and “provisional” possibility away. Only being free for death gives being-there its one goal and casts ex-sistence into its finitude. The finitude of ex-sistence thus seized upon rips one back out of the endless multiplicity of possibilities offering themselves right off — those of comfort, taking things easy, shirking obligations — and brings being-there to the simplicity of its destiny. With this term we designate the primordial happening of being-there, a happening embedded in authentic resoluteness, one in which being-there consigns itself to itself, free for death, within a possibility inherited and yet chosen.

Being-there can only be touched by the blows of destiny because it is destiny — in the ground of its being and in the sense described. Ex-sisting destinedly in resoluteness consigning itself to itself, being-there is disclosed, as being-in-world, for both the “accommodation” of “fortunate” circumstances and the cruelty of chance developments. Destiny does not first originate with the collision of circumstances and events. Even an irresolute person is driven by these, more so than someone who has chosen, and yet such a person can still not “have” a destiny.*

---

* Heidegger is here dialoguing with our tradition on the question of μορφή: allotment, destiny, fate. Situations appear as burdens unless we take them as our own: but this taking depends on whether we can give ourselves. Once giving myself to them, they give themselves to me: but only as defining my task. — Here, as in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Part Two), redemption consists in “re-creating every ‘it was’ into ‘that's the way I wanted it!’.”

---

2. Cf. §62, p. 305.
When being-there, readying itself, lets death become powerful in itself, it understands itself, as free for death, in its own higher power of its finite freedom, and takes over the powerlessness of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, which always only is in having chosen the choice, and becomes clear about the chance developments in the situation disclosed. But if destined being-there, as being-in-world, essentially exists in being-with others, its happening is a co-happening and is determined as a shared lot. With this term, we designate the happening of the community, of a people. A shared lot is not composed of individual destinies, any more than being-with-one-another can be conceived of as the mutual incidence of several subjects. Within their being-with-one-another in the same world, and within their resoluteness for determinate possibilities, these destinies are guided already beforehand. In communication and in struggle, the power of their shared lot first becomes free. The lot of being-there, shared and destined, in and with its "generation," constitutes the complete, authentic happening of being-there.

As the powerless higher power preparing itself for adversities — the power of reticent self-projection, ready for dread, upon one’s own being-guilty — destiny requires the essential constitution of care as the ontological condition of its possibility, i.e. it requires temporality. Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the being of a being, as they do in care, can that being ex-sist in the mode of destiny, i.e. be historical in the ground of its existence.

Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factical there, free for its death and shattering itself on it, i.e. only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially been-ness can consign itself to its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be momentarily for “its time.” Only authentic temporality, finite by nature, makes anything like destiny, i.e. authentic historicity, possible.

It is not necessary that resoluteness explicitly know the provenance of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. However, in the temporality of being-there, and only in it, lies the possibility of explicitly recovering, from the received understanding of being-there, the existentiell ability-to-be upon which it projects itself. Resoluteness that comes back to itself, consigning itself [to its thrownness], then becomes the repetition of a possibility of ex-sistence that has come down to it. Repetition is explicit reception, i.e. return to the possibilities of being-there in its been-there. The authentic repetition of a been-possibility of ex-sistence — that being-there may choose its hero — is existentiell grounded in readying resoluteness; for in resoluteness the choice is first chosen which frees one for the struggle to come and for the loyalty to what can be repeated. However, the self-consignment, the repetition, of a been-possibility does not disclose the being-there in its been-there in order to actualize it again. The repetition of what is possible neither brings back “what is past,” nor does it bind the “present” back to what is “obsolete.” Springing from a resolute self-projection, repetition does not let itself be overwhelmed by anything “past,” letting it return as what was earlier actual. Rather, repetition responds to the possibility of ex-sistence in its been-there. But responding to the possibility in a resolution is also, as momentary, the repudiation of the day’s preoccupation with the “past.” Repetition neither abandons itself to the past nor aims at progress. In the moment, authentic ex-sistence is indifferent to both.

We characterize repetition as the mode of self-consigning resoluteness by which being-there ex-sists explicitly as destiny. But if destiny constitutes the primordial historicity of being-there, history has its essential weight neither in what is past nor in the today and its “connection” with what is past, but in the authentic happening of ex-sistence that springs from the future of being-there. As an essential mode of being-there, history has its roots so essentially in the future that death,
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

484

Ecstatically open: all along, Heidegger is bringing being-there into view as essentially open — the “place” where things happen rather than a self-enclosed reality. Soon (p. 396), he will talk of being “open in repetition” — in and as restitution of our inheritance. Heidegger is here dialoguing with the ancient understanding of human being as essentially “incomplete” — as (momentarily) whole only in opening out.

The characterized possibility of being-there, throws readying ex-sistence back upon its factual thrownness and thus first gives to been-ness its peculiar priority in what is historical. Authentic being-toward-death, i.e. the finitude of temporality, is the concealed ground of the historicity of being-there. Being-there does not first become historical in repetition; rather, because as temporal it is historical, it can take itself over in its history, repeating itself. Here no historiography is as yet needed.

We call destiny the readying self-consignment to the there of the moment, the self-consignment lying in resoluteness. In this destiny is also grounded a shared lot, by which we understand the happening of being-there in being-with-others. A destined lot can be explicitly disclosed in repetition with regard to its being bound up with an inheritance coming upon it. Repetition first makes manifest to being-there its own history. The happening itself, and the disclosedness belonging to it, or the appropriation of it, is existentially grounded herein: that being-there is, as temporal, ecstatically open.*

We call destiny the readying self-consignment to the there of the moment, the self-consignment lying in resoluteness. From the phenomena of tradition [i.e., reception of inheritance] and repetition, both rooted in the future, it has become clear why the happening of authentic history has its weight in been-ness. However, it remains all the more enigmatic how this happening, as destiny, is to constitute the whole “inter-connectedness” of being-there from its birth to its death. What might going back to resoluteness add in the way of enlightenment? Is not each resolution just one more single “experience” in the succession of the whole complex of experiences? Is the “inter-connectedness” of authentic happening supposed to consist of an uninterrupted flow of resolutions? Why does the question of the constitution of “life’s inter-connectedness” not find a sufficiently satisfactory answer? Does our investigation not, in its haste, cling too much to the answer, without having tested the question beforehand as to its legitimacy? Nothing has become more clear, from the course of our existential analysis so far, than the fact that the ontology of being-there falls victim again and again to the temptations of the ordinary understanding of being. Methodologically, we can cope with this only by pursuing the origin of the question of the constitution of the inter-connectedness of being-there, no matter how “self-evident” this question may be, and by determining in what ontological horizon the question moves.

If historicity belongs to the being of being-there, then even inauthentic ex-sistence must be historical. What if the inauthentic historicity of being-there has hitherto determined how the question has been posed about an “interconnectedness of life” and has blocked the access to authentic historicity and the “connectedness” peculiar to it? However that may be, for the exposition of the ontological problem of history to be sufficiently complete, we cannot escape considering the inauthentic historicity of being-there.

§75. The historicity of being-there, and world-history

Initially and mostly, being-there understands itself in terms of what it encounters in its circum-world and what it circumspectly takes care of. This understanding is not just a bare taking cognizance of itself that simply accompanies all compartments of being-there. Understanding signifies self-projection upon some prevailing possibility of being-in-world, i.e. ex-sisting as this possibility. As a common understanding, it then also constitutes the inauthentic ex-sistence of the one. What everyday taking care of things encounters in public being-with-one-another is not just instruments and works, but also “what is going on” with them: “affairs,” undertakings, incidents, mishaps. The “world” is both soil and stage-setting, and belongs as such to everyday trade and traffic. In public being-with-one-another the others are encountered in such business as allows “one,” the one-self “itself,” to “go with the flow.” One always knows about this business, talks about it, furthers it, resists it, retains it, and forgets it — all primarily with regard to what is getting done and what will “come of it.” We initially calculate the progress, arrest, adjustment, and “output” of individual being-there in terms of the course, status, change, and availability of what is taken care of. As trivial as the reference to the understanding of being-there of everyday intelligibility may be, this understanding is by no means ontologically transparent. But then why should the “connectedness” of being-there not

* Ecstatically open: all along, Heidegger is bringing being-there into view as essentially open — the “place” where things happen rather than a self-enclosed reality. Soon (p. 396), he will talk of being “open in repetition” — in and as restitution of our inheritance. Heidegger is here dialoguing with the ancient understanding of human being as essentially “incomplete” — as (momentarily) whole only in opening out.
be determined in terms of what is taken care of and “experienced”? Do not instruments and works, and everything over which being-there lingers, also belong to “history”? Is the happening of history then only the isolated course of “streams of experience” in individual subjects?

Indeed, history is neither the inter-connectedness of movement in changing objects, nor the free-floating succession of experiences of “subjects.” Does the happening of history then pertain to the “linking” of subject and object? Even if we want to ascribe the happening to the subject-object relationship, we must ask about the manner in which this linking as such has its being — assuming it is this linking that basically “happens.” The thesis of the historicity of being-there does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that what is historical is the being that ex-sists as being-in-world. The happening of history is the happening of being-in-world. The historicity of being-there is essentially the historicity of the world which, on the basis of its ecstatic-horizontal temporality, belongs to the fructification of that temporality. Insofar as being-there factically ex-sists, inner-worldly discovered beings are also encountered. With the ex-sistence of historical being-in-world, things at hand and on hand are in each instance already included in the history of the world.* Each instrument and each work, e.g. books, have their “destinies”; buildings and institutions have their history. And even nature is historical — precisely not, to be sure, as in talk about “natural history”; but very much, in contrast, as countryside, as settled or exploited territory, as battlefield, as cultic site. Such inner-worldly beings are, as such, historical, and history signifies not something “outside” that simply accompanies an “inner” history of the “soul.” We call these things world-historical.

* Note the genitives: “the ex-sistence of historical being-in-the-world” means the ex-sistence entailed by it; “the history of the world” means the history embedded within it. Often, the “of” in a sentence can read either as a genetivus subjectivus or as a genetivus objectivus: “the love of God” can mean the love from God (for us) or the love toward God (from us). For Heidegger’s own commentary on this grammatical difference, see his marginalium on p. 42 and the opening pages of his “Letter on Humanism.”

§75. Historicity and World-History

As Heidegger insists in his essay “On φυσις in Aristotle’s Physics, II, 1” (in Pathmarks, 1998), what is at issue under the rubric of κινησις is not first of all movement but being moved: moved-ness. Like Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger will argue in his later works that being is “what gets things moving”; however, unlike earlier thinkers, he articulates this “source” without recourse to such ontic considerations as those of ἐρως (eros: now historically biologized) or δικτύω (“draw” or “incitement”: cf. Republic, 521d & 524c), both of which presuppose the primacy of the passivity-activity dichotomy.
of being as such is taken to be something simply self-evident, the question of the manner world-historical things have their being, and of the moved-ness of happening as such, is “after all really” only the unfruitful fussing of verbal sophistry.

Everyday being-there is dispersed in the multiplicity of what “passes by” daily. The opportunities, the circumstances that taking-care “tactically” waits for [seem to] produce “destiny.” From what is taken care of, inauthentically ex-sisting being-there first devises its history. And because it is in this condition of being driven hither and thither by its “affairs,” and thus having to pull itself together out of the dispersion and the dis-connectedness of what has just “passed by,” so that it might come to itself, the question now arises how one might establish an “inter-connectedness” of being-there (being-there now construed as the experiences of a [human] subject that are “also” on hand); the question arises out of the horizon of intelligibility furnished by inauthentic historicity. The possibility of this horizon of questioning achieving dominance is grounded in the irresoluteness constituting the nature of the in-constancy of the self. *

Thus we have pointed out the origin of the question about the “inter-connectedness” of being-there — connectedness construed as a unity of the linkage of experiences running from birth to death. The provenance of the question immediately reveals its inappropriateness in regard to a primordial existential interpretation of the way being-there happens in wholeness. But, on the other hand, the predominance of this “natural” horizon of questioning explains why it appears that precisely the authentic historicity of being-there — destiny and repetition — could least of all provide the phenomenal ground for reshaping what the question about “life’s inter-connectedness” basically intends to bring into an ontologically grounded problem.

The question cannot read: How does being-there gain a coherent unity in order then to link together the ensued and ensuing succession of “experiences”? It rather reads: In what essential manner does being-

* Our inheritance (thrownness in its fullness) consigns itself to us: Heidegger's awkward formulation intends to ward off the supposition that inheritance is just something we occasionally remember, something we carry around with us as an adjunct. Phenomenally, our various "births" (the parentage at issue for Homeric heroes out on the field, our loyalty-engendering institutions, the interpretations of our origins and endings in literature) come down to us—first of all as the world (its settledness) in which we find ourselves, and only thereby on us (possibly individuating us, and only then "giving" us something to "carry around" and "remember").
come to terms with every possible moment springing from it. As destiny, resoluteness is freedom to give up any [one] determinate resolve — according to what the situation might possibly require.* The steadiness of ex-sistence does not thereby get interrupted; rather, it gets assured for the moment. Steadiness does not first get built up out of and from “moments” adjoining one another; rather, these spring from the already stretched out temporality of repetition, where things that have been are futurally.

For inauthentic historicity, in contrast, the primordial stretched-out-ness of destiny is concealed. As the one-self, being-there un-constantly finds-present its “today.” Waiting for what will soon be new, being-there has also already forgotten the old. The one evades choice. Blind to possibilities, it is unable to repeat anything in its been-ness; rather, it can only retain and conserve things that are “real” in the sense of being left over from world-historical things in their been-ness — remnants, along with the on-hand lore about them.† Lost in the finding-present of the today, being-there understands the “past” from the “present.” In contrast, the temporality of authentic historicity, as the readying-repeating moment, undoes the finding-present of the today, it dis-accustoms us from the customariness of the one. In contrast [again], inauthentically historical ex-sistence, burdened with the legacy of a “past” that has become unrecognizable to it, seeks what is modern. Authentic historicity understands history as the “return” of the possible, and knows this much about it: possibility only returns when ex-sistence, destined and

* For a similar statement of “giving up” (“revoking”), cf. p. 308.
† Heidegger’s remarks on “remnants” echo a passage from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (1074 b 1 ff.):

> From those at the beginning ... a remnant has been passed down in the form of a story: that the celestial bodies are gods and that the divine encloses all nature. The rest has been added, story-wise, with an eye to persuading the many, i.e. with an eye to their conduct and advantage. …

Tellingly, Aristotle also remarks that “the opinion (δοξα) of our ancestors, those who came first, only becomes clear to us in this way” —i.e., first of all as remnants that have lost their power (because entering into foreign service). Heidegger both agrees and disagrees: agrees, inasmuch as we fall back into assessing (projecting) a time-line; disagrees, inasmuch as these “remnants” come upon us already within an interpretation that already informs the world in which we “go about our business” and “come across remnants.”

### §76. The Existential Origin of Historiography

That historiography, like every science, is, as a way of being-there, factically and in each case “dependent” upon the “dominant world-view”: this needs no discussion. However, beyond this fact, we must inquire into the ontological possibility of the origin of the sciences in the essential constitution of being-there. This origin is still hardly transparent. In the present context, our analysis will take stock, in outline, of the existential origin of historiography only to the extent that it will throw more light upon the historicity of being-there, and its roots in temporality.

If the being of being-there is at its basis historical, then every factual science evidently remains bound to this happening. But historiography presupposes, in its own distinctive way, the historicity of being-there.

At first one might be tempted to clarify this by recalling that historiography, as a science of the history of being-there, must

---

* Heidegger is here dialoguing with Nietzsche’s thoughts on the “eternal return of the same” in relation to Kierkegaard’s thoughts on “repetition.”
† Cf. §6, pp. 19 ff. [Part Two of *Being and Time* was to complete this task of destructuring; many of Heidegger’s later works do as much.]
‡ Recall that “historical” means also “story-based”: arising as a story of its own happening. Subsequent thinkers (especially in France) have emphasized this thought: each science, each institution, is the story of its happening, its discourse.
“presuppose,” as its possible “object,” the being that is primordially historical. But not only must history be in order for a historiographical object to be accessible; and not only is historiographical cognition, as a comportment of being-there, historical — a comportment that happens. More: the historiographical disclosure of history is in itself rooted in the historicity of being-there in accordance with its ontological structure, whether it is factically carried out or not. This connection is what the talk about the existential origin of historiography in the historicity of being-there means. To throw light on this connection methodologically means: to project ontologically the idea of historiography in terms of the historicity of being-there. On the other hand, it is not a matter of “abstracting” the concept of historiography from some factual scientific enterprise of the day, nor of aligning the concept with such enterprises. For what principle would guarantee that our chosen factual procedure indeed represented historiography’s primordial and authentic possibilities? And even if there is such a guarantee (about which we shall not now decide), the concept could still only be “discovered” as fact if it were guided by the idea of historiography already understood. On the other hand, though, the existential idea of historiography is not given any special justification if historians, in their factual comportment, confirm their agreement with it. Nor does the idea become “false” if they happen to contest it.

The idea of historiography as a science implies that it has grasped the disclosure of historical beings as its own task. Every science is primarily constituted by thematizing. What is pre-scientifically familiar in being-there as disclosed being-in-world is projected upon its specific being. With this projection, a region of beings gets delimited: the accesses to it contain their methodological “directive,” and the conceptual structure of interpretation receives its initial outline. If we may postpone the question of whether a “history of the present” is possible and assign to historiography the task of disclosing the “past,” the historiographical thematizing of history is possible only if the “past” has in some instance already been disclosed as such. Quite apart from whether sufficient sources are available for historiographically making the past present, the way to it must somehow be open for the historiographical return to it. That anything like this is the case, and how it is possible, is by no means obvious.

But inasmuch as the being of being-there is historical, i.e. open in

its been-ness (owing to its ecstatic-horizontal temporality), the way is in general freed for such thematizing of the “past” as can be carried out in ex-sistence. And because being-there, and only being-there, is primordially historical, what historiographical thematizing offers as the possible object of its investigation must have its being in the way being-there does: as been-there. Together with factual being-there as being-in-world, there is also world-history. Even when being-there is no longer there, the world is [as] having-been-there. This does not conflict with the fact that what was formerly at hand within a world has not yet gone away but is still available “historiographically” for the present as something belonging to the world having-been-there.

Remnants, monuments, and records still on hand are possible “material” for the concrete disclosure of being-there having been there. These things can become historiographical material only because they have, in accordance with their own way of being, a world-historical character. And they become such material only by being understood from the outset with regard to their inner-worldliness. This already projected world gets determined during an interpretation of the world-historical material that has been “preserved.” The acquiring, examining and securing of such material does not first bring about a return to the “past,” but rather already presupposes historical being-toward being-there having been there, i.e. the historicity of the historian’s ex-sistence. This historicity existentially grounds historiography as science, down to its most unassuming “artisanal” operations. If historiography is rooted in historicity in this way, then we should also be able to determine from there what the object of historiography “really” is. The delimitation of the primordial theme of historiography must be carried out in conformity with authentic historicity and its disclosure of what-has-been-there, its repetition. Repetition understands being-there having-been-there in the authentic possibility that it had. The “birth” of historiography from authentic historicity then means this: the primary thematizing of the object of historiography projects being-there having-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of existence. Does
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

Heidegger here dialogues with the Aristotelian dictum that, while poetry deals with what can happen, historiography deals with what did happen (Poetics, 9). Only in an authentic mode can we take upon ourselves the possibilities at issue in, say, Plato’s work—or in such events as the American Revolution. Although R. W. Emerson remains within traditional metaphysics, he insists on a thought akin to Heidegger’s: “...history is an impertinence and an injury if it be any thing more than a cheerful apologue and parable of my being and becoming” (from his “Self-Reliance,” 1841).

If historiography, itself growing out of authentic historicity, reveals by repetition been-there ex-sistence in its possibility, it has therewith already made the “universal” manifest in what is unique. The question whether historiography has only a series of unique “individual” incidents or also “laws” as its object goes wrong already from the start. Its theme is neither what only occurs uniquely, nor something universal floating above these, but rather the possibility that was factically ex-sistent. This possibility is not repeated as such, i.e. understood in an authentically historiographical manner, if it is transformed into the pallor of a supra-temporal pattern. Only factual authentic historicity, as resolute destiny, can disclose been-there history in such a way that, in repetition, the “power” of the possible breaks into factual ex-sistence, i.e. comes upon it in its futurality. Historiography by no means takes its point of departure from the “present” and what is “real” only today, and then gropes its way back from there to a past—any more than does the historicity of unhistoriographical [e.g., “primitive”] being-there. Rather, the historiographical disclosure of the “past” is grounded in destiny-based repetition and is so far from being “subjective” that it alone guarantees the “objectivity” of historiography. For the objectivity of a science gets primarily determined by whether it can bring, unconcealedly, the being belonging to it as its theme (this being in the primordiality of its being) face-to-face with our understanding. In no science are the “universal validity” of standards and the claims to “universality” demanded by the one and its common intelligibility less possible criteria of “truth” than in authentic historiography.

Only because the central theme of historiography is in each case the possibility of been-there ex-sistence, and because the latter always factically ex-sists in a world-historical way, can historiography demand of itself a relentless orientation toward “facts.” For this reason factual research has many branches and makes the history of instruments, works, culture, spirit, and ideas its object. At the same time, history, as consigning itself [to being-there], is itself in each instance [unfurling] within an interpretedness belonging to it and having a history of its own, so that it is mostly only through the history of what has been consigned to us [the story of our traditions] that historiography penetrates to the having-been-there. Thus it is that concrete historiographical research can in each instance keep to its authentic theme in varying degrees of nearness. The historian who from the outset “throws” himself upon the “world-view” of an era has not yet proven that he understands his object in an authentically historical and not just in an “aesthetic” way.†

— The argument in Jean-Paul Sartre’s What is Literature? (Paris, 1947; New York, 1965) follows Heidegger’s closely in regard to the question of what it means to write. Cf. the long paragraph on pp. 64-65 (of the English translation):

Authors too are historical. And that is precisely the reason why some of them want to escape from history by a leap into eternity. The book ... establishes an historical contact among the people who are steeped in the same history and who likewise contribute to its making. ... It is by choosing his reader that the author decides upon his subject.

† Originally (especially in Kierkegaard and still in Count Yorck as cited below), “aesthetic” means “immediately in the present.”
other hand, the ex-sistence of an historian who “merely” edits sources may be determined by an authentic historicity.

Thus the dominance of diversified historiographical interest, reaching even into the most remote and primitive cultures, is in itself no proof of the authentic historicity of an “age.” That “historicism” begins to pose a problem, is itself ultimately the clearest indication that historiography endeavors to alienate being-there from its authentic historicity. Historicity does not necessarily stand in need of historiography. Unhistoriographical ages are not for that reason automatically unhistorical.

The possibility that historiography in general can be either “useful” or “disadvantageous” for “life” is based on this: life is, at the root of its being, historical — and accordingly, as factically ex-sisting, has in each case already decided upon authentic or inauthentic historicity. Nietzsche recognized what is essential about the “use and disadvantage of historiography for life” in the second of his Untimely Meditations (1874), and he stated it unequivocally and penetratingly. He distinguishes three kinds of historiography: the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical — without explicitly showing the necessity of this triad and the ground of its unity. The threefold character of historiography is prefigured in the historicity of being-there. Historicity also enables us to understand why authentic historicity must be the factically concrete unity of these three possibilities. Nietzsche’s division is not accidental. The beginning of his Meditations leads us to suspect that he understood more than he ever let on.

As historical, being-there is possible only on the basis of temporality. Temporality fructifies itself in the ecstatic-horizontal unity of its raptures. Being-there authentically ex-sists as futural in the resolute disclosure of a chosen possibility. Resolutely coming back to itself, it is open in repetition for the “monumental” possibilities of human ex-sistence. The possibility that historiography arising from this historicity is “monumental.” In its been-ness, being-there is committed to its thrownness. In appropriating the possible in repetition, there is also prefigured the possibility of reverently preserving the ex-sistence that has-been-there, wherein the possibility grasped became manifest. As monumental, authentic historicity is therefore “antiquarian.” Being-there fructifies itself, in the unity of future and been-ness, as presence. The present, as the moment, discloses the day authentically. But since the day is interpreted in terms of understanding a possibility of ex-sistence grasped — an understanding that futurally repeats — authentic historicity becomes the [occasion for] de-presencing the day, i.e. releasing oneself (painfully) from its collapsing publicness. As authentic, monumental-antiquarian historiography is necessarily a critique of the “present.” — Authentic historicity is the foundation of the possible unity of the three kinds of historiography. But the ground on which authentic historicity is founded is temporality as the existential meaning of care, the way care is.

The concrete portrayal of the existential-historical origin of historiography is consummated in the analysis of the thematizing that constitutes this science. Historiographical thematizing has as its central task to expand upon the hermeneutical situation as it is opened up — once historically ex-sisting being-there has made its resolution — to the disclosure in repetition of some been-there. The possibility and the structure of historiographical truth are to be set forth in terms of the authentic disclosedness (“truth”) of historical ex-sistence. But, since the fundamental concepts of the historiographical sciences — whether they pertain to the objects of these sciences or to the manner these objects are approached — are concepts of ex-sistence, the theory of the humanities, of the “human sciences,” presupposes a thematically existential interpretation of the historicity of being-there. Such an interpretation is the

* Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations begins with reflections on the dangers of the then-recent German victory over France: on how “public opinion” was then running the risk of assuming that military victory entailed cultural victory — and on how this presumption might lead to the worst defeat, namely “the extirpation of the German spirit in the name of the German empire.” Heidegger’s work, too, can be read as implicitly responding to this danger. His 1937 “Wege zur Aussprache” explicitly discusses the tensions between France and Germany (Collected Works, Vol. 13, pp.15-21).
II. Chapter Five: Temporality and Historicity

constant goal that Wilhelm Dilthey’s investigations attempt to approach; this goal is illuminated more penetratingly by the ideas of Count Yorck von Wartenburg.

§77. The connection of the foregoing exposition of the problem of historicity with the investigations of Dilthey and the ideas of Count Yorck

The account of the problem of history I have here given grew out of an appropriation of Dilthey’s work. It was corroborated, and also strengthened, by Count Yorck’s theses that are scattered throughout his letters to Dilthey.¹

The image of Dilthey still prevalent today is that of the “sensitive” interpreter of the history of the spirit, especially the history of literature, who “also” concerned himself with the distinction between the natural and the human sciences, attributing a pre-eminent role to the history of these sciences and also to “psychology,” then letting the whole merge into a relativistic “philosophy of life.” For a superficial consideration, this sketch is “correct.” But it misses the “substance.” It conceals more than it reveals.

Dilthey’s investigations can be divided schematically into three areas: [1] studies in the theory of the human sciences and the way they differ from the natural sciences; [2] investigations into the history of the sciences of man, society, and state; [3] endeavors to form a psychology in which the “whole fact of man” is portrayed. Investigations in scientific theory, history of science, and hermeneutical psychology constantly interpenetrate and overlap each other. When one direction predominates, the others are motives and means. What appears to be fragmentary, unsure and casual “striving,” is an elemental restlessness, the one goal of which is to understand “life” philosophically and to secure for this understanding a hermeneutical foundation in terms of “life itself.” Everything is centered in the “psychology” that hopes to understand “life” in the historical context of its development and its effects, as at once the way in which human being is, the possible object of the human sciences, and the root of these sciences. Hermeneutics is the self-clarification of this understanding; it is also the methodology of historiography, though only in a derivative form.

With a view to the discussions current at the time, which pushed his own investigations for laying the foundations for the humanistic sciences one-sidedly into the field of a theory of science, Dilthey did in fact gear his published works very much in this direction. The “logic of the human sciences” was [nonetheless] by no means central for him — no more than he was striving in his “psychology” “merely” to improve the positivistic science of the psychical.

Dilthey’s friend, Count Yorck, gives unambiguous expression to Dilthey’s ownmost philosophical intention when he refers to “our common interest in understanding historicity.”¹ Dilthey’s investigations are only now becoming accessible in their complete scope, and if we are to make them our own we need the constancy and concretion of a well-grounded account. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the problems that motivated him, or of how they motivated him.² Still, we can provisionally sketch out some of Count Yorck’s central ideas by selecting characteristic passages from his letters.

What Yorck is actually driving at in his interaction with Dilthey’s investigations and labors becomes evident precisely in the stand he takes regarding the tasks of [what Dilthey takes to be] the foundational discipline: analytical psychology. In response to Dilthey’s academic treatise “Ideas about a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology” (1894), he writes:

That self-reflection is the primary means of knowing, and that the primary procedure of knowing is analytic, we may safely assume. From here on we formulate propositions that our own findings verify. We do not proceed to any critical resolution, explanation, or (therewith) internal refutation of constructive psychology and its assumptions. *Ibid.*, 177

Your disregard for critical resolution — for psychological demonstration of sources, in detail and in trenchant implementation — is, in my opinion, connected with your concept of the theory of cognition

¹ *Briefwechsel*, p. 185; italics added.
² Such analysis we can all the more forgo since we have G. Misch to thank for a concrete portrayal of Dilthey, one aiming at what Dilthey is centrally driving at; Misch’s account is indispensable for any account of Dilthey’s work. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey’s *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 5 (1924), “Vorbericht,” pp. vii-cxvii.

¹ *Briefwechsel* zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, 1877-1897 (Halle an der Salle), 1923.
and the status you assign to it. *Ibid.*, 177

Only a theory of cognition provides the explanation of the inapplic-
ability [of constructive psychology] — the fact is assumed and clarified. It must give justifications for the adequacy of scientific
methods; it must provide the grounds for a doctrine of method, instead of having its methods taken from individual areas (haphazardly, I

At bottom Yorck is demanding a logic preceding the sciences and
guiding them, as did Platonic and Aristotelian logic, and this demand
includes the task of developing, positively and radically, the various
categorical structures of the being that is nature and the being that is
history (being-there). Yorck finds that Dilthey’s investigations “empha-
size too little the generic difference between the ontic and the
historiographical” (*ibid.*, 191; italics added):

In particular, you lay claim to the procedure of comparison as the
method of the human sciences. Here I disagree with you. …
Comparison is always aesthetic and is bound to configuration.
Windelband assigns configurations to history. Your concept of “type”
is an entirely inward one. Here it is a matter of characteristics, not
configurations. For Windelband, history is a series of pictures,
individual configurations, aesthetic demands. For the natural scientist
there remains, besides science, only aesthetic pleasure as a kind of
human tranquilizer. Your concept of history is, after all, that of a
nexus of forces, unities of force, to which the category of con-
figuration rightly applies only in a symbolic sense. *Ibid.*, 193

In terms of his certain instinct for the “difference between the ontic
and the historiographical,” Yorck knew how strongly traditional historical
investigation is geared to “purely ocular determinations” (*ibid.*, 192),
which aim at what is corporeal and configural.

Ranke is a great ocularist, for whom things that have vanished can
never become realities … Ranke’s whole manner can be explained in
terms of his limiting the stuff of history to the political. Only the
political is dramatic. *Ibid.*, 60

The modifications that have come in the course of time seem
inessential to me, and here I probably judge differently [than you].
For example, I think that the so-called historical school is merely a
side-current within the same river bed, and represents only one branch
of an old and thorough-going opposition. The name has something
deceptive about it. That school was not historical at all (italics
added) but rather an antiquarian one, construing things aesthetically,
whereas the great, dominating movement was one of mechanical
construction. Thus what it added methodologically to the method of
rationality was only an overall feeling. *Ibid.*, 68-69

The pure scholar conceives of historiography as a cabinet of
antiquities. Where nothing is palpable, where only a living psychical
transposition guides us — these gentlemen never get there. At heart
they are natural scientists, and they become skeptics all the more
because there are no experiments. One must stay completely away
from all such petty detail, e.g. how often Plato was in Magna Graecia
or Syracuse. There is no vitality in that. I have seen through this
superficial affectionation critically, seen that it finally boils down to a
large question mark and is put to shame by the great realities of Plato,
Homer, and the New Testament. Everything actually real takes on a
shadowy shape when it is considered as a “thing in itself,” when it is
not experienced. *Ibid.*, 61

“Scientists” confront the powers of the time in a way similar to the
over-refined French society of the revolutionary period. Here as there,
formalism, the cult of form, the defining of relationships is the last
word of wisdom. Of course, this direction of thought has its
own history that, I believe, is not yet written. The groundlessness
of this thinking and of the faith in it (and such thinking is, epistemo-
logically considered, a metaphysical comportment) is a product of
history. *Ibid.*, 39

The ground swells evoked [in astronomy] by the principle of
eccentricity, that led to a new age more than four hundred years ago,
seem to me to have become exceedingly broad and flat; cognition has
progressed to the point of negating itself; man has become so far
removed from himself that he has lost sight of himself. “Modern
man,” i.e. man since the Renaissance, is ready to be buried. *Ibid.*, 83

In contrast:

All written history that is alive, and that does not just depict life, is
critique. *Ibid.*, 19

But historical cognition is, at its best, cognition of hidden sources.
*Ibid.*, 109

With history, what creates a spectacle and catches the eye is not the
main thing. The nerves are invisible, as anything essential is. And
just as it is said that “if you would be quiet, you would be strong,” so
too is its variation true: If you are quiet, you will perceive, i.e.
This “if you are quiet, you will perceive, i.e. understand” may provide the key to Heidegger’s appreciation of Yorck’s work. While the early Romantics (like Herder) could bask in national heritage, and the cultural scientists (like Ranke) could start developing rigorous standards for historiography, Heidegger examines the conditions of the possibility of both: temporality and readiness to receptivity to one's fullest historical condition marks the occasion—a mode prior to both passivity and activity. I am reminded of the reflections possible when reading H. D. Thoreau’s remark in *Walden* (“Brute Neighbors”):

> You only need to sit still long enough in some attractive spot in the woods that all its inhabitants may exhibit themselves to you by turns.

Of course, “being quiet” or “sitting still” is the art at issue.

† We must read “virtuality” in the original sense: empowerment.
by the fact that paradox is a mark of truth and that the communis opinio is surely never in the truth, but is like an elemental precipitate of a half-way understanding that makes generalizations; in its relationship to truth it is like the sulphurous fumes that lightning leaves behind. Truth is never an element. To dissolve elemental public opinion, and as much as possible to enhance the shaping of individuality in seeing and examining, would be a pedagogical task for the state. Then, instead of there being a so-called public conscience — this radical externalization — individual conscience, genuine conscience, would again become powerful. Ibid., 249-50*

If one has an interest in historicity, one is brought to the task of developing the “generic difference between the ontic and the historiographical.” We have thereby ascertained the fundamental goal of the “philosophy of life.” Still, the way these questions are posed stands in need of a fundamental radicalization. How else is historicity to be philosophically grasped and “categorially” conceived in its difference from the ontic than by bringing the “ontic” as well as the “historiographical” into a more primordial unity so that they can be compared and distinguished? But that is possible only if we attain the following insights:

1. The question of historicity is an ontological question about the essential constitution of historical beings.
2. The question of the ontic is the ontological question of the essential constitution of beings not taking being-there as their measure — of what is on hand in the broadest sense.
3. The ontic is only one domain of beings.*

The idea of being encompasses both “ontic” and “historiographical” matters. This idea is what must be “generically differentiated.”

It is not by chance that Yorck calls non-historical beings simply “the ontic.” That merely reflects the unbroken dominance of the traditional ontology which, coming from the ancient way of posing questions about being, keeps the ontological problematic within a fundamentally narrow scope. The problem of the difference between the ontic and the historiographical can be worked out as a problem to be investigated only if it has made sure of its guideline beforehand by clarifying, through fundamental ontology, the question of the meaning of being as such.¹

Thus it becomes clear in what sense the preparatory existential-temporal analysis of being-there is resolved to cultivate the spirit of Count Yorck in order to serve the work of Dilthey.

* These last thoughts come close to those of Emerson’s “Self-Reliance”:

Society never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes continual changes; it is barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not amelioration. Emerson’s verdict, coming at the end of the argument, reflects a keen insight, formulated earlier on, into the historical development of the liberal state and its “civil society” (not community):

Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.

For all their recognition of these historical developments, both Yorck and Heidegger continue to suppose that, somehow, the state (society) could take over the education of the youth in overcoming the conformity.

* That is, only one domain in which discourse might legitimately unfold. Recall again that “beings”—the translation of τὸ ὅντα—has the generic sense of “what is by way of our talking about it.” Heidegger claims that traditional philosophy has confined our talking to predication (κατηγορεῖσθαι: categorization). Much of his later work aims to liberate discourse from this confinement — in full recognition that such a war of liberation has many fronts, including our basic sense of language and our basic involvement in history.

¹ Cf. §§5 & 6, pp. 15 ff.
Chapter Six
Temporality and Inner-timely-ness
as the Origin of the Ordinary Concept of Time

§78. The incompleteness of the foregoing temporal analysis of being-there.

To establish that and how temporality constitutes the being of being-there, we showed this much: as an essential constitution of ex-sistence, historicity is “at bottom” temporality. We conducted our interpretation of the temporal character of history without any reference to the “fact” that any happening takes place “in time.” In the course of our existential-temporal analysis of historicity we prevented the everyday understanding of being-there—an understanding that, factically, recognizes history only as “inner-timely” happening—from having its say. Precisely if our existential analysis is to make being-there ontologically transparent in its facticity, it must expressly show how the factual “ontic-temporal” interpretation of history has its justification. Since, besides history, also natural processes are determined by “means of time,” it is all the more necessary to embark on a thorough analysis of the time “in which” beings arise for encounter. However, more elemental than the circumstance that the “factor of time” comes up in the sciences of history and of nature is the factum that being-there, already prior to any thematizing research, “reckons with time” and arranges itself according to time. And here again we find the reckoning “with time” that is decisive for and prior to every use of measuring instruments designed to determine time. The one [the reckoning with time essential to facticity] precedes the other [instruments], and first makes possible the use of clocks and the like.

While it factically ex-sists, “time” is something any one being-there “has” or “doesn’t have.” It “takes time out” for something, or it “doesn’t have any time for” it. How is it that being-there can take “time” out, can “waste” time? From where is it taking its time? How does this time relate to the temporality of being-there?

Any one being-there takes time into account without existentially understanding temporality. Before raising the question what it means for a being to be “within time,” we need to illuminate the elemental comportment of reckoning with time. Every comportment of being-there is
to be interpreted from the being of the latter, i.e. from temporality. What we have to show is how being-there, as temporality, fructifies a comportment that relates to time in such a way that it takes time into account. Our previous characterization of temporality is therefore not only incomplete inasmuch as we have not attended to all dimensions of the phenomenon; the characterization is deficient at its very basis because something like world-time — this understood in a strict sense as pertaining to the existential-temporal concept of world — belongs to temporality itself. How this is possible, and why it is necessary, must become intelligible. Making this intelligible, we will cast light on the ordinary and familiar “time” “within which” beings come up — and therewith also on the inner-timely-ness of these beings.

Everyday being-there — being-there that takes out time for doing things — initially meets up with time as it regards inner-worldly at-hand and on-hand beings arising for encounter. Time thus “experienced” being-there understands within the horizon of the understanding of being closest to it, i.e. as itself a being somehow on hand. How and why the ordinary concept of time develops: this requires elucidation from the temporally founded constitution of being-there as it, according to its very being, takes heed of time. The ordinary concept of time owes its provenance to a levelling-down of primordial time. Demonstrating this origin of the ordinary concept of time, we justify our earlier interpretation of temporality as *primordial time*.

In the [historical] development of the ordinary concept of time, a remarkable vacillation becomes evident: Should time be accorded a “subjective” or an “objective” status? Whenever one construes it as having being in itself, it nonetheless gets ascribed primarily to the “soul.” And whenever it has the status of something “belonging to consciousness” it still serves in an “objective” capacity. In Hegel’s interpretation of time both possibilities are in a certain way transformed. Hegel tries to determine the interconnection between “time” and “spirit” in order then to render intelligible why spirit “falls into time” as history. In its result, our own interpretation of the temporality of being-there, and of the way world-time belongs to it, seems to agree with Hegel. However, because our foregoing analysis of time departs, basically and already at the outset, from Hegel — and in its goal, namely in its fundamental-ontological intention, orients itself precisely in opposition to him — a brief account of the way Hegel construes the relation between time and spirit might indirectly serve to clarify the existential-ontological interpretation of the temporality of being-there, of world-time, and of the origin of the ordinary concept of time. And also to bring our interpretation of these to a provisional close.

The question whether and how some sort of “being” belongs to time, why and in what sense we say that time “is”: this question we can only answer once we have shown the extent to which temporality itself, in the whole of its fructification, makes possible anything like an understanding of being and an addressing of beings.

The Chapter is then divided up as follows: the temporality of being-there, and the heeding of time (§79); the time that is heeded, and inner-timely-ness (§80); inner-timely-ness and the genesis of the ordinary concept of time (§81); contrasting the existential-ontological interconnection of temporality, being-there and world-time with Hegel’s construal of the relation between time and spirit (§82); the existential-temporal analysis of being-there, and the fundamental-ontological question about the meaning of being in general (§83).

§79. The temporality of being-there, and the heeding of time

Being-there ex-sists as a being for whom, in its very being, its being is at issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has already projected itself onto its ability-to-be *before* any mere (and after-the-fact) contemplation of itself. In such projection, it is unveiled as thrown. Abandoned to a “world” as thrown, it collapses onto it in the mode of taking-care. It is as care, i.e. as ex-sisting in the unity of collapsing-thrown projection, that being-there is disclosed as there. Co-being along with others, it holds itself within an average interpreted-ness, one articulated in talk and expressed in language. Being-in-world has already always expressed *itself*; and, as *being near* inner-worldly beings arising for encounter, it constantly expresses *itself* within an addressing and discussing of what is itself taken care of. Circumspectly intelligible taking-care is grounded in temporality, and this in the mode of finding-present that waits-for and retains. As figuring things out and planning for things, making provisions and taking precautions — all the while taking-care — being-there is always already saying (whether audibly or not): “*then*” (such-and-such should happen) “*before*” (it can be accomplished); “*now*” (can be “made good”) what “*back then*” (went wrong or got away).
In the "until then," taking-care expresses itself as waiting-for — while also retaining (in the "back then") and finding-present (in the "now"). In the "until then" lies (for the most part unexpressed) the "not yet now," i.e. it is spoken in [the mode of] a finding-present that is waiting-for and retaining (or forgetting). The "back then" contains itself the "no longer now": with it, retaining expresses itself as finding-present-that-waits-for. Both the "until then" and the "back then" are co-understood with a view to a "now," i.e. finding-present has a special weight. To be sure, finding-present fructifies itself in a unity of waiting-for and retaining — even if these are modified into an un-waiting-for forgetting, in which mode temporality gets ensnared into a present that incessantly declares, as it finds things present: "Now! Now!" What taking-care first of all waits for gets addressed in the [phrase] "right away," while what has just been achieved or lost gets addressed in the [phrase] "a moment ago." The horizon of the retaining that gets expressed in the "back then" is the "earlier"; the horizon for the "until then" is the "later on" ("what's coming"); the horizon for the "now" is the "today."

Yet every "until then" is, as such, an "until then, when..."; every "back then" a "back then, when..."; every "now" a "now, that...". We call date-ableness this apparently self-evident relational structure of the "now," "back then" and "until then." We must entirely disregard whether such dating takes place factically in reference to a calendrical "date." Even without such "dates," the "now" and the "until then" and the "back then" are more or less dated. The lack of determinate dating does not imply the lack of the structure of date-ableness, nor that the structure is incidental.

What is it, to which such date-ableness essentially belongs, and wherein does this date-ableness find its ground? But [one might ask] can any question be more superfluous than this one? With the "now, that..." everyone "of course" means a "point in time"; the "now" is time [itself]. It is incontestable that we do understand, in some way, the "now—that," "until then—when," "back then—when" as going together with "time." That these imply "time" itself, how such is possible, and what "time" means: all this is not already grasped in our "natural" understanding of the "now," the "until then," and the "back then." Indeed, is it even self-evident that we understand "right off" what these three are "naturally" saying? Where are we getting these [instances of] "now—that..."?

§79. Temporality and the Heeding of Time

Have we found any such thing among inner-worldly beings, beings on hand? Manifestly not. Is it something that has ever been found at all? Have we ever once set about to search for it and to ascertain it? We avail ourselves of it "all the time" without expressly taking it upon ourselves, and we constantly make use of it even though mostly without uttering it. The most trivial talk, heard everyday — e.g., "It's cold" — co-intends a "now, that..." Why does being-there, addressing things it takes care of, co-express, even though mostly without uttering it, a "now, that..." "until then, when..." "back then, when..."? It does so because the interpreting-addressing of ... co-expresses itself (i.e., it co-expresses a circumspectly understanding being-near beings at hand), and because this addressing-and-discussing that is also interpreting itself is grounded in a finding-present, and is possible only as this finding-present.¹

Waiting-for-and-retaining finding-present interprets itself. And this in turn is only possible because this finding-present — being in itself ecstically open is in each instance already disclosed for itself, and is articulable in an understanding-talking interpretation. Because temporality constitutes, ecstactically-horizonally, the cleared-ness of the there, it itself is, at its origin, already always interpretable in the there, and is in this way familiar. We call "time" this self-interpreting finding-present, i.e. what it is that is getting interpreted as it is addressed in the "now." What this evinces is simply that temporality, taken as ecstically open, is initially and mostly familiar only in this taking-care interpreted-ness. The "immediate" intelligibility and familiarity of time does not prevent primordial temporality (as well as the origin of expressed time, the origin fructifying itself from primordial temporality) from remaining unknown and unconceptualized.²

¹ Cf. §33, pp. 154 ff. [This is where Heidegger argues that assertion is based on circumspect interpretation. Heidegger's account of pre-calendrical "date-able" time leans heavily on his earlier account of the more primordial structure of "finding-present that waits-for and retains" — the temporality of being-in-world (e.g., pp. 353 f.). Cf. also §68 (d): the temporality of talk.]

² Cf. Augustine's Confessions, XI. 14: "So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I want to explicate it, I don't know." To his question "where" future and past could be (XI. 17), Heidegger would answer: right "here" in the thrownness and the projection of the there, these two co-gruing (in authenticity) to form a situation first revealing the moment, its history, and its destiny. In contrast, on Augustine's account, time is a kind of distensionem (XI. 13: stretched-ness) ultimately grounded in the soul (XI. 26: "... to me
II. Chapter Six: Temporality and Inner-timely-ness

That the structure of date-ability belongs to what is [in each instance already] interpreted with the “now,” “until then,” and “back then”: this becomes [when we detect it phenomenologically] the most elementary proof that whatever has been interpreted has its origin in temporality interpreting itself.* Saying “now,” we also understand always already, without having to say it, a [complementing] “—that there is this and that . . . .” But why? Because any “now” interprets a finding-present of beings.† In the “now, that . . . .” there lurks the ecstatic character of the present.† The date-ability of the “now,” “until then,” and “back then” is a reflection stemming from the ecstatic constitution of temporality; for this reason it is essential to expressed time itself. The structure of the date-ability of “now,” “until then,” and “back then” provides the evidence that these are themselves time, stemming as they do from temporality. Interpretive expression of the “now,” “until then,” and “back then” is the most primordial/* telling-time. And because, within the ecstatic unity of the temporality that, in date-ability, is understood unthematically (and not taken note of as such), being-there is in each instance already disclosed to itself as being-in-world (and along with this disclosure inner-worldly beings are uncovered), —because of all this, interpreted time also already has, in each instance, a dated-ness drawn from the beings arising for encounter within the disclosure of the there: “now, that — the door is slamming”; “now, that — the book is missing,” and the like.

On the basis of the same origin in ecstatic temporality, the horizons belonging to the “now,” “until then,” and “back then” also have the character of date-ability as “today, when . . . .”, “later on, when . . . .”, and “earlier on, when . . . .”

When waiting-for (understanding itself in the “until then”) interprets itself — and, as finding-present, understands, from its “now,” whatever it is waiting for — there already lies, in the “telling” of the “until then,” an “and not yet now.” The waiting-for that finds-present [already] understands the “until then.” The interpreting [essential to understanding] articulates this “until then” — namely, that it “has its time” — as the in-between that in turn has its own relational date-ability. This comes to expression in [the phrase] “meanwhile . . . .” Taking-care can then go on to articulate, in the manner of waiting-for, this “meanwhile” itself, inserting further tellings of “when.” The “until then” gets divided up into a number of [instances of] “from then . . . to then,” these however being already at the outset circumscribed within the waiting-for projection of the primary “until then.”* Along with waiting-for-and-finding-present understanding of a “during,” a “lasting” gets articulated. This duration is, once again, time: time as manifested in the self-interpretation of temporality. This time [as duration] is what gets understood unthematically as a “span” in the course of taking care of things. Finding-present, [essentially] waiting-for-and-retaining, lays out a spanned “during” only because it is thereby disclosed to itself as the ecstatic stretched-out-ness of historical temporality (even if this stretched-ness is not cognized as such). And here again there shows itself yet another feature of time getting “told.” Not only does the “during” have

---

*a closest [Heidegger suggests that “most primordial” is too strong here, even for the phenomenon of “telling what time it is.”]

* Heidegger is here offering an existential account of the “continuum,” construing it as a phenomenon of being-in-world: therefore as finite.
a span; with the structure of date-ability, every “now,” “until then,” and “back-then” has, instantially, a spanned-ness of variable expanse: “now” means during the break, during the meal, during the evening, during the summer; “then” means at breakfast, while ascending, and so on.

Taking-care (this as waiting-for, as retaining, and as finding-present) “takes its time” in one way or another, and tells time to itself as it is taking care of things — and it also does this without any (and prior to every) specifically calculative determination of time. Time hereby gets dated (in some mode of “taking its time” as is embedded in taking-care) from whatever is taken care of in the circum-world — and (in whatever is disclosed in attuned understanding) from what one is doing “all day long.” All according to whether being-there, as waiting-for, dissolves into what it takes care of (and, inattentive to itself, forgets itself), the time that being-there “takes” [to be doing whatever it is doing] remains concealed — precisely by this way of “taking” it. Precisely in “living from day to day,” taking care of things in the everyday manner, being-there never understands itself as coursing along in a continuously enduring sequence of pure “nows.” Owing to this concealment, the time being-there is taking has gaps, as it were. Often we cannot pull a “day” together when we review the “time” we spent. This un-togetherness of time-riddled-with-gaps is not at all a falling-to-pieces, but rather a mode of temporality — of temporality already disclosed, and ecstatically stretched out. The way in which the time being-there “takes” “runs its course,” and the manner in which taking-care more or less expressly tells time, can be phenomenally explicated in an...

§79. Temporality and the Heeding of Time

We earlier characterized authentic and inauthentic ex-sisting in reference to the modes of the fructification of temporality that founds such ex-sisting [cf. p. 348]. On that account, the irresoluteness of inauthentic ex-sistence fructifies itself in the mode of a finding-present that undoes waiting-for, and forgets. He who is irresponsible understands himself from the closest facts, figures, and incidents befellling him — as these arise for encounter in such finding-present, and pressure him in varying ways. Ever busy, losing himself in what he takes care of, he loses himself in the time he has. Thus the talk so characteristic of such a one: “I have no time.” Just as the one who ex-sists inauthentically is constantly running out of time and never “has any,” so it is the pre-eminence of the temporality of authentic ex-sistence that, in its irresoluteness, it never loses time and “always has time.”* For, in regard to its presence, the temporality of irresoluteness has the character of the moment. The authentic finding-present of a situation at such a moment does not itself take the lead, it is rather upheld in the future of its been-ness. Ex-sistence at a moment fructifies itself as a stretched-out-ness, destinedly whole — this construed as the authentic and historical constancy of the self. Ex-sistence that is temporal in this way “constantly” has time for whatever the situation demands of it.† Yet irresoluteness discloses the there in this way only as a situation. For this reason, what gets disclosed to one who is irresolute can never arise for encounter in such a way that he could ever lose his time in it irresolutely.

Factually, thrown being-there can “take out time,” and lose it, only because a “time” is granted to being-there — to being-there as ecstatically stretched-out temporality, along with the disclosedness (grounded in temporality) of the there.‡

* Cf. Goethe’s motto: “Without haste, but without rest.” I am grateful to Alex Colville for his remarks on this motto in a conversation at his summer cottage near Wolfville, Nova Scotia, in August of 1998.

† Here and elsewhere, Heidegger’s talk of “constancy” refers to the possibility of what moral philosophers have called “steadfastness” of character. Steadfast, we have no need of postulating a constancy behind the scenes (whether of soul or nature, of ego or thing-in-itself: these traditional terms may take on other, possibly “richer” and more demanding meanings in authenticity — as phenomena in no need of any postulation or justification).

‡ The term “being-there” derives its meaning from an event: that of temporality (congruence of been-ness of world and coming-upon of world — world as itself...
As a disclosed being, being-there ex-sists factically in the manner of being-with others. It holds itself in a public, in an average intelligibility. The “now, that . . .” and “until then, when . . .” — these as interpreted and expressed in everyday being-with-one-another—are basically understood, even if they are clearly dated only within certain limits. In our “closest” being-with-one-another, several of us can say “now” in “unison” while each dates the uttered “now” differently: “now that this or that has occurred . . . .” It is within the public sphere of being-with-one-another-in-world that each expresses the “now.” For this reason, i.e. on the basis of its ecstatic being-in-world, the interpreted and expressed time of any one being-there has also, as such, already become public. And inasmuch as everyday taking-care understands itself from the “world” it takes care of, it knows the time it takes out not as [privately] its own; rather, taking care of things, it “exploits” the time that “there is,” the time with which one reckons. Yet the more factual being-there expressly takes heed of time, the more urgent the public-ness of “time” becomes; it is here that being-there actually accounts for time.*

§80. The time that is heeded, and inner-timely-ness

So far, our first task has only been to understand how being-there, grounded in temporality, heeds time ex-sistingly, and how this time is made public for being-in-world while one is taking care of things interpretively. It has still remained entirely undetermined in just what way such expressed and public time “is” — whether it can even be addressed as something that is. Prior to any decision regarding whether public time “is after all only subjective” or whether it is “objectively real” or neither the one nor the other, we must first of all determine more sharply the phenomenal character of public time.

The becoming-public of time does not happen “after the fact” and merely on occasion. Rather, because, as ecstatic-temporal, being-there is in each instance already disclosed, and because to ex-sistence belongs a “nothingness,” so that it can open out on to the ownmost ability-to-be of what arises within, or through it).

* An example of Heidegger’s phenomenological procedure: we first strain (intellectually) to bring our “subject” (here, time) into view as it brings itself into view (pre-intellectually) — so that our own account (intellation) is already grounded, and can take the form of a response rather than a deduction or an induction (let alone a concoction).

Although the heeding of time can unfold from circum-worldly affairs in the manner we characterized as dating things, this still basically happens, always already, within the horizon of the kind of heeding of time that we know as astronomical and calendrical reckoning of time. This latter does not just incidentally occur; it rather has its existential-ontological necessity in the basic constitution of being-there as care. Because being-there, by its very nature as thrown, ex-sists collapsingly, it interprets its time heedfully in the manner of a reckoning of it. In this reckoning, the “real” becoming public of time gets fructified — so that we must say: the thrownness of being-there is the reason “there is” public time. In order to secure a possible intelligibility for the demonstration that public time originates from factical temporality, we had to characterize in advance the time interpreted in the temporality of taking-care [§79] — if nothing else, to make it clear that the nature of heeding time does not lie in the application of numerical determinations in the course of dating things. For this reason, we may not rightly look to the quantification of time for what is existential-ontologically decisive about the reckoning of time; rather, we must conceive it more primordially as based on the temporality of being-there as it [already, pre-quantitatively] reckons with time.

“Public time” proves to be the time “in which” inner-worldly beings, at hand and on hand, arise for encounter. This requires us to call these beings (those not taking their measure from being-there) inner-timely. Our [up-coming] interpretation of inner-timely-ness forges a more primordial insight into the nature of “public time” — and also makes it possible for us to delimit its “being.”

The being of being-there is care. As a thrown being, this one being ex-sists collapsingly. Abandoned to the “world” uncovered in its factical there, and relying on this “world” as it takes care of it, being-there waits for its ability-to-be-in-world in a way that “reckons” with and “counts” on whatever it is pre-eminently bound up with — doing this, ultimately, for the sake of that ability-to-be. Everyday circum-spect being-in-world has need of the possibility of vision, i.e. it has need of light, in order to be able to move caringly around with at-hand beings within [a sphere of] on-hand beings. Along with the factual disclosedness of its world, nature understanding-interpretation, time has already become public in the course of taking care of things. One takes one’s cues from time, so that time must somehow be available to everyone.
is uncovered for being-there.* In its thrownness, it is consigned to the change of day and night. The one provides the light for possible vision, the other takes it away.

Circumspectly and caringly waiting for the possibility of vision, and understanding itself in its daily work, being-there starts its time with "when the day comes." The "when" here heeded gets dated in reference to whatever, in some very close circum-worldly context of bindings, is interconnecting with the dawn: the rise of the sun. Then, when the sun rises, it will be time to . . . . As a result, being-there dates the time it must take out, doing so from whatever it is that arises for encounter in the horizon of its abandonment to the world—arising, that is, within its world as something with which, for its circumspect ability-to-be-in-world, it is pre-eminently bound up. Taking-care makes use of the "being-at-hand" of the sun as it expends light and warmth. The sun dates the time that gets interpreted in taking-care. Out of this dating, there grows the "most natural" measure of time: the day. And because the temporality of being-there (that time must be taken out) is finite, its days are also already numbered. The "so long as it's daylight" offers to taking-care-waiting-for the possibility to determine "ahead of time" the "when" of whatever must be taken care of—i.e., to divide up the day. This division of the day again unfolds with a view to what dates time: the courseing sun. Just as sun-rise, so too are sun-down and mid-day pre-eminent "locations" that this heavenly body occupies. Being-there—thrown into its world, fructifyingly bestowing time upon itself—takes account of the sun's coursing-by in regular cycles. Owing to its dating-interpretation of time (prefigured by being-there's thrownness into the there), the happening of being-there is a day-by-day happening.

This dating [of and in the day], unfolding in reference to the heavens (from the one body expending light and warmth, and from its pre-eminent "locations") is a time-telling that, within certain limits, can unfold (with initial agreement) in our being-with-one-another—under the same heaven— for everyone anytime, and in the same manner. What here does the dating is available in our circum-world, and yet not restricted to any particular instrumental world taken care of.* Rather [than posing any restriction], it is in this world that the natural environment and the public circum-world are co-uncovered.† Upon such public dating, in which everyone can tell his own time, everyone can also count: such dating makes use of a measure that is publicly available. This dating reckons with time in the sense of measuring time, a measuring that then needs a measure of time, i.e. a clock. In sum: along with the temporality of being-there — this being as thrown, abandoned to "world," and generating time — already some sort of "clock" is uncovered; that is, some at-hand being which, in its regular cyclical movement, has become accessible in waiting-for finding-present.‡ Thrown being-near at-hand beings is grounded in temporality. Temporality is the ground of [there being] clocks. As the condition of the possibility of the factual necessity of clocks, temporality also conditions their un-cover-ability; for only the finding-present (this as waiting-for and retaining) of the sun's course (this as arising for encounter within the uncoveredness of inner-worldly beings) makes possible and also requires (as the finding-present interprets itself) a dating in reference to at-hand beings in a public circum-world.

The "natural" clock—in each instance already uncovered along with the factual thrownness of being-there as grounded in temporality—first motivates, and also makes possible, the production and use of clocks of a more handy sort—and in such a way that these more "artificial" ones must be "set" according to the "natural" one if they are to make accessible the time that is uncovered in a primary way by the natural clock.

Before we characterize the chief features of the development of time-reckoning, and of clock-usage, in their existential-ontological meaning, we should first characterize more fully the time that is heeded ["taken care of"] in the measuring of time. If it is the measuring of time that first "really" makes heeded time public, then public time must be

---

* Heidegger's phenomenological analysis has all along intended to show how each of the prime "subjects" of traditional metaphysics first becomes an issue in being-there itself (here, "nature" — elsewhere, cognition, obligation, community, self and, eventually, the divine).

† Cf. §15, pp. 66 ff. [Cf. more exactly the paragraph on pp. 70-71.]

‡ The sun, initially the expender of light and warmth within an at-hand world, easily becomes on hand (as does the moon in its cycles). In contrast, instruments such as a water-clock, sand-clock, sun-clock, wall-clock, wrist-watch are at hand, along with other instruments.
Only here and on p. 83 does Heidegger speak of “suitability” and “unsuitability,” the earlier instance in regard to tools and the like.

The term “world-time” was introduced, in anticipation, on p. 404. It refers, of course, to the time of the public sphere, and this has the character of “the time for . . . ” or “the wrong time for . . . .” 

The dating of the self-interpretating “then, when” that arises within taking-care waiting-for includes already: “then, when the day dawns, it is time for the day’s work.” The time interpreted in taking-care is in each instance already understood as “time for . . . .” Any instance of “now that this or that [is occurring]” is as such either suitable or unsuitable [for doing something]. The “now”—just as any mode of interpreted time—is not only a “now, that . . . .” but rather, as this essentially date-able [reference], also essentially determined by the [entire] structure of suitability and unsuitability. The term “world-time” was introduced, in anticipation, on p. 404. It refers, of course, to the time of the public sphere, and this has the character of “the time for . . . ” or “the wrong time for . . . .”

The dating of the self-interpretating “then, when” that arises within taking-care waiting-for includes already: “then, when the day dawns, it is time for the day’s work.” The time interpreted in taking-care is in each instance already understood as “time for . . . .” Any instance of “now that this or that [is occurring]” is as such either suitable or unsuitable [for doing something]. The “now”—just as any mode of interpreted time—is not only a “now, that . . . .” but rather, as this essentially date-able [reference], also essentially determined by the [entire] structure of suitability and unsuitability.

Right at its heart, interpreted time has the character of “the time for . . . ” or “the wrong time for . . . .” The finding-present (essentially waiting-for and retaining) essential to taking-care understands time in relation to a where-to—one ultimately anchored in a for-the-sake-of-which of the ability-to-be of being-there. With this relation of the in-order-to, time-made-public manifests the structure that we earlier got to know as signification. This it is that constitutes the worldliness of world. As time-for . . . , time-made-public has, essentially, the character of world. For this reason, we call the time becoming public in the fructification of temporality: world-time. 

And [we name it so] not because it is [supposedly] on hand as an inner-worldly being (something it can never be), but because it belongs to world in the meaning [of this term] as we have interpreted it existential-ontologically. In what follows, it must be shown just how the essential relations of the structure of world (e.g., the “in-order-to”) hang together with public time (e.g., the “until then, when”)—hang together, that is, on the basis of the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality. In any event, we can only now characterize, in its complete structure, heeded time: it is date-able, spanned, public; and, as so structured, it belongs to world itself. Every natural-everyday expression of time—e.g., “now”—has this structure and is understood as such, even though unthematically and pre-conceptually, as being-there, taking care of things, takes its time.

In the disclosedness of the natural clock—the disclosedness belonging to thrown-collapsing and ex-sisting being-there—there also lies a pre-eminent becoming-public of heeded time, one in each instance already accomplished by a factual being-there. As the reckoning of time becomes perfected and the use of clocks becomes more refined, this becoming-public gets ever-more intensified and confirmed. It is not the intention here to present historiographically the historical development of time-reckoning and clock-use in their possible variations. Let us rather ask, existential-ontologically: Which mode of the fructification of the temporality of being-there becomes manifest in the direction in which time-reckoning and clock-use take on their form? As we answer this question, a more primordial understanding must mature regarding how time-measuring (and that also includes the explicit becoming-public of heeded time) is grounded in the temporality of being-there—and in a very determinate fructification thereof.

If we compare “primitive” being-there (which we took as the basis of our analysis of “natural” time-measuring) with “advanced” being-there, it becomes evident that, for the latter, the day and the presence of the sun no longer have any preferential function, since it has the “advantage” of being able to make even the night into day. So, too, it no longer needs to look directly at the sun and its position for determining the time. The manufacture and employment of our own measuring instruments allow us to read the time directly off a clock produced just for that purpose. “What time it is” becomes “How much time there is.” Although it may well remain concealed in any instance of reading off the time, even the use of an instrumental clock is grounded in the temporality of being-there, since a clock (one construed as making possible a public time-reckoning) will have to be set to the “natural” one. And this temporality is what first makes possible, along with the disclosedness of the there, a dating of heeded time. Our [historical] understanding that develops along with the progressive uncovering of nature provides instructions for novel possibilities of measuring time, ones relatively independent of the day and the concomitantly explicit observation of the heavens.

* Only here and on p. 83 does Heidegger speak of “suitability” and “unsuitability,” the earlier instance in regard to tools and the like.

† Cf. §18, pp. 83 ff. and §69(c), pp. 364 ff.

‡ The term “world-time” was introduced, in anticipation, on p. 404. It refers, of course, to the time of the public sphere, and this as grounded in world. As fructified from temporality (been-as-ness as futural, occasionally engendering a present situation), world-time precedes the global time of interest in international affairs.

* Recall that “heeded time” means the time that (1) arises “naturally” in taking care of things (heeding things within a circum-world) and (2) “receives attention” itself (in the ordering of taking-care).
Yet, in a certain manner, even “primitive” being-there already frees itself from having to read time directly off the heavens — inasmuch, namely, as it does not ascertain the position of the sun but rather measures the shadow cast by some being that is always available. First of all, such can happen in the simplest form of the “peasant clock” in antiquity: in the very shadow that accompanies everyone of us, the sun is encountered in regard to its ever-varying presence at different places. During the day, the different shadow-lengths can “at any time” be paced off. Even if individual lengths of both body and feet differ [from person to person], the relation of the two nonetheless remains constant (within certain limits of exactitude). For example, the public time-determination of an appointment, one arising in the course of taking care of things, takes the form: “Let's meet there when the shadow is so-many-feet long.” Making such arrangements in being-with-one-another in the narrow limits of a close-by circum-world, one implicitly presupposes that the “location” where one is pacing off the shadow stays at the same latitude [of the globe]. This is a clock that being-there does not even have to wear or carry along: it is itself, in a certain way, the clock.*

We need not further describe [the workings of] a public sundial, in which a shadow-line moves along a numbered course, in parallel with the course of the sun. But why is it that we find something like time at each position occupied by the shadow on the dial? Neither the shadow nor the divided track is time itself, nor is the spatial relation between the two. Where, then, is the time that we directly read off the “sundial”—and also off any pocket-watch?

What does it mean to read off time? Surely “looking at the clock”

* “The Greeks invented the peasant clock.” Heidegger says in his 1925 Kasseler lectures (Dilthey-Jahrbuch, Vol. 8, p. 170); in his note on p. 418 below, he states the source of these remarks: Diels’ Antike Technik (pp. 158-160). In his Decline of the West (1918), “The Idea of Destiny and the Principle of Causality,” Oswald Spengler comments extensively on this same source. Elsewhere in Being and Time Heidegger alludes to the bodily condition of being-there only in his commentaries on Descartes, the fable of cura, Count Yorck, and the traditional notion of the synthesis of soul and body. Cf. Medard Boss’ Zollikon Seminars, 3 March 1972, where Heidegger responds at some length to Jean-Paul Sartre’s reproach that “in all of Being and Time there are only six lines about the body.” See also Collected Works, Vol. 82, p. 9. Does not just mean that we observe some at-hand instrument in its changes, following the positions of a pointer. Making use of a clock to determine what time it is, we say (whether expressly or not): “now it’s such-and-such time,” “now it’s time to . . . ” —or “there’s still time . . . , namely until . . . .” Looking at the clock is grounded in, and receives its direction from, taking time out [for something]. What it was that showed itself in the most elementary reckoning of time becomes even more clear here: any looking to a clock to orient ourselves in reference to time is essentially a now-saying. This is so “self-evident” that we don’t notice it at all—and even less do we know that, in each instance, the now is already understood, and interpreted, in its full structural content of dateable-ness, spanned-ness, public-ness, and worldly-ness.

Yet now-saying is the articulation (in talk) of a finding-present that shows itself in its unity with a retentive waiting-for. The dating accomplished in the use of a clock proves to be a pre-eminent finding-present of an on-hand being. Dating does not simply take up a relation toward an on-hand being; rather, the taking-up-a-relation itself has the character of measuring. And indeed, we can immediately read off the number involved in the measurement. Yet this implies that we understand how the unit of measurement is contained within the stretch to be measured; i.e., that we determine how often this unit is present in the stretch. Measuring is constituted temporally in the finding-present of a unit of measurement that presents itself in a present stretch. The unchangeability lying in the idea of a unit of measurement means that, for anyone at anytime, the unit must be on hand in its constancy. The [kind of] dating of heeded time that measures it interprets it by way of a looking at on-hand beings that finds them present; and these beings are accessible —[1] as a unit of measurement and [2] as something measured —only in a pre-eminent [kind of] finding-present. Because finding-present of things presenting themselves has a special primacy in any dating that measures, the measuring of time occurring when it is read off a clock takes on an expression of its own, along with the now [of the time-determination]. Thus it is that the measuring of time unfolds in a becoming public of time wherein time arises in each instance, at anytime and for anyone, as “now and now and now.” This “universal” time, accessible in clocks, we now come across as an on-hand manifold of times, it seems, without the measuring of time being directed toward time as such.
Because the temporality of factical being-in-world makes the disclosure of space primordially possible — and because spatial being-there has in each instance allocated to itself, in reference to an uncovered over-there, a here taking its measure from being-there — the time heeded in the temporality of being-there is, in regard to its date-ability, in each instance bound to one place of being-there. It is not that time is tied to a place; rather, temporality is the condition of the possibility for dating to bind itself to something spatial-locative, and in a way that allows this to be binding for everyone as a measure. It's not that time first gets coupled with space; rather, the space supposedly to be “coupled” only arises for encounter on the basis of time-begetting temporality. In keeping with the foundation of clocks and time-reckoning in the temporality of being-there — the temporality that constitutes being-there as an historical being — it can be shown to what extent the use of clocks is itself ontologically historical, and the extent to which every clock has, as such, a “history.”*1

The time that becomes public in time-measurement does not at all become space by the fact that the dating stems from measured spatial relations. Nor are we to seek what is existential-ontologically essential in measuring time in the fact that the dated “time” gets determined numerically in reference to stretches of space, and to the changes in location of a spatial thing. Rather, what is ontologically decisive lies in the kind of finding-present making measuring possible. Dating in reference to beings “spatially” on hand [shadows, sundials, watches] does not in the least spatialize time; rather, such supposed spatializing signifies nothing less than finding beings present: beings on hand, in their presence, for everyone in every now. In the measuring of time — a measuring which, by its very essence, necessarily includes now-saying —

the being measured is forgotten, as it were, in the course of one's taking its measure, so that one does not find anything besides stretch and number.*

The less being-there can, in its heeding of time, afford to lose time, the more “costly” time becomes and the more handy clocks have to be. Not only must one tell time “more exactly,” the very act of determining what time it is should take as little time as possible, all the while also agreeing with how others tell time.

Our provisional task has only been to point up the “connection” of clock-use with temporality in its mode of taking time out. Just as the concrete analysis of developed astronomical time-reckoning belongs within the existential-ontological interpretation of nature-discovery, so too we can only exposit the fundament of calendrical, historiographical “chronology” from within the domain of tasks belonging to the existential analysis of historiographical cognition.1

* As he will make clear in a footnote on p. 432, Heidegger is here contesting the reduction of time to space as readers may find it in the works of Henri Bergson.


The two works that laid the foundations for the development of historiographical chronology are: Josephus Justus Scaliger, De emendatione temporum (1583) and Dionysius Petavius, S.J., Opus de doctrina temporum (1627). [Readers might recall that Heidegger's habilitation dissertation of 1915 was devoted to medieval doctrines.]


The measuring of time makes time prominently public, so that it is in this manner that what we usually mean by “time” takes familiar shape. In our taking care of things, each is assigned “its time”: each thing “has” its time, and (just as any inner-worldly being) it can “have” it only because it is, precisely, “in time.” The time with which we are familiar—the time “within which” inner-worldly beings arise for encounter—is world-time. Because of its basis in the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality to which it belongs, this time has the same transcendence as does world itself. With the disclosedness of world, world-time becomes public, so that every temporally heedful being-near inner-worldly beings understands, circumspectly, these beings as arising for encounter “in time.”

The time “in which” on-hand beings move and rest is not “objective” if by this expression we mean the being-on-hand-by-themselves of beings arising for encounter. But neither is time “subjective” if by this we understand being-on-hand and coming-up within a [human] “subject.” World-time is “more objective” than any possible object because, as the condition of the possibility of inner-worldly beings, it is in each instance already ecstatical-horizontal, with the disclosedness of world, getting “objected.”* Thus, too, and contrary to Kant’s view, world-time occurs just as immediately in regard to physical affairs as it does in regard to psychic affairs, and not in the physical by way of a detour through the psychical. Initially, “time” shows itself precisely in regard to the heavens, i.e. where one finds it by orienting oneself according to it—so that “time” is even identified with the [movement of the] heavens.

But world-time is also “more subjective” than any possible subject because, in the rightly understood meaning of care as the being of the factically ex-sisting self, it first makes this being [of being-there] possible. “Time” is on hand neither in the “subject” nor in the “object,” it is modern developments of chronology.

* I.e., “cast up”—the original sense of the verb “to object” (as a noun, an “object” is either an obstacle to be overcome or an aim to be achieved). It is no coincidence that Heidegger objects to the modern supposition that we can fruitfully begin by analyzing our engagement with “objects.” By analyzing being-there as thrown both back into and forward onto a world, Heidegger allows for a richer understanding of what, in our environment or in our entourage, might emerge in modes other than that of being thrown at us (the modern supposition that other things and other people are essentially threats).

§80. Heeded Time, and Inner-timely-ness

neither “inside” nor “outside”: it is “earlier” than any subjectivity or objectivity—because it confers the condition of the very possibility for [there being] any such “earlier.” So does it have any “being” at all? And if not, is it then a phantom—or does it have “more being” than any one possible being?* Any investigation pushing farther in this direction will come up against the same “limitation” that was erected already in our provisional discussion of the connection between truth and being.† However we may answer these questions in what follows—or, rather, however they may be first posed in a primordial manner—our immediate task is to understand that, as ecstatical-horizontal, temporality fructifies the sort of world-time that constitutes an inner-timely-ness of at-hand and on-hand beings. But then, strictly speaking, these beings can never rightly be called “temporal.” As any being not taking its measure from being-there—whether it arises as “real” (coming into being and passing away) or subsists as “ideal”—such beings are non-temporal.†

* Heidegger’s questions here parallel the assertions in Plato’s Republic (508e-509b): ἦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (vision of the good), or rather ἦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξις (being settled into the good), is the ground of truth—so that the good is not οὐσία (being) but rather ἐπεκείνα τῆς οὐσίας (beyond being). In his Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Collected Works, Vol. 24, p. 436), Heidegger explicitly draws the parallel:

In its ecstatic-horizontal unity, temporality is the basic condition of the possibility of έπεκείνα, i.e. of the transcendence constituting being-there itself. Temporality is even the basic condition of the possibility of all understanding that has its ground in transcendence…

He has already argued (§69) that “world is transcendent” (p. 366)—is itself a clearing grounded in care, so that the Platonic image of an ontic source for the much-needed light is misleading (p. 350).

† Cf. §44 (c), pp. 226 ff. [For example: “Truth first makes it possible for us to presuppose anything”—to paraphrase, slightly, the comment on the top of p. 228.]

† These two sentences should give pause for thought. Only world (or being-there) is temporal; what arises for encounter is “temporal” only inasmuch as it arises “through” our worldly dealings. By-passing the phenomenon of world, our entire intellectual tradition nonetheless recognizes that “something” is non-temporal—namely, “what beings need to be” (what’s real: Plato) or our own “logic” of responding to them (what’s ideal: Kant), whereupon things initially appearing (in sensation) are called temporal. By reserving “time” for being-there, Heidegger paves the way for other ways of understanding what
If, then, world-time belongs to the fructification of temporality, it can neither be “subjectively” volatilized nor, in a spurious “objectification,” be “reified.” Both can be avoided — insightfully, and not simply by oscillating in uncertainty between the two possibilities — only if we come to understand how everyday being-there theoretically conceives of time on the basis of the intelligibility of time closest to it, and to what extent this concept of time (i.e., its predominance) thwarts its possibility of understanding, in reference to primordial time, what such intelligibility means — thwarts, that is, the possibility of understanding this meaning as temporality. Everyday, time-getting taking care of things finds “time” in [its dealings with] inner-worldly beings as these arise for encounter “in time.” For this reason, the elucidation of the genesis of the ordinary concept of time must start with inner-timely-ness.

§81. Inner-timely-ness and the genesis of the ordinary concept of time

How does anything like “time” initially show itself to everyday circumspect taking-care? In what kind of dealings — dealings in which one takes care of things and employs instruments — does time become expressly accessible?

If time becomes public along with the disclosedness of world, and if time is always already heeded along with the uncoveredness of inner-worldly beings belonging to the disclosedness of world — inasmuch as being-there calculates time along with figuring itself out — then it is in the employment of clocks that we will find the comportment in which “one” expressly orients oneself with a view to time. The existential-temporal meaning of such employment proves to be a finding-present of a pointer that shifts its position. As one follows these positions, one counts. This finding-present fructifies itself in the ecstatic unity of a retaining that is also a waiting-for. To retain the “back then” while also finding it present means: to be open, in now-saying, for the horizon of the earlier, i.e. of the now-no-longer. To wait-for the “until then” while also finding it present means: to be open, in now-saying, for the horizon of the later, i.e. of the now-not-yet. Time is what shows itself in such finding-present.* How are we then to define the time that is manifest within the horizon of the circumspect, time-taking and taking-care employment of clocks? This time is what gets counted as one follows, while finding-present and counting what shows itself, a pointer that shifts its position — and this in such a way that finding-present fructifies itself in ecstatic unity with the retaining and waiting-for horizontally open to the earlier and the later. But this is nothing else than the existential-ontological exposition of the definition Aristotle offers for time: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀρίθμος κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ δεύτερον — “For this, namely, is time: what’s counted in encountered movement within the horizon of the earlier and the later.”\(^1\) While this definition might sound weird at first hearing, it is “self-evident,” and genuinely derived, once we have delimited the existential-ontological horizon from which Aristotle obtained it. For Aristotle, the origin of such manifest time does not become a problem. Rather, his interpretation of time takes the direction provided by the “natural” understanding of being. However, because it is precisely this understanding, as well as the being it understands, that our current investigation basically intends to turn into a problem, we can thematically interpret the Aristotelian analysis of time only after unravelling the question of being — and this in such a way that his analysis takes on a basic significance for appropriating positively, and within critical limits, ancient ontology’s positioning of the question.\(^2\)

Every subsequent discussion of the concept of time has basically kept to the Aristotelian definition; that is, each makes time thematic as it shows itself in circumspect taking-care. Time is “what gets counted” — i.e. what gets declared (and, even when remaining unthematic, meant) in the finding-present of a pointer (or a shadow) shifting its position. In this finding-present of what is getting moved, one says: “now here, now here, . . . .” What gets counted are the nows. And these nows show themselves “in each case” as “just-no-longer” and “not-quite-yet.” We call now-time the world-time that is thus sighted in the employment of clocks.

The more “naturally” one reckons with time in time-generating

* Heidegger is here summarizing the results of his analysis in §79, pp. 406 ff.

\(^{1}\) Cf. *Physics*, Book Four, 219 b 1 ff. [Heidegger translates κατά, “regarding,” as “within the horizon of”: much of *Being and Time* intends to show that and how things make sense in contexts that vary.]

\(^{2}\) Cf. §6, pp. 19-27 [on the destructuring of the history of ancient ontology].
II. Chapter Six: Temporality and Inner-timely-ness

On p. 407 Heidegger first introduced date-ability as a feature of the full structure of time. In reference to Plato’s famous image (Republic, Book 10), we might say that sequential time makes sense “at the third remove from the truth,” while world-time makes sense at the “first remove.” What’s going on with this interpretation of heeded world-time?

We obtain the answer by recurring to the full structure of world-time and comparing this essential structure with what the ordinary understanding of time discerns. Date-ability was the first essential factor of heeded time that we exposited. Such date-ability is grounded in the ecstatic constitution of temporality. Any now is essentially a “now, that . . . .” Each date-able now understood in taking-care is, whether or not comprehended as such, one that is suitable or unsuitable [for . . .]. To the structure of the now belongs signification. For this reason we called heeded time world-time. In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of nows, both date-ability and signification are missing. The characterization of time as a pure sequence prevents both these structures from “coming to the fore.” The ordinary interpretation of time covers them up. By way of this cover-up, the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality (in which date-ability and signification are grounded) gets levelled down. The nows are, as it were, sheered of their relationality and, thus sheered, are simply lined up with one another to form a succession.

This cover-up of world-time through levelling-down, effected by the ordinary understanding of time, does not happen by chance. Rather, precisely because the everyday interpretation of time keeps its vision directed solely to the common intelligibility evident in taking-care, and understands only what “shows” itself within the horizon of such intelligibility, these structures [date-ability and signification] must escape its notice. As one takes care of things at hand and on hand, the now that one counts, in taking care to measure the time, is co-understood. Then, when this heeding of time turns toward such co-understood time and “contemplates” it, it sees the nows (which are indeed somehow “there” as well) within the horizon of that understanding of being by which this heeding, this taking-care, is also constantly guided. Thus the nows are, in a certain way, also co-on-hand: that is, beings arise for encounter along with their nows. Even though it does not get explicitly said [by philosophers] that these nows are on hand the way things are, they are nevertheless “seen” ontologically within the horizon of the idea of on-hand-ness. Now pass, and the passed nows constitute the past. Now arrive, and those arriving delimit the “future.” The ordinary [philosophical] interpretation of world-time as now-time is cut off from the horizon that would allow it access to anything like world, signification, and date-ability. These structures necessarily remain covered up — all the more so as the ordinary interpretation of time consolidates this cover-up by the manner in which it conceptually develops its characterization of time.

The sequence of nows is taken as something somehow on hand; for this sequence itself shifts “into time.” We say: the now is in every now, yet in every now the now is also already disappearing. Or: in every now the now is now, and therefore constantly present as the same, even if in each now there is another that is coming and going. Precisely as changing in this way, the now shows also its constant presence. It was this view of time as a sequence of nows coming and going that drove Plato to call time an image of eternity: εικω δ’ επενοει κινητον τινα αιωνος ποιηναι, και διακοσµων δια ουρανον ποιει αιωνιον εικονα, τουτον δη χρονον ωνοµασθαιν. 1

The sequence of nows is uninterrupted and gapless. No matter how

1 Cf. Plato’s Timaeus, 37D [from the creation myth: “. . .and so he decided to make a moving image of eternity; and while ordering the heavens he made an eternal one, an image abiding in oneness regarding number, this being what we call time”].
“far” we proceed in “dividing” a now, it is still always a now. Within the horizon of such an indissoluble and on-hand being, one detects the steadiness of time. Orienting oneself ontologically in reference to a constantly on-hand being [the heavens, or a clock], one tries to find the problem of the continuity of time, or lets it stand as an impasse. In all this (since such time is, together with ecstatically founded date-ablelessness, spanned), the specific structure of world-time must remain covered up. The spannedness of time is not [here] understood from the horizontal stretched-out-ness of the ecstatic unity of temporality that has become public in heading time [as explicated on p. 409]. That in each ever so momentary now there is already a now: this must be [properly] understood as stemming from one still “earlier,” one from which every now derives; it must be conceptualized as stemming from the ecstatic stretched-ness of temporality, something to which every continuity of an on-hand being remains foreign but which in its turn presents the condition of the possibility of access to anything steadily on hand [like the heavens, or a clock].

The main thesis of the ordinary interpretation of time — that time is “infinite” — most emphatically manifests the levelling-down and covering-up of world-time, and therewith of temporality itself, that lurk in such interpretation. Time offers itself initially as an uninterrupted succession of nows. Every now is also already a “just gone” and a “just coming.” If one adheres primarily and exclusively to this succession when characterizing time, one is prevented in principle from finding in it any beginning or end. Each and every previous now is, as a now, always already a just-gone-and-no-longer, thus time in the sense of no-longer-now: of the past. Each and every coming now is a just-coming-and-not-yet, therefore time in the sense of still-not-yet: of the “future.” Time is then end-less “on both sides.” — This thesis regarding time becomes possible only because one orients oneself toward a free-floating in-itself of an on-hand course of nows, whereupon the full phenomenon of the now — date-ableness, worldliness, spanned-ness, and the placed-ness special to being-there — is covered up and has sunk into an unrecognizable fragment. If one “thinks” the succession of nows through “to the end,” directing oneself toward being-on-hand or not-being-on-hand, one will never be able to find an end. From the fact that this thinking through of time must in each instance always think of still more time, one concludes that time itself is without end, i.e. infinite.

But wherein are grounded this levelling-down of world-time and covering-up of temporality? In the being of being-there itself — which, by way of preparation, we interpreted as care.1 Thrown and collapsing, being-there is initially and mostly lost in what it takes care of. In this lostness, there is evinced the covering-up, the flight of being-there from its authentic ex-sistence, which we characterized as readying resoluteness. In this flight, fraught with care, lurks flight in the face of death, i.e. a looking-away from the end of being-in-world.2 This looking-away-from . . . is in itself a mode of ecstatic futural being-toward-the-end. As such looking away from its endly-ness, its finitude, the inauthentic temporality of collapsing everyday being-there must misconstrue its authentic futural-ness, and therewith temporality in general.3 And if then the ordinary understanding of being-there takes its guidance from the one, the self-forgetting “representation” of the “infinitude” of public time can really consolidate itself. The one never dies because it is not able to die, seeing that death is instantially mine and can only be authentically understood existentially in readying resoluteness. The one, which can never die and which misconstrues being-toward-death, still gives to the flight from death a characteristic interpretation. It “always still has time” before the end.4 Here a “having time” is evinced that means “being able

* This paragraph responds to the arguments inaugurated by Aristotle; besides his Physics, see also his Metaphysics, e.g. 1067 a 28 ff. (time is infinite, ιδιαιτερος, because it is tied to the before and after of movedness, κνυστις) and 1020 a 30 (time is continuous, συνεχης, because, as tied to the movedness of what is moved, it is divisible, διαιρετος). In the first two of his “antinomies of pure reason” Kant shows that arguments about the infinitely large and the infinitely small, whether pro or contra, imply a stance incompatible with fulfilled cognition; yet Kant still assumes the primacy of on-hand-ness.

1 Cf. §41, pp. 191 ff.
2 Cf. §51, pp. 245 ff.
3 In the sense defined in Plato’s Laws (at 817B). Being and Time is a tragedy: the rehearsal (representation: µυθησις) of the best and noblest — but this as a possibility, and therefore as including the “missing” or “loss” of the best and the noblest. One difference, perhaps: Heidegger keeps the διαιρετικα intrinsically embedded within being-there itself.

* Compare this sense of “having time” with the authentic “having time” explicated on p. 410.
to waste it”: “there’s now still time for . . ., and then also for . . ., and still for . . ., and then for . . .” What’s understood here is nothing like the finitude of time, but rather the opposite: taking-care intends to amass as much as possible from the time that is still coming and “continuing.” Publicly, time is something each takes, and can take. The levelled-down sequence of nows remains entirely unrecognizable in relation to its provenance from the temporality of individual being-there within everyday being-with-one-another. How could it ever in the least affect “the course of time” that someone “in time” should no longer ex-sist? Time goes on just as it had “before” when that someone “entered life.” One recognizes time only as public—a time that, levelled down, belongs to everyone, i.e. to nobody.

Yet, just as in the evasion of death the one in flight is pursued by it—just as one must see it to turn away from it—so too even the infinitesequence of nows, a harmless sequence simply running its course, still hangs “over” being-there in a remarkably enigmatic way. Why do we say, “time passes,” and not just as pointedly, “time emerges”? With a view to the pure sequence of nows, both can be said with equal justification. In the end, when talking about the passing of time, being-there understands more about time than it would like to admit; that is, the temporality in which world-time fructifies itself is, for all the covering-up, not fully closed off. The talk about time passing gives expression to the “experience” that time cannot be stopped. This “experience” is, in its turn, only possible on the basis of a volition to stop time. Herein lies an inauthentic waiting for “moments” — a waiting-for that immediately forgets those that are slipping by. This waiting-for of inauthentic exist-ence, one finding-present and forgetting, is the condition of the possibility of the ordinary experience of a passing . . . It is only from the temporality of being-there, and from the fructification of this temporality, that it becomes intelligible why and how world-time belongs to temporality. Our interpretation of the full structure of world-time, an interpretation drawn from [our previous insight into] temporality, first provides the guiding thread allowing us to arises for encounter.” While the parallel with psychoanalysis is evident, the difference is suggested by Medard Boss in the collection Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), pp. 34-35:

He could hardly believe that anyone so intelligent as Freud could come up with such artificial, inhuman, even absurd and purely fictive constructions for homo sapiens. It made him ill just to read them. His mood was more conciliatory when considering Freud’s “technical writings,” those containing Freud’s suggestions for following up therapeutic analyses with practical applications in the treatment of those suffering neuroses. Heidegger immediately noted the crass self-contradiction between the two: the unbridgeable gap separating the absolute scientific determinism of Freud’s theory and the repeated emphasis on liberating the patient by way of psychoanalytic practice. 

“see” the cover-up lying in the ordinary concept of time, and to assess the levelling-down of the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality. And taking our orientation from the temporality of being-there also allows us to point up the provenance as well as the factual necessity of this levelling-down cover-up, and to probe the ordinary theses regarding time for their justification.

In contrast, temporality remains inaccessible from the opposite direction, namely from within the horizon of the ordinary understanding of time. Yet because, in the order of possible interpretation, now-time not only must receive its orientation from temporality but only gets fructified in the inauthentic temporality of being-there, we are justified in claiming for temporality the status of primordial time, now-time being derived from it [first claimed on p. 329].

Ecstatic-horizontal temporality fructifies itself primarily out of the future. In contrast, the ordinary understanding of time sees in the now the basic phenomenon of time — in the pure now that has been sheered in its full structure, and that one calls “the present.” These considerations allow us to see that it must, in principle, be futile to start from this now to elucidate (or even to derive) the ecstatic-horizontal phenomenon of the moment, a phenomenon belonging to authentic temporality. Correspondingly, the ecstatically understood future, the dateable and signifying “until then,” does not coincide with the ordinary concept of “future” understood as the pure now that has not yet arrived and is only about to come. Just as little does ecstatic been-ness, the dateable and signifying “back then” cover the same ground as does the concept of the past understood as a pure now gone by. The now is not pregnant with the not-yet-now; rather, the present springs from the future within the primordial ecstatic unity of the fructification of temporality.1

1 That the traditional concept of eternity — in the sense of the “standing now” (nunc stans) — is drawn from the ordinary understanding of time, and is delimited within an orientation toward the idea of a “constant” on-hand-ness: this needs no extensive discussion. If the eternity of God could be “constructed” philosophically, it could only be understood as a more primordial and “infinite” temporality. Whether the via negationis et eminentiae might offer a possible path: this should remain an open question.

[It was Leibniz who famously remarked that le present est gros de l’avenir, “the present is pregnant with the future” (Theodicy, §360; see also his letter to Johann Bernoulli, 21 February 1699: “There’s no doubt that our future states are in some way contained within our present ones”). Heidegger reverses the image in his Kasseler Lectures: “We are pregnant with the past” (see my annotation on Heidegger’s footnote on p. 385). Kierkegaard already suggests this momentous difference in his Concept of Dread: “…habit arises as soon as the eternal goes out of repetition. When originality is acquired and conserved, then there is succession and repetition. The serious man is serious precisely through the originality with which he comes back in repetition. … A clergyman has to recite every Sunday the prescribed prayers, or he has to baptize several children every Sunday” (Lowrie’s translation, p. 132; Thomte’s p. 149; emphasis added).]

1 Physics, 223 a 25 [“if by nature nothing other than soul, or intellection on the part of soul, engages in numbering, then time is unable to be without soul …”]; cf. 218 b 29 to 219 a 6.

2 Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 26. [Augustine is considering the “measuring” of syllables in the enunciation of a text; but the longs and the shorts are either coming or gone and so cannot be measured against one another: “So it seemed to me that time is nothing other than a stretching-out; but of what I don’t know; and it would be astonishing if it were not of the soul itself.” Augustine goes on to analyze and illustrate this understanding of time.]

1 Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis is archaeological rather than innovative in intent.
bound to it. Hegel’s explicit argument justifying the connection between time and spirit is well suited for indirectly clarifying both our own interpretation of being-there as temporality and the exhibition of the origin of world-time in this temporality.

§82. Contrasting the existential-ontological interconnection of temporality, being-there and world-time with Hegel’s construal of the relation between time and spirit

History — which is essentially history of spirit — runs its course “in time.” Thus it is that “the unfolding of history falls into time.” 1 But Hegel does not rest with presenting the inner-timely-ness of spirit as a factum; rather, he aspires to understand the possibility that spirit can fall into time, time being “what’s entirely abstract, something sensuous.” 1 Time must be able to absorb spirit, as it were. And spirit in its turn must be kin to time and its essence. Thus two things must be discussed: 1. How does Hegel delimit the essence of time? 2. What belongs to the essence of spirit that makes it possible for spirit “to fall into time”? The answering of these two questions serves simply to illustrate our own interpretation of being-there as temporality. It makes no claim to treat, even in a relatively complete way, the necessarily associated problems in Hegel’s own account; even less is there any intention of criticizing Hegel. Contrasting the idea of temporality we have expounded with Hegel’s concept of time is especially appropriate because Hegel’s concept of time presents the most radical conceptual configuration of the ordinary understanding of time, a configuration that has received too little attention.

(a) Hegel’s concept of time

The “location” at which a philosophical interpretation of time gets enacted in a “system” can serve as criterion for the basic construal of time guiding the interpretation. In Aristotle’s Physics, i.e. in connection with an ontology of nature, we find handed down to us the first thematically exhaustive interpretation of the ordinary understanding of time. “Time” stands together with “location” and “movement.” True to this tradition, Hegel’s analysis of time is located in the second part of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences bearing the title “Philosophy of Nature.” The first portion of this treats mechanics. Its first division discusses “space and time.” These are [Hegel says] the “abstract outside-one-another.”

Although Hegel puts space and time together, this still does not happen simply in a superficial line-up: space “and then time also.” “With this ‘also’ philosophy does battle.” The passage from space to time does not signify the joining together of the paragraphs treating these two; rather, “space itself passes over [into time].” Space “is” time, i.e.

---

1. The extent to which in Kant an understanding of time breaks through that is more radical than the one in Hegel: this the first Division of the Part Two of the present treatise shows. [On this “station,” see the annotation on p. 40. Whereas Aristotle, Augustine, and ultimately even Hegel proceed from the assumption that time (in the ordinary sense, Heidegger insists) is essentially a thief (cf. Physics, IV. 12), Heidegger elicits time (in the primordial sense he works out) as a gift. He detects in Kant an effort to shift the understanding of time in this direction; consider Kant’s re-assessment of the significance of counting:

Were I to forget, while counting, that the units now hovering before the senses are gradually put together by me, I would not recognize the production of the group by this successive putting together of one to one, and so would not cognize number at all. For the concept [of number] consists simply in the consciousness of this unity of synthesis. (A103)

... number ... is a representation that gathers together the successive addition of one to one (of the same kind). Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of same-kind intuition in general — in such a way that, in the apprehension of intuition, I produce time itself. (A142-3, B182)

Note that Heidegger locates and analyzes such “unity of synthesis” as “being-in-world.”

time is the “truth” of space.\(^1\) When space gets thought dialectically for what it is, then this being of space unveils itself as time, according to Hegel. How must space be thought?

Space is “the unmediated indifference of the being-outside-itself of nature.”\(^2\) In other words: space is the abstract many-ness of the points differentiable within it. Space is not interrupted by these points, yet neither does it spring from them — by, say, some sort of assembling of them. Differentiated by the differentiable points (which are themselves space), space remains without differentiation. The differentiations themselves have the character of what they differentiate. Yet any point is still, inasmuch as it differentiates anything at all in space, negation of space — however, in such a way that, as this negation, it remains (being itself space, after all) in space. The point does not, as something other than space, pull itself out of space. Space is the outside-one-another, without differentiation, of the manifold of points. Yet space is not a point; as Hegel says, it is rather “appointedness.” This is the basis of the statement in which Hegel thinks space in its truth, i.e. as time:

But negation — which, as point, bears on space and, in space, unfolds its determinations as line and surface — is, in the sphere of being-outside-itself, just as much for itself and its determinations therein; yet, too, as it is positing in the sphere of being-outside-itself, it appears as indifferent in regard to the tranquil one-after-another [in the formation of lines and surfaces]. As thus posited for itself, negativity is time.\(^3\)

Once space gets represented, i.e. immediately intuited in the indifferent subsistence of its differentiations, then the negations are, as it were, straightaway given. But such representation does not yet grasp space in its being. This is only possible in thinking — in thinking as synthesis that has passed through thesis and antithesis, and transmuted them. Space gets thought, and thereby grasped in its being, only when the negations do not simply remain in their indifference but get transmuted, i.e. are themselves negated. In the negation of negation (i.e. in its appointedness) a point posits itself for itself and thereby moves out of the indifference of subsistence. As posited for itself, a point differentiates itself from this one and that one: it is no longer this one and not yet that one. With this positing of itself for itself, any one point posits the one-after-another wherein it subsists — the sphere of being-outside-itself, a sphere which is henceforth that of negated negation. The transmutation of appointedness as indifference signifies a no-longer-resting in the “paralyzed tranquillity” of space [cf. addendum to §257]. Any one point “spreads itself out” in contrast to all other points. As appointedness, this negation of negation is, according to Hegel, time. —

If this discussion is to have any sense at all, it can mean nothing other than this: the positing-itself-for-itself of each point is a now-here, a now-here, and so on. Each point “is” a now-point posited for itself. “Thus it is in time that a point has its actuality” [§257, addendum]. That by virtue of which a point, each as able to posit itself for itself as this one point there, is in each instance a now. The condition of the possibility of the positing-itself-for-itself of each point is the now. This possibility-condition constitutes the being of each point, and such being is also its getting-thought. Because, on this account, the pure thinking of appointedness, i.e. of space, in each instance “thinks” the now and the being-outside-itself of the now, space “is” time. How does this time itself get determined?

As the negative unity of being-outside-itself, time is also something simply abstract, something ideational. — It is being which, in that it is, is not; and which, in that it is not, is: it is intuited becoming. This means that the differentiations, although simply momentary and immediately transmuted, are determined as external, yet as external to themselves.\(^4\)

On this interpretation, time unveils itself as “intuited becoming.” According to Hegel, this signifies transition from being to nothing, or

---

1. ibid., §257, addendum.
2. ibid., §254.
3. ibid., §257 [Aristotle thematizes “point, line, and surface” while raising the question of being, but he keeps this theme in close contact with our understanding of bodies (cf. his *Metaphysics*, e.g. around 1002 b 6, where he notes the similarity of these three with the “now” of time. In contrast, Hegel formulates the same considerations from the standpoint of mathematical thinking — especially the development of the infinitesimal calculus, but then also the general application of mathematical induction — where the connection with, even a passage into (linear) time is more evident. — If Aristotle’s account pertains especially to garden architecture, and Hegel’s especially to Cartesian geometry, Heidegger’s asks us to recall the gardening itself as the original location of both space and time.]
4. On this interpretation, time unveils itself as “intuited becoming.” According to Hegel, this signifies transition from being to nothing, or

---

\[^{1}\] ibid., §258.
from nothing to being. The becoming is emerging as well as passing away; being “switches” [into its opposite], and so does not-being. What does this say about time? The being of time is the now; however, inasmuch as every now is also “now” already not-any-longer or is, in each case before, not-yet, it can also be taken as not-being. Time is “intuited becoming,” i.e. transition which does not get thought but which rather offers itself simply in the sequence of nows. Once the essence of time gets determined as “intuited becoming,” it becomes manifest that time is getting understood primarily from the now, and in such a way that it is available to pure intuiting.

There’s no need of a drawn-out discussion to make it clear that, with his interpretation of time, Hegel is moving entirely in the direction of the ordinary understanding of time. His characterization of time, based as it is on the now, presupposes that the now remains covered up and levelled down in its full structure in order to be intuited as something on hand (even though “ideaitionally” so).

The following statements serve as evidence that Hegel effects his interpretation of time primarily from an orientation toward the levelled-down now: “The now has an enormous jurisdiction — it ‘is’ nothing but an individual now, yet in spreading itself out this exclusionary thing is dissolved, diffused, pulverized even as I speak about it.”

“Moreover, in nature, where time is the now, there is no ‘subsisting’ differentiation of those dimensions” (past and future).

“In the positive sense of time, one can therefore say: only the present is, not the before or the after; yet the concrete present is the result of the past and it is pregnant with the future. The veritable present is then eternity.”

When Hegel calls time “intuited becoming,” neither arising nor passing away has any primacy in the time so named. Nevertheless, he sometimes characterizes time as the “abstraction of consuming,” in this way giving the most radical formulation of the ordinary experience and interpretation of time. On the other hand, Hegel is sufficiently consistent not to assign any primacy to such consuming and passing when really defining time — a primacy it does rightly enjoy in the everyday experience of time; for Hegel could no more dialectically justify this primacy than he could the “fact” that it is from the positing-itself-for-itself of a point that the now emerges. And so even in his characterization of time as becoming Hegel understands this becoming in an “abstract” sense, one going well beyond the representation of a “flow” of time. Thus the most fitting expression of the Hegelian understanding of time lies in the determination of time as negation of negation (i.e., appointedness). The sequence of nows is here formalized in its most extreme meaning, and levelled down in a way that cannot be surpassed. It is only from this formal-dialectical concept of time that Hegel can devise a connection between time and spirit.

---


3 ibid., §259.

4 ibid., §259, addendum.
§82. A Contrast with Hegel on Time and Spirit

How is spirit being understood so that it can be said it would be in keeping with its actualization that it fall into time construed as the negation of negation? The essence of spirit is concept. Hegel underv-
At every step of this “progress,” spirit has to “overcome its own self as the veritable and inimical obstacle to its purpose.”¹ The goal of the development of spirit is “to reach its own concept.”² The development itself is “a hard, an infinite battle with itself.”³

Because the restlessness of the development of spirit as it is coming into its concept is the negation of negation, it stands in accord with spirit that, as it actualizes itself, it fall “into time” as the unmediated negation of negation.

For:

Time is the concept itself, the concept that is there, and as empty intuition presents itself to consciousness; for this reason, spirit necessarily appears in time, doing so as long as it does not take hold of its pure concept, i.e. so long as it does not extirpate time. Time is the external and intuited self, a pure self that is not taken hold of by the self, the concept that is only intuited.⁴

Accordingly, by its very essence spirit necessarily appears in time. “So world-history is in general the interpretation of spirit within time, just as the idea interprets itself as nature.”⁵ The “exclusion” belonging to the movement of development contains within itself a relationship with not-being. This exclusion is time — time understood as the now spreading itself out.

Time is “abstract” negativity. As “intuited becoming” it is the unmediatedly available, differentiated self-differentiation — the concept that “is there,” i.e. is on hand. As something on hand and therefore external about spirit, time has no power over the concept; rather, the concept “is the power of time.”⁶

It is by recurring to the self-sameness of the formal structure of spirit and time as negation of negation that Hegel shows the possibility of the

---

¹ ibid., 152. [Rauch’s translation, Hackett edition, p. 59.]
² ibid.
³ ibid.
⁴ Cf. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, “Absolute Knowing” (p. 800 of the Baille translation, p. 487 of the Miller translation). [Note Hegel’s suggestion that time be “extirpated.” In his What is Called Thinking? (especially pp. 92 ff.) Heidegger discusses Nietzsche’s recognition of the propensity of western metaphysics to erect a bulwark against time (“the will’s revulsion against time and its ‘It was’”: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, II, “On Deliverance”).]
⁵ Cf. Reason in History, p. 154. [Rauch’s translation, p. 75.]

---

§82. A Contrast with Hegel on Time and Spirit

historical actualization of spirit “in time.” Spirit and time get cast into the emptiest, formal-ontological and formal-apophatic abstraction: this abstraction makes it possible to devise a kinship of the two. Still, precisely because time also gets conceptualized as utterly levelled-down world-time — whereby its provenance remains entirely covered up — it simply stands over against spirit as something on hand. For this reason, spirit must fall “into time” first of all. What exactly this “lapsing” signifies — what exactly the “actualization” of spirit having power over time and really “being” outside time signifies: this remains obscure. Just as Hegel hardly casts any light onto the origin of levelled-down time, so he leaves totally unexamined the question whether the essential constitution of spirit is possible in any way other than as the negating of negation — say, a way based on primordial temporality.

Whether Hegel’s interpretation of time and spirit and their interconnection has its justification and rests on ontologically primordial foundations: this cannot yet be discussed.* However, that the formal-dialectical “construction” of the interconnection of spirit and time can be ventured at all: this reveals a primordial kinship of the two. Hegel’s “construction” gets its impulse from the arduous struggle to conceptualize the “concretion” of spirit. This is evinced by the following passage from the final chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit:

Thus time appears as the destiny and the necessity of the spirit that is not complete in itself — the necessity to enrich the share self-consciousness has in consciousness and to set into movement the unmediatedness of the in-itself (the form in which the substance is in consciousness); or, conversely, to make real and revealed the in-itself

---

* It belongs to Heidegger’s destructuring that the works of predecessors be understood as having their own justification — if only we uncover their foundations momentarily. At a seminar in 1951, Emil Staiger asked Heidegger why he embedded his thought in the interpretation of texts. Heidegger gave two reasons: first, what he himself had to say could no longer be exposed directly to public view (it gets immediately perverted), and, secondly, learning to read is the first prerequisite: “to bring the word, and language, closer to human beings once again.” As though to illustrate this task, he remarked: “From my activity as a teacher I can report the experience that, when I would interpret a passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology the students would say: now he’s an Hegelian.” Collected Works, Vol 15, p. 427.
II. Chapter Six: Temporality and Inner-timely-ness

§83. The existential-temporal analysis of being-there, and the fundamental-ontological question about the meaning of being in general

The task of the foregoing considerations has been to interpret existential-ontologically the primordial whole of factical being-there, with a view to the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic ex-sisting — to interpret this in reference to the ground of being-there. It was temporality that manifested itself as this ground, and thereby as the essential meaning of care. What, at that earlier stage, prior to the exposition of temporality, the preparatory analysis of being-there was marshalling, has now been taken back into the primordial structure of the essential wholeness of being-there. From the possibilities of the fructification of primordial time, the structures we earlier only “pointed out” have received their “justification.” However, the exhibition of the essential constitution of being-there still remains only a path. The goal is the elaboration of the overall question of being. Then, too, the thematic analysis of ex-sistence stands in need of the light cast by the idea of being in general [that must be] clarified beforehand. This especially holds if we keep to the proposition enunciated in the Introduction — understanding this proposition as establishing the measure of each and every philosophical investigation: philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology that, proceeding from a hermeneutic of being-there and analyzing ex-sistence, ties the thread of all philosophical questioning right at the point from which this questioning arises and to which it reverses. Of course, even this thesis should not be allowed to stand as dogma, but rather as a formulation of the basic problem still “under wraps”: Does ontology allow an ontological grounding, or does such justification stand in need of an ontic foundation — and [if so] which being should take over this function of founding?

What appears to be so illuminating, here the difference between the being of ex-sisting being-there and the being of beings not taking their measure from being-there (e.g., reality) — this still only marks the start of the ontological problematic; it is not anything allowing philosophy to rest. It has long been known that ancient ontology worked with “thing-concepts” and that there is a danger of “reifying consciousness.” But what does reification mean? Wherefrom does it arise? Why does being “initially” get “conceived” in reference to on-hand beings and not in reference to at-hand beings, these latter lying so much closer to us? Why does reification ever again become predominant? How is the being of “consciousness” positively structured, so that it is inappropriate to reify it? Does the “difference” between “consciousness” and “thing” suffice

\footnote{Therefore [ontology is] not philosophy of existence [à la Jaspers].}

\footnote{Cf. §37. p. 38. [In his Walden (“Visitors”), H. D. Thoreau says of the French-Canadian wood-chopper:

He could defend many institutions better than any philosopher, because in describing them as they concerned him, he gave the true reason for their prevalence.

Similarly, in “The Principles of Thinking” (1957) Heidegger remarks: “We can only dis-cern what con-cerns us” (Collected Works, Vol. 79, p. 100).]

* Being and Time addresses beings, i.e. the “character” of the one being called being-there. In parallel, Plato and Aristotle address artisanal engagements. Can we address the epiphanies directly? Cf. his 1962 lecture (and “minutes” of the subsequent seminar) on “Time and Being” in On Time and Being (Harper & Row, 1972), p. 33. In the first version of his 1949 Postscript to “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger wrote: “...being does indeed take place without beings...”; in later editions, he changed this to read: “...being can never take place without beings...”— In any case, recall that “beings” covers not so much “things” or “people” as “determinables” regarding these.

\footnote{Cf. Phenomenology of Spirit (Baillie translation, p. 800; Miller translation p. 487).}

* Herein lies Heidegger’s “reversal” of western philosophy generally, which (since Parmenides) has based itself on the exigencies of thinking and then asked how thinking (the ‘I’) “arrives at being-there” (Hegel’s phrase: cf. Heidegger’s first footnote on p. 433, with my annotation).}
II. Chapter Six: Temporality and Inner-timely-ness

for unfurling, primordially, the ontological problematic? — Do the answers to these questions lie in wait for us on our path? And can we even look for an answer so long as the question about the meaning of being in general remains unposed and unclarified?

Never can we research the origin and the possibility of the “idea” of being in general with the tools of “abstraction” provided by formal logic, i.e. without an assured horizon of question and answer. Our task is to search out and walk along a path leading to the illumination of the basic ontological question. Whether this path is the only one, or in general the right one, can only be decided after walking it. The quarrel regarding the interpretation of being cannot be settled because this quarrel has not yet even been kindled.* And in the end we cannot just crash into this quarrel, we must rather prepare for it. It is only toward such preparation that the present investigation is underway. Where does it stand?

Some sort of “being” is disclosed in the intelligibility of being that, as understanding, belongs to ex-sisting being-there. This preceidental, though unconceptualized disclosedness of being makes it possible for being-there, as ex-sisting being-in-world, to comport itself toward beings — to those arising for encounter within a world as well as to itself as an ex-sisting being. How is disclosive understanding of being possible at all — in a manner taking its measure from being-there? Can we obtain an answer to this question by recurring to the primordial constitution of being-there as a being that understands being? The existential-ontological constitution of the wholeness of being-there has its ground in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial manner of fructification of ecstatic temporality must make possible the ecstatic projection of being in general. How are we to interpret this mode of fructification of temporality? Is there a path leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?

---

* not the “one and only” [Heidegger’s early works often share the Husserlian mood of “setting philosophy on the right path.” See his own account in his 1963 “My Path to Phenomenology” (translated in On Time and Being, Harper & Row, 1972) and also Husserl’s 1931 account in his “Letter to Alexander Pfänder” (translated in Edmund Husserl: Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997). Husserl, at least, could never dream of saying what Ralph Waldo Emerson says in his 1837 address “The American Scholar”:

Each age, it is found, must write its own books; or, rather, each generation for the next succeeding. The books of an older period will not fit this.]

* Recall the first paragraph of the Introduction: for all the interest in metaphysics, there is still no thought that it is necessary to kindle anew “any γιγαντομάχες περί τῆς οὐσίας” — any “battle of the giants over being.”
Translator’s Postscript

Seven Words

Writers especially, then readers, hear not only the immediate contours of words but also their undertones and overtones—temporal layers of meaning bequeathed by the works of literary tradition and also present in daily talk of the age. They also move within peripheral hearing: in a work, each word resonates with other words, so that each has a coterie of cohorts, phonetic as well as semantic. Readers especially will always be hearing in the words of the moment responses to those in works not only preceding but also succeeding the work presently in progress—and must often struggle to disentangle the narrations to maintain the integrity, the genuine multiplicity of the foci in motion, rather than letting the conversation collapse into a stagnating hubbub.

Writers then form their works as much out of the overtones and undertones, and out of lateral meanings, as out of the words themselves, i.e. artificially isolated from their companions. It is precisely the interplay of their cohorts that allows words to intertwine to form a smooth fabric for calling attention to what they are about—the subject of the work—rather than only to themselves. The cohorts may not suffice to do the job, although they may come close, as in haiku and many terse utterances of daily talk. For each language also brings along inherited expectations of sequence, rhythm, and trope, all of which figure in the interplays essential to inciting attention to the subject—or, failing that, to themselves only. And writers distinguish their works partly by their manner of conforming to and deviating from these expectations.

Any great work, one bequeathing as much as inheriting, comes with a personality distinctly its own—all according to the successful way it configures and converges its interplays. And its personality perennially changes as it grows older and interacts with subsequent works—those by other authors as well. Thus Heidegger’s first monumental work appears differently as it has gotten overlaid, and will continue to be overlaid, by subsequent re-envisionings of its subject.

A translation even more so. Whichever word of my native tongue I choose for one in the foreign tongue, it will resonate differently among its own cohorts and with the tradition conveyed by this second language. Immediately, the translated work presents a personality of its own—as competent readers of both versions will easily notice. Who has ever read, competently, a work by Aristotle, first in a translation and then in the original, and not been transported through a looking glass into a region in many respects inverted? In the course of the ages, originals and their translations become ever more distant cousins.

Does that mean a translation necessarily counteracts the original? You may cite the familiar Italian answer in the affirmative: traduttore, traditore—an example of a resonance that does not quite come off in English: “translator, traitor.” But, in obvious self-interest, I say it is the reader who is more than likely the traitor, the one who would betray the text in whatever tongue it appears. A translation is, like the original, up against what the text is about, and readers betray it so long as they fail to address themselves to what it is up against.

Reader, whether you read Sein und Zeit or some version of Being and Time—read either one actually, fruitfully—you are going to have to labor hard in the field to get it to bear the fruits essential to it, rather than just weeds. You are going to have to get it to work—exactly, exactingly, as performers and conductors must get their scores to work. And you may fail—likely will—at first rehearsal. As we all have—all who have taken upon themselves decisive works with the intent to retain them as insightful rather than to glean them for leftover opinions.

Like anything that must be performed, translations too can be good, bad or middling. Good if readers can and sometimes do find a way through them to what they are about, bad if they cannot or do not, middling if they allow readers to start going but leave them stranded part way on the journey (which the best readers will not mind: grateful for the head start, they will forge ahead by themselves, perhaps recurring to the original).

Every translation being a reading, an interpretation in the musical sense, there will always be new ones of those works that both inherit and bequeath. For these always change, requiring new readings. That is, each sends us back to the origin, if not to the original text intending to focus us on the origin. And, in keeping with the original, each successful translation will have its own personality.

Translator’s Postscript
For my own translation I chose not to call attention to the German underlying the English—not ever. An exercise in taking responsibility for my own rendition. Instead, I prepared an analytic index that for a large number of the English words, where I do record the German and which, more importantly, cites the sentences in which the words occur, thereby putting them to work.

But it may also prove instructive to discuss some of them. A bit of shop-talk, as it were. A number came to mind as I was preparing the translation. Here are seven, starting with the shortest.

\[ je \]

\textit{je}

\textit{jeweils, jeweilig, Jemeinigkeit}

Speaking of the price of a bunch of things, a clerk may tell you, “10¢ each,” and an exercise in arithmetic tells you the cost of the bunch. Similarly, we can talk about the dogs in a kennel one at a time (the breed of each), as opposed to talking about them as a whole (the noise they are making). In contrast, we sometimes intend to speak about everything of a kind, and all at once: the total price, the nature of sound transmission, the nature of dogs as distinct from wolves.

The word occurs 403 times in \textit{Sein und Zeit}, and I have generally translated it as “in each instance.” It first occurs on p. 2: everyone supposedly uses the concept of being, and in each instance already understands what he means by it. It occurs again on p. 3, in the translation of Thomas Aquinas’ Latin: an understanding of being is already included in each instance of comprehending something. In neither case is there a general understanding. And the third occurrence, on p. 4, underscores the task of Heidegger’s own work: the fact that, in each instance of determining how things are (the sky is blue, I am happy) we are already living within an understanding of being, while the sense of being remains obscure—which demonstrates the basic necessity of recovering the question of this sense.

The seventh and eighth occurrences (on p. 7) introduce the thematic employment of the word. Concerned to chose and understand what we should contemplate while raising the question of the sense of being, we might pause to notice that this very concern suggests where might profitably start: we should first examine the being that each of us in each instance is. For you and I have already dared to stick out.

Yet, as we turn toward this one being that protrudes already, we likely bring along elements of our long tradition already interpreting this effort: that of Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and finally 20th-Century psychologists. To free ourselves of the leftovers of these efforts (perhaps to recover their original power), we might turn to how we are situated—already (in each instance!) engaged with things and other people within a situation prior to, cleansed of, these inherited overlays.

So Heidegger’s work asks me and you to contemplate the situation in which we find ourselves—in each instance our situatedness: I mine, you yours. Not, then, our situation apart from ourselves, and not situations in general. Or not right away: one of the tasks of contemplating my own situation is to discover, to uncover, how this one situation might engender the concern for the whole—its own whole, and then also the whole inclusive of yours, his, hers, theirs; past, present and future. And how this initial situatedness might invite two versions of such wholeness: the one apart from and the other inclusive of myself as engaged in the contemplation.

Yet... here we are reading someone telling us that we have to look not just for ourselves (every philosophical work asks this of us) but at our own situation, and he will tell us already what we are going to find. How can an author do this without already assuming a universality of, in this case, “situatedness”? Shouldn’t an author rather just tell us what he or she finds, and leave it to us to find and tell our own?

An ancient principle of education is that learning takes place as the learner concentrates on one instance, fathoming it until it reveals the universal. Perhaps one puppy to take care of for a while — or one city, one lover, one geometric figure. Guidance is possible, but the individual must engage willingly in the learning process; the teacher (or, as one used to say, the master) imparts nothing of great significance, but directs the attention of the learner — always toward the one instance, whereupon, with luck, the learner passes on to the holistic import of the one instance and thereby comes to know instances in general. —This principle contrasts strikingly with today’s academia, built as it is on the Enlightenment understanding of knowledge as accumulative and heritage because placing us in an intellectual realm where instances are incidental illustrations of the idea. This understanding of knowledge corresponds to the dominant understanding of being propagated by our universities.
We might then understand Being and Time as providing guidance of the sort provided anciently by Plato’s and Aristotle’s works (and still recalled in much later works) — with the important difference that the instance at issue for each reader is his or her own situatedness (“being in a world,” Heidegger says — reserving “situation” for this location revealed at moments when we take finally take full responsibility for it). Guidance, that is, for the reader’s uncovering of how and where he or she is. Unlike the guidance provided by a good proof in physics, which will always require demonstrations transcending what lies under our noses — because what’s at issue not only transcends any one instance but also transcends our own situatedness (although Werner Heisenberg’s account of quantum theory tantalizes).

It will hardly escape my reader’s notice that much literature (novels, epics, poems, stage plays, meditative autobiographies) also provide guidance in the uncovering of instances of situatedness — and thereby also contrast with the arm’s-length discourses of modern science. Yet such literature is much kinder than Being and Time: it cheerfully allows us to believe that the discourse, with its uncovering, belongs to another.

Finally, there are the cousins and progeny of this one word. The adverbial jeweils (32 occurrences) resonates with time: being is every single time the being of some determinate thing (p. 9). The adjective jeweilig (98 occurrences) could often be translated simply as “each” or “each respective”: the basic principles of each discipline (p. 9), but often suggests the stronger sense of “in each instance”: highlighting one aspect of something requires, in each instance, that we look to the whole phenomenon (p. 53).

And, awkwardest of all, there’s the noun Heidegger compounds out of je, resulting in what I have translated as instantial mineness on pp. 53 and 240: Jemeinigkeit occurs only five times, and for the three times it occurs on pp. 42 and 43 I have translated it more fluently, e.g. [its character] as in each case mine (instead of “its character of instantial mineness”). Along with the facility of the German language to compound sentences with qualifying clauses, this facility to compound words works better in German than in French, Italian or English. Still, a noun suggests a focal point rather than a way to configure our own focalizing, as do adverbs and adjectives. These compounds do serve a purpose.

In logical terms, all these occurrences, whether of je, jeweils, jeweilig, or Jemeinigkeit, intend “distributive” rather than “collective” discernment of how and where each of us is. And especially discernment of what is distinctively one’s own — as distinct from what’s second-hand — things only heard about from others, who often pass on traditional views of our situatedness — and also from what’s inferred or surmised. Such discernment may have to be engendered: Heidegger suggests that only my mortality brings “instantial mineness” home to me: not, or not entirely, a book written by another.

Translator’s Postscript

The second sentence of Heidegger’s Introduction says that, nowadays (by the 1920s) one considers oneself absolved from the arduous task of kindling anew the ancient battle over the question of being. In English we would rather avoid this impersonal construction, especially in its reflexive form, and say rather something like “there’s the general conviction that the question is superfluous.” But German-speakers routinely say man, just as French-speakers say on: it’s a convenient way of talking about things happening without having to specify the human agency. In fact, educated speakers of English often resort to it for simple phrasing: “At this point one might say…” (avoiding the more personal “you” or “I,” the more restrictive “someone” and the awkward passive voice “it might be said”).

It is perhaps in adolescence that one first discovers intuitively what Heidegger’s work asks us to uncover thematically: that human agency lurks everywhere in any experienced situation — yet, paradoxically, you and I who now agree to consider, as individual agents, the basics of our situatedness prior to our meditative exercise, are, in this prior condition, primarily immersed in an anonymity of agency. There are already ways of doing things, thinking things, wanting things, feeling things: these govern our situation, define our role in it, allow us to commune with others and to discover things along with others. In adolescence this prior condition of agency affronts the nascent sense of our own individuality, and we speak — at least I and my cohorts at the time did speak — of “society” or “they” (family, teachers, neighbors, policemen) as pressuring us to conform (in our dress, our manners, our ambitions, even our feelings). In contrast, now individuated to the point where we can
undertake the task of considering freshly our essentially unfresh situation, you and I might be able to appreciate its positive aspects. First, it assures that we are already engaged with others, even on the proverbial desert island, so that our task is not primarily to gain access to others (as those aspire to do whose meditations lead them to withdraw into what they think of as their private world). And, secondly, it reminds us of the recurrent task of earning our own agency, our own insight, even our own name: of taking our situation as our own rather than as simply foisted off on us.

I have then translated the German word with the English impersonal “one” even though its lineage is very nearly the opposite of the German and French, both of which draw upon the generic sense of the Latin *homo* (Dante’s Italian, long preceding the study of human being all by itself, employs *uomo* impersonally as well). In decided contrast, our English “one” stems from its use as a grammatical number: a demonstrative one as distinct from an indefinite plurality.

The word occurs 233 times in all, 75 times in its colloquial sense prior to its thematic usage. So long as it serves as a pronoun there’s nothing misleading about the English term, although often an English variant is smoother. But of course Heidegger makes a noun out of it, complete with its definite article: *das Man*. Which then translates as “the one”—a phrasing that undercuts the indefiniteness of the original. An acquaintance of mine, a Plato scholar, found this translation offensive for another reason: in Greek philosophy the concern for *τὸ εἷς*, “the one,” aims for definite unity substantiating otherwise disparate plurality—it names what the intellectually adroit among us strive to achieve, not our condition prior to such development. I can imagine, too, that the translation might offend readers of Kierkegaard, whose sense of “the one” is precisely that of the individual who has extracted himself or herself from “the crowd”—and may therefore be able to read meditative works such as his own. Socrates already said it in answer to the question. To whom might we wisely lend our ears?—not to the many (the bearer of generally accepted opinions about healthy decisions, healthy bodies and healthy cities), but to the one (who knows these things).

The advantage of my translation over others is that it retains the resonance of the verbal and the substantive formulations in the original.

We enjoy things, take pleasure in them, the way one enjoys; we read, see and judge regarding literature and art the way one sees and judges; then too we pull ourselves out from “the masses” the way one pulls oneself out; we get indignant the way one gets indignant. The one, which is nothing determinate and which all are, although not as a sum, prescribes the manner in which everydayness is.

So too the way one writes English sentences, the way one separates one’s trash for recycling. The adolescent “they” resonates with divisiveness, even a call to arms; the impersonal “one” resonates rather with a basically comfortable unity.

One must chose one’s resonances. In the present instance I myself would like to emphasize one strain of thinking in *Being and Time*: that “the one” provides the platform, the “default” setting (as one can say nowadays, recalling computer programs), or the “material cause” (as those who have carefully studied Aristotle can say), for all further developments of human agency, and especially those various developments leading to various insights of the sort answering to the question of being.

Intimate cousins of “the one” is a family of terms I translate with the Latin-based English verb “collapse”: *verfallen* (infinitive and past participle), *verfallend* (present participle), *Verfallen* (substantive), *Verfallenheit* and *Verfallensein* (abstract nouns), *Verfall* (once, in a commentary), *Fall* (as in “fall from grace”), *fallen* and *Fallen* (verb and noun easily transliterated as “falling”). If you insist on keeping the root throughout, you can translate all these words with slight variations on “falling”: one sort of resonance. However, with the prefixed versions Heidegger is asking us to see something about our condition that the unprefixed versions do not address: namely, that at any given (ordinary) moment, our condition is quietly imploded — functional, all too functional, but not fully open to the occasion (on automatic pilot, as it were). Judged at moments when we might hope for more, and especially when a crisis looms, the situation appears as an old building that has not been properly maintained: it’s collapsed (*verfallen*). Then, too, we can now see it is collapsing: while it may occasion despair, such insight may also occasion inspiration. Indeed, Heidegger’s point of the diagnosis is to suggest it is time — it is always time — for an overhaul (and, incidentally, you may here detect a basic meaning for temporality). So we end up contemplating at length what I translate as “collapsedness”: something differing considerably from personal lapses of faith or decorum, and having nothing to do with Eve.
The past participle of *reden*, talking, is *geredet*, which then easily (in German) serves to form a noun: *das Geredete*, “what’s (been) talked about already.” Heidegger asks us to see in our condition the essential prevalence of “rehashing,” as we say in colloquial English. He then borrows a familiar word in his own language, *Gerede*, to name this prevalence. To retain the resonances I translate the German as “re-talk.” The “re-” parallels the German *ge-*, emphasizing the temporality at issue.

The first difficulty for the reader, however, is to learn the prevalence of talk itself: not just the fact that most people talk (talk then as an obvious feature of most situations), but talk as an *a priori* condition evident, upon careful examination, throughout every situation and allowing such other obvious phenomena as sharing circumstances, paying attention to others, analyzing proposals, reading and writing, solitary thinking (reviewing and planning)—then too the frustrations and failures of all these. A world (start by concentrating on sub-worlds, like those of tending to a household, working in an office complex, camping out in the woods, repairing machinery, visiting relatives in a hospital) is as an articulated whole (sub-worlds have fuzzy borders because they spill over into other worlds). Articulated = assembled, flexible at the joints, functional but also breakable. Heidegger call this *a priori* condition *Rede*, which recalls the kind of talk one gives at a conference, except that here the writer and the listener aim either for entertainment or instruction, and often criticism of the way others have re-assembled familiar facts and manners of expression.

Once we see that and (to some extent) how talk prevails as an enabling condition, we can see how it easily loses its roots while yet continuing to carry us along. We find ourselves... through its contents in cheerful oblivion of its, i.e. our own rootlessness: after all, everyone is doing it.

In his 1924 lectures “The Concept of Time” (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 64), which provides a kind of trailer to *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites academic discourse (*Wissenschaft*) to illustrate what he means by re-talk. Indeed, the original hope of the Enlightenment was that knowledge could accumulate so that subsequent researchers could stand on the shoulders of their predecessors to see further then they. However, for the most part, researchers re-write familiar things, adding a twist here and there for flavor, and can squabble energetically over detail without recalling the original question, subject, or intent. A teacher, too, can very energetically lay out the prevailing discourse of the field of study without any concern about whether the students learn to speak out of its source or merely learn to talk about what others have said. It is important that we recognize the prevalence of re-talk because, in any given institution in any given age, it already determines what counts as “really being”—whereas our present intent is, supposedly, to raise this question freshly.

I have to say, then, that the familiar translation of *Gerede* as “idle talk” is ill advised. It is perhaps inspired by the reasonable translation of Wittgenstein’s remark that “confusions arise...” Re-talk is generally running at full capacity, cluttered and clanging, whereas rooted talk is likely quiet and calm.

Re-talk is what ordinary talk essentially is. As we go about our ordinary business, what we actually say and hear is essentially pre-fixed in form, and as we are shopping or selling, doing our bit or asking others to do theirs, informing or being informed (by colleagues or the media), elaborate or imbibe tales—at each moment we draw upon familiar ways of speaking: a tongue with its own grammar and vocabulary (familial or local or national or international). Such re-talk may still be weakly rooted—both drawing upon and passing by what the talk is about. Or it may let the roots wither to near nothing, as in deceitful talk (prevarication) and more or less vicious talk (gossiping, scandal-mongering).

Heidegger is trying to scare us. And we should be scared. For we are supposedly engaging in the linguistic enterprise of writing and reading about the conditions for raising the question of being—and, for all our efforts, we may still be begging the question, assuming all along “what really is” and fussing over ramifications of our own presumptions.

Re-talk is the norm, our own vocation-specific platform, and our task...
is to learn (and help others learn) to speak and to listen, to write and to read, incisively — that is, in a way that reroots talk strongly, saves it momentarily from re-talk, into which it naturally collapses.

The duo Redel/Gerede resonates also with subsequent literature: (1) Heidegger’s own meditations on incisive language in the pieces collected under the title Unterwegs zur Sprache (partially translated as On the Way to Language), (2) his meticulous consideration of the works of others (to help us read through the re-talk of scholarship to recover our heritage), and (3) the meditations of others who have taken up his challenge (already Husserl in the 1936 fragment translated as “The Origin of Geometry,” then also Merleau-Ponty in his 1945 delineation of the difference between la parole parlée and la parole parlante).

Translation, too, is scary, in this instance having to preserve resonances both internal and external to the work — in each case a selection — while orchestrating all these to resonate with what the work is about.

Da-sein
Mit-sein, Mit-da-sein

A t the end of the penultimate section, Heidegger contrasts his own with Hegel’s use of this term. Hegel’s phenomenology understands “spirit” as becoming concrete (incarnated, fulfilled) by being there (otherwise spirit may only hover over situations abstractly). Heidegger’s starts out (setzt ein) within the (weak) concretion of “factically thrown ex-sistence” — the way we are already “out there” (in order, as he immediately says, to unveil temporality as the original enabling of such being-there). All along, Heidegger has been responding to Hegel.

To side with Hegel first: in his sense of the word, closer to the colloquial expressions in both English and German, being there is an important development on the part of the individual — who may at times fail to be there (as every parent, teacher and coach knows, and most of us recognize as we get older and prone to absent-mindedness ourselves). Learning to be there is essential in enterprises depending on knowledge rather than willingness just to do what one is told.

Heidegger, in contrast, proposes that we examine carefully the way we are already “out there” dealing with things (if only routinely) and with others (if only conformatively). The use of the word Dasein to name the focal point of examination deviates importantly from what its everyday use may suggest. The intended focal point is, in each instance, the multiple and interwoven ways we are there. The achievement of this focal point requires arduous effort on our respective parts, since we are strongly tempted to assume that we are looking either at ourselves or at others out there in the field — the way researchers in the fields of psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology do (looking out for the universal “human being” lurking within all the empirical variations). But we are “out there” prior to such studies: such research, placing its subject at arm’s length, is itself one achievement of our being there — a strange alienation whose results will always be tainted with self-forgetfulness.

Michel Foucault’s 1966 Les mots et les choses traces the historical developments that led finally (and recently) to the ambition of studying human being in this manner. You can read this work as interplaying with Heidegger’s—all the more so if you recall Foucault’s acknowledged debt to Heidegger’s two-volume work on Nietzsche, where Heidegger addresses explicitly the task of liberating ourselves from the trappings of this ambition.

The first English translation of Heidegger’s masterpiece chose to retain, untranslated, the German for being-there. The choice reflects Heidegger’s original conviction that special terminology was required to overcome the re-talk dominating philosophical work. However, within a couple decades he stated that the task was to restore the inherited lexicon rather than devise another one. I suggest that readers try this tact as well.

I am out in a pathless wilderness and I come across an axe and a jacket, partly sunken into the fallen branches and leaves. I sense immediately a human presence, precisely in the absence: ... from their presence, perhaps even to enjoy their absence — in any case, they are there inseparably from my own being there.

From the beginning in Plato and Aristotle, and increasingly ever since in our intellectual tradition, the half-buried axe and jacket figure as
triggering my faculty of recollection of human agency, along with my faculty of inference; and, similarly, I remember, or try to forget, my wife and colleagues and authors whom I happen to be studying. These others, obviously absent in the flesh, are present only in me, as an essentially isolated subject who recognizes familiar objects and infers an earlier presence, or happens to retain memories of certain people, alive or dead. Ask any academic psychologist or tradition-bound novelist.

Yet my first experience is that of shared being-there. Period. Retaining this pristine experience—sharing it now in contemplation—you might appreciate the observation that this sharedness conditions the possibility of being there with nameable others, of inferring their presence, recalling and anticipating encounters. If so, you are well on your way to a sustained and sustaining examination of being there that does not reduce being-there to human being, i.e. revert to the arm’s-length examination of something “out there”—as a detective may examine the axe and jacket and surrounding leaves and branches for signs of foul play.

Indeed, my first experience of things (e.g., my own axe or my own jacket) is that of using them, not puzzling over them for the purpose of describing them and attributing origins to them (hyletic, kinetic, telic or eidetic). Both Plato and Aristotle noted that things are, are fully themselves what they really are, only when they are functioning and, in the case of sublunar things, when we are using them. Modernity, however, developed ways of contemplating and knowing things suspended from our involvement with them. Heidegger then asks us to take a second look in order to recover the full force of our involvement with things as we are actually there with them, prior to becoming detectives bent on providing descriptions of their appearance and attributions of their provenance.

Content with employing the obvious English rendering of the German, my own translation can concentrate on retaining the resonances of this one word with a host of others: essential to being-there is being-with (it’s shared) as well as being-there-with (encountering others: no need to infer other minds!). Also, the reader can shift attention directly to the “there” and ask what all the locative entails: what it’s like to be in-there.

Still, in the end, the purpose is to develop a mode of thinking that can itself be there rather than withdraw immediately into our own world —no doubt also shared, but as scholars share a field, and no doubt insightful into the nature of things, but things put out of their own function and readapted strictly for our own use. In an important sense, Heidegger agrees with Hegel: being fully there must be learned, and this learning is arduous for intellectuals such as ourselves (although “natural” in pre-intellectual work). Heidegger differs only in showing how we might begin at the beginning, with a careful consideration of being-there in its unlearned manifestations and generally weakened forms. He acknowledges the circularity of this enterprise.

Bewandnis

Bewendenlassen, Zuhandenhait, Vorhandenhait

Here is a word that reminds me of what Augustine said of the word “time”: we have no trouble understanding it until we try to understand it. You hear it frequently enough in some parts of the German-speaking world, and in colloquial usage you might easily translate it with phrases including such words as “context” or “background”—with the suggestion that the recollection of it provides also the rationale for what one is more specifically focusing on. For instance, we might closely paraphrase the first occurrence of the word (p. 80) this way: what a sign (like the blinker blinking on the car in front of you at an intersection) primarily points up is always that wherein you are living, where you are tending to things, its own (and your own) context, this being what provides its rationale (and not simply the fact that the car in front of you is about to turn).

Heidegger is asking us to see, and in elaborate detail, just how things are as we in fact deal with them prior to examining them in abstraction from our primary role as tending to them, taking care of them, following and guiding them. Each thing is not only in a context but is as its context: both as bringing the context into play and as available to us by assigning to us our role in responding to it. The blinker on the car in front of you (often inconspicuous when not in fact blinking), but also tools (that axe and jacket out in the wilderness) and rockcliffs for climbing, chickens in our coops, cows in the field or deer in hunting season—each has its being from its context, is bound up in it.

Its dynamic context, I want to add. The German connotes movement, whereas the English suggests stasis. Heidegger then drifts
into the verbal form *bewenden*, which in colloquial usage corresponds roughly with such English expressions as “letting things run their course”—letting the context do its work in regard to the specific thing we might otherwise wish to alter by our own agency. It is the dynamic context of wending your way through traffic, a context including dozens of co-functional things (stoplights, crosswalks, lanes, accelerator, steering wheel...) that makes “relevant”—even available—that blinking blinker: that lets it function, lets it be bound up with other things.

One of the most important achievements of *Being and Time* is its clarification of how things most concretely arise for us, therefore also how we ourselves most concretely rise to them, namely as *zuhanden* (quite easily and literally translated at “at hand”). They do so (and are) in keeping with a “whole dynamic context” (provided by the slightly more broadly intended “world” in which you are involved: here including your having to pick up your kids and take them to the dentist before getting back to your other work). And each is as coming and going, both taking its own course and requiring you to guide some things in their coming and going: an account clearly resonating with Aristotle’s talk of the narrower form of involvement he calls *τη χνη*.

The achievement requires an account of how we (and especially we intellectuals) come to the project of understanding things “out of context”—or, rather, in the special contexts of investigation that we learn in school. Here, those things occupying our attention are no longer “in use”: no longer *zuhanden*, at hand, but rather *vorhanden* (again easily and literally translated as “on hand”). Arriving at the scene of an accident, an investigator (from the police, perhaps from an insurance company) does not work with blinkers, stoplights, crosswalks and the likes, but measures their interrelations, along with any skid marks, fresh vs. old damage, and so on. Yet the investigation itself has its own dynamic context, with myriad things at hand—but this *Bewandtnis* contrasts with the first and hovers eerily out of sight for those wishing to get on with their day.

It is especially important that the translation neatly retain this distinction between things being at hand (within reach, used, put to use, bound up with one another) and things being on hand (examined out of their original context, therefore countable and storable—as the wreckage might be). Heidegger challenges us to learn a kind of thinking (meditating, reflecting, reading and writing) that does justice to our concrete dealings with things, and thereby learn to “put in its proper place” the kind of intellectual discourse that modernity has devised for accounting for things only as on hand, unbound—as we think of things as resources for subsequent exploitation.

Essential to thinking this distinction through is a discernment of our being there within a dynamic context conditioning both our own role and the availability of things to us as, first, we are working with them, bound up with them as they are bound among themselves—but then also learning to investigate them. One of Heidegger’s signature thoughts is that one way, perhaps the prime or even only way, of learning this discernment is the experience of its utter devastation: of the dynamic context no longer sustaining our role in it, but rather appearing vacuous: What’s the point of taking the kids to the dentist and getting back to work? Or even pausing to let the other guy turn? Not that I won’t do these things, but that the whole of things raises the distressing question.

*zweitigen*

*Zeitigung, Bewegtheit*

One of the chief aims of Heidegger’s work is to allow for careful consideration of what it means for things to reveal themselves fully, and this in consonance with the traditional principle that we ourselves must learn to be fully there to bear witness to the revelation. Learn, that is, to allow for this revelation in a way undercutting the modern supposition that we inaugurate it by withdrawing into the special position of independent observation, calculation and decision—the modern predisposition to devise a mix of objectivity and subjectivity.

True, anyone able to engage in such considerations has already moved out of ordinary engagements into a meta-discourse of sorts. Yet Heidegger is suggesting throughout *Being and Time* that we might exploit this vantage point to raise the most reflective question: How do our ordinary engagements already evidence the possibility—more exactly, the urgency, even the necessity—of achieving this vantage point? Modulated by this question, the withdrawal will not carry the flavor of an absolute, as it does in modern philosophy.

Heidegger then asks us to look out for signs of, even seeds of growth. How does our being-there evidence incipient ripening, maturation, into something more than the absorption marking its (our)
initial movement? Or: How may we understand, albeit from our “outside” vantage point, how our condition is moved, changed, developed “inside”? Or: What makes being-there evolve, even devolve?

The key verb for such movement is *zeitigen* — which has no other meaning than to ripen, to maturate, to fructify: transitively, to make bear fruit; intransitively (in German, reflexively), to bear fruit. From which Heidegger easily forms the noun *Zeitigung*, a key word in his own account. Early translators saw in these words the root *Zeit* and strove to retain the resonance with “time” — a retention that utterly obliterates the simplicity and importance of the question Heidegger is raising.

The verb first occurs on p. 22: fresh contemplation is difficult because tradition, initially forming our being-there, necessarily fructifies (brings about, generates) cover-ups. It next occurs in a question posed on p. 152: since every investigation moves within a presupposed interpretation of what is investigated, How can it (we, now) fructify (come up with) legitimate results, i.e. not argue in a circle? And then the first occurrence of the noun on p. 235, announcing the projected achievement of the second half of the book: temporality itself, to be freshly understood, will reveal its own possibility of fructification (maturation, transformation, metamorphosis), i.e. whole new ways of understanding what’s going on in our being-there. On p. 304 Heidegger elaborates on the promise: each element already exposed in the structure of being-there will become clearer when we see it as a fructification (a development, a modulation, an “effect”) of temporality (yet to be freshly understood). Finally, on p. 328 both the verb and the noun start taking on the thematic meaning governing the remaining one-hundred pages of the book: temporality is not, is not something that “is” (that arises for encounter), it rather fructifies, is the fructifying that throbs throughout our condition, yielding both tasteful fruit (as in art works), tasteless fruit (as in banalized and banalizing interpretations), and distasteful fruit (as in baneful actions and frustrations).

Heidegger here addresses a question central to our tradition, first available in Zeno, Plato and Aristotle, then again in Leibniz, Newton and Kant — the question, What gets things moving? That is: How can we intellectuals understand “the buzzing, booming confusion” in which we find ourselves? — While Zeno left the question hanging by seemingly denying that things are moving (or denying that we can understand them as getting moved), Plato incipiently, and Aristotle finally, answer that what makes their movement intelligible is their pending fulfilment (even failure to get fulfilled): this pending restfulness not only governs restlessness but supplies the focus of our understanding. — While Leibniz and Newton devised a way of intellectualizing movement itself, relocating the intellect-defying notion of the infinite into our own formulations (thereby taming and harnessing it), Kant supplied the overall account of human experience that justified this relocation. — And we today, in the aftermath of these decisive developments (maturations, fructifications) are left with a mishmash (a veritable “buzzing, booming confusion”) of intellectual accounts of movement: modern notions of gravity to explain both terrestrial and celestial motions; of instinct to explain behavior of animals (including ourselves); of genetic structure to explain reproduction, maturation, deformation and termination of plants and animals; of greed, self-interest and fear to explain economic forces; and finally of “human nature” to detect in what it means to be human a variety of causes for historical changes in social formations and intellectual interpretations. Throughout these efforts there hovers something like Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” — an underhanded recourse to divine intervention after all, or at least to the notions of purpose, intention, fulfillment hearkening back to our earlier traditions.

Heidegger directs our attention rather to the ordered movement already taking place in our everyday being-there in a “dynamic context” where purpose obviously reigns independently of any consideration of the fulfillments possible either for what we deal with or for our own nature, and where the interconnections of things requires no leaps over infinitudes of space and spatialized time. The main task is to unveil, in our world, the “seeds” of possible fruit-bearing — the urgencies calling for the kinds of extra-ordinary developments we associate with the marvels of art work and the like. But an important subsidiary task is to recover the power of the earlier accounts of κινήσις (movedness), and therewith our Greek and modern heritage (much facilitated by the distinction between at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness, itself fructified by the refreshed sense of temporality). While Plato and Aristotle posed the question of growth as prominent in φυσις, and Leibniz, Newton and Kant posed the question of knowing motion in our own formulations of space and time, Heidegger poses the question in regard to a third focal point, our ever-initial being-there. And employs the metaphor of ripening, maturing, or fructifying to name the movement first of all at issue for our
being there with others dealing with things.

In this one word lies multiple challenges: to focus on something hitherto unthematized, to search for seeds of development, to reassess (along with a fresh understanding of time) the positive and negative role of tradition, and finally (in Heidegger’s later works) to recover the power of the literature of our tradition in order to overcome, at moments, the tasteless or even poisonous fruits it will always engender. Reader, I wish you luck!

das Seiende
das nicht-daseins-mäßige Seiende

Such a simple word! Yet how can it best be translated into English? An early translation of a later work tried “the essent”—a neologism that, understandably, did not take hold. The first translation of Being and Time tried “entities”—an abstract noun that fails to resonate with the concrete meaning of the original. I myself have often settled on “beings”—as have most other translators, I believe.

So what’s the problem? For one thing, the German is singular. For another, it is adjectival (formed from the present participle of “to be”); it is not a substantive—not a noun as, say, “creature” or “thing” would be. Perhaps the more neutral “what is” would do in some cases. But... How can we get a fix on what this word designates?

There in our dynamic context, we deal with things and people by considering each, arising for encounter, as something that fits or fails to fit into the on-going affair. While we may mistake things, misuse them, underestimate or overestimate their role in the context, our being there still requires something like “attribution”: it is... But in each instance one “is” sends us to the next “is” within the context: it is first and foremost dynamic even though there may be occasion, as when a police officer examines the scene of an accident, where the attribution itself is at issue and appears static (bearing now on something on hand rather than at hand).

Our ordinary condition buzzes and booms with such preintellectualized (unthematized) attributions—myriad flashes of “it is” organized according to our involvements, our own being there in some dynamic context, itself nameable as... doing housework, watching a game of chess, strolling through the woods, climbing a mountain, or whatever.

The problem of translation is that we—translators and readers—live within inherited interpretations of what’s going on in this initial arena of flashing attributions. My first formulation follows Heidegger’s account of their initial configuration (each “is” sends us along to another, all within a dynamic context: each is as an “as”). But now we are trying to focus (reflectively, contemplatively, thematically) on something else that “is”: the whole of our being-there (the whole of these “is’s”), something that also imposes itself on us, posing questions of an order transcending the questions internal to our ordinary contexts. And here our inheritance impinges on our understanding of the word “is”: the difference between the “is” as signaling something about something and as signaling the something itself. Indeed, there is (again that “is”) an enigmatic contrast between what a horse or a city is doing or undergoing, where or when it is happening, how it strikes us, how it relates to something else and so on, and what it is “in itself”—what it really is, what the horse-trainer or the city-leader must know in order to discern those details accurately and guide the development of the horse or the city properly. As modern thinkers turned increasingly to what they themselves, as intellectuals rather than artisans or leaders, could know about horses and cities, the question of what really is concentrated attention on principles of organizing the details rather than penetrating them: these principles now (since Kant) count as what really is.

Each “flash in the pan” is, and each of us very frequently asks about its what, its how, its where, its when, etc. (in line with Aristotle’s list of ten categories). Each happens. It’s something we encounter. It’s something we initially determine and then perhaps re-determine or further determine, even find enigmatic—all in a flow itself framed by a context, perhaps by different contexts. Greeks called it simply τὸ ὁν, Germans easily call it das Seiende—an appearance before us, one that hardly distinguishes itself from a determination on our part (indeed, we could also translate the Greek and the German as “determination”: each “is,” as temporal, has a follow-up determination).

Within their own fields, routine thinkers have no need to go beyond the “flashes in the pan”; indeed, fields of inquiry have become increasingly defined by their steadfast answers. However, full-fledged thinkers go on to ask about their status—better, their dynamic (power, potential): ask about their being. Aristotle says that our concern to become clear about τὸ ὁν, about a flash, ultimately leads to a concern for
η οὐσία, its “substance” (its estate). Heidegger translates this question as bearing on das Sein des Seienden — what we might have to translate into English as “the being of beings” (resorting to the plural for the second in order to retain the distinction, and perhaps capitalizing the first for the same reason). But all the translations fail to resonate fully with the original words of the original thinkers.

Essential in reading Being and Time is that we keep remembering what it asks us to focus on: our being-there in its multifarious manifestations. Everything that then appears for our consideration takes its measure from our dealings with it, including what we see ourselves and others refashioning it to be (to appear) as on hand rather than at hand. What then do we make of the talk on p. 333 of das nicht-daseinsmäßige Seiende? — beings not taking their measure from being-there?

As being-in-world, being-there ex-sists factically with and near inner-worldly encountered things. For this reason, the being of being-there receives its comprehensive ontological transparency only within the horizon of the clarified being of beings not taking their measure from being-there, and this also means: the being of what, not at hand and not on hand, only “subsists.”

Heidegger has elsewhere remarked that fully effective artworks may serve as guides: great cathedrals, great plays, great paintings, great works of contemplation. These do not take their measure from being-there, they rather measure our being there (and, as a consequence, take the measure of each of us capable of entering into them). With such works in mind — as beings, as things, as flashes in the pan that keep flashing — I highlight what’s only penumbral in the German suffix -mäßige, the sense of measure, a word recalling the ancient and ever-recurring debate over the dictum that “man is the measure of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.” Be it remembered, though, that being-there is a phenomenon, a being, in its own right, already suffused with measures to which we, as individuals and as communities must own up; if Heidegger’s work enters this debate, it is as a third party.

So is translation essentially distortive of the original? Pointless, hopeless, worthless, thankless? No more so than just reading the original. Indeed, native speakers of German do not enjoy any remarkable advantage (perhaps they will less likely be waylaid by Zeitigung, but they are even more likely to be waylaid by Gerede). Indeed, the advantage we German-reading non-natives have is that we must immediately triangulate to focus more conscientiously on what the original is asking us to address. To approximate this advantage of ours, natives would have to translate the German into a second language and then discuss among themselves which resonances to retain and which to forgo.