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Sampler through page 51 of PDF,
followed by Postscript on seven words

Martin Heidegger

Being and Time

An Annotated Translation

Cyril Welch

This translation was prepared in the expectation that Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (1927) would enter into the (United States) public domain on January 1, 2003. However, on October 27, 1998, the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act was signed into law. Despite the valiant efforts of the Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in a decision handed down on January 15, 2003. The result is that works such as Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Walt Disney's Mickey Mouse will not enter the public domain for another twenty years. Thus the publication of this translation in the U.S. must wait until January 1, 2023 (four years later in Canada, where "life of the author plus fifty years" prevails).

The delay has allowed me to notice and to correct a small number of typographical errors (insignificant for the understanding of the text but aesthetically displeasing), to rectify some infelicities of expression, to uniformize some of the terminology, and to insert additional annotations in my master copy.

Of the copies prematurely printed and bound, I submit a few to the critical review of students and scholars — on two conditions: that they make use of their copies for private study only, and that they communicate to me their suggestions for improving the text and the translation for the subsequent publications in 2023 and 2027.

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Liliane Welch performed a service most writers only dream of: she scoured the entire manuscript on the lookout for inelegancies and downright errors. As a result, the translation reads much more accurately and coherently than it otherwise would have.

In addition, an anonymous reader of a university press also read the entire manuscript and submitted twelve pages of discerning commentary and criticism.

Finally, several students of mine at Mount Allison University test-read the translation, supplying helpful suggestions for improving its readability, as well as detecting typographical and other errors.

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Translator's Preface

The chief challenge has been to provide a reading that remains close by the spirit of Heidegger's work — and that proceeds as smoothly as possible, given the bumpy road. The chief temptation, avoided every time, has been to insert the original German in order to explain the interconnections of the original text, or the inadequacies of the English version.

Accuracy too, of course. But accuracy in regard to what? The letter or the spirit? In the case of great works, the only literal accuracy is that provided by the original text. All else is interpretation, and, if the translator shrinks from interpreting, the result will be . . . an interpretation, namely of how to transpose one set of letters into another.

Any translation of a norm-resetting work requires interpretation in a special sense, the one we easily recognize in the work of conductors and musicians: they must get the score to work.

Interpretation lurks everywhere in a translation: in the punctuation, in the choice or omission of articles, in the pursuit or not of metaphors, in the layout of the pages.

And in the location of the notes: since I interpret the whole of *Being and Time* as instituting a dialogue with the entire tradition of philosophy, I place the references to this tradition right where they address the reader—at the foot of the page.

Also, since more than seventy-five years have passed since the original publication of the book, not only are many of the unspoken references fading from memory, but many new voices from later works now have a say as well in the reading of the text. These I have only begun to suggest in the multitudinous annotations.

Many of these voices Heidegger himself has indicated in his own marginalia. These often consist of keywords only, recalling later texts. These I have annotated with a view to what they would suggest to a reader of the originals.

There is some confusion about the original text of *Being and Time*. To the seventh edition (1953), Heidegger added a note that begins:

The treatise *Being and Time* first appeared in the spring of 1927 in Volume VIII of the *Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, edited by E. Husserl, and simultaneously as a special edition.

Volume VIII also contained an entire treatise by another author. It is primarily as the “special edition” that *Being and Time* is available to us, in its many reprintings. (Still, several footnotes in the text refer to works as appearing “in this *Yearbook*,” i.e. in previous volumes of the series.) Then in 1977 the work appeared as Volume 2 in the on-going publication of the *Gesamtausgabe* (which I refer to as his *Collected Works*). This edition includes Heidegger's marginalia.

In all, there are three sorts of footnotes in the present translation:

Arabic numerals (¹, ², ³, ...) for Heidegger's own.

Lower-case letters (^a, ^b, ^c, ...) for Heidegger's marginalia.

Characters (*, †, ‡, ...) for my annotations.

Throughout, square brackets, [...], also contain my annotations. And the page numbers I cite (both in the annotations and in the margins of the translation) are those of the original “special” edition.

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- 1 ... δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα (τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὄν φθέγγησθε) πάλαι γινώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὠόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν...

“For evidently you have long been familiar with what you really mean when you say of something that it ‘is’; we however thought we understood it but now find ourselves perplexed.”¹

Do we today have an answer to the question what we mean when we say that something “is”? By no means. It is then important that we position *the question of the meaning of being* freshly. Are we today even perplexed that we do not understand what we mean by “being”? By no means. And so it is important above all that we first awaken an understanding of this question.

The following treatise intends to work out concretely the question of the meaning of “being.” Its provisional goal is to interpret *time* as the possible horizon of each and every understanding of being.*

The setting of our sights on this goal, the investigations entailed and required by it, and the path toward it—all these call for an introductory elucidation.

¹ Plato's *Sophist*, 244A. [The “you” here refers to Parmenides and all those who have undertaken to delimit the number of things counting as being: each tells a tale rather than considering the question thoroughly and including others in the discussion. Cf. especially the Stranger's comments from 241D through 244B.]

* Throughout *Being and Time*, Heidegger will talk about provisional tasks, interpretations, indications, characterizations, manners, analyses. Although occasionally having the sense of “temporary” or “for the time being,” the term “provisional” evolves into a stronger sense of “anticipative” or “moving forward.” In his 1962 *On Time and Being* (p. 35), Heidegger remarks on this double meaning. One of the questions of *Being and Time* will be *how* we can ready ourselves for this kind of pro-vision; e.g., p. 302:

What if resoluteness, as the *authentic* truth of being-there, reached the *certainty authentically belonging to it* only in readying for death? What if only in *readying* for death every “provisionality” of resolve were authentically understood, i.e. existentially *recovered*?

Introduction:

Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being

Chapter One

Necessity, Structure, and Primacy of the Question of Being

- §1. *The necessity of an explicit repetition of the question of being*
- §2. *The formal structure of the question of being*
- §3. *The ontological primacy of the question of being*
- §4. *The ontical primacy of the question of being*

Chapter Two

The Double Task in the Elaboration of the Question of Being
The Method of the Investigation, and its Outline

- §5. *The ontological analysis of being-there as the exposure of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of being in general*
- §6. *The task of destructuring the history of ontology*
- §7. *The phenomenological method of investigation*
- §8. *Outline of the treatise*

Introduction

Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being

Chapter One

Necessity, Structure, and Primacy of the Question of Being

§1. *The necessity of an explicit repetition of the question of being*^{*}

This question has today fallen into oblivion, even though our age considers itself progressive in that it once again affirms “metaphysics.” But then it also considers itself exempt from the exertions required to kindle anew any *γυαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας*.[†] Yet the question here touched upon is not just one among others. It kept the inquiries of Plato and Aristotle in an aura of suspense, only to subside from then on into silence *as a thematic question of actual investigation*. What those two achieved held up, throughout manifold displacements and “retouchings,” on into Hegel’s *Logic*. And what at one time was wrested from the phenomena with the utmost effort of thought, although fragmentary and roughly incipient, has long since become trivialized.

Not only that. On the basis of the Greek approaches to the interpretation of being, there has evolved a dogma that not only declares

^{*} In his *On the Way to Language* (Harper & Row, 1971), Heidegger comments:

The talk of “repetition” on the first page of *Being and Time* is deliberate. It does not mean uniform continuation of the same; rather, it means: fetching, retrieving, gathering of what lies concealed in the old. (English, p. 36; translated from original: *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 1959, p. 131)

Cf. his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (Yale University Press, 1959, 2000), p. 39, p. 41: the question is whether we can “again get hold of” our spiritual-historical beginning — to transform it into “the other [forgotten] beginning.”

[†] Any “battle of giants over being” (or “over our estate”; *Sophist*, 246A): the Stranger is referring to conflicting accounts proposed by the early thinkers in Greece. In his *Republic* (at 378C) Plato has Socrates forbid children from hearing tales of *any* “battle of giants” (i.e. of gods, as in the Homeric stories), or even viewing pictures of such battle.

superfluous the question about the meaning of being but also sanctions the neglect of the question. It is said that “being” is the most universal and the most empty concept. As such, it resists every attempt to define it. Moreover, this most universal and therefore indefinable concept needs no definition. Everyone uses it constantly, and also understands what is thereby meant. Thus that which, as concealed, drove ancient philosophizing into restlessness, and kept it so, has become perfectly obvious, clear as day, such that anyone who even continues to pose the question is charged with committing a methodological error.

At the beginning of this investigation it is not possible to discuss thoroughly the prejudices ever again planting and cultivating the confidence that there is no need for the question about being. These prejudices have their root in ancient ontology itself. This ontology can in turn only be interpreted adequately with the guidance of the question of being — the very question that we must first clarify and answer: and here we must look to the soil from which the fundamental concepts grew, and ask about the appropriateness with which the categories were certified, and about their completeness. We therefore intend to discuss these prejudices only to the extent that the necessity of a repetition of the question about the meaning of being becomes clear. There are three such prejudices:

1. “Being”^a is the “most universal” concept: τὸ ὄν ἐστὶ καθόλον μάλιστα πάντων.¹ *Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit.* “An understanding of being is in each instance already included in everything one apprehends about a being.”² Yet the “universality” of “being” is not

^a What is, what makes it be. [Heidegger here corrects the original, which does not distinguish between “being” as the topic of *Being and Time* and “being” in the sense of “what is determined to be” — as Aristotle himself does when he remarks (1028 b 4) that the question what (or how) something is: τί τὸ ὄν — which in each instance receives an answer falling under one of the usual categories — lurks within and comes down to the question what being (or substance) is: τίς ἡ οὐσία — which Aristotle answers (after and while engaging in the battle of the giants) in terms of “energy,” “ability,” “purpose” and even, in a somewhat Platonic manner, “matter” and “form.”]

¹ Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 1001 a 21. [Word for word: “being-one and being-something are the most universal of all things we say.”]

² Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*, II.1, Question 94, Article 2.

that of a genus. It does not encompass the highest region of things that are, as these things get articulated conceptually in the manner of genus and species: οὔτε τὸ ὄν γένος.¹ The “universality” of being “surpasses” every genus-based universality. In the language of medieval ontology, “being” is a “*transcendens*.” Aristotle already understood the unity of this transcendent “universality,” a unity for the multiplicity of the highest generic concepts pertaining to things, as *unity by analogy*. With this discovery, Aristotle placed the problem of being on a fundamentally new basis — for all his dependence on Plato’s ontological way of positioning the question. To be sure, he too did not cast light on the obscurity of these categorial inter-connections. Medieval ontology discussed this question in many ways, mainly in the Scholastic manner of Thomas and Scotus, without coming to any fundamental clarity. And when, finally, Hegel defines “being” as the “undetermined immediate,” and makes this definition the foundation of all further categorial explications in his *Logic*, he remains within the perspective of ancient ontology, except that he dismisses the problem of the unity of being for the multiplicity of the “categories” pertaining to things. So, considering all this, when one says that “being” is the most universal concept, this cannot mean that this concept is the clearest, and in need of no further discussion. The concept of “being” is much rather the most obscure.

2. The concept “being” is indefinable. This follows from its being the highest universality.² And rightly so — if *definito fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam* [if definition is made by proximate genus and specific difference]. As a matter of fact, “being” cannot be

¹ Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, 998 b 22. [“... neither is what-is a genus”: a horse trainer does not get closer to his horse (its being fast, lame, or small) by discovering that it is an animal.]

² Cf. *Œuvres de Blaise Pascal* (ed. by Léon Brunschvicg *et al*, Paris: 1914 [Kraus reprint, 1965], Vol. 9, pp. 218 f. [“On the Geometric Spirit”]:

On ne peut entreprendre de définir l’être sans tomber dans cette absurdité: car on ne peut définir un mot sans commencer par celui-ci, *c’est*, soit qu’on l’exprime ou qu’on le sous-entende. Donc, pour définir l’être, il faudrait dire *c’est*, et ainsi employer le mot défini dans sa définition.

[“One cannot undertake to define being without falling into this absurdity: for one cannot define a word without beginning with this, *it is*, whether expressly or implicitly. Thus, to define being it would be necessary to say *it is*, and thereby to use the defined word in its definition.”]

conceptualized as a being; *enti non additur aliqua natura*: “being” cannot become determinate by our attributing something to it. Being cannot be derived definitionally from higher concepts, and cannot be presented by lower concepts. But does it then follow that “being” can offer no further problem? Hardly. It can only be inferred that “being” is not anything like a being.^a Thus the way one determines beings (justified within certain limits) — the “definition” of traditional logic, itself grounded in ancient ontology — is not applicable. The indefinability of being does not dispense with the question of its meaning; rather, it makes it all the more urgent.

3. “Being” is the one self-evident concept. In every cognizing, every stating, every relating to beings, in every relation to oneself, “being” is used, and the expression is immediately intelligible. Everyone understands such utterances as “The sky *is* blue” and “I *am* happy.” Yet this average intelligibility only demonstrates its unintelligibility. It makes manifest that in every comportment, every being toward beings as beings, there lies an enigma. That each of us already lives in an understanding of being, while the meaning of being also remains shrouded in darkness, proves the foundational necessity of repeating the question about the meaning of being.

Recourse to self-evidence is a dubious procedure in the realm of basic philosophical concepts, all the more so in regard to the concept “being” — assuming that precisely what appears “self-evident” (what Kant calls “the covert judgements of common reason”) is to become and remain our explicit theme of analysis (“the business of philosophers”).^{*}

The consideration of these prejudices has also made it clear that not only is the *answer* to the question about being lacking, but even the question itself is obscure and without direction. Thus to repeat the question of being means first of all to work out adequately the way to *position* the question.

^a no! rather [what can be inferred is this]: with the help of such conceptuality we cannot decide about being.

^{*} “The business of philosophers is not to give rules, it is rather to analyze the covert judgements of common reason” (*Akademie* edition of Kant’s collected works, Vol. 14, p. 180); cited again on p. 23. — Heidegger almost always takes “self-evident” in the sense of “taken for granted as obvious,” whereas the evidence at issue in phenomenological discourse must be *earned*.

5 §2. *The formal structure of the question of being*

The question about the meaning of being must be *positioned*. If it is a — or even *the* — fundamental question, such questioning stands in need of a transparency suitable to it. Thus we must briefly discuss what in general belongs to any question, in order then to make the question of being discernible as a *pre-eminent* one.

Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its initial direction from what is sought. Questioning is a knowledgeable searching of beings, a sifting through their *that* and their *how*. Knowledgeable searching can become “investigation,” i.e. a determining of what the question aims at, a determining that lays it bare for [theoretical] inspection. As a questioning about..., questioning has *something pressing* about which it asks. Every questioning about... is a questioning in the nearness of... Besides what presses in any questioning, questioning also engages *something to be examined*. In an investigative, i.e. specifically theoretical question, what presses in must be determined and conceptualized. Thus within the pressing there lies, as what is uppermost intended and toward which the questioning aims, *something to be ascertained*. Questioning itself, as a comportment of a being, of the questioner, has its own character of being. A given question might unfold as a “just asking” or as an explicit interrogative stance. Special about this latter stance is that questioning here becomes transparent to itself, in all three named constitutive elements.^{*}

The question about the meaning of being must be *positioned*. Thus we are confronted with the necessity of discussing the question of being in regard to the structural moments just cited.

As a seeking, questioning needs precedential guidance from what it seeks.[†] The meaning of being must therefore already be available in

^{*} I can’t find my car key, and I ask where it is. The key itself is the pressing issue: what is asked for. But the question invokes the circumstances in which I might look for it: what is then examined. Then, too, an answer is envisioned, as when I find the key I can record where exactly it was: what might be “theoretically” ascertained. — Heidegger here structures the question of his work as a whole: what presses = being; what will be examined = being-there; and what is to be ascertained = the meaning of being.

[†] In a marginalium on p. 85, Heidegger comments extensively on the word “precedential”: this neologism corresponds to Aristotle’s sense of “prior by nature” and to Kant’s sense of “*a priori*.” It does not mean prior in time.

some way. This much was intimated: we always already move within an understanding of being. Out of this understanding there grows the explicit question about the meaning of being, and the drive toward conceptualizing it. We don't *know* what [the word] "being" means. But already when we ask what "being" *is* we move within an understanding of the "is" — even without being able to fix conceptually what the "is" signifies. We don't even know the horizon within which we might get hold of and fix its meaning. *This average and vague understanding of being is a factum.*

This understanding of being may ever so much waver and fade and border on mere verbal familiarity. Yet this very indeterminateness of the understanding of being, in each instance already available, is itself a positive phenomenon that stands in need of clarification. However, 6 an investigation of the meaning of being cannot hope to provide this clarification at the outset. The interpretation of this average understanding obtains its necessary guidance only with the developed concept of being. From the clarity of the concept, and an appropriate manner of explicitly understanding it, we shall be able to discern what the obscure, or the not-yet elucidated understanding of being means, and what sorts of obfuscation or hindrance of an explicit elucidation of the meaning of being are possible and necessary.

More: the average and vague understanding of being can be permeated by traditional theories and opinions about being, and in such a way that these theories, as the sources of prevailing understanding, remain hidden. — What is sought in the question of being is not something entirely unfamiliar, but it is something at first totally incomprehensible.

What presses us into elaborating the question is being — that which determines things to be as they are; that from which things, however they are discussed, are in each instance already understood. The being of beings "is" not itself a being. The first philosophical step in the understanding of being consists in not "telling a tale" — $\mu\theta\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\alpha\ \delta\iota\eta\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ¹ — i.e. in not determining the provenance of things as the things they are by recurring to something else that is, as though being had the character of some determinate being. As what presses in on us, being thereby requires its own manner of display, one essentially different from

¹ Plato's *Sophist*, 242C. [Cf. his *Republic*, 396C to 398B, on telling tales.]

that of discovering beings. Accordingly, what we aim to *ascertain*, the meaning of being, will require its own conceptuality, one that again stands in contrast to those concepts in which beings attain their significant determinateness.

Inasmuch as being constitutes what presses (being means the being of something that *is*), it turns out that what the question of being asks us to *examine* is something that is. This it is that gets tested, so to speak — tested in regard to its being. If, however, it is to yield the characteristics of its being without falsification, it must in turn have become accessible in advance as the being it is in itself. In regard to what it examines, the question of being must achieve, secure at the outset, a proper manner of access to something that is. But we say of many things that they are, and we do so in many different ways. Everything we talk about "is," 7 everything we believe in, everything to which we relate in whatever way; what and how we ourselves are — this too "is." Being lies in each that and in each how, in reality, on-hand-ness, inventory, prevalence, being-there,^a and in each "there is." From *which* thing that *is* should we read off the meaning of being, *which* should we take as the point of departure for the disclosure of being?^b Is the point of departure incidental, or does some one being have primacy in our elaboration of the question of being? Which one is this exemplary^c being, and in what sense does it have primacy?

If the question about being is to be explicitly posed, and brought to full transparency of itself, then the elaboration of this question requires (according to what we have just elucidated) an explication of [1] the manner in which we view being, [2] the understanding and conceptual comprehension of its meaning, [3] the preparation for the possibility of properly choosing an exemplary being, [4] the elaboration of an intrinsic manner of accessing this being. Viewing, understanding and conceptualizing, choice and access — these are constitutive comportments of questioning, and thus are themselves modes of being of a determinate

^a still in the ordinary sense [i.e., existence], not yet any other. [Heidegger will soon introduce the special sense of "being-there."]

^b Two quite different questions are here strung together; misleading, above all in relation to the role of being-there [as remarked in the previous note].

^c Misleading. Being-there is exemplary [only] because in its nature as being-there (upholding the truth of being) it is a *co*-player playing up to and along with being as such — bringing being into the play of resonance.

being, namely of that being that we ourselves, each of us engaged in the questioning, are. Accordingly, to elaborate the question of being means this: to make this one being—the one who questions—transparent in its being. The very asking of this question is itself, as one being's mode of *being*, essentially determined from what is pressing within this one being—from being.^a This one being, one that each of us is and that has, among other things, the essential possibility of questioning, we formulate terminologically as *being-there*. The very positioning of the question about the meaning of being, posing it explicitly and transparently, requires a precedential and appropriate explication of one being (*being-there*) regarding its being.^b

But is not such an undertaking obviously circular? To have to determine beforehand one being *in its being*, and then on the basis of this determination to want to pose the question about being: What else is this but to run in a circle? Do we not here already “presuppose” for the elaboration of the question something that only the answer to the question can provide? Such formal objections as this one—arguing about the “circularity” of a “proof,” invariably easy to do in areas where we are searching out principles—are always sterile when we are considering concrete paths of investigation. They contribute nothing to understanding the matter at hand, and inhibit advancement into the field of investigation.

8 Factly, however, there is no circularity at all in the manner in which we are positioning the question. A being can get determined in its being apart from any need for an explicit concept of the meaning of being to be already available. If that were not the case, there could not ever have been any ontological cognition, the factual stock of which we can hardly deny. Indeed, “being” gets “presupposed” in all previous ontology, but not as an available *concept*—not as that which defines

^a Being-there: being held out into the nothingness of being, held up as relation. [Heidegger here qualifies in advance this present concern to examine “ourselves”: what is distinctive about ourselves is precisely our relation to the being of things other than ourselves. The image of “being held out into nothingness” is elaborated in his lecture “What is Metaphysics?” (1929). That the self of human being is a relation, and finds its support in this relation, Heidegger states below (p. 12); it is a thought developed explicitly by Kierkegaard in his *Sickness unto Death*.]

^b But the meaning of being does not get read off this one being. [Heidegger here contradicts his remark on the top of p. 7.]

what is sought. The “presupposition” of being has the character of a precedential vista opening onto being, and in such a way that from this vista beings that are already available in their being get provisionally articulated. This guiding vista onto being emerges from the average manner in which being is intelligible, an intelligibility within which we always already move *and which belongs in the end^a to the essential constitution of being-there*. Such “presupposing” has nothing to do with positing a principle from which one deductively derives a series of propositions. In posing the question about the meaning of being there can never be a “circularity in the proof” because in answering the question it is not a matter of deriving anything from a ground, but rather of laying bare the ground, showing it.

In the question about the meaning of being, there is no “circularity in the proof,” but there is indeed a remarkable “back and forth relation” between what presses for the question (*being*) and the questioning itself—as a mode in which this one being [i.e., *being-there*] *is*. The way what is pressing engages our questioning belongs to the innermost meaning of the question of being. But that only says: a being bearing the character of *being-there* has a relation—perhaps even a distinctive one—to this question of being. Have we not thereby proved a determinate being to have a primacy [for the question] of being, and displayed^b the exemplary being that can serve as what we *examine* in the question of being? Our discussions hitherto have neither proved the primacy of *being-there*, nor decided upon its possible, let alone necessary, service as the being to be primarily examined. Yet something like a primacy of *being-there* has suggested itself.

§3. *The ontological primacy of the question of being*

The characterization of the question of being, under the guidance of the formal structure of the question as such, has clarified the question as a special one, special in that its elaboration, not to speak of its solution, requires a series of fundamental reflections. However, what is distinctive

^a i.e. from the very beginning [not just at the end of the investigation].

^b Again, as on page 7 [note c], this is an essential simplification, yet the right thing is getting thought. *Being-there* is not one instance among other beings for the representational abstraction of being; it is rather the site at which being becomes intelligible.

about the question of being will fully come to light only when the question gets sufficiently delimited in regard to its function, its intention, and its motive.

Hitherto the necessity of a repetition of the question has been motivated partly by its venerable provenance, but above all by the lack of a determinate answer, even by the want of an adequate manner of positioning the question at all. One can therefore wonder what purpose the question might serve. Does it remain, or *is* it in fact, only the business of a free-floating speculation about the most universal generalities — *or is it the question that at once aims at the most basic principles and at what is most concrete?*

Being is in each instance the being of some being. In reference to its various domains, the totality of beings can become a field in which we can lay bare and delimit determinate areas of inquiry. These areas — e.g. history, nature, space, life, being-there, language, and the like — can in turn become thematized as objects of scientific investigations. Scientific research brings these areas into relief roughly and naïvely, providing their initial demarcation. The elaboration of a given area in its basic structures is, in a way, already accomplished by the pre-scientific experience and interpretation of the domain of being in which the given area of inquiry confines itself. The resulting “basic concepts” initially serve as guidelines for the first concrete disclosure of the area. Even if the thrust of research continues to lie in such positivity, its real progress comes about not so much in collecting results and storing them in “handbooks” as in the questioning of the basic constitution of the area itself — a questioning to which one is generally driven retroactively by the increasing knowledge of the matters at issue in the area.

The real “evolution” of the sciences takes place in the more or less radical revision of the basic concepts, a revision transparent to itself. The level to which a science is developed gets determined by the extent to which it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises in the sciences the relation of positive investigative questioning to the matters being examined becomes shaky.* Everywhere today in the

* About these terms “positive” and “positivity”: whatever we can *record* (whether data or patterns) counts as “positive,” and the achievement of the manner of doing this is called a “positivity.” In contrast, thoughts about the relation between the efforts to record and the matters addressed: these thoughts have traditionally been called “philosophical.” Positivism (whether

various disciplines there are drives to shift research onto new foundations.

Mathematics, the science apparently the most strict and the most secure in its structure, has been experiencing a “foundational crisis.” The battle between formalism and intuitionism centers on obtaining and securing the primary mode of access to what can serve as the object of this science. In *physics*, relativity theory grew out of the drive to expose nature’s own coherence as this coherence subsists “in itself.” As a theory of the conditions of access to nature herself, physics is seeking to preserve, by determining all relativities, the immutability of the laws of motion; it is thus confronted by the question of the structure of its pre-given area of inquiry, i.e. by the problem of matter. In *biology* the drive has awakened to get behind the determinations that both mechanism and vitalism have given to organism and to life, and to determine anew the way living beings as such *are*. In the *historiographical humanities* the thirst has grown for historical actuality itself, by way of tradition and its portrayal: the history of literature tends to become the history of problems. *Theology* is searching for a more original interpretation of man’s being toward God, an interpretation prefigured by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within that faith. It is slowly beginning to understand again Luther’s insight that its [present] doctrinal system rests on a “foundation” that does not grow from a questioning wherein faith is primary, a “foundation” whose conceptuality is not only insufficient for the range of problems proper to theology, but even covers over this range and distorts it.

Basic concepts are determinations in which the area of inquiry underlying all the thematic objects of a science acquires a precedential intelligibility guiding every positive investigation. These concepts are thus identified and “justified” only in a correspondingly precedential research into the area of inquiry itself. However, inasmuch as each of these areas arises from the domain of beings themselves, this precedential research excavating the basic concepts entails nothing less than interpretation of these beings in reference to the basic constitution of their being. Such research must precede the positive sciences; and it *can* do so. The labors of Plato and Aristotle prove the point. This manner of

in law or in science) is the belief that positivities suffice by themselves, and that philosophy can only help clarify them in their self-sufficiency. Cf. the end of §10, p. 50.

laying the foundations of the sciences differs in principle from the kind of “logic” that limps along behind, investigating some current condition of a science for its “method.” It is a productive logic—productive in the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into a determinate area of being, discloses this area in its essential constitution for the first time, and makes available to the positive sciences the structures thereby acquired, these structures then supplying the transparent directives of questioning. Thus what is philosophically primary is not, for example, a theory of concept-formation in historiography; neither is it the theory of historiographical cognition nor the theory of history as the object of historiography; it is rather the interpretation of what is authentically historical with a view to its historicity. Then, too, the positive outcome of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* consists in its approach to working out
 11 what belongs to any nature whatsoever, and not in a “theory” of cognition. His transcendental logic is an *a priori*, a material [not just formal] logic of the area of being we call nature.

Yet such questioning—ontology, taken in the broadest sense, without leaning on ontological movements or drives—itself still stands in need of guidance. To be sure, in comparison with the ontical questioning of the positive sciences, ontological questioning is more primordial. But by itself it remains naïve and opaque if its investigations into the being of beings leave the meaning of being undiscussed. And precisely the ontological task of a genealogy that does not construe deductively the various possible manners of being—this task requires an initial agreement about “what we then really have in mind with this word ‘being’.”

Thus the question of being aims at an *a priori* condition of possibility—not just of the sciences, which investigate beings as determined to be such-and-such and which thereby already in each instance move within an understanding of being, but rather [also] of those ontologies that precede and found the ontic sciences. *All ontology, no matter how rich and tightly knit the categorial system at its disposal, remains fundamentally blind, and distorts its innermost intent, if it has not sufficiently clarified at the outset the meaning of being and understood this clarification as its fundamental task.*

Correctly understood, ontological research itself bestows upon the question of being its ontological priority over the mere resumption of a

venerable tradition and the promotion of an hitherto opaque problem. But this primacy in regard to the material sciences is not the only one.

§4. *The ontical primacy of the question of being*

Science in general can be defined as the whole of interconnected and justified propositions. This definition is not complete, nor does it get at the meaning of science. As human comportments, sciences *are* in the manner of this one being, human being. This being we have terminologically formulated as *being-there*. Scientific research is not the sole and not the most intimate way this being *is*. Moreover, being-there itself differs distinctively from other beings. It is our provisional task
 12 to make this distinctive difference visible. Here the discussion must anticipate subsequent analyses that only later really show the matter.

Being-there is not simply one being that occurs among others. Rather, it is ontically distinguished inasmuch as, in its being, its being is at issue for it. But then, to this essential constitution of being-there belongs, in its very being, a relation to being. And this again means: in its being, being-there understands itself in some manner and with some explicitness. It is proper to this one being that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being. *Understanding of being is itself a determination of the being of being-there.*^a What distinguishes being-there ontically is that it is ontologically.

To be ontological does not yet mean to study ontology. Thus if we reserve the term “ontology” for the explicit theoretical questioning about the meaning of beings, then what is intended by calling being-there “ontological” should be designated as “pre-ontological.” But this signifies nothing so simple as being in an ontic manner, but rather being within some understanding of being.

^a But here being not only as the being of human being (ex-sistence). This becomes clear from what follows. Being-in-world includes *in itself* a bearing of ex-sistence upon being as a whole: understanding of being. [Heidegger repeatedly recognizes that his formulations at this point might mislead readers, and emphasizes here (as in the note on p. 8 regarding being-there as relation) that the concern of being-there for its *own* being spills over into the concern for the being of *whatever* arises within the “horizon” of being-there.]

The^a being to which^b being-there can, and always somehow does relate itself, in various ways, we call *ex-sistence*.^{*} And because the determination of the nature of this being cannot be accomplished by proffering a “what” specifying its factual content—its nature lying much rather in the task of each to be its own being—the term “being-there” has been chosen to designate this being, this term expressing its being purely.

Being-there understands itself always in reference to its ex-sistence, to a possibility of its own: the possibility of being itself or not being itself. Being-there has either itself chosen these possibilities, or it has stumbled into them, or it has long grown up within them. Only each instance of being-there decides ex-sistence, either in the manner of seizing or in the manner of neglecting. Only through ex-sisting can the question of ex-sistence be settled. We call *this latter* self-understanding *existentiell* understanding. The question of ex-sistence is an ontic “concern” of being-there. There is here no need for the theoretical transparency of the ontological structure of ex-sistence. The question about this latter aims for a dissection of what constitutes ex-sistence.^c The interconnectedness of these structures we call *existentiality*. The analysis of existentiality has the character, not of an *existentiell*, but rather of an *existential* understanding. The task of an existential analysis
13 of being-there is, so far as its possibility and necessity go, prefigured in the ontic constitution of being-there.

Now, inasmuch as ex-sistence defines being-there, the ontological analysis of this being will in any case always stand in need of a

^a That very [Heidegger adds a restrictive emphasis: not being as such.]

^b as its own [Heidegger again emphasizes the restriction.]

^{*} I shall hyphenate this word, in keeping with Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” (1946-1947: available in *Pathmarks*), where the hyphenation brings out the root of the word: ex-stasis, standing out. “The standing in the clearing of being I call the ex-sistence of human being.” Later, Heidegger will talk about the “three ecstasies of temporality,” i.e. the threefold way we are drawn out of ourselves (into the clearing).

^c Thus [there is here] no philosophy of existence [Heidegger wishes to distinguish his own work from that of Karl Jaspers (who, along with Jean-Paul Sartre, analyzes the “existentiell” understandings open to us); still, later Heidegger repeatedly acknowledges Jaspers’ contribution on the question of “boundary situations.”]

precedental glimpse of existentiality. This existentiality we understand as an essential constitution of the one being that ex-sists. Already in the idea of such a constitution lies the idea of being. And thus the possibility of undertaking an analysis of being-there depends upon the precedental elaboration of the question about the meaning of being as such.

Scientific disciplines are ways in which being-there *is*, and therewith ways of relating to beings that it itself need not be. However, one thing belongs essentially to being-there: being in a world. Thus the understanding of being belonging to being-there bears equi-primordially on the understanding of something like “world” and on the understanding of the being of those beings becoming accessible within that world. Those ontologies that take as their theme beings not taking the measure of their nature from being-there are on this account grounded in and motivated by the ontic structure of being-there itself, a structure that includes the determinateness of a pre-ontological understanding of being.

It follows that *fundamental ontology*, out of which all other ontologies spring, must be sought in the *existential analysis of being-there*.

So, then, being-there has a multiple primacy over all other beings. The first primacy is an *ontical* one: this one being is determined in its being by ex-sistence. The second primacy is an *ontological* one: being-there is, given its determinateness to ex-sist, in itself “ontological.” But then this also belongs to being-there equiprimordially—as a constituent of the understanding of ex-sistence: an understanding of the being of all beings not taking their measure from being-there.^{*} Thus being-there has a third primacy as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies. So being-there has proved to be what, prior to all other beings, deserves to be examined first of all.

^{*} Throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger refers to “beings not taking their measure from being-there.” Since the analyses themselves concentrate precisely on what *does* take its measure from being-there, the reference is elusive. There are at least three exemplifications: (1) the things that modern science investigates (Galileo’s concern about the material of the moon, the present-day concern about the elements and energies at the origin of our solar system); (2) the things at issue in ancient ontology (the horseness of horses, the divinity of nature); and (3) things as Heidegger understands them to emerge through, but not as measured by, being-there (contemplated in his later works: see my annotation on p. 333).

Still, the existential analysis itself is and remains *existentielly*, i.e. *ontically* rooted. Only when philosophically investigative questioning is itself understood existentielly as a possible way for a given ex-sisting being-there *to be*—only then does the possibility arise of a disclosure of the existentiality of ex-sistence, and thereby of a firm hold on any 14 sufficiently grounded ontological problematic. This consideration also makes clear the ontic primacy of the question of being.

The ontic-ontological primacy of being-there was already seen early on, without being-there itself getting formulated in its intrinsic ontological structure, or even becoming a problem aiming at such a structure. Aristotle says: ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστίν,¹ “the soul (of man) is in some way the beings [known]”; the “soul,” which constitutes the being of human being, uncovers, in the manners of its own being, i.e. in αἴσθησις and νόησις, everything that is—in regard to its that-ness and its how-ness, but also always in regard to its being. Itself deriving from the ontological thesis of Parmenides, this statement Thomas Aquinas resumed in a discussion characteristic of his own work. In the course of undertaking to derive the “transcendents,” i.e. those characteristics of being that lie out beyond everything that can possibly be determined as confined to any one being (determined by way of the thing’s material and generic content), out beyond every *modus specialis entis*—characters that bear upon every “thing” whatsoever—he aspires to show how the *verum* also counts as one of these transcendents. He proceeds by appealing to the one being that, in accordance with its own manner of being, has the aptitude to “come together with” anything that in any way is. This pre-eminent being, this *ens, quod natum est convenire cum omni ente*, is the soul (*anima*).² Although ontologically unclarified, the primacy of being-there that emerges in these passages obviously has nothing in common with the vapid subjectification of the totality of beings.—

The proof that the question of being is ontically and ontologically pre-eminent is grounded in the provisional indication of the ontic-ontological primacy of being-there. But the analysis of the structure of the question of being as a question (§2) came up against a pre-eminent function of this one being within the positioning of the question itself.

¹ *On the Soul*, 431 b 21; cf. also 430 a 14 ff.

² *Quaestiones de veritate*, question 1, a. 1c; cf. the “deduction” of the transcendents in the short work *de natura generis*, a deduction that proceeds in some ways more rigorously and differently than the one just cited.

Here, being-there revealed itself as the one being that must be elaborated in an ontologically sufficient manner if the question is to become transparent. But now it has become clear that the ontological analysis of being-there precisely constitutes fundamental ontology—that, in this vein, being-there serves as the being that we must *examine* in its fundament and in advance, with an eye to its being.

If the interpretation of the meaning of being becomes the task, being-there is not only the primary being to be examined, it is even more the 15 one being that in each case already relates itself to what is pressing in the question. Hence the question of being is nothing other than the radicalization of a drive belonging essentially to the being of being-there itself—the radicalization of the pre-ontological understanding of being.*

Chapter Two

The Double Task in the Elaboration of the Question of Being

The Method of the Investigation and its Outline

§5. *The ontological analysis of being-there as the exposure of the horizon for an interpretation of the meaning of being in general*

When characterizing the tasks lying within the “positioning” of the question of being we showed not only that we need to establish the one being that is to serve as the focus of our examination, but also that it is necessary explicitly to appropriate and secure a proper access to this being. Which being assumes the preferred role within the question of being, this we have discussed. But how might this being, being-there, become accessible—and, during our interpretation and understanding, how can we “take aim” at it?

* Several times already Heidegger has talked of “drive,” and throughout the text he will continue to do so, without ever talking *about* it. The term is best understood in its verbal form: being-there *drives* at various things and in various ways, but all the while it also *drives* at its own fulfillment (cf. Plato’s account of ἔρως in his *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* as complementing those passages from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas on the soul *being* the “convening” of things). Abstractly, we might say: being-there is “tendentious,” i.e. in-sistent as well as ex-sistent. Later, Heidegger will use the noun to express a feature of any literary work: it *drives* at something, and our task is to become attuned to what it is *driving* at.

The ontic-ontological primacy we have displayed for being-there might wrongly lead one to believe that this one being would also have to be what is primarily given for ontic-ontological consideration — in the sense that not only it itself would be “immediately” graspable but also the manner in which it *is* in this “immediate” pre-givenness. To be sure, being-there is ontically not only nearby or even the nearest thing: we *are* this being, each of us. Nevertheless, or precisely thereby, this being is ontologically the farthest away. To be sure, it belongs to its ownmost being to have an understanding of its being and to comport itself in each instance within a certain interpretedness of its being. But this does not at all mean that such pre-ontological interpretation of [its own] being can be adopted as an adequate guide, as though this understanding of its being would have to spring from a thematically ontological reflection on one’s ownmost essential constitution. Much to the contrary, and in accordance with a manner of being belonging to it, being-there has the drive to understand its own being in reference to those beings to which it essentially relates itself, constantly and most closely — in reference to its “world.”^a In being-there itself, and therewith in its own understanding of being, there lies what we will show to be an ontological reflection cast back from the understanding of world onto the interpretation of being-there.

The ontic-ontological primacy of being-there is therefore the reason why the essential constitution specifically belonging to being-there — this constitution understood as its “categorical” structure — remains hidden from it. To itself, being-there is ontically “nearest,” ontologically farthest, and yet pre-ontologically not at all foreign.

With these considerations we have only shown, in a provisional manner, that the interpretation of this one being is confronted with peculiar difficulties rooted both in the way our thematized object itself *is* and in the way our own thematizing comportment *is* — and not rooted in some shortcoming of our cognitive powers, or in an apparently remediable deficiency in our conceptual apparatus.

Now, because not only an understanding of being belongs to being-there, but also because this understanding develops or degenerates in keeping with the variable ways being-there *is*, it has a wealth of fixed

^a i.e., here, in reference to what is on hand [not in reference to what is *at hand*, as Heidegger will eventually draw this distinction].

interpretations available to it. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, “politics,” poetry, biography, historiography: all these have carefully studied the bearings, faculties, powers, possibilities, and destinies of being-there, and done this in differing ways and to varying extents. However, the question remains whether these interpretations have been as existentially primordial in their development as they have been existentially primordial in themselves. These two do not necessary proceed together, although they do not exclude one another. Existential interpretation can lead to existential analysis, provided we grasp philosophical cognition in its possibility and necessity. Only once we have sufficiently elaborated the basic structures of being-there in an explicit orientation toward the problem of being itself will all those earlier attainments in the interpretation of being-there receive their existential justification.

So the first concern in the question of being must remain an analysis of being-there. But then the problem of attaining and securing a guiding manner of access to being-there becomes really crucial. Negatively formulated: we cannot afford to let just any arbitrary idea of being and actuality, no matter how “self-evident,” be applied to this one being by way of dogmatic constructions, nor to let any “categories” prefigured in such an idea be impressed upon being-there without ontological consideration. Very much to the contrary, our manner of access and interpretation must be chosen in such a way that this one being can show itself from itself and as itself. And the manner should show this being as it *initially and mostly* is — in its average *everydayness*. Not arbitrary and incidental, but essential structures of this everydayness should be brought out into the open, structures persevering throughout each and every manner of factual being-there, and its different manners of being, as determinate of its being. In the purview of the basic constitution of the everydayness of being-there, the being of this one being will come into relief in a preparatory way.

Thus construed, the analysis of being-there remains wholly oriented toward the one guiding task of elaborating the question of being. Its limits get thereby determined. The analysis cannot hope to provide a complete ontology of being-there, something that must be built out if anything like a “philosophical anthropology” is ever to rest upon a philosophically adequate foundation. With a view to a possible anthropology, or to its ontological fundament, the following interpretation

offers only a few, although hardly inessential “pieces.” The analysis of being-there is, however, not only incomplete, it is at first also *provisional*. It initially only brings the being of this one being into relief, without interpreting its meaning. It intends rather to prepare for exposing the horizon for the most primordial interpretation of being. Once this horizon is attained, the preparatory analysis of being-there requires repetition on a higher, an authentic ontological basis.

The meaning of the being of the one being we call being-there proves to be *temporality*. The proof of this must sustain itself in the repeated interpretation of the (earlier only provisionally displayed) structures of being-there as modes of temporality. But this interpretation of being-there as temporality does not already provide the answer to the guiding question, the question intent upon the meaning of being in general.^a Yet the ground has been prepared for the attainment of this answer.

This much has been partly shown: a pre-ontological being belongs to being-there in its ontic constitution. Being-there *is* in such a manner that, inasmuch as it is, it understands something like being. Holding fast to this connection, we intend to show that *time* is what serves being-there in its inexplicit understanding and interpretation of anything like being. Time we must bring to light and intrinsically conceptualize as the horizon of every understanding of being and of each interpretation of being. In order to become clear about this, we stand in need of a *primordial explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, an explication deriving from temporality as the being of being-there—of the being that understands being*. In the entire scope of this task there lies also the requirement that we distinguish this concept of time from the ordinary understanding of it, an understanding that has become explicit in one interpretation of time reflecting the traditional concept that has persisted since Aristotle down to Bergson and beyond. Then, too, we must make it clear that and how this concept of time, and the ordinary understanding of time, spring from temporality at all. We thereby restore to the ordinary concept of time its own rightful place—in contrast to Bergson’s thesis that time construed in the ordinary manner is space.

“Time” has long served as the ontological, or rather the ontic,

^a καθόλου, καθ’ αὐτό [Heidegger recalls two key phrases in Plato and Aristotle: “regarding the whole” (= “universal”) and “regarding itself” (= “in itself”): these qualify the meaning of being .]

criterion for naïvely distinguishing the different regions of beings. One separates off things that *are* “temporally” (natural processes and historical events) from things that *are* “atemporally” (spatial and numerical relations). It is customary to distinguish the “timeless” meaning of propositions from the “temporal” course of propositional assertions. Then too, one discovers a “gap” between “temporal” beings and “super-temporal” eternal beings, and one tries to bridge the two. In each of these cases, “temporal” means as much as being “within time,” a determination that is of course still rather obscure. But the factum remains: time, in the sense of “being in time,” serves as a criterion for separating regions of being. How time comes to have this pre-eminent function, and even with what right precisely something like time serves as such a criterion, and more importantly whether in this naïvely ontological application of time its genuinely possible ontological relevance is expressed—none of this has hitherto been questioned or investigated. “Time,” especially within the horizon of the ordinary understanding of it, has just taken on this “self-evident” function—“on its own,” as it were—and has ever since been stuck in it.

In contrast, the task is to show, on the basis of the elaborated question about the meaning of being, *that and how the central problematic of every ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time—this phenomenon as rightly viewed and explicated*.

If being is to be conceived on the basis of time, and if the various modes and derivatives of being (within their modifications and derivations) are in fact to become intelligible in reference to time, then being itself—and not only beings as “within time”—gets made visible in its “temporal” character. But then “temporal” can no longer mean merely “being in time.” Even things “non-temporal” or “super-temporal” are, in regard to their being, “temporal.” And this again not only by way of privation when compared to something “temporal,” i.e. “within time,”¹⁹ but in a *positive* sense—one that remains to be clarified, of course. Because the expression “temporal” has been expatiated in its meaning by reference to pre-philosophical and philosophical usage, and because in the following investigations the expression will lay claim to yet another meaning, we call the primordial determinateness of the meaning of being, as well as its various characters and modes based on time, its *time-bound* determinateness. The fundamental ontological task of interpreting being as such includes, then, the elaboration of the *time-boundedness of being*.

In the exposition of the problematic of time-boundedness is found the first concrete answer to the question about the meaning of being.*

Because being in each instance only becomes comprehensible in regard to time, the answer to the question of being cannot lie in an isolated and self-enclosed proposition. The answer is not grasped in the recitation of what it asserts in propositional form, especially when it is transmitted as a free-floating result, so that we merely take note of a “standpoint” which perhaps deviates from the way things have previously been treated. Whether the answer is “new” has no bearing and remains an external consideration. What is positive about the answer must lie in its being *old* enough that, from it, we can learn to conceive the possibilities the “Ancients” set up for us. By its very meaning, the answer provides a directive for concrete ontological research to begin questioning investigatively within the exposed horizon—and this is all the answer provides.

If in this way the answer to the question of being becomes the guiding directive for research, it follows that it is only adequately given when it leads to insight into the specific manner of previous ontology—the destinies of its questioning, discovering, and failing—as something necessary to being-there itself.

§6. *The task of deconstructing the history of ontology*

All research—and not least research moving within the sphere of the central question of being—is an ontic possibility of being-there. The being of being-there finds its meaning in temporality. But temporality is also the condition of the possibility of historicity as a temporal manner in which being-there itself *is*, quite apart from whether and how it is something “in time.” What we [will] determine as historicity precedes
 20 what is called history (world-historical happening). Historicity means the essential constitution of the “happening” of being-there as such; only on the ground of this happening can there be anything like [disciplines of] “world-history,” and can [these] historically belong to world-history. In

* After the Introduction, Heidegger makes no use of this distinction between “temporality” and “time-bounded-ness.” Perhaps Heidegger planned to make use of the second expression in Division Three. On p. 39, when describing Part Two, he employs the term; and again on p. 147: “the time-bound interpretation of being.”

its factual being, each instance of being-there *is* how and “what” it has already been. Whether explicitly or not, it *is* its past. And it is this way not only in that its past drags along “behind,” as it were, and that it possesses past things as still on-hand properties occasionally affecting it. Being-there “is” its past in the manner of its *own* being—and, crudely stated, its being “happens” in each instance out of its future. In various ways of being, and in accordance with corresponding understandings of being, being-there has grown up within and into a received interpretation of being-there. It initially understands itself from this received interpretation—and, within a certain range, it constantly does so. This understanding discloses the possibilities of its being, and regulates them. Its own past—and this always means the past of its “generation”—does not *follow behind* it; rather, in each instance its past already moves ahead of it.

This elemental historicity of being-there can remain concealed from it. But it can also, in a certain way, be uncovered and undergo a cultivation of its own. Being-there can uncover, preserve, and explicitly track down tradition. The discovery of tradition, and the disclosure of what and how it “transmits,” can be undertaken as a task in its own right. In this way, being-there moves into the mode of being proper to historiographical questioning and researching. However, as a manner in which being-there poses questions, historiography—better, engagement in the telling of history—is only possible because being-there is in the ground of its being determined by historicity. If and as long as historicity remains concealed from being-there, the possibility of historiographical questioning and discovering of history is withheld from it. The absence of historiography is no evidence *against* the historicity of being-there; rather, as a deficient mode of the constitution of its being, such absence is evidence *for* it. An epoch can only be unhistoriographical because it is “historical.”

On the other hand, once being-there has comprehended the possibility lurking within it, not only of making its ex-sistence transparent to itself but also of tracking down the meaning of existentiality, and that means tracking down the meaning of being in a provisional way, and once our eyes have been opened to the essential historicity of being-there, then this one insight is inevitable: questioning about being, the questioning we indicated in its ontic-ontological necessity, is itself characterized by historicity. The elaboration of the question of being

21 must therefore detect, in the innermost sense of its own questioning, as itself historical, the directive to track down its own history, i.e. to become historiographical — and this in order to enact, while in full possession of its ownmost possibilities of inquiry, a positive appropriation of the past. The question about the meaning of being is of itself brought to understand itself as historiographical — in accordance with the manner in which this question gets enacted, i.e. as a precedental explication of being-there in its temporality and historicity.

Yet the preparatory interpretation of the fundamental structures of being-there with regard to its initial and average manner of being — wherein it is initially historical as well — will make it manifest that being-there not only has the inclination to collapse into the world in which it finds itself, and to interpret itself in the reflection of this world; in unison with all this, being-there also gets caught in its tradition, more or less explicitly comprehending it. Tradition then divests being-there of its own leadership, its questioning and its choosing. This holds not least for *that* understanding and its possible formation which is rooted in the innermost being of being-there — ontological understanding.

The tradition thereby gaining dominance makes what it “transmits” so little accessible that, instead, it initially and mostly covers it up. It entrusts to self-evidence what has been transmitted, it dislocates the access to the primordial “wellsprings” from which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. Tradition even makes us forget such provenance altogether. Indeed, it even undoes our capacity to understand the necessity of returning to such wellsprings. Tradition uproots the historicity of being-there to such an extent that all being-there can do is take an interest in the phantasmagoria of possible types, movements, and standpoints of philosophizing, and in the remotest and strangest cultures — and with this interest it seeks to veil its own groundlessness. As a result, for all the historiographical interest and zeal for a philologically “objective” interpretation, being-there no longer understands the most elemental conditions that alone make possible a positive return to the past, i.e. a productive appropriation of it.

At the outset (§1) it was shown that the question about the meaning of being was not only unresolved, not only inadequately positioned, but has also, for all the interest in “metaphysics,” fallen into oblivion. Greek ontology and its history, which throughout its many filiations and contortions still determines the conceptuality of philosophy, is proof that

22 being-there understands both itself and being in general in terms of the “world,” and that the ontology that has emerged in this way is trapped in its own tradition — letting this tradition sink to self-evidence and mere material to be reworked (as in Hegel). Thus uprooted, Greek ontology becomes, in the Middle Ages, a fixed body of doctrine. Its systematics is anything but a joining together of inherited pieces into a single construction. Within the limits of its dogmatic adoption of the fundamental conceptions of being, this systematics contains much unpretentious work that does make advances. In its *Scholastic* mould, Greek ontology makes the essential transition, by way of Suarez’s *disputationes metaphysicae*, into the “metaphysics” and transcendental philosophy of the modern period, and still determines the fundamentals and the goals of Hegel’s *Logic*. Insofar as, in the course of this history, certain pre-eminent domains of being loom into view and continue to guide the problematic (the *ego cogito* of Descartes, subject, I, reason, spirit, person), these domains remain unexamined in regard to being, and in regard to their own being — in keeping with the thorough neglect of the question of being. Instead, the body of categories embedded within traditional ontology gets transferred to this one being [*ego cogito*, subject, ...], with corresponding formalizations and merely negative restrictions — or else dialectic is called upon to help in the effort to provide an ontological interpretation of the substantiality of the subject.

If the question of being is to attain to a transparency of its own history, there is a need to loosen up our hardened tradition, to dissolve the cover-ups that our tradition has fructified.* This task we understand as the *destructuring* of the inherited body of ancient ontology, one returning us to the primordial experiences in which the first, and from then on the guiding determinations of being were obtained. Such destructuring proceeds *under the guidance of the question of being*.

As an investigation displaying their “birth certificate,” this proof of the provenance of the basic concepts of ontology has nothing to do with the pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints. Just as little does destructuring have the *negative* meaning of shaking off the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it intends to stake out this tradition in its positive possibilities — and this always means to stake out the limits factually given in the positioning of the question and the encircling of the possible field of investigation. This destructuring does not relate

* On the crucial metaphor of “fructifying,” see my annotation on p. 328.

itself negatively to the past; its critique bears on the “current day,” on
 23 the currently dominant manner of treating the history of ontology,
 whether inclined toward the history of opinions, ideas, or problems.
 Destructuring does not aim to bury the past in nothingness; it has a
 positive intention, and its negative function remains tacit and indirect.

Within the scope of this treatise, which aims at a fundamental
 elaboration of the question of being, we can carry out the destructuring
 of the history of ontology (which belongs essentially to the positioning
 of the question, and is only possible within this positioning) only in
 regard to the fundamentally decisive stations of this history.

In accordance with the positive drive of destructuring, the question
 we need first ask is whether and to what extent, in the course of the
 history of ontology, the interpretation of being has at all been
 thematically connected with the phenomenon of time, and then whether
 the necessary problematic of time-boundedness was or could be
 elaborated in its fundamentals. The first and the only one who traversed
 a stretch of the path toward investigating the dimension of time-
 boundedness—or allowed himself to be driven there by the compelling
 force of the phenomena themselves—is Kant. Only once we achieve a
 focus on the problematic of time-boundedness can we succeed in casting
 light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. Along the way
 we will also be able to show *why* this area had to remain closed to Kant
 in its authentic dimensions and central ontological function. Kant himself
 was aware that he was venturing into an obscure area:

This schematism of our understanding, in its application to
 appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the
 depths of the human soul, whose true modes of activity we
 will likely never extract from nature and lay open to our
 gaze.¹

That from which Kant here shrinks, so to speak, must be brought to light
 in a thematic and fundamental way—if the expression “being” is ever to
 have a certifiable meaning. In the end, those phenomena that the
 following analysis will unfurl under the title “time-boundedness” are the
most covert judgements of “common reason,” the analysis of which Kant
 defines as the “business of philosophers.”

While pursuing the task of destructuring under the guidance of the

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A141, B180 f.

problematic of time-boundedness, the following treatise attempts to
 interpret Kant’s chapter on the schematism, and from there the Kantian
 24 doctrine of time. It will also show why Kant could not succeed in
 gaining insight into the problematic of time-boundedness. Two things
 prevented this insight: for one, the total neglect of the question of being
 and, in connection with this neglect, the lack of a thematic ontology of
 being-there—in Kantian language, the lack of a provisional ontological
 analytic of the subject’s subjectivity. Instead, for all his essential
 improvements, Kant dogmatically adopted Descartes’ position. As a
 result, his analysis of time still takes its orientation from the traditional
 and ordinary understanding of time, despite his reinsertion of this
 phenomenon into the [human] subject; and this is ultimately what
 prevents Kant from elaborating the phenomenon of a “transcendental role
 for time” in its own structure and function. As a consequence of this
 double after-effect of the tradition, the decisive *connection* between *time*
 and the “*I think*” remains entirely shrouded in obscurity; it does not even
 become a problem.

By taking over Descartes’ ontological position, Kant neglects
 something essential: an ontology of being-there. This neglect is a
 decisive one, given Descartes’ ownmost drive. With the *cogito sum* [I
 think therefore I am], Descartes claims to prepare a new and secure
 foundation for philosophy. However, what he leaves undetermined in this
 “radical” beginning is the being of the *res cogitans*, the way this
 [thinking thing] *is*, more exactly the meaning of the *sum*, the way it [the
 “am”] *is*. The elaboration of the tacit ontological foundations of the
cogito sum occupies the second station on the path of the destructural
 return to the history of ontology. The interpretation not only presents
 evidence that Descartes had to neglect the question of being altogether,
 but also shows why he came to the opinion that the absolute “certainty” of
 the *cogito* exempted him from the question of the meaning of this one
 being, how it *is*.

However, with Descartes it is not just a matter of this one neglect,
 and thus of a thorough ontological indeterminateness of the *res cogitans*
sive mens sive animus [. . . whether mind or soul]. Descartes effects the
 fundamental reflections of his *Meditations* by transferring medieval
 ontology onto this one being he takes to be the *fundamentum*
inconcussum [unshakable foundation]. He ontologically defines the *res*
cogitans as *ens*, and for medieval ontology the meaning of *ens*, the way

something *is*, is geared to an understanding of *ens* as *ens creatum* [created being, creature]. As the *ens infinitum*, God is the *ens increatum*. Now, createdness — in the broadest sense of having been produced — is an essential structural moment of the ancient concept of being. The
 25 apparently new beginning of philosophizing proves to be the implantation of a disastrous prejudice. And it is this prejudice that allows posterity to dispense with a thematic ontological analysis of the “mind,” one guided by the question of being and simultaneously serving as a critical confrontation with the inherited ancient ontology.

That Descartes is “dependent” on medieval Scholasticism, and that he uses its terminology — this anyone sees who is familiar with the Middle Ages. But with this “discovery” nothing is gained philosophically so long as it remains obscure to what profound extent medieval ontology influences the way posterity determines (or does not determine) the *res cogitans* ontologically. The extent of this influence cannot be estimated until the meaning and limits of ancient ontology have been shown by an orientation toward the question of being. In other words, destructuring finds itself faced with the task of interpreting the soil of ancient ontology in the light of the problematic of time-boundedness. It then becomes manifest that the ancient interpretation of the being of beings is oriented toward the “world,” or toward “nature” in the broadest sense, and that it in fact takes its understanding of being from “time.” An external testimony of this — but of course it is *only* external — is the determination of the meaning of being as *παρουσία*, or *ούσία* — which means, ontologically-temporally, “presentness.”* Each being is comprehended in its being as “presentness,” i.e. it is understood with an eye to a determinate mode of time, the “present.”

The problematic of Greek ontology must, like any other ontology,

* The common Greek word for “the present” is *par-ousia*, while *ousia* has the ordinary meaning of “estate.” In the first Book of Plato’s *Republic* the latter word can be translated as “wealth,” whereas later in that work, and in his *Sophist*, it seems to take on the meaning of “essence.” In Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, “substance” seems appropriate and, in his *Politics*, “property.” Both thinkers assume that what makes things intelligible is what gives them presence — *starting* with the thought that each item on an estate “makes sense” only against the background presence of the whole estate. Heidegger himself raises the question of how, where and when an “estate” can become *our* own — or, rather, come into *its* own as we learn to “take” it as our own.

take its guideline from being-there itself. Being-there, i.e. the being of human being, is, both in the ordinary and in the philosophical “definition,” delimited as ζῶον λόγον ἔχον, the living being whose being is essentially determined by its ability to talk. It is λέγειν (cf. §7 b) that supplies the guideline for attaining to the essential structures of that one being encountered in the addressing and discussing of beings arising for encounter. That is why the ancient ontology taking shape in Plato becomes “dialectic.” Once we progress in the elaboration of the guideline itself, i.e. of an “hermeneutics” of λόγος, there emerges the possibility of a more radical version of the problem of being. Then “dialectic,” which has been a veritable philosophical embarrassment, becomes superfluous. The reason Aristotle “no longer had any understanding” of dialectic was that he placed it, raised it, onto a more radical plane. Then λέγειν itself, or νοεῖν (the direct [intellectual] perception of something on hand in its pure on-hand-ness, what Parmenides already
 26 took as the guiding thread of his interpretation of being) has the temporal structure of a pure “finding present” of something. Beings — those that show themselves in and for this “finding present,” and that are then understood as what really *is* — are accordingly interpreted with an eye to . . . the present. That is, they are conceptualized as presentness (ούσία).

Yet this Greek interpretation of being unfolds without any explicit awareness of the guideline serving it, without knowledge or understanding of the fundamental ontological function of time, without inspection of the ground of the possibility of this function. On the contrary: time itself is taken as one being among others, and the attempt is made to comprehend it, in its essential structure, from within the horizon of an understanding of being that is tacitly and naïvely oriented toward time itself.

Within the framework of the following fundamental elaboration of the question of being, we cannot offer a thorough interpretation of the time-bound foundations of ancient ontology — especially not of its intellectually highest and purest level in Aristotle. Instead, the elaboration offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s treatise on time,¹ which can be taken as the *discrimen* [decisive point] revealing the basis and limits of the ancient science of being.

Aristotle’s treatise on time is the first thorough interpretation of this phenomenon that has come down to us. It set the essential course for all

¹ *Physics*, Δ 10-14, 217 b 29 through 224 a 17.

subsequent construal of time—including that of Bergson. Also, from the analysis of Aristotle's concept of time it will become retrospectively clear that the Kantian construal of time still moves within the structures unfurled by Aristotle; this means that, for all the differences in its new manner of questioning, Kant's ontological orientation remains, in its fundament, that of the Greeks.

Only once we have completed the destructuring of our ontological tradition does the question of being attain its veritable concretion. In doing so we obtain solid evidence that we cannot avoid the question about the meaning of being, and in this way we demonstrate the meaning of talking about the "repetition" of this question.*

In this field, where "the matter itself is profoundly veiled,"¹ every investigation should refrain from overestimating its results. For this kind of questioning constantly forces itself to face the possibility of the disclosure of a still more primordial, still more universal horizon from which one might draw the answer to the question: What does "being" mean? We can only debate such possibilities seriously, and with positive outcome, when once again the question of being is awakened and a field has been opened where thoughts can compete in a verifiable manner.

§7. *The phenomenological method of investigation*

With the provisional characterization of the thematic object of our investigation (the being of beings, or just the meaning of being), its method also seems already to be prefigured. The task of ontology is to bring the being of beings into relief and to explicate being itself. And the method of ontology remains highly questionable so long as we wish merely to consult historically transmitted ontologies or similar efforts. Since in our investigation the term "ontology" is used in a formally broad sense, the approach of clarifying its method by tracing its history is

* In his 1955 lecture "The Question of Being" Heidegger comments:

The "destructuring" discussed in *Being and Time* has only one intent: by dismantling current and empty conceptions, to win back the primordial experience of being lurking in metaphysics.

Headings such as "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" will always have a double meaning: the inherited conception and the lurking possibility.

¹ Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, A88, B121. [N. K. Smith translates very loosely: "the inevitable difficulty of the undertaking."]

automatically precluded.

In using the term "ontology" we do not refer to some one determinate philosophical discipline standing in relation to others. It should not at all be our task to satisfy the demands of any pre-given discipline. On the contrary: a discipline inevitably takes shape from the in-built necessities of determinate questions, and from a style of handling them that "the matters themselves" demand.

With the guiding question of the meaning of being, the investigation stands within the fundamental question of philosophy itself. The style of handling this question is the *phenomenological* one. This treatise does not thereby subscribe to any "standpoint," nor to any "movement" — because, so long as it understands itself, phenomenology neither is nor can become any such thing. The expression "phenomenology" signifies primarily a *concept of method*. It does not characterize what the objects of philosophical research are, what it bears on, but rather its *how*. The more genuinely a concept of method unfolds itself, and the more comprehensively it determines the fundamental flow of a discipline, the more primordially it is rooted in the struggle with the matters themselves and the more it distances itself from what we call technical manipulation, the likes of which are also legion in theoretical disciplines.

The term "phenomenology" expresses a maxim, one that can be formulated: "To the things themselves!" — as opposed to all free-floating constructions and incidental discoveries, as opposed to taking over concepts only apparently demonstrated, and as opposed to those pseudo-questions that often spread through whole generations as "problems." But, one might object, this maxim is abundantly self-evident, and, moreover, is an expression of the principle of all scientific knowledge. It is not clear why this self-evident commonplace should be explicitly inserted into the name designating an investigation. Indeed, at stake here is a "self-evidence," one we want to bring in closer to ourselves, insofar as it helps to illuminate the procedure of this treatise. We shall explicate only the initial concept of phenomenology.

The expression has two components: phenomenon and *logos*. Both go back to Greek terms: φαίνόμενον and λόγος. Viewed from the outside, the word phenomenology is formed like those of theology, biology, and sociology, names we translate as science of God, of life, and of community. Accordingly, phenomenology would be the *science of phenomena*. The initial concept of phenomenology we shall unfurl by

characterizing the meaning of each component, “phenomenon” and “*logos*” and by getting a focus on the meaning of the *compounded* name. The history of the word itself, which seems to have originated in the Wolffian school, is here without any significance.

A. *The concept of phenomenon*

The Greek expression φαίνόμενον, from which the term “phenomenon” derives, stems from the verb φαίνεσθαι, meaning “to show itself.” Thus φαίνόμενον means: what it is that shows itself, the self-showing, the manifest. As for φαίνεσθαι itself, it is a middle voice form of φαίνω, to bring to the light of day, to place into the light; and φαίνω has the root φα-, as in φῶς, light, i.e. that wherein something can become manifest, visible in itself. To be *born in mind* as the meaning of the expression “*phenomenon*” is this: what shows itself in itself, what is manifest. The φαίνόμενα, the “phenomena,” then comprise the totality of what lies in the light of day, or can be brought to light—what the Greeks sometimes identified with τὰ ὄντα (beings). Yet beings can show themselves in various ways, depending on our manner of access to them. There is even the possibility that beings show themselves as something they are *not*. In this kind of self-showing a being “looks
29 like...” *Such self-showing we call seeming.* And so in Greek the expression φαίνόμενον, phenomenon, also has the meaning: what looks like, what seems to be, “seeming”; φαίνόμενον ἀγαθόν means a good that looks like, but is not “in reality” what it gives itself out to be. For any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon everything depends on seeing how what is named in these two meanings of φαίνόμενον (“phenomenon” as what shows itself and “phenomenon” as seeming) coalesces in its structure. Only inasmuch as something strives to show itself, i.e. to be a phenomenon, *can* it show itself *as* something that it is *not*—*can* it “only look like...” Already in the one meaning of φαίνόμενον (“seeming”) there lies the primordial meaning (phenomenon: the manifest) as founding the other. We assign the term “phenomenon” to the positive and primordial meaning of φαίνόμενον, and distinguish this from seeming as its privative modification. What *both* terms express has from the start nothing whatsoever to do with what is called “appearance,” let alone “mere appearance.”

As in the talk of “appearances of illness”: what is meant are occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing, as the self-showing, “indicate” something that does *not* show itself. The

emergence of such occurrences, their self-showing, coincides with on-hand disturbances that do not show themselves. Accordingly, appearance as appearance “of something” means precisely *not* “showing itself” but rather the reporting, by way of something that does show itself, of something that does not show itself. Appearing is^a a *not showing itself*. This “not” we should under no circumstances confound with the primitive one figuring in the structure of seeming. What does *not* show itself—as in the manner of something appearing—can also never seem. All indications, depictions, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though these do differ among themselves.

Although “appearing” is not, and is never, a self-showing in the way a phenomenon is, appearing is still possible only *on the basis* of a *self-showing* of something. But this self-showing enabling appearance is not itself the appearing. The appearing is a self-reporting by way of something that shows itself. If it is now said that with the word “appearance” we are referring to something within which something appears without itself being an appearance, such talk fails to encompass—but rather *presupposes*—the concept of phenomenon. This presup-
30 position remains concealed because in such talk of “appearance” the expression “to appear” takes on two meanings: that wherein something “appears” means that wherein something reports itself, i.e. does not show itself; and in the phrase “without being itself ‘appearance,’” appearance means the *showing of itself*. Yet this self-showing belongs essentially to that “wherein” in which something reports itself. On this account, phenomena are *never* appearances, but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena. If one defines “phenomenon” with the help of the concept of “appearance” (a concept which is, moreover, still unclear), then everything is turned upside down—and a “critique” of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking.

The expression “appearance” can itself mean two things: for one, *appearing* in the sense of reporting itself as not showing itself, and then also the reporting itself, a self-showing indicating that there is something not showing itself. And of course one can use “appearance” as a name for phenomenon in the genuine sense, the self-showing. If one designates these three different conditions as “appearance,” confusion is inevitable.

Yet “appearance” can assume still another meaning, and this only

^a in this case [as in the appearances of an illness: symptoms, signs]

increases the confusion. Taking the reporting that, in its self-showing, indicates something non-manifest — taking this sense of appearance as what it is about the non-manifest itself that comes to the fore — as what radiates from the non-manifest, and in such a way that the non-manifest gets *thought* as what is by its own nature *never* manifest: then “appearance” means as much as producing, or even what is produced (this latter, though, not constituting the authentic being of what does the producing: appearance in the sense of “mere appearance”). What reports itself (as itself produced) does show itself, and in such a way that, as the radiation of what it reports, it constantly veils what it reports. But this not-showing, this veiling, is not yet seeming. Kant employs the term appearance in this connection. In his use, appearances are the “objects of empirical intuition” — what shows itself in such intuition. This self-showing (phenomenon, in the genuine primordial sense) is also “appearance” as the radiation reporting something that *conceals* itself in the appearance.

Inasmuch as there is a phenomenon even when something “appears” in the sense of reporting itself by way of a self-showing, and inasmuch as this phenomenon can then transform itself privatively into seeming, appearance can become mere seeming — illusion. Under certain lighting conditions someone can look as if he were flushed: the self-showing
31 redness of his cheeks can then be taken as reporting the presence of a fever, which in turn indicates a disturbance in the organism.

Phenomenon — the showing of itself as itself — signifies a distinctive manner in which something gets encountered. In contrast, *appearance* means an indicational relation within a being such that what does the indicating (the reporting) can only perform its function when it shows itself, and does this showing as itself: is “phenomenal.” In different ways, both appearance and illusion are founded in phenomenon. The confusing multiplicity of “phenomena” — carrying the names “phenomenon,” “seeming,” “appearance,” and “mere appearance” — can only be disentangled if right from the start we understand the concept of phenomenon, namely as what shows itself by itself.

If in this understanding of the concept of phenomenon it remains undetermined which being it is we are addressing as a phenomenon, and if it remains undecided whether what is showing itself in any given instance is a being or rather a characteristic of the being of this being, then one has simply obtained the *formal* concept of phenomenon. If,

however, by what is showing itself we understand those beings accessible in empirical intuition (as in Kant), the formal concept of phenomenon takes on a legitimate application. This usage satisfies the *ordinary* concept of phenomenon. This ordinary concept, however, is not the phenomenological concept. Within the horizon of the Kantian problematic, we can illustrate what we shall conceptualize phenomenologically with the term “phenomenon” by saying this (disregarding other differences): what shows itself in appearances (in each case preceding and accompanying the phenomenon in the ordinary sense, yet still unthematic) can be brought thematically into self-showing, and this showing of itself as itself (in Kant, the “forms of intuition”) are the phenomena of phenomenology. For manifestly space and time must be able to show themselves in this way — they must be able to become phenomenon — if, when he says that space is the *a priori* “wherein” of an order, Kant is laying claim to a transcendental statement grounded in the matter itself.

Now, if the phenomenological concept of phenomenon is at all to be understood (apart from how we might determine more exactly what it is that shows itself), one unavoidable precondition is insight into the meaning of the formal concept of phenomenon, and into how it may be legitimately employed in one of its ordinary meanings. — Before getting a focus on the concept of phenomenology we must delimit the meaning of λόγος, so that it becomes clear in what sense phenomenology can ever be a “science of” phenomena.

32

B. The concept of logos

In Plato and Aristotle the concept of λόγος has many meanings, and in such a way that these meanings strain in divergent directions without positive guidance from any basic meaning. In fact this only *seems* to be the case; it's an illusion that perseveres only so long as our interpretation of their works is unable to comprehend appropriately the basic meaning in its primary content. When we say that the basic meaning of λόγος is talk, this literal translation is fully valid only when we determine what talk itself means. Later developments in the meaning of λόγος, and above all the multiple and capricious interpretations of subsequent philosophy, constantly conceal the authentic meaning of talk, a meaning which is often plain enough. Increasingly, λόγος gets “translated,” i.e. always interpreted, as reason, judgement, concept, definition, ground, proportion. How might “talk” have this ability to modify itself, so that

λόγος means all these things, and this within scholarly usage? Even if λόγος is understood in the sense of assertion, and assertion as “judgement,” this apparently correct translation can still miss the fundamental meaning, especially if judgement is understood in the manner of some contemporary “theory of judgement”; λόγος does not mean judgement, in any case does not primarily mean this, if judgement is understood as “connecting” [a predicate with a subject] or as “taking a stand” (acknowledging or rejecting).

Much rather, λόγος as talk means δηλοῦν, making manifest what, in the talk, “the talk is all about.” Aristotle explicated this function of talk more precisely as ἀποφαίνεσθαι.¹ A λόγος lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι), namely what the talk is about—and this *for* the one who is talking (the medium), or for those who are talking with one another. Talk “lets something be seen” from, ἀπὸ . . . : from whatever the talk is about. In genuine talk (ἀπόφανσις), *what* is said will be drawn *from* what is talked about, so that any talked communication will, in what it says, make manifest, and therefore accessible to others, what it talks about. Such is the structure of λόγος as ἀπόφανσις, “apophantical talk.” Not every kind of “talking” suits *this* mode of making manifest, the mode of letting something be seen by pointing it up. For example, requesting (εὐχῆ) makes something manifest, but in a different way.

In concrete performance, talking (letting something be seen) takes the form of speaking, a voiced sounding-out in words. Then λόγος is
 33 φωνή, more exactly φωνή μετὰ φαντασίας—a voiced sounding-out where in each case something is sighted.

And only *because* the function of λόγος (as ἀπόφανσις) lies in letting something be seen (in pointing it up), can it take the structural form of σύνθεσις, “synthesis.” Here, synthesis does not mean the associating or conjoining of representations, the tinkering with psychical occurrences, whereupon there arises the “problem” of how these associations, as inside, can agree with the physical conditions outside. Rather, the συν, the “with,” has a purely apophantical meaning, and says: letting something be seen *as* something—seen in its *togetherness* with something else.

¹ Cf. *On Interpretation*, Chapters 1—6; also, *Metaphysics*, Book Seven, Chapter 4, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Seven. [Heidegger’s commentary follows these texts very closely.]

And then too, because λόγος is a letting be seen, it can *therefore* be true or false. Here everything depends on freeing oneself from any concept of truth construed as an “agreement” of some sort. In no way is this idea of agreement (or correspondence) the primary concept of ἀλήθεια, “truth.” The “being true” of a λόγος means, as ἀληθεύειν: in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι, while talking apophantically, to bring out of its concealment what the talk is *coming from*, to let it be seen as unconcealed (ἀληθές)—to *uncover*.^{*} In the same manner “being false,” ψευδεσθαι, means as much as deceiving, this construed as *covering up*: to place something in front of something (by way of letting the one be seen) and thereby to pass it off *as* something it is *not*.

Because “truth” has this sense, and because λόγος is a determinate mode of letting be seen, we cannot rightly acclaim λόγος as the primary “location” of truth. When, as so often happens these days, truth gets determined as what “really” pertains to judgement, and Aristotle is invoked to support this thesis, not only is this invocation unjustified: more importantly, the Greek concept of truth is misunderstood. In the Greek sense, what counts as “true,” more primordially than does the λόγος we have discussed, is αἴσθησις: the straightforward sensible perception of something. Insofar as an instance of αἴσθησις is directed to what is proper to it (its ἴδια), namely to the being that in each case becomes intrinsically accessible *by* and *for* such perception (e.g. sight directed toward colors), perception is always true. Thus: seeing always uncovers colors, hearing always uncovers sounds. Still, in the most pure and most primordial sense of truth, it is pure νοεῖν—the perception straightforwardly detecting the simplest determinations of how a being itself *is*—that is “true,” i.e., that *only* uncovers, so that it can never cover up anything. This νοεῖν can never cover up, never be false, it can at most remain an *imperception*, ἀγνοεῖν, not sufficing for straightforward and appropriate access.

34 What no longer takes active shape as a *pure* letting-see, but rather recurs, in its pointing up, to something *else*, and in this way lets something be seen *as* something: this, with its structure of synthesis,

^{*} Heidegger often reflects on the fact that the Greek word for “truth” is a compound: ἀ-λήθεια, something like “un-forgotten”; also “being true” can take the form of a verb: ἀληθεύειν, something like “to bring out of oblivion.” Another Greek word for truth is νημέρεια, also a compound: free of error.

takes on the possibility of covering things up. The “truth” belonging to a judgement is only the counter-movement to such cover-up — i.e., a *multiply founded* phenomenon of truth. Realism and idealism alike thoroughly miss the meaning of the Greek concept of truth, from which alone the possibility of anything like a “doctrine of ideas” can be understood as philosophical *cognition*.

And because the function of λόγος lies in its letting something be seen straightforwardly — in *letting* things be perceived, apprehended — it can mean *reason* in the sense of intellectual apprehension. And then again, because λόγος gets used not only in the meaning of λέγειν (“saying”) but also in the meaning of λεγόμενον (“what is said,” what is pointed up as such), and because this in turn is nothing other than the ὑποκείμενον (what in each instance lies always on hand as the *basis* for each incipient addressing and discussing), λόγος *qua* λεγόμενον means reason in the sense of ground, *ratio*. And, finally, because λόγος *qua* λεγόμενον can also mean what is addressed as something which has become visible in its bearing on something else, in its “relatedness,” λόγος takes on the meaning of *relationship* or *proportion*.

May this interpretation of “apophantic talk” suffice for the clarification of the primary function of λόγος.

C. The concept of phenomenology

If we think through concretely what has been exhibited in the interpretation of “phenomenon” and “*logos*,” we will be struck by how what is intended by each of these terms bears intimately on what is intended by the other. The expression “phenomenology” we may formulate in Greek: λέγειν τὰ φαινόμενα, “saying the phenomena”; but λέγειν means ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Phenomenology then means: ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα: to let be seen, from itself, what shows itself, and in the way it shows itself from itself. Here is the formal meaning of the research that calls itself phenomenology. But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To the things themselves!”

Accordingly, the term “phenomenology” differs in its meaning from such designations as “theology” and the like. These name the objects of their respective sciences, each in regard to its content. “Phenomenology” names neither the object of its research, nor does the term characterize the content of the research. The word tells us only about *how* things are to

be pointed up, *how* we are to treat *whatever* might be considered in this science. Science “of” phenomena means: getting hold of its objects in *such* a way that everything that gets discussed must be considered as it is directly shown and directly identified. The expression “descriptive phenomenology” (which is basically tautological) has the very same meaning. Here, description does not mean the kind of procedure one finds, say, in botanical morphology. Once again, the term introduces a prohibition: Keep away from every act of determining that does not draw something identifiable into view! The way this description works, the specific meaning of its λόγος, can only be stipulated in reference to, and out of, the “whatness” of what is to be “described,” i.e. brought into scientific determinateness while retaining the manner in which it is encountered as phenomenon. Formally speaking, the meaning of the formal and ordinary concept of phenomenon justifies us in calling “phenomenology” any manner of pointing up beings as they show themselves by themselves.*

What then must we take account of so that the formal concept of phenomenon will be deformed into the phenomenological one? And how does this one get distinguished from the ordinary one? What is it that phenomenology might “let us see”? What is it that should be called “phenomenology” in a distinguished sense? What is it that, by its very nature, serves as the theme to be pointed up *explicitly*? [The answer:] Manifestly, a theme that initially and mostly does *not* show itself, one that, in contrast to what does initially and mostly show itself, remains *concealed* while also being something that essentially belongs to what initially and mostly does show itself, and in such a way that it constitutes the latter’s meaning and ground.^a

* In short: this science “of” is really science “from.” In his later works, Heidegger more and more recurs to a thought implied in this account of phenomenology: fully thoughtful discourse incarnates primarily, if not exclusively, a response to what addresses us (“we only *discern* what *concerns* us”: *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 100). He then recognizes that it is misleading to call such thinking “scientific,” since even the broadest meaning of “science” implies the priority of a pre-established framework — a promotion of *it* rather than of the encounter with phenomena addressing us.

^a Truth of being. [In his later works, Heidegger repeatedly argues that traditional philosophy focuses on the truth of *beings*, i.e. on how we *know* phenomena. He then distinguishes this concern for truth from his own concern

Now, what in a special sense remains *concealed*—or falls back again *under cover*, or only shows itself “*distortedly*”—is not this or that being; rather, as the foregoing considerations have shown, it is the *being* of these beings. This can be covered up to such an extent that it is forgotten, that the question about it and about its meaning does not get raised. What phenomenology thematically “takes in hand” as its object is then this: what demands to become phenomenon—in a distinguished sense, where the demand issues from the matter itself.

Phenomenology is a manner of access to, and the revelatory manner of determining, whatever is to become the theme of ontology. *Ontology is only possible as phenomenology*. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, of what shows itself, bears on the being of beings, its meaning, its modifications and derivations. And the self-showing is not just any self-showing, nor anything like appearing. Least of all can the being of beings ever be something “behind” which something else lurks, “something not appearing.”

“Behind” the phenomena of interest in phenomenology lurks, by their very nature, nothing at all. Still, what is to become phenomenon can be concealed. And precisely because phenomena are initially and mostly *not* given is there a need for phenomenology. The counter-concept to “phenomenon” is covered-up-ness.

There are various ways in which phenomena are covered up. For one, a phenomenon can be covered up in the sense that it is still entirely *undiscovered*: there is neither information nor misinformation about it. Then, too, a phenomenon can be *buried*: here, the phenomenon was at some earlier time uncovered, but has since gone undercover. This latter can happen totally, but as a rule what has earlier been uncovered does remain visible, only now as seeming—illusion. However, where there is seeming there is “being.” This kind of covering up, i.e. “disguising,” is the most frequent and the most dangerous, since here the possibilities of deception and misguidance are especially persistent. Within a “system,” the structures of being and their corresponding concepts can perhaps assert themselves rightly; they are after all available, just veiled in their rootedness. Constructively bolstered within a system, they take

for the truth of *being*, i.e. for the ways that the being of beings concerns us, takes us into its draw precisely in its withdrawal—this draw then “constituting” truth (so that our refusal to be drawn strands us with ghostly beings—in logical terms, with “predications” floating free of “subjects”).]

on the status of what needs no further justification; they are “clear” and therefore serviceable as the departure-point for progressive deductions.*

The cover-up, whether construed as concealment or burial or distortion, again has two possible versions. There are incidental cover-ups and there are necessary cover-ups—ones having their basis in the condition of the thing discovered. Every phenomenological concept or proposition drawn from its source can degenerate when communicated in an assertion: it gets circulated in a vacuous intelligibility, loses its rootedness, and becomes a free-floating thesis. Right within the concrete work of phenomenology itself there lies the possibility that what primordially offers a “good grip” becomes stiff and slippery. And the difficulty of this research consists precisely in keeping it critically disposed toward itself in a positive way.

Our first and abiding task is to *wrest* from the objects of phenomenology the manner in which being, and in which the structures of being, can protrude in the mode of phenomenon.† Thus the *departure-point* of the analysis, as well as the *access-point* to the phenomenon and the *passage* through the prevailing cover-ups, must secure its own method. In the idea of an “originary” and “intuitive” hold on and explication of phenomena there lies an opposition to the naïveté of incidental, “immediate,” and unreflective “beholding.”

Having delimited the concept of phenomenology in rough fashion, we can now achieve a focus on the meaning of the terms “phenomenal” and “phenomenological.” We call “phenomenal” what is given in the manner of a phenomenon and can be explicated as such; we can therefore talk about phenomenal structures. We call “phenomenological”

* Here and throughout, Heidegger invites us to dwell at the point of “conversion” from thinking “downwards” to thinking “upwards”—as first formulated by Plato in his *Republic*, 510B - 518D.

† In his later works, Heidegger reconsiders the appropriateness of “wresting.” Cf. the end of his essay on Aristotle’s concept of nature (available in *Pathmarks*) where, in reference to Heraclitus’ “nature loves to hide,” he remarks that what is called for is not that we overcome the hiding, rip something from it, but rather that we leave nature her hiding, in all its purity, as what belongs to her—a much more difficult task, as many myths suggest. On p. 222, Heidegger does associate the violence of “overcoming” and “ripping” more with discovery than with disclosure (a distinction only later worked out).

everything belonging to this manner of identification and explication, and everything constituting the conceptuality required in this research.

Because phenomenon understood phenomenologically is always just what constitutes being, and being is in each instance the being of some being, what we first of all need, in our intention to expose being, is that this one being become available. Moreover, this one being must show itself within the manner of access that intrinsically belongs to it. And so the ordinary concept of phenomenon does become phenomenologically relevant. The first task of “phenomenologically” securing the exemplary being [= being-there] as the departure-point for an authentic analysis is always already pre-figured in the goal of the analysis itself.*

Considered in reference to its content, phenomenology is the science of the being of beings — ontology. During the elucidation of the tasks of ontology the necessity of a fundamental ontology emerged, one having as its ontologically and ontically distinguished theme one being, being-there — and in such a way that this ontology is brought before the cardinal problem, the question about the meaning of being in general.^a In the course of the investigation itself this much will emerge: the method of phenomenological description proceeds as *interpretation*. The λόγος of the phenomenology of being-there takes the shape of ἐρμηνεύειν: in and through the act of interpreting, the authentic meaning of being, and the basic structures of its own being, are *divulged* to the understanding of being that already belongs to being-there. Phenomenology of being-there is *hermeneutics* — in the original meaning of the word, according to which it designates the work of interpretation. But inasmuch as the uncovering of the meaning of being, and of the basic

* Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of “analysis”: (1) the descriptive taking-apart (e.g., of Aristotle’s concept of time) and (2) the *projective* account of the way things are “projectively” (viz. of being-there). This distinction is implicit in *Being and Time*, but stated explicitly in *Collected Works*, Vol. 67, p. 132.

^a Being — not genus, not being for beings universally; the “in general” = καθόλου = in the whole of: *being of beings*; meaning of the difference. [Heidegger here calls attention to something bothersome about the phrase “in general” occurring throughout the work: it tends to suggest the traditional concern to formulate generalizations about how things are, “universals” as against “particulars”; instead, Heidegger invites us to think about wholeness, as the Greek adverb suggests, and to question the difference between being and beings.]

structures of being-there in general, establishes the horizon for all further ontological investigation of beings not taking their measure from being-there, this hermeneutics becomes “hermeneutics” in a second sense: the elaboration of the conditions of the possibility of any ontological investigation. And, finally, inasmuch as being-there has ontological primacy over every other being — since it *is* in its possibility of existence — hermeneutics, as interpretation of being-there, receives a
38 specific, a third meaning (philosophically understood, the *primary* one): the analysis of the existentiality of ex-sistence. In this hermeneutics — inasmuch as it elaborates ontologically the historicity of being-there as the ontic condition of the possibility of historiography — lie the roots of what can be called “hermeneutics” only in a derivative sense: the methodology of those disciplines in the humanities that proceed historiographically.

Being, understood as the basic theme of philosophy, is no genus of beings, and yet it pertains to each and every being. Its “universality” is to be sought higher. Being and the structure of being lie beyond each and every being, beyond each and every possible determination we make about beings. *Being is the transcendens pure and simple.*^a The transcendence of the being of being-there is a distinguished one, inasmuch as in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*. Every disclosure of being as *transcendens* is *transcendental* cognition. *Phenomenological truth (disclosure of being) is veritas transcendentalis.*

Ontology and phenomenology are not two differing disciplines among others belonging to philosophy. The two terms characterize philosophy itself, the one its object and the other the way it proceeds. Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutics of being-there; as analysis of *ex-sistence*,^b

^a of course, not *transcendens* — despite all the metaphysical resonance — in the scholastic and Greek-Platonic sense of κοινόν, “common”; rather, transcendence as what’s ek-static — temporality — time-boundedness; but [this happens within, or creates, an] “horizon”! Being “drives” thought beyond beings. Still, transcendence stems from the truth of being: the event of appropriation. [In his later works Heidegger increasingly speaks about — or, he says, *from* — the event of things, including ourselves, coming into their own: “appropriation” in this very special sense.]

^b “ex-sistence” understood in the manner of fundamental ontology, i.e. as bearing down on the truth of being, and only in this manner!

hermeneutics ties the knot of the guiding thread of all philosophical questioning at the point where such questioning *springs up* and to which it *pulls back*.^{*}

The following investigations only became possible owing to the groundwork laid by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logical Investigations* phenomenology achieved its breakthrough. The elucidation of the concept of it shows that what is essential about phenomenology does not lie in its *actualizing* a “movement.”^a *Possibility* stands higher than actuality. Phenomenology becomes intelligible only when we apprehend it as possibility.¹

About the cumbersomeness, the “inelegance” of expression during the following analysis, this much may be said: it is one thing to tell stories about how *beings* are, another to lay hold of beings in their *being*. For this second task, not only are the words mostly lacking, but even more the “grammar.” If an allusion to earlier and (in their level of achievement) incomparable analyses of being be permitted, compare the ontological parts of Plato’s *Parmenides* or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* with one of Thucydides’ stories: then one can see just how stunning the formulations were that the Greeks had to undergo from their philosophers. And where our powers are

^{*} In his “Letter on Humanism” Heidegger writes:

I say in *Being and Time* (p. 38) that all questioning of philosophy “pulls back into existence.” But existence is here not the actuality of the *ego cogito*. It is also not just the actuality of subjects coming to themselves by working for and with one another. Fundamentally distinct from all *existentia* and existence, “ex-sistence” is the ex-static dwelling in the nearness of being.

See my annotation on p. 12, at the first hyphenation of the word.

^a i.e., not the movement of transcendental philosophy, the critical philosophy of Kantian idealism. [Heidegger asks us to appreciate the core of Husserl’s thought — which does in fact veer toward transcendental philosophy, a kind of Kantian idealism. Cf. his 1963 account of Husserl’s phenomenology in “My Way to Phenomenology,” available in *On Time and Being*, 1972.]

¹ If the following investigation moves a few steps forward in the disclosure of “things themselves,” the author must above all thank Edmund Husserl, who brought the author, during his studies at Freiburg, into an intimacy with the various areas of phenomenological research — by providing his own penetrating personal guidance, and by generously sharing his unpublished investigations. [Heidegger was Husserl’s *assistant*, not his student.]

essentially less, and where in addition the domain of being to be disclosed is much more difficult than the one presented to the Greeks, the awkwardness of concept-formation and severity of expression will increase.

§8. *Outline of the treatise*

The question about the meaning of being is the most universal and the most empty; yet within this question there also lies the possibility of its ownmost acute individualization as it bears down on each instance of being-there.^a To attain to the basic concept of “being” and to prefigure the ontological conceptuality required by it as well as the necessary variations of this conceptuality, we need a concrete guideline. The “specialness” of the investigation — i.e., the penetration to the concept by way of a special interpretation of one determinate being, being-there, whereupon we should attain the horizon of understanding and of possible interpretation of being — does not conflict with the universality of the concept of being. This one being is in itself “historical,” so that the most proper ontological illumination of this one being necessarily becomes an “historiographical” interpretation.

The elaboration of the question of being branches into two tasks, corresponding to which the treatise falls into two parts:

First Part: The interpretation of being-there in view of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question about being.

Second Part: The basics of a phenomenological destructuring of the history of ontology, following the guidelines of the problematic of time-boundedness.

Part One consists of three *Divisions*:

1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of being-there.
2. Being-there and temporality.

^a really: [the possibility of] enacting the urgency to stand within the there. [Heidegger emphasizes the difference between his earlier and his later thought: individuation merely prepares for participation. On “urgency to stand within,” see his marginalium on p. 223.]

3. Time and being.^b

40 Part Two likewise takes a three-fold form:

1. Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time as the initial stage of the problematic of time-boundedness.
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes' *cogito sum* and the resumption of medieval ontology in the problematic of the *res cogitans*.
3. Aristotle's treatise on time as the *discrimen* [decisive point] of the phenomenal basis of ancient ontology, and of its limits.[†]

^a The transcendence-like difference.

Overcoming of the horizon as such.

Return into inheritance.

Estate from inheritance.

[Heidegger later forbid himself to use the word "horizon"; cf. Georg Picht's account in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), p. 204. A central thesis in Heidegger's later work is that we come into our *estate* (a "presence" where each thing comes into its own—not the present achieved by determining how things are) only as we learn to receive our *inheritance* (what our intellectual traditions answer to—not the answers themselves).]

[†] Only the first two Divisions of Part One exist. To the 1953 edition of *Being and Time* Heidegger added a note regarding the plan of the treatise:

The designation "First Half" appended to previous editions has been dropped. After a quarter century the second half [Division Three of Part One, plus the whole of Part Two] could not be affixed without the first being reworked. This path remains still today a necessary one, if the question about being is to move our being-there.

For an elucidation of this question, the reader may refer to my *Introduction to Metaphysics*. It presents the text of lectures held in the summer semester of 1935.

Actually, much of Heidegger's very late work can be read as a "replacement" of Division Three of Part One, or at least as intimating the reversal of thinking devoted to "beings not taking their measure from being-there." Then, too, Heidegger has since analyzed to some extent each of the three "stations" he planned to destructure in Part Two: most obviously the first "station" in his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929).

Part One

The Interpretation of Being-there in Reference to Temporality^a

and

the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question about Being^b

^a Only this much in this published portion.

^b On this portion, see the Marburg lectures of the summer semester 1927 (*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* [Indiana U. Press, 1982]).

Division One: Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Being-There

Chapter One The Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Being-there

- §9. *The theme of the analysis of being-there*
- §10. *Contrasting the analysis of being-there with anthropology, psychology, and biology*
- §11. *Existential analysis and the interpretation of primitive being-there. The difficulties in securing a “natural concept of world”*

Division One

Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Being-there

[Prelude]

In the question about the meaning of being, first to be examined is that one being we construe as being-there. In keeping with its own uniqueness, the preparatory existential analysis of being-there stands in need of an exposition prefiguring it, and of a demarcation distinguishing it from apparently similar investigations (Chapter One). Recalling the point of departure we have settled on for the investigation, we must then lay bare a fundamental structure of being-there: being-in-world (Chapter Two). This “*a priori*,” revealed in the interpretation of being-there, is not just a set of determinations cobbled together, it is rather a structure that is primordially and constantly whole. However, the interpretation does provide various perspectives on the factors constituting the structure. We must bring these factors into phenomenal relief while keeping in view the wholeness of this structure that in each case already prevails. Thus, the object of our analysis comprises: the world in its worldliness (Chapter Three), being-in-world as being with others and being oneself (Chapter Four), and being-in as such (Chapter Five). On the basis of the analysis of this fundamental structure a provisional indication of the being of being-there becomes possible: its existential meaning is *care* (Chapter Six).

Chapter One The Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Being-there

§9. *The theme of the analysis of being-there*

The being setting the task of our analysis is in each case we^a ourselves. The being of this one being is *in each case mine*. By its very being, this

^a in each case “I” [A tension in the focal point of contemplation: the being-there (in the woods, in academia...) “we” are investigating is open to “us” only in the sense of *each* willing to be... there.]

Translator's Postscript

Seven Words

Writers especially, then readers, hear not only the immediate contours of words but also their undertones and overtones — temporal layers of meaning bequeathed by the works of literary tradition and also present in daily talk of the age. They also move within peripheral hearing: in a work, each word resonates with other words, so that each has a coterie of cohorts, phonetic as well as semantic. Readers especially will always be hearing in the words of the moment responses to those in works not only preceding but also succeeding the work presently in progress — and must often struggle to disentangle the narrations to maintain the integrity, the genuine multiplicity of the foci in motion, rather than letting the conversation collapse into a stagnating hubbub.

Writers then form their works as much out of the overtones and undertones, and out of lateral meanings, as out of the words themselves, i.e. artificially isolated from their companions. It is precisely the interplay of their cohorts that allows words to intertwine to form a smooth fabric for calling attention to what they are about — the subject of the work — rather than only to themselves. The cohorts may not suffice to do the job, although they may come close, as in haiku and many terse utterances of daily talk. For each language also brings along inherited expectations of sequence, rhythm, and trope, all of which figure in the interplays essential to inciting attention to the subject — or, failing that, to themselves only. And writers distinguish their works partly by their manner of conforming to and deviating from these expectations.

Any great work, one bequeathing as much as inheriting, comes with a personality distinctly its own — all according to the successful way it configures and converges its interplays. And its personality perennially changes as it grows older and interacts with subsequent works — those by other authors as well. Thus Heidegger's first monumental work appears differently as it has gotten overlaid, and will continue to be overlaid, by subsequent re-envisionings of its subject.

A translation even more so. Whichever word of my native tongue I choose for one in the foreign tongue, it will resonate differently among its own cohorts and with the tradition conveyed by this second language. Immediately, the translated work presents a personality of its own — as competent readers of both versions will easily notice. Who has ever read, competently, a work by Aristotle, first in a translation and then in the original, and not been transported through a looking glass into a region in many respects inverted? In the course of the ages, originals and their translations become ever more distant cousins.

Does that mean a translation necessarily counteracts the original? You may cite the familiar Italian answer in the affirmative: *traduttore, traditore* — an example of a resonance that does not quite come off in English: “translator, traitor.” But, in obvious self-interest, I say it is the reader who is more than likely the traitor, the one who would betray the text in whatever tongue it appears. A translation is, like the original, up against what the text is about, and readers betray it so long as they fail to address themselves to what it is up against.

Reader, whether you read *Sein und Zeit* or some version of *Being and Time* — read either one actually, fruitfully — you are going to have to labor hard in the field to get it to bear the fruits essential to it, rather than just weeds. You are going to have to get it to work — exactly, exactly, as performers and conductors must get their scores to work. And you may fail — likely will — at first rehearsal. As we all have — all who have taken upon themselves decisive works with the intent to retain them as insightful rather than to glean them for leftover opinions.

Like anything that must be performed, translations too can be good, bad or middling. Good if readers can and sometimes do find a way through them to what they are about, bad if they cannot or do not, middling if they allow readers to start going but leave them stranded part way on the journey (which the best readers will not mind: grateful for the head start, they will forge ahead by themselves, perhaps recurring to the original).

Every translation being a reading, an interpretation in the musical sense, there will always be new ones of those works that both inherit and bequeath. For these always change, requiring new readings. That is, each sends us back to the origin, if not to the original text intending to focus us on the origin. And, in keeping with the original, each successful translation will have its own personality.

For my own translation I chose not to call attention to the German underlying the English—not ever. An exercise in taking responsibility for my own rendition. Instead, I prepared an analytic index that for a large number of the English words, where I do record the German and which, more importantly, cites the sentences in which the words occur, thereby putting them to work.

But it may also prove instructive to discuss some of them. A bit of shoptalk, as it were. A number came to mind as I was preparing the translation. Here are seven, starting with the shortest.

je

jeweils, jeweilig, Jemeinigkeit

Speaking of the price of a bunch of things, a clerk may tell you, “10¢ each,” and an exercise in arithmetic tells you the cost of the bunch. Similarly, we can talk about the dogs in a kennel one at a time (the breed of each), as opposed to talking about them as a whole (the noise they are making). In contrast, we sometimes intend to speak about everything of a kind, and all at once: the total price, the nature of sound transmission, the nature of dogs as distinct from wolves.

The word occurs 403 times in *Sein und Zeit*, and I have generally translated it as “in each instance.” It first occurs on p. 2: everyone supposedly uses the concept of being, and *in each instance* already understands what he means by it. It occurs again on p. 3, in the translation of Thomas Aquinas’ Latin: an understanding of being is already included *in each instance* of comprehending something. In neither case is there a general understanding. And the third occurrence, on p. 4, underscores the task of Heidegger’s own work: the fact that, *in each instance* of determining how things are (the sky is blue, I am happy) we are already living within an understanding of being, while the sense of being remains obscure—which demonstrates the basic necessity of recovering the question of this sense.

The seventh and eighth occurrences (on p. 7) introduce the thematic employment of the word. Concerned to chose and understand what we should contemplate while raising the question of the sense of being, we might pause to notice that this very concern suggests where might profitably start: we should first examine the being that each of us *in each instance* is. For you and I have already dared to stick out.

Yet, as we turn toward this one being that protrudes already, we likely bring along elements of our long tradition already interpreting this effort: that of Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and finally 20th-Century psychologists. To free ourselves of the leftovers of these efforts (perhaps to recover their original power), we might turn to how we are situated—already (in each instance!) engaged with things and other people within a situation prior to, cleansed of, these inherited overlays.

So Heidegger’s work asks me and you to contemplate the situation in which we find ourselves—in each instance our situatedness: I mine, you yours. Not, then, our situation apart from ourselves, and not situations in general. Or not right away: one of the tasks of contemplating my own situation is to discover, to uncover, how this one situation might engender the concern for the whole—its own whole, and then also the whole inclusive of yours, his, hers, theirs; past, present and future. And how this initial situatedness might invite two versions of such wholeness: the one apart from and the other inclusive of myself as engaged in the contemplation.

Yet . . . here we are reading someone telling us that we have to look not just for ourselves (every philosophical work asks this of us) but at our own situation, and he will tell us already what we are going to find. How can an author do this without already assuming a universality of, in this case, “situatedness”? Shouldn’t an author rather just tell us what he or she finds, and leave it to us to find and tell our own?

An ancient principle of education is that learning takes place as the learner concentrates on one instance, fathoming it until it reveals the universal. Perhaps one puppy to take care of for a while—or one city, one lover, one geometric figure. Guidance is possible, but the individual must engage willingly in the learning process; the teacher (or, as one used to say, the master) imparts nothing of great significance, but directs the attention of the learner—always toward the one instance, whereupon, with luck, the learner passes on to the holistic import of the one instance and thereby comes to know instances in general.—This principle contrasts strikingly with today’s academia, built as it is on the Enlightenment understanding of knowledge as accumulative and heritable because placing us in an intellectual realm where instances are incidental illustrations of the idea. This understanding of knowledge corresponds to the dominant understanding of being propagated by our universities.

We might then understand Being and Time as providing guidance of the sort provided anciently by Plato's and Aristotle's works (and still recalled in much later works) — with the important difference that the instance at issue for each reader is his or her own situatedness (“being in a world,” Heidegger says — reserving “situation” for this location revealed at moments when we take finally take full responsibility for it). Guidance, that is, for the reader's uncovering of how and where he or she is. Unlike the guidance provided by a good proof in physics, which will always require demonstrations transcending what lies under our noses — because what's at issue not only transcends any one instance but also transcends our own situatedness (although Werner Heisenberg's account of quantum theory tantalizes).

It will hardly escape my reader's notice that much literature (novels, epics, poems, stage plays, meditative autobiographies) also provide guidance in the uncovering of instances of situatedness — and thereby also contrast with the arm's-length discourses of modern science. Yet such literature is much kinder than *Being and Time*: it cheerfully allows us to believe that the discourse, with its uncovering, belongs to another.

Finally, there are the cousins and progeny of this one word. The adverbial *jeweils* (32 occurrences) resonates with time: being is *every single time* the being of some determinate thing (p. 9). The adjective *jeweilig* (98 occurrences) could often be translated simply as “each” or “each respective”: the basic principles of *each* discipline (p. 9), but often suggests the stronger sense of “in each instance”: highlighting one aspect of something requires, *in each instance*, that we look to the whole phenomenon (p. 53).

And, awkwardest of all, there's the noun Heidegger compounds out of *je*, resulting in what I have translated as *instantial mineness* on pp. 53 and 240: *Jemeinigkeit* occurs only five times, and for the three times it occurs on pp. 42 and 43 I have translated it more fluently, e.g. [its character] as *in each case mine* (instead of “its character of instantial mineness”). Along with the facility of the German language to compound sentences with qualifying clauses, this facility to compound words works better in German than in French, Italian or English. Still, a noun suggests a focal point rather than a way to configure our own focalizing, as do adverbs and adjectives. These compounds do serve a purpose.

In logical terms, all these occurrences, whether of *je*, *jeweils*, *jeweilig*, or *Jemeinigkeit*, intend “distributive” rather than “collective” discernment of how and where each of us is. And especially discernment of what is distinctively one's own — as distinct from what's second-hand — things only heard about from others, who often pass on traditional views of our situatedness — and also from what's inferred or surmised. Such discernment may have to be engendered: Heidegger suggests that only my mortality brings “instantial mineness” home to me: not, or not entirely, a book written by another.

man

das Man

The second sentence of Heidegger's Introduction says that, nowadays (by the 1920s) one considers oneself absolved from the arduous task of kindling anew the ancient battle over the question of being. In English we would rather avoid this impersonal construction, especially in its reflexive form, and say rather something like “there's the general conviction that the question is superfluous.” But German-speakers routinely say *man*, just as French-speakers say *on*: it's a convenient way of talking about things happening without having to specify the human agency. In fact, educated speakers of English often resort to it for simple phrasing: “At this point one might say...” (avoiding the more personal “you” or “I,” the more restrictive “someone” and the awkward passive voice “it might be said”).

It is perhaps in adolescence that one first discovers intuitively what Heidegger's work asks us to uncover thematically: that human agency lurks everywhere in any experienced situation — yet, paradoxically, you and I who now agree to consider, as individual agents, the basics of our situatedness prior to our meditative exercise, are, in this prior condition, primarily immersed in an anonymity of agency. There are already ways of doing things, thinking things, wanting things, feeling things: these govern our situation, define our role in it, allow us to commune with others and to discover things along with others. In adolescence this prior condition of agency affronts the nascent sense of our own individuality, and we speak — at least I and my cohorts at the time did speak — of “society” or “the” (family, teachers, neighbors, policemen) as pressuring us to conform (in our dress, our manners, our ambitions, even our feelings). In contrast, now individuated to the point where we can

undertake the task of considering freshly our essentially unfresh situation, you and I might be able to appreciate its positive aspects. First, it assures that we are already engaged with others, even on the proverbial desert island, so that our task is not primarily to gain access to others (as those aspire to do whose meditations lead them to withdraw into what they think of as their private world). And, secondly, it reminds us of the recurrent task of earning our own agency, our own insight, even our own name: of taking our situation as our own rather than as simply foisted off on us.

I have then translated the German word with the English impersonal “one” even though its lineage is very nearly the opposite of the German and French, both of which draw upon the generic sense of the Latin *homo* (Dante’s Italian, long preceding the study of human being all by itself, employs *uomo* impersonally as well). In decided contrast, our English “one” stems from its use as a grammatical number: a demonstrative one as distinct from an indefinite plurality.

The word occurs 233 times in all, 75 times in its colloquial sense prior to its thematic usage. So long as it serves as a pronoun there’s nothing misleading about the English term, although often an English variant is smoother. But of course Heidegger makes a noun out of it, complete with its definite article: *das Man*. Which then translates as “the one”—a phrasing that undercuts the indefiniteness of the original. An acquaintance of mine, a Plato scholar, found this translation offensive for another reason: in Greek philosophy the concern for τὸ ἕν, “the one,” aims for definite unity substantiating otherwise disparate plurality—it names what the intellectually adroit among us strive to achieve, not our condition prior to such development. I can imagine, too, that the translation might offend readers of Kierkegaard, whose sense of “the one” is precisely that of the individual who has extracted himself or herself from “the crowd”—and may therefore be able to read meditative works such as his own. Socrates already said it in answer to the question, To whom might we wisely lend our ears?—not to the many (the bearer of generally accepted opinions about healthy decisions, healthy bodies and healthy cities), but to the one (who knows these things).

The advantage of my translation over others is that it retains the resonance of the verbal and the substantive formulations in the original.

We enjoy things, take pleasure in them, the way one enjoys; we read, see and judge regarding literature and art the way one sees

and judges; then too we pull ourselves out from “the masses” the way one pulls oneself out; we get indignant the way one gets indignant. The one, which is nothing determinate and which all are, although not as a sum, prescribes the manner in which everydayness is.

So too the way one writes English sentences, the way one separates one’s trash for recycling. The adolescent “they” resonates with divisiveness, even a call to arms; the impersonal “one” resonates rather with a basically comfortable unity.

One must choose one’s resonances. In the present instance I myself would like to emphasize one strain of thinking in *Being and Time*: that “the one” provides the platform, the “default” setting (as one can say nowadays, recalling computer programs), or the “material cause” (as those who have carefully studied Aristotle can say), for all further developments of human agency, and especially those various developments leading to various insights of the sort answering to the question of being.

Intimate cousins of “the one” is a family of terms I translate with the Latin-based English verb “collapse”: *verfallen* (infinitive and past participle), *verfallend* (present participle), *Verfallen* (substantive), *Verfallenheit* and *Verfallensein* (abstract nouns), *Verfall* (once, in a commentary), *Fall* (as in “fall from grace”), *fallen* and *Fallen* (verb and noun easily transliterated as “falling”). If you insist on keeping the root throughout, you can translate all these words with slight variations on “falling”: one sort of resonance. However, with the prefixed versions Heidegger is asking us to see something about our condition that the unprefix versions do not address: namely, that at any given (ordinary) moment, our condition is quietly imploded—functional, all too functional, but not fully open to the occasion (on automatic pilot, as it were). Judged at moments when we might hope for more, and especially when a crisis looms, the situation appears as an old building that has not been properly maintained: it’s collapsed (*verfallen*). Then, too, we can now see it is collapsing: while it may occasion despair, such insight may also occasion inspiration. Indeed, Heidegger’s point of the diagnosis is to suggest it is time—it is always time—for an overhaul (and, incidentally, you may here detect a basic meaning for temporality). So we end up contemplating at length what I translate as “collapsedness”: something differing considerably from personal lapses of faith or decorum, and having nothing to do with Eve.

*Gerede**Rede*

The past participle of *reden*, talking, is *geredet*, which then easily (in German) serves to form a noun: *das Geredete*, “what’s (been) talked about already.” Heidegger asks us to see in our condition the essential prevalence of “rehashing,” as we say in colloquial English. He then borrows a familiar word in his own language, *Gerede*, to name this prevalence. To retain the resonances I translate the German as “re-talk.” The “re-” parallels the German *ge-*, emphasizing the temporality at issue.

The first difficulty for the reader, however, is to learn the prevalence of talk itself: not just the fact that most people talk (talk then as an obvious feature of most situations), but talk as an *a priori* condition evident, upon careful examination, throughout every situation and allowing such other obvious phenomena as sharing circumstances, paying attention to others, analyzing proposals, reading and writing, solitary thinking (reviewing and planning)—then too the frustrations and failures of all these. A world (start by concentrating on sub-worlds, like those of tending to a household, working in an office complex, camping out in the woods, repairing machinery, visiting relatives in a hospital) *is* as an articulated whole (sub-worlds have fuzzy borders because they spill over into other worlds). Articulated = assembled, flexible at the joints, functional but also breakable. Heidegger call this *a priori* condition *Rede*, which recalls the kind of talk one gives at a conference, except that here the writer and the listener aim either for entertainment or instruction, and often criticism of the way others have re-assembled familiar facts and manners of expression.

Once we see that and (to some extent) how talk prevails as an enabling condition, we can see how it easily loses its roots while yet continuing to carry us along. We find ourselves saying and writing the same thing, then also hearing and reading the same thing—discovering perhaps that we are distorting what others are proposing (positively or negatively), even faulting others for not proposing the “right” (i.e., same) things. Indeed, knowing something often means being able to re-say it. If knowledge can take the form of a storehouse, re-talk is our primary way of assuring ourselves and others that we are in fact knowledgeable. And today we have the Internet as our storehouse: skimming is our way of moving electronically through its contents in cheerful oblivion of its, i.e. our own rootlessness: after all, everyone is doing it.

In his 1924 lectures “The Concept of Time” (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 64), which provides a kind of trailer to *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites academic discourse (*Wissenschaft*) to illustrate what he means by re-talk. Indeed, the original hope of the Enlightenment was that knowledge could accumulate so that subsequent researchers could stand on the shoulders of their predecessors to see further than they. However, for the most part, researchers re-write familiar things, adding a twist here and there for flavor, and can squabble energetically over detail without recalling the original question, subject, or intent. A teacher, too, can very energetically lay out the prevailing discourse of the field of study without any concern about whether the students learn to speak out of its source or merely learn to talk about what others have said. It is important that we recognize the prevalence of re-talk because, in any given institution in any given age, it already determines what counts as “really being”—whereas our present intent is, supposedly, to raise this question freshly.

I have to say, then, that the familiar translation of *Gerede* as “idle talk” ill advised. It is perhaps inspired by the reasonable translation of Wittgenstein’s remark that “confusions arise when language is idling, not when working” (idling as an engine idles: *leerläuft*). Re-talk is generally running at full capacity, cluttered and clanging, whereas rooted talk is likely quiet and calm.

Re-talk is what ordinary talk essentially is. As we go about our ordinary business, what we actually say and hear is essentially pre-fixed in form, and as we are shopping or selling, doing our bit or asking others to do theirs, informing or being informed (by colleagues or the media), elaborate or imbibe tales—at each moment we draw upon familiar ways of speaking: a tongue with its own grammar and vocabulary (familial or local or national or international). Such re-talk may still be weakly rooted—both drawing upon and passing by what the talk is about. Or it may let the roots wither to near nothing, as in deceitful talk (prevarication) and more or less vicious talk (gossiping, scandal-mongering).

Heidegger is trying to scare us. And we should be scared. For we are supposedly engaging in the linguistic enterprise of writing and reading about the conditions for raising the question of being—and, for all our efforts, we may still be begging the question, assuming all along “what really is” and fussing over ramifications of our own presumptions.

Re-talk is the norm, our own vocation-specific platform, and our task

is to learn (and help others learn) to speak and to listen, to write and to read, incisively — that is, in a way that reroots talk strongly, saves it momentarily from re-talk, into which it naturally collapses.

The duo *Rede/Gerede* resonates also with subsequent literature: (1) Heidegger's own meditations on incisive language in the pieces collected under the title *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (partially translated as *On the Way to Language*), (2) his meticulous consideration of the works of others (to help us read through the re-talk of scholarship to recover our heritage), and (3) the meditations of others who have taken up his challenge (already Husserl in the 1936 fragment translated as "The Origin of Geometry," then also Merleau-Ponty in his 1945 delineation of the difference between *la parole parlée* and *la parole parlante*).

Translation, too, is scary in this instance having to preserve resonances both internal and external to the work — in each case a selection — while orchestrating all these to resonate with what the work is about.

Da-sein

Mit-sein, Mit-da-sein

At the end of the penultimate section, Heidegger contrasts his own with Hegel's use of this term. Hegel's phenomenology understands "spirit" as becoming concrete (incarnated, fulfilled) by being there (otherwise spirit may only hover over situations abstractly). Heidegger's starts out (*setzt ein*) within the (weak) concretion of "factically thrown ex-sistence" — the way we are already "out there" (in order, as he immediately says), to unveil temporality as the original enabling of such being-there). All along, Heidegger has been responding to Hegel.

To side with Hegel first: in his sense of the word, closer to the colloquial expressions in both English and German, being there is an important development on the part of the individual — who may at times not be there (as every parent, teacher and coach knows, and most of us recognize as we get older and prone to absent-mindedness ourselves). Learning to be there is essential in enterprises depending on knowledge rather than willingness just to do what one is told.

Heidegger proposes that we examine carefully the way we are already "out there" dealing with things (if only routinely) and with others

(if only conformatively). The use of the word *Dasein* to name the focal point of examination deviates importantly from what its everyday use (whether in German or English) may suggest. The intended focal point is, in each instance, the multiple and interwoven ways we are there. The achievement of this focal point requires arduous effort on our respective parts, since we are strongly tempted to assume that we are looking either at ourselves or at others out there in the field — the way researchers in the fields of psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology do (looking out for the universal "human being" lurking within all the empirical variations). But we are "out there" prior to such studies: such research, placing its subject at arm's length, is itself one achievement of our being there — a strange alienation whose results will always be tainted with self-forgetfulness.

Michel Foucault's 1966 *Les mots et les choses* traces the historical developments that led finally (and recently) to the ambition of studying human being in this manner. You can read this work as interplaying with Heidegger's — all the more so if you recall Foucault's acknowledged debt to Heidegger's two-volume work on Nietzsche, where Heidegger addresses explicitly the task of liberating ourselves from the trappings of this ambition.

The first English translation of Heidegger's masterpiece chose to retain, untranslated, the German for being-there. The choice reflects Heidegger's original conviction that special terminology was required to overcome the re-talk dominating philosophical work. However, within a couple decades he stated that the task was to restore the inherited lexicon rather than devise another one. I suggest that readers try this tact as well.

I am out in a pathless wilderness and I come across an axe and a jacket, partly sunken into the fallen branches and leaves. I sense immediately a human presence, precisely in the absence: these things belonged to someone who was also there, even is there — this stretch of wilderness is/was shared. But already, before this discovery in the woods, my wife at home, my colleagues at work, perhaps Plato or Aristotle, Kant or Heidegger have peopled my excursion out there: I embarked this morning to get away from their presence, perhaps even to enjoy their absence — in any case, they are there inseparably from my own being there.

From the beginning in Plato and Aristotle, and increasingly ever

since in our intellectual tradition, the half-buried axe and jacket figure as triggering my faculty of recollection of human agency, along with my faculty of inference; and, similarly, I remember, or try to forget, my wife and colleagues and authors whom I happen to be studying. These others, obviously absent in the flesh, are present only in me, as an essentially isolated subject who recognizes familiar objects and infers an earlier presence, or happens to retain memories of certain people, alive or dead. Ask any academic psychologist or tradition-bound novelist.

Yet my first experience is that of shared being-there. Period. Retaining this pristine experience—sharing it now in contemplation—you might appreciate the observation that this sharedness conditions the possibility of being there with nameable others, of inferring their presence, recalling and anticipating encounters. If so, you are well on your way to a sustained and sustaining examination of being there that does not reduce being-there to human being, i.e. revert to the arm's-length examination of something “out there”—as a detective may examine the axe and jacket and surrounding leaves and branches for signs of foul play.

Indeed, my first experience of things (e.g., my own axe or my own jacket) is that of using them, not puzzling over them for the purpose of describing them and attributing origins to them (hyletic, kinetic, telic or eidetic). Both Plato and Aristotle noted that things *are*, are fully themselves what they really are, only when they are functioning and, in the case of sublunar things, when we are using them. Modernity, however, developed ways of contemplating and knowing things suspended from our involvement with them. Heidegger then asks us to take a second look in order to recover the full force of our involvement with things as we are actually there with them, prior to becoming detectives bent on providing descriptions of their appearance and attributions of their provenance.

Content with employing the obvious English rendering of the German, my own translation can concentrate on retaining the resonances of this one word with a host of others: essential to being-there is being-with (it's shared) as well as being-there-with (encountering others: no need to infer other minds!). Also, the reader can shift attention directly to the “there” and ask what all the locative entails: what it's like to be in-there.

Still, in the end, the purpose is to develop a mode of thinking that

can itself be there rather than withdraw immediately into our own world—no doubt also shared, but as scholars share a field, and no doubt insightful into the nature of things, but things put out of their own function and readapted strictly for our own use. In an important sense, Heidegger agrees with Hegel: being fully there must be learned, and this learning is arduous for intellectuals such as ourselves (although “natural” in pre-intellectual work). Heidegger differs only in showing how we might begin at the beginning, with a careful consideration of being-there in its unlearned manifestations and generally weakened forms. He acknowledges the circularity of this enterprise.

Bewandtnis

Bewendenlassen, Zuhandenheit, Vorhandenheit

Here is a word that reminds me of what Augustine said of the word “time”: we have no trouble understanding it until we *try* to understand it. You hear it frequently enough in some parts of the German-speaking world, and in colloquial usage you might easily translate it with phrases including such words as “context” or “background”—with the suggestion that the recollection of it provides also the rationale for what one is more specifically focusing on. For instance, we might closely paraphrase the first occurrence of the word (p. 80) this way: what a sign (like the blinker blinking on the car in front of you at an intersection) primarily points up is always that wherein you are living, where you are tending to things, its own (and your own) context, this being what provides its rationale (and not simply the fact that the car in front of you is about to turn).

Heidegger is asking us to see, and in elaborate detail, just how things are as we in fact deal with them prior to examining them in abstraction from our primary role as tending to them, taking care of them, following and guiding them. Each thing *is* not only in a context but is as its context: both as bringing the context into play and as available to us by assigning to us our role in responding to it. The blinker on the car in front of you (often inconspicuous when not in fact blinking), but also tools (that axe and jacket out in the wilderness) and rockcliffs for climbing, chickens in our coops, cows in the field or deer in hunting season—each has its being from its context, is bound up in it.

Its dynamic context, I want to add. The German connotes

movement, whereas the English suggests stasis. Heidegger then drifts into the verbal form *bewenden*, which in colloquial usage corresponds roughly with such English expressions as “letting things run their course” — letting the context do its work in regard to the specific thing we might otherwise wish to alter by our own agency. It is the dynamic context of wending your way through traffic, a context including dozens of co-functional things (stoplights, crosswalks, lanes, accelerator, steering wheel...) that makes “relevant” — even available — that blinking blinker: that lets it function, let’s it be bound up with other things.

One of the most important achievements of *Being and Time* is its clarification of how things most concretely arise for us, therefore also how we ourselves most concretely rise to them, namely as *zuhanden* (quite easily and literally translated at “at hand”). They do so (and are) in keeping with a “whole dynamic context” (provided by the slightly more broadly intended “world” in which you are involved: here including your having to pick up your kids and take them to the dentist before getting back to your other work). And each *is* as coming and going, both taking its own course and requiring you to guide some things in their coming and going: an account clearly resonating with Aristotle’s talk of the narrower form of involvement he calls $\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\eta$.

The achievement requires an account of how we (and especially we intellectuals) come to the project of understanding things “out of context” — or, rather, in the special contexts of investigation that we learn in school. Here, those things occupying our attention are no longer “in use”: no longer *zuhanden*, at hand, but rather *vorhanden* (again easily and literally translated as “on hand”). Arriving at the scene of an accident, an investigator (from the police, perhaps from an insurance company) does not work with blinkers, stoplights, crosswalks and the likes, but measures their interrelations, along with any skid marks, fresh vs. old damage, and so on. Yet the investigation itself has its own dynamic context, with myriad things at hand — but this *Bewandtnis* contrasts with the first and hovers eerily out of sight for those wishing to get on with their day.

It is especially important that the translation neatly retain this distinction between things being at hand (within reach, used, put to use, bound up with one another) and things being on hand (examined out of their original context, therefore countable and storable — as the wreckage might be). Heidegger’s challenges us to learn a kind of thinking

(meditating, reflecting, reading and writing) that does justice to our concrete dealings with things, and thereby learn to “put in its proper place” the kind of intellectual discourse that modernity has devised for accounting for things only as on hand, unbound — as we think of things as resources for subsequent exploitation.

Essential to thinking this distinction through is a discernment of our being there within a dynamic context conditioning both our own role and the availability of things to us as, first, we are working with them, bound up with them as they are bound among themselves — but then also learning to investigate them. One of Heidegger’s signature thoughts is that one way, perhaps the prime or even only way, of learning this discernment is the experience of its utter devastation: of the dynamic context no longer sustaining our role in it, but rather appearing vacuous: What’s the point of taking the kids to the dentist and getting back to work? Or even pausing to let the other guy turn? Not that I won’t do these things, but that the whole of things raises the distressing question.

zeitigen

Zeitigung, Bewegtheit

One of the chief aims of Heidegger’s work is to allow for careful consideration of what it means for things to reveal themselves fully, and this in consonance with the traditional principle that we ourselves must learn to be fully there to bear witness to the revelation. Learn, that is, to allow for this revelation in a way undercutting the modern supposition that we inaugurate it by withdrawing into the special position of independent observation, calculation and decision — the modern predisposition to devise a mix of objectivity and subjectivity.

True, anyone able to engage in such considerations has already moved out of ordinary engagements into a meta-discourse of sorts. Yet Heidegger is suggesting throughout *Being and Time* that we might exploit this vantage point to raise the most reflective question: How do our ordinary engagements already evidence the possibility — more exactly, the urgency, even the necessity — of achieving this vantage point? Modulated by this question, the withdrawal will not carry the flavor of an absolute, as it does in modern philosophy.

Heidegger then asks us to look out for signs of, even seeds of growth. How does our being-there evidence incipient ripening,

maturation, into something more than the absorption marking its (our) initial movement? Or: How may we understand, albeit from our “outside” vantage point, how our condition is moved, changed, developed “inside”? Or: What makes being-there evolve, even devolve?

The key verb for such movement is *zeitigen*—which has no other meaning than to ripen, to mature, to fructify: transitively, to make bear fruit; intransitively (in German, reflexively), to bear fruit. From which Heidegger easily forms the noun *Zeitigung*, a key word in his own account. Early translators saw in these words the root *Zeit* and strove to retain the resonance with “time”—a retention that utterly obliterates the simplicity and importance of the question Heidegger is raising.

The verb first occurs on p. 22: fresh contemplation is difficult because tradition, initially forming our being-there, necessarily fructifies (brings about, generates) cover-ups. It next occurs in a question posed on p. 152: since every investigation moves within a presupposed interpretation of what is investigated, How can it (we, now) fructify (come up with) legitimate results, i.e. not argue in a circle? And then the first occurrence of the noun on p. 235, announcing the projected achievement of the second half of the book: temporality itself, to be freshly understood, will reveal its own possibility of fructification (maturation, transformation, metamorphosis), i.e. whole new ways of understanding what’s going on in our being-there. On p. 304 Heidegger elaborates on the promise: each element already exposed in the structure of being-there will become clearer when we see it as a fructification (a development, a modulation, an “effect”) of temporality (yet to be freshly understood). Finally, on p. 328 both the verb and the noun start taking on the thematic meaning governing the remaining one-hundred pages of the book: temporality *is* not, is not something that “is” (that arises for encounter), it rather fructifies, is the fructifying that throbs throughout our condition, yielding both tasteful fruit (as in art works), tasteless fruit (as in banalized and banalizing interpretations), and distasteful fruit (as in baneful actions and frustrations).

Heidegger here addresses a question central to our tradition, first available in Zeno, Plato and Aristotle, then again in Leibniz, Newton and Kant—the question, What gets things moving? That is: How can we intellectuals understand “the buzzing, booming confusion” in which we find ourselves?—While Zeno left the question hanging by seemingly denying that things are moving (or denying that we can understand them

as getting moved), Plato incipiently, and Aristotle finally, answer that what makes their movement intelligible is their pending fulfilment (even failure to get fulfilled): this pending restfulness not only governs restlessness but supplies the focus of our understanding.—While Leibniz and Newton devised a way of intellectualizing movement itself, relocating the intellect-defying notion of the infinite into our own formulations (thereby taming and harnessing it), Kant supplied the overall account of human experience that justified this relocation.—And we today, in the aftermath of these decisive developments (maturation, fructifications) are left with a mishmash (a veritable “buzzing, booming confusion”) of intellectual accounts of movement: modern notions of gravity to explain both terrestrial and celestial motions; of instinct to explain behavior of animals (including ourselves); of genetic structure to explain reproduction, maturation, deformation and termination of plants and animals; of greed, self-interest and fear to explain economic forces; and finally of “human nature” to detect in what it means to be human a variety of causes for historical changes in social formations and intellectual interpretations. Throughout these efforts there hovers something like Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—an underhanded recourse to divine intervention after all, or at least to the notions of purpose, intention, fulfillment hearkening back to our earlier traditions.

Heidegger directs our attention rather to the ordered movement already taking place in our everyday being-there in a “dynamic context” where purpose obviously reigns independently of any consideration of the fulfillments possible either for what we deal with or for our own nature, and where the interconnections of things requires no leaps over infinitudes of space and spatialized time. The main task is to unveil, in our world, the “seeds” of possible fruit-bearing—the urgencies calling for the kinds of extra-ordinary developments we associate with the marvels of art work and the like. But an important subsidiary task is to recover the power of the earlier accounts of κίνησις (movedness), and therewith our Greek and modern heritage (much facilitated by the distinction between at-hand-ness and on-hand-ness, itself fructified by the refreshed sense of temporality). While Plato and Aristotle posed the question of growth as prominent in φύσις, and Leibniz, Newton and Kant posed the question of knowing motion in our own formulations of space and time, Heidegger poses the question in regard to a third focal point, our ever-initial being-there. And employs the metaphor of ripening,

maturing, or fructifying to name the movement first of all at issue for our being there with others dealing with things.

In this one word lies multiple challenges: to focus on something hitherto unthematized, to search for seeds of development, to reassess (along with a fresh understanding of time) the positive and negative role of tradition, and finally (in Heidegger's later works) to recover the power of the literature of our tradition in order to overcome, at moments, the tasteless or even poisonous fruits it will always engender. Reader, I wish you luck!

das Seiende

das nicht-daseins-mäßige Seiende

Such a simple word! Yet how can it best be translated into English? An early translation of a later work tried “the essent”—a neologism that, understandably, did not take hold. The first translation of *Being and Time* tried “entities”—an abstract noun that fails to resonate with the concrete meaning of the original. I myself have often settled on “beings”—as have most other translators, I believe.

So what's the problem? For one thing, the German is singular. For another, it is adjectival (formed from the present participle of “to be”); it is not a substantive—not a noun as, say, “creature” or “thing” would be. Perhaps the more neutral “what is” would do in some cases. But... How can we get a fix on what this word designates?

There in our dynamic context, we deal with things and people by considering each, arising for encounter, as something that fits or fails to fit into the on-going affair. While we may mistake things, misuse them, underestimate or overestimate their role in the context, our being there still requires something like “attribution”: it is... But in each instance one “is” sends us to the next “is” within the context: it is first and foremost dynamic even though there may be occasion, as when a police officer examines the scene of an accident, where the attribution itself is at issue and appears static (bearing now on something on hand rather than at hand).

Our ordinary condition buzzes and booms with such preintellectualized (unthematized) attributions—myriad flashes of “it is” organized according to our involvements, our own being there in some dynamic context, itself nameable as... doing housework, watching a game

of chess, strolling through the woods, climbing a mountain, or whatever.

The problem of translation is that we—translators and readers—live within inherited interpretations of what's going on in this initial arena of flashing attributions. My first formulation follows Heidegger's account of their initial configuration (each “is” sends us along to another, all within a dynamic context: each is as an “as”). But now we are trying to focus (reflectively, contemplatively, thematically) on something else that “is”: the whole of our being-there (the whole of these “is's”), something that also imposes itself on us, posing questions of an order transcending the questions internal to our ordinary contexts. And here our inheritance impinges on our understanding of the word “is”: the difference between the “is” as signaling something about something and as signaling the something itself. Indeed, there is (again that “is”) an enigmatic contrast between what a horse or a city is doing or undergoing, where or when it is happening, how it strikes us, how it relates to something else and so on, and what it is “in itself”—what it really is, what the horse-trainer or the city-leader must know in order to discern those details accurately and guide the development of the horse or the city properly. As modern thinkers turned increasingly to what they themselves, as intellectuals rather than artisans or leaders, could know about horses and cities, the question of what really is concentrated attention on principles of organizing the details rather than penetrating them: these principles now (since Kant) count as what really is.

Each “flash in the pan” *is*, and each of us very frequently asks about its what, its how, its where, its when, etc. (in line with Aristotle's list of ten categories). Each happens. It's something we encounter. It's something we initially determine and then perhaps re-determine or further determine, even find enigmatic—all in a flow itself framed by a context, perhaps by different contexts. Greeks called it simply τὸ ὄν, Germans easily call it *das Seiende*—an appearance before us, one that hardly distinguishes itself from a determination on our part (indeed, we could also translate the Greek and the German as “determination”: each “is,” as temporal, has a follow-up determination).

Within their own fields, routine thinkers have no need to go beyond the “flashes in the pan”; indeed, fields of inquiry have become increasingly defined by their steadfast answers. However, full-fledged thinkers go on to ask about their status—better, their dynamic (power, potential): ask about their being. Aristotle says that our concern to

become clear about τὸ ὄν, about a flash, ultimately leads to a concern for ἡ οὐσία, its “substance” (its estate). Heidegger translates this question as bearing on *das Sein des Seienden* — what we might have to translate into English as “the being of beings” (resorting to the plural for the second in order to retain the distinction, and perhaps capitalizing the first for the same reason). But all the translations fail to resonate fully with the original words of the original thinkers.

Essential in reading *Being and Time* is that we keep remembering what it asks us to focus on: our being-there in its multifarious manifestations. Everything that then appears for our consideration takes its measure from our dealings with it, including what we see ourselves and others refashioning it to be (to appear) as on hand rather than at hand. What then do we make of the talk on p. 333 of *das nicht-daseinsmäßige Seiende*? — beings not taking their measure from being-there?

As being-in-world, being-there ex-sists factually with and near inner-worldly encountered things. For this reason, the being of being-there receives its comprehensive ontological transparency only within the horizon of the clarified being of beings not taking their measure from being-there, and this also means: the being of what, not at hand and not on hand, only “subsists.”

Heidegger has elsewhere remarked that fully effective artworks may serve as guides: great cathedrals, great plays, great paintings, great works of contemplation. These do not take their measure from being-there, they rather measure our being there (and, as a consequence, take the measure of each of us capable of entering into them). With such works in mind — as beings, as things, as flashes in the pan that keep flashing — I highlight what’s only penumbral in the German suffix *-mäßige*, the sense of measure, a word recalling the ancient and ever-recurring debate over the dictum that “man is the measure of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not.” Be it remembered, though, that being-there is a phenomenon, a being, in its own right, already suffused with measures to which we, as individuals and as communities must own up; if Heidegger’s work enters this debate, it is as a third party.

So is translation essentially distortive of the original? Pointless, hopeless, worthless, thankless? No more so than just reading the original. Indeed, native speakers of German do not enjoy any remarkable advantage (perhaps they will less likely be waylaid by *Zeitigung*, but they are even more likely to be waylaid by *Gerede*). Indeed, the advantage we German-reading non-natives have is that we must immediately triangulate to focus more conscientiously on what the original is asking us to address. To approximate this advantage of ours, natives would have to translate the German into a second language and then discuss among themselves which resonances to retain and which to forgo.